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INTRODUCTION 
This study identifies and evaluates the effects of tenure forms 
and instruments on efficient resource use and capital formation as 
related to operator entrant farms. The emphasis is on explaining how 
and why tenure forms and instruments impede or facilitate operator 
entry into farming and progress of the entrant farm firm toward control 
over a resource mix which earns at least its opportunity cost. The 
study is located in North Central Iowa, and includes a planning period 
which begins January 1, 1962 and ends December 31, 1981. The planning 
period is broken down into 4 5-year decision intervals. Results are 
obtained for each interval on individual entrant farms through the 
application of an analytical model which employs quadratic programming 
and techniques of simulation. Data requirements of the analytical model 
were obtained through (1) personal interview with each operator entrant, 
(2) entrant farm firm account books extending over a 5 year interval, 
beginning January 1, 19&2 and ending December 31, 19&6, and (3) farm 
management planning guides as well as other pertinent sources of data. 
The entrant farm firm includes at least one operator who started 
farming during the period from January 1, 1950 to December 31, 1961. 
The entrant operator had to be at least 21 years of age by the end of 
this period, and had to be employed at least 10 months per year on the 
farm over the 5 year interval from January 1, 1962 to December 31, 1966. 
The entrant farm firm is referred to as a sole proprietorship, 
partnership or corporation. These are forms of business organizations 
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which are identified in this study as tenure forms. Given a tenure 
form, the firm obtains control over productive assets and variable 
inputs through tenure instruments which are identified as (1) owner­
ship, (2) credit, (3) leasing contracts and (4) forward conditional 
sale contracts as related to selected variable inputs. For a given 
tenure form interrelationships between tenure instruments produce tenure 
arrangements. 
Tenure forms perform both legal and economic roles. Legally, the 
role of the tenure form is to provide a structural framework for the 
conduct of economic activity by firms, i.e. tenure forms are legal 
formats under which farm firms acquire and organize resource inputs, 
and transform them into outputs. Tenure instruments have developed 
from, and perform economic roles, within the structural framework of 
tenure forms. Tenure forms are the framework of business organizations 
whereas tenure instruments perform functions within the framework that 
permit operator(s) or decision maker of the firm to obtain control 
over productive assets and variable inputs, making economic activity 
possible. Tenure forms establish the methods of sharing (1) control 
over the productive assets, (2) risk and (3) profit, among participants 
within the firm.^ Tenure instruments establish the methods by which 
the firm is able to obtain productive assets and variable Inputs from 
resource owners outside the firm, and the manner and degree to which 
the firm and these individual resource owners share control, risk 
^The firm organized under sole proprietorship contains only one 
member. Thus, within the firm itself, the operator assumes all the 
control, risk and profit. 
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and profit. 
Other factors which aid or obstruct the economic roles of tenure 
forms and instruments are identified as (1) savings accruing from non-
farm income earned by operator entrants or their wives, (2) family 
assistance involving gifts, credit, inheritance and machine use and 
(3) real and personal property taxation. 
The study was developed within the NC-53 project statement (73) 
which delineated "the identification of functions of tenure arrangements 
in retrospect and in prospect" as the responsibility of phases B and C 
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of NC-53. The scope of the study is delimited to identifying, examining 
and measuring the effects of alternative tenure forms, instruments and 
factors on efficient resource use and capital formation over a 20 year 
period which begins January 1, 1962 and ends December 31, 1981. 
The Problematic Situation 
The U.S. is experiencing sustained growth of per capital real income 
but, at the same time, is confronted with the problem of low farm income. 
Although real income is increasing for the U.S. national economy, Boyne 
2 
NC-53 is a North Central regional project involving the cooperating 
efforts of 13 North Central State Agricultural Experiment Stations, the 
Farm Economics Research Division of the Economics Research Service, the 
State Experiment Stations Division of the Agricultural Research Services, 
USDA, and the Farm Foundation. The project concerned "needed adjustments 
in land tenure to meet changing agricultural conditions." Phase A of 
NC-53 concerned efficient organization of the agricultural industry for 
the North Central region in 1980, The present study uses the knowledge 
resulting from phase A as criteria in testing tenure forms and instru­
ments as means employed by the entrant farm firm to gain control of a 
resource mix which earns at least its opportunity cost. 
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has observed that "absolute real incomes of farm families have increased 
only about one-third as fast as real incomes of all families," over the 
period (which he studied), 1948 to 1963 (13, p. 1223). Further, he 
observed that "75 per cent of farmer and farm manager families were in 
the lowest 40 per cent of income receiving units in the U.S." Heady 
et al. (42) have shown that the economic roots of the low farm income 
problem are: too many resource inputs and resource fixity. Kaldor and 
Saupe (63) corroborate these conclusions by showing that at a point in 
time labor and capital inputs must flow out of the farm sector while, 
at the same time, capital must flow into the individual farm bringing 
about an- increase in farm size in terms of capital and land, if the 
resource mix within farms and within the farm sector is to earn its 
opportunity cost. Over time, the Kaldor-Saupe study implies substitution 
of capital and land for labor which reflects optimally efficient economic 
development and growth of per capita real income on farms through 
•7 
advancing technological knowledge; it establishes 1980 economic targets 
in terms of resource earnings as well as the resource mix of land, labor 
and capital which are adjusted for use as bench marks in this study. 
Current failure of resource earnings to equal or exceed resource 
opportunity costs on the majority of farm units implies the existence 
^Technological knowledge (which has developed exogenously of the 
farm firm) includes innovations of a mechanical and biological nature 
as well as improvements in farmer management and practices resulting 
from innovations in farmer education and means of disseminating 
technical information. Technological knowledge has altered the eco­
nomic organization of transforming inputs into outputs by reducing 
costs or increasing output per unit of input, in order for firms to 
take advantage of technological knowledge, greater amounts of capital 
are required. 
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of a gap between the optimally efficient rate of growth of per capita 
real income and the actual rate, indications are that the gap will 
widen over time unless it is possible for entrant farm firms to acquire 
control over more capital and land through tenure arrangements that 
currently prevail. Among other things, this study tests the extent to 
which prevailing tenure arrangements make it possible for the individual 
entrant farm firm to acquire enough capital and land to create a resource 
mix which earns at least its opportunity cost. 
Problems of breaking capital barriers 
The operator entrant himself is confronted with the problem of 
breaking at least the lowest capital barrier to entry through farm 
earnings and aids to entry. These aids are identified and classified as 
(1) savings from nonfarm employment and (2) family assistance received 
by the entrant. It is implied that entry into farming as a full time 
operator does not occur instantaneously. The entrant successfully breaks 
the lowest capital barrier to entry only when he is able to accumulate 
operating equity in productive assets. The magnitude of this capital 
barrier is dependent on the choice of tenure form and related instruments 
as well as the amount of equity invested in productive assets of the 
firm by other participating operator(s) and nonoperator(s) within the 
firm itself; breaking it is dependent on farm earnings as well as aids 
to entry. Ceteris paribus, sole proprietorships would induce the highest 
capital barrier to entry since, by definition, it contains no other 
participants within the firm. Consequently, under sole proprietorships, 
aids to entry should be important means in breaking the capital barrier 
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to entry. 
The entrant farm firm, as organized under a given tenure form, is 
confronted with the problem of breaking the lowest equity barrier to 
gaining control over a resource mix that earns at least its opportunity 
cost through (1) accumulation of operating equity in productive assets 
and (2) the use of alternative tenure instruments in obtaining additional 
productive assets and variable inputs. When the entrant farm firm 
successfully breaks th)s equity barrier tenure engendered imperfections 
(which impede the breaking of the barrier) would be minimized. 
This study is primarily concerned with the entrant farm firm's 
problem of breaking the lowest equity barrier to gaining control over a 
resource mix that earns at least its opportunity cost through prevailing 
tenure arrangements. Since aids to entry are important factors not 
only in breaking the lowest capital barrier to entry but also the lowest 
equity barrier to optimal resource efficiency (after satisfactory entry 
occurs), the study also tests the effects of aids to entry on attainment 
of a resource mix which earns at least its opportunity cost. 
Problem of conflîctîng goals 
Associated with the problems of the operator entrant and the entrant 
farm firm in obtaining enough capital is the problem of conflicting 
goals. Although growth of per capita real income appears to be an im­
portant goal, it also appears in conflict with the goal of owning and 
operating a family type farm. Since the era of free land ended, tra­
ditional ownership patterns have emerged; they are based on the belief 
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that an entrant into farming should be able to establish ownership over 
the productive assets of the farm firm sometime within his life cycle 
(22). However, adherence to this belief raises the equity barrier to 
optimal resource efficiency, postponing the attainment of a resource mix 
earning at least its opportunity cost. This implies a sacrifice in 
income and efficient resource use in order to achieve non income goals. 
Apparently there is a social welfare trade off, if the effects of ad­
hering or not adhering to traditional ownership patterns were known. 
This study is not concerned directly with this social welfare trade off, 
but it is concerned with identifying and measuring economic effects of 
alternative tenure arrangements in relation to how and why they impede 
or facilitate economic incentives and capital formation in a dynamic 
setting. Accordingly, If tenure arrangements are related to nonincome 
goals, it is possible that results may provide a basis for determining 
a social welfare trade off, assuming subjective weights could be attached. 
Objectives of the Study 
The central theme is to identify and evaluate how and why tenure 
forms and instruments impede or facilitate operator entry and progress 
of the entrant farm firm toward control over a resource mix which earns 
at least its opportunity cost. This theme is pursued through two major 
objectives: 
1. To test tenure forms and instruments in terms of their 
inhibiting and facilitating affects on gaining control 
over resources and on using these resources efficiently as 
related to entrant farm firms studied In North Central Iowa. 
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2. To discern and develop or indicate adjustments in tenure 
forms and instruments which facilitate (a) successful farm 
entry, (b) gaining control over resources and (c) using 
these resources efficiently. 
These two major objectives are dependent on the development of the 
essential characteristics of tenure forms and instruments as well as 
the evaluation of them in terms of the ways they engender imperfections 
that impede farm entry and attainment of optimal resource efficiency by 
entrant farm firms. 
Associated with the central theme are other factors (pp. 2-3). 
These other factors are evaluated in terms of how and why they aid or 
obstruct the economic roles of tenure forms and instruments. The 
relationships of other factors to the central theme of the study are 
identified and evaluated by pursuing two minor objectives: 
1. To determine the nature and magnitudes of aids to entry 
and their affects on the optimal formation and use of 
resources controlled by the entrant farm firm. 
2. To determine the nature and magnitudes of real and 
personal property taxes and their affects on the optimal 
formation and use of resources controlled by the entrant 
farm firm. 
Hypotheses Directing Inquiry 
This study is guided by two types of explanatory hypotheses: 
1. Diagnostic hypotheses compatible with theory of the firm 
under selected conditions of imperfect knowledge were 
formulated and utilized in explaining how and why tenure 
forms and instruments can engender imperfections that 
impede entry into farming, and attainment of optimal 
resource efficiency. 
2. Working hypotheses compatible with diagnostic hypotheses 
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were formulated and utilized in achieving the objectives 
of the study. 
Both types of hypotheses serve as directors of inquiry into theory 
of the firm and previous empirical research as required in developing a 
framework for empirical analysis. Diagnostic hypotheses are stated as 
fol lows: 
1. Tenure engendered aversion to uncertainty of expected net 
income raises risk allowances attached to net product 
prices, assuming that costs and technological knowledge 
are known with perfect certainty. It is presumed that 
aversion to uncertainty of expected net income is 
dependent on the firm's debt/equity ratio in productive 
inventory assets. As the debt/equity ratio rises the 
chance of firm survival declines unless aversion to un­
certainty of expected net income rises pari passu with the 
debt/equity ratio. If aversion to uncertainty of expected 
net income alters relative net product prices, then re­
sources are not utilized efficiently by the firm. It 
follows that expected net income will be reduced as well 
as the growth of operating equity in productive assets of 
the firm. Tenure forms and instruments in alternative 
arrangements are presumed to affect differently the degree 
of risk aversion attached to uncertainty of expected net 
returns. 
2. Tenure engendered limitations on economic planning horizons 
raise investment costs of productive activities and lowers 
net product prices. These limitations on economic planning 
horizons are dependent on the terms associated with alterna­
tive leasing contracts. It is presumed that alternative 
leasing arrangements are based on a one year agreement 
without compensation from the lessor to the lessee for un­
used resources invested by the lessee in land or attached 
improvements. The lessor is assumed to make improvements 
only if they correspondingly increase the value of land. 
It is further presumed that the length of the planning 
horizon associated with a given arrangement is known with 
perfect certainty. It is assumed that a given arrangement 
is renewable with perfect certainty but whether or not it 
is renewable with the same resource owners is assumed to 
be known with perfect uncertainty. Thus, risk attached to 
the planning horizon is assumed away. If a firm has more 
than one leasing contract, it follows that the firm maxi­
mizes expected net income, at a point in time, in relation 
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to productive activities, that produce the same products, 
which may be associated with different length planning 
horizons. 
3. Tenure engendered lack of operating capital causes intra-
firm opportunity cost for labor to decline. This makes 
labor using-capital saving productive activities more 
profitable. Although resources may be utilized and 
organized efficiently within the firm, they are not from 
the viewpoint of society, because the firm is not earning 
opportunity costs for its resources as related to resource 
efficiency. Lack of operating capital is dependent on the 
terms associated with alternative leasing contracts, forms 
of credit and forward conditional sale contracts. If 
terms associated with credit forms and conditional sale 
contracts are based on security interests in chattels 
rather than productivity, then they would engender lack 
of operating capital. Further, if leasing contracts are in­
flexible and fail to respond to the firm's (lessee) economic 
level of operating capital, they also engender lack of 
operating capital. 
4. Tenure engendered changes in relative prices to individual 
resource owners cause lack of equivalence among income 
objectives of these resource owners. Perfect resource 
efficiency is not obtained unless relative prices to indi­
vidual resource owners are the same, if the firm contains 
more than one participant as in the case of partnership or 
corporation, the firm's decisions may not optimize the 
income objectives of the participants. The partnership is 
based on "one member one vote". If the partners do not 
share productive contributions and profit in relation to 
voting power, then relative prices or weights to the indi­
vidual partners are not all the same. The corporation can 
specify a set planning period. Since there is no trading 
market for share capital In farm corporations, this could 
(depending on management) lock dividend earnings into the 
farm business which could be contrary to the income 
objectives of nonfarm members of the corporation. If the 
firm has arrangements with resource owners outside the 
firm as in the case of alternative lessor-lessee arrangements, 
the firm's decisions may not optimize income objectives of 
the firm and these resource owners. This arises whenever 
(a) inputs and outputs are shared in differing proportions 
and (b) economic relationships are fixed to a point in time. 
Leasing contracts fix economic relationships. In order to 
make economic adjustments, it is presumed that both the 
firm and resource owners outside the firm desire flexible 
leasing arrangements as facilitated by a one year agreement. 
11 
Working hypotheses formulated for achieving the two major objectives 
are: 
1. (a) For a given tenure form, it is hypothesized that 
prevailing tenure instruments (which establish the 
methods by which the firm is able to obtain pro­
ductive assets and variable inputs from resource 
owners outside the firm, and the degree to which the 
firm and these resource owners share control, risk 
and profit) provide a continuum of arrangements that 
cause the breaking of equity barriers to gaining 
control over a resource mix which earns at least its 
opportunity cost in relation to growth of the entrant 
farm firm's operating equity in productive assets 
over the period January 1, 1962 to December 31, 1981. 
(b) For a given tenure form, it is hypothesized that if 
prevailing tenure instruments provide a continuum 
of arrangements that do not cause the breaking of 
equity barriers to gaining control over a resource 
mix which earns at least its opportunity cost in 
relation to growth of the entrant farm firm's 
operating equity in productive inventory assets 
over the period January 1, 1962 to December 31, 1981, 
then it is because of overcapitalization of land. 
Overcapitalization implies that land resource owners 
transfer some nonland earnings to land and capitalize 
the resulting amount into land value through the 
land market. Because of the high value of land, it 
is likely that entrant farm firm ownership of land 
would represent a small proportion of the total land 
they operate. Thus, if land resource owners outside 
the firm do not pass on the extra costs resulting 
from overcapitalization, then entrant farm firms may 
attain optimal resource efficiency. To the extent 
that land resource owners outside the firm are able 
to pass on these extra costs to the entrant farm firm 
through tenure instruments, it represents the value 
placed on farming by entrant farm firms. 
(c) For a given tenure form, it is hypothesized that as 
the entrant farm firm's operating equity in productive 
assets increases, greater control, risk and profit is 
assumed by the firm through substituting capital using-
labor saving productive activities for labor using-
capital saving activities, and expanding the scale of 
operations. It follows that the firm would employ 
higher levels of technological knowledge in producing 
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its products, and would seek tenure instruments 
that featured less sharing of inputs and outputs 
with resource owners outside the firm. This implies 
that as equity in productive assets increases, 
tenure imperfections decline and attainment of 
optimal resource efficiency is possible. 
(d) For a given tenure form, it is hypothesized that if 
the entrant farm firm attaches preference to some 
tenure instruments and, at the same time, excludes 
others from the feasible set of instruments, it is 
likely to reduce expected net income and growth of 
operating equity in productive assets as well as 
postpone, or make impossible, attainment of optimal 
resource efficiency. 
2. (a) It is hypothesized that forward conditional sale 
contracts as used in gaining control over variable 
inputs are complementary with forms of credit, if 
the security required under the terms of these 
contracts is based on future farm output rather than 
farm chattels. 
(b) It is hypothesized that lengthening repayment schedules 
and lowering down payments, as associated with long 
term financing of land purchases, as well as extending 
100 per cent credit on equity in land for purchase 
of additional land are complementary with other forms 
of credit and forward conditional sale contracts. 
Working hypotheses formulated for achieving the two minor objectives 
are: 
1. It is hypothesized that aids to entry are an integral part 
of entry processes which involve the selection of tenure 
forms and related instruments. It is presumed that aids to 
entry have a positive affect on the breaking of the capital 
barrier to entry and attainment of optimal resource ef­
ficiency; they are most likely to diminish in magnitude 
and relative importance once the capital barrier to entry 
has been successfully broken. 
2. It is hypothesized that real and personal property taxation 
assessed against entrant farm firms exceeds its economic 
benefits to the firm because (a) entrant farm firms whose 
taxable assets are likely to be encumbered pay taxes not on 
the equity in the assets but on the assessed value of them 
and (b) the amount of these taxes earmarked for education 
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exceeds its equitable share. If these taxes obstruct 
attainment of optimal resource efficiency, then the 
objective becomes one of determining the effects of 
altering the nature and magnitudes of these taxes on 
attainment of optimal resource efficiency. 
Procedures for Achieving the Objectives 
through Testing Hypotheses 
For a given tenure form, instruments for producing products are 
translated into a set of constrained variables or—activities. The model 
minimizes tenure imperfections through maximizing the entrant farm firm's 
expected net income when allowances for risk, as attached to uncertain 
net income expectations, are included. It employs a truncated minimax 
objective function subject to linear constraints (102). This objective 
function involves the maximizing of expected net income and simultaneously 
the minimizing of risk when the level of risk aversion is given. Expected 
net income is assumed to be inversely related to risk aversion. This is 
based on the behavioral assumption that the marginal utility of expected 
net income diminishes as risk increases. The degree of risk aversion 
is measured by the debt/equity ratio of the firm's productive inventory 
assets. 
The period over which the rr.odel operates is 20 years, beginning 
January 1, 1962 and ending December 31, 1981. The period is broken down 
into 4 5-year intervals. Interval k, where k = 1, 2, 3, or 4, is de­
pendent on interval k-1, but interval k-1 is assumed to be independent 
of interval k. Accordingly, the model is one-way recursive, in effect, 
] k  
the model determines the optimal expected net Income, the optimal plan 
for production and the optimal use of tenure instruments for one year 
within Interval k-1. Economic decisions are assumed to be static over 
interval k-1. A simulator interpolates within interval k-1 and it 
updates the supply levels of the resource and product constraints to 
Interval k. - " 
Risk aversion Is determined for each Interval k-1 through another 
simulator, and It is constant within each interval but variable over 
intervals. 
The model handles contributions from and payments to resource 
owners outside the entrant farm firm according to the methods and terms 
specified by alternative tenure Instruments. It pays resource owners 
within the firm in terms of net returns to (1) equity in productive 
inventory assets and (2) labor-management. All other resources are paid 
opportunity cost. By estimating opportunity cost for equity in pro­
ductive assets as well as labor-management, the resource mix can be 
evaluated in terms of whether or not it earns at least its opportunity 
cost. 
The model contains bench marks for land and labor. These are 
handled as upper bound constraints In the amount of land and labor 
controlled by the entrant farm firm. These bench marks were taken from 
phase A of NC-53 (64) and adjusted In accordance to (1) the time period 
over which this model operates and (2) the number of full time operators 
within a given firm. 
Data required by the model were obtained through (1) personal 
interview with each operator entrant, (2) entrant farm firm account 
books extending over a 5 year interval, beginning January 1, 1962 and 
ending December 31, 1966, (3) farm management planning guides and (4) 
other pertinent sources of data which include results of phase A of 
NC-53. 
Data were organized, synthesized and projected at 5 year intervals 
as required by the model to test hypotheses associated with objectives. 
Organization of the Study — 
Chapter 1 introduces the study through (l) delimiting the problem, 
(2) stating objectives, (3) formulating hypotheses directing the inquiry 
and (4) indicating the procedures to be developed and utilized in 
achieving objectives through testing hypotheses. 
Chapter 2 develops the framework for analysis based on theory of 
the firm under selected conditions of imperfect knowledge, and analyzes 
tenure forms and instruments in terms of the ways they engender imper­
fections that affect attainment of an optimal resource mix. 
Chapter 3 develops the model through (l) specifying the method of 
solution, (2) translating tenure instruments and ways of producing 
products into constrained activities, (3) adapting the model to time by 
means of simulators, (4) coordinating the parts of the model by means 
of a main computer program and (5) establishing the format for results 
and adjustments in results as required for testing hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 operationalizes the model through developing procedures 
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for obtaining, organizing, synthesizing and projecting data as required 
by the model for testing hypotheses. It identifies the assumptions 
underlying these procedures. 
Chapter 5 reports on the tests of hypotheses. It examines the 
continuum of tenure arrangements as means in facilitating successful 
farm entry and in achieving a resource mix which earns at least its 
opportunity cost in terms of tests of hypotheses. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the study and provides inferences for further 
research. 
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FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF TENURE FORMS, 
INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER FACTORS 
Economic activity is motivated by income incentives. In pursuing 
these incentives, the firm accepts the role of the decision maker who 
maximizes net income when given a set of prices and a set of technical 
production functions. The decision maker may comprise more than one 
individual but all individuals must act, and react, with singularity 
of purpose in maximizing net income for the firm. The greatest possible 
profit occurs when the firm is in general equilibrium in which case 
each resource earns its highest opportunity cost. This is possible for 
any farm firm, as it exists in the U.S. agricultural sector, if it is 
assumed to be confronted with (l) a perfectly elastic supply of inputs, 
and demand for products, (2) perfect knowledge of market prices, and 
technical input-output relationships and (3) perfect institutions termed 
tenure forms and instruments in this study. Accordingly, if the farm 
firm was confronted with all of these conditions then it would be possi­
ble for it to attain optimal formation and use of resources for pro­
duction of farm products. 
Development of the Hicksian Risk Allowance 
Hicks (47) introduced uncertain income expectations, resulting 
from imperfect knowledge, into theory of the firm through discounting of 
general prices. Technological knowledge in terms of productivity, costs 
and physical input-output relationships is assumed to be known in this 
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study. Accordingly, the Hicksian approach to discounting general prices 
can be applied to net prices. This implies that the decision maker needs 
only discount net product prices in order to maximize net income under 
uncertain net income expectations. 
Hicks distinguishes between the representative expected price and 
the most probable price. We can do the same in terms of net prices. 
The representative net product price is the most probable net product 
price minus an allowance for risk as attached to uncertain net price 
expectations (47, pp. 125-126). This risk allowance is developed into 
an objective criterion. For sake of simplicity, first assume a one-
product world (j=l) and second that observable net product prices (c.^), 
adjusted for productivity trends, are normally distributed over time 
with the mean (y) and variance (o^) as parameters. Graphically, we show 
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from which we can define the representative net product price as a 
function of the mean net price minus the standard deviation of observed 
net prices times the absolute value of a subjective risk aversion 
factor, m. Before defining m, translate representative net product 
price into representative net income. Since our product is produced 
under technical conditions that are known with perfect certainty, then 
our one productive activity (x) is dependent only on net prices. This 
is translated to n-dimensional product world by assuming that all net 
product prices are normally distributed with parameters y. and a?. Net 
product prices are not independent so covariances exist. We can 
now define: (102) 
f(x) = C'X - m(X'VX)*  (2.1) 
where C' and X are n-dimensional vectors, and V is the variance-covariance 
matrix of net product prices and (X'VX)^ is the standard deviation of 
4 
net income. By maximizing 2.1 subject to given linear technical input-
output relationships as well as resource and product constraints and 
economic feasibility conditions, the following risk programming problem 
is defined: 
max. f(x) = C'X - m(X'VX)^ (2.1) 
AX < b (2.2) 
X > 0 (2.3) 
The objective function 2,1 is nonlinear and convex in shape, but is 
homogenous of degree 1. Since 2.2 forms a set of linear restraints, if 
4 
V is positive semi défini te. 
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the origin is not a maximizer, then all possible maximizers (as associ­
ated with alternative values of m) of 2.1 on 2.2 are formed on the 
boundary of production possibilities as formed by 2.2 (102, p. 216). 
This includes all linear segments as well as corner points formed by 
2.2. For a known m, we observe, in figure 1, the tangency of the 
objective function to linear restraints for a 2 product world. In this 
figure, a corner point is not a maximizer. The optimal solution is at 
X . 
Implications of risk aversion 
The risk aversion factor, m, is the amount of confidence or degree 
of probability by which most probable net income is likely to exceed the 
representative net income. Thus, m is the trade off price between 
expected net income and risk acceptance, its value (when known) is 
directly related to the cumulative probability of the normal variate, z. 
For example, if - m = 1.64, then this expresses 95 per cent confidence 
that most probable net income will exceed representative net income. 
For values of m < 0, it implies that the decision maker is a risk 
averter. Since m £ 0, for all decision makers as related to this study, 
we take its absolute value for injection into the risk programming 
model. This would not be necessary if we altered the V matrix from 
positive semidefinite to negative semidefinite. 
The risk aversion factor, m, is generally considered to have a 
finite number of values. Corresponding maximizers of 2.1 on 2.2 form a 
set of efficient combinations of expected net income and risk acceptance 
as illustrated by curve A in figure 2. Consequently, the final choice 
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Figure 1. Hypothetical illustration of maximum net income under given 
aversion to risk of uncertain net income expectations 
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Figure 2. Hypothetical illustration of the decision maker's best 
choice of efficient alternative expected net income -
risk acceptance combinations resulting from finite 
values of m as m approaches zero " 
is dependent on the individual decision maker who is assumed to have an 
indifference system (40, p. 557), i.e. he obtains greater utility from 
higher expected net income or lower risk. The best choice is at the 
point where his highest indifference curve (l^) is tangent to the set 
of efficient combinations of expected net income and risk acceptance. 
At this point we know the value of m for that particular decision maker. 
The indifference curves are convex because they are based on the be­
havioral relationship that the marginal utility of expected net income 
diminishes as risk increases. 
Defining risk aversion = the debt/equity ratio 
It is presumed that decision makers avoid risk in order to increase 
the chance of firm survival. Further, it is assumed that firm survival 
depends on the debt-equity structure of the firm's productive inventory 
assets. Accordingly, we suppose that the value of m is equal to the 
debt to equity ratio of corresponding productive inventory assets. This 
implies that the trade off price between expected net income and risk 
acceptance is the debt/equity ratio, as illustrated in figure 3. For a 
given production situation such as that described by the curve BC, 
expected net income will vary depending on the debt-equity structure 
under which resources are organized. If the amount of debt owing on 
productive inventory assets were large in comparison to corresponding 
market value, then we may describe this situation by dg/e^. At this 
level of debt/equity, the corresponding expected net income is (ENl)^. 
The difference between (ENl)^ and B represents the sacrifice in net 
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Figure 3. Hypothetical illustration of the trade off between 
expected net income and risk aversion as determined by 
the debt/equity ratio in productive inventory assets 
for a given production situation 
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Income în order to achieve cumulative probability, as related to 
amount of confidence by which expected net income is likely to exceed 
representative net income or f(x). For d^/e^, the sacrifice in net 
income is the difference between (ENI)^ and B. The nature of curve BC 
implies increasing marginal rate of sacrifice in expected net income as 
risk aversion increases. Thus, there is a proportionately smaller 
sacrifice in expected net income for lower risk aversion than for higher 
risk aversion. 
The flatness of curve BC for lower values of risk aversion implies 
that expected net income declines less quickly then representative net 
income, f(x). For example, observe the hypothetical relationships 
between f(x) and expected net income for alternative values of d/e in 
figure 4. For d/e = 0, the relationship is a one to one correspondence, 
but for d/e >0 it is not one to one. However, it is only when the risk 
aversion factor reaches a value of 0.84 that expected net income is 
sacrificed, i.e. the difference between (ENI)^ and B. Thus, for lower 
values of d/e, alternative maximizers of 2.1 on 2,2 are likely to provide 
the same expected net income. This implies stability of expected net 
income, as productive activities are organized to minimize risk while 
increasing confidence in the probable outcomes. It also implies that 
minor imperfections of tenure engendered aversion to uncertainty of 
expected net income will have negligible effects in impeding optimal 
formation, and use, of resources. However, the converse of this is true 
for large imperfections which raise d/e to larger values. 
Knight (65) established that profit was a function of uncertainty 
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f(x) 
j/e = 0.253 
d/e = 0.84 
(ENl) 
d/e = 1.64 
Expected net income 
Figure 4. Hypothetical illustration that for lower values of the risk 
aversion factor alternative maximizers of 2.1 on 2.2 are 
likely to provide the same expected net income 
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or risk attached to uncertain income expectations. In figure 3, for 
example, if the risk aversion factor was as large as point C, then profit 
or expected net income would be zero. Only when the decision maker can 
assume some risk is profit possible. Although risk aversion as developed 
in this study is only part of a broader set of relations concerning risk 
(37, pp. 439-464), it is believed to be a reasonable approach when firm 
survival may be in question. 
Evaluation of Tenure Forms, Instruments 
and Other Factors 
The organizational set: tenure forms 
5 
Tenure forms refer only to alternative forms of business organi­
zation.^ These alternative forms were delimited to an organizational 
set of sole proprietorship, partnership and corporation. 
Sole proprietorship This is the most common form of business 
organization in the U.S. farming industry. It involves a single operator 
who typically makes all or nearly all of the decisions concerning pro­
curement, organization and transformation of resource inputs into outputs. 
The degree of control or decision making power as well as risk assumed 
by the operator depend on tenure instruments and the level of operator's 
^Tenure, per se, refers to the way in which assets are held. 
^From a strictly legal viewpoint, tenure forms are "uniquely and 
singularly identified as sole proprietorships, cooperatives, general 
or limited partnerships, joint ventures, trusts, joint stock companies, 
or corporations" (32, p. 4) in which the finite structural framework 
of one is not entirely mutually exclusive of the others. 
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equity. The degree and type of tenure imperfection as well as the 
lowest capital barrier to entry depend on the structure of tenure instru­
ments and the ways that these instruments are combined and employed in 
acquiring resources. There are no inherent imperfections in sole 
proprietorship itself. 
Partnership It is "an association of two or more persons to 
carry on as coowners a business for profit", i.e. whether or not the 
farm assets are owned by the partnership, the partners are coowners of 
the "farming business as distinguished from its physical assets" (8, 
p. 146). The partnership is based on the concept of "one member one 
vote" and legally implies equal sharing of productive contributions and 
profit among partners of the firm. The contributions are based on 
the value of labor and management as well as the flow value of assets. 
Accordingly, the legal format would motivate a 50/50 sharing ar­
rangement between partners of a two member partnership. For suppose 
two partners mutually agree on a 60/40 sharing arrangement and further 
suppose they come to some eventual disagreement and legal settlement of 
the partnership is necessary, the law would discriminate the larger 
contributor by forcing profit to be shared 50/50 as a result of basing 
its decision on "one member one vote". This implies that the smaller 
contributor could dominate the decision making processes by threat of 
legal settlement. Presumably, such a possibility encourages partner­
ships to equalize contributions among the partners. This is achieved 
by not including some of the assets of members holding the greatest 
vyealth of assets. Assets or the flow value of assets which are not 
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committed to the partnership may be leased by the partnership. As the 
member holding the smaller amount of assets accumulates equity, the 
members can increase their contributions by the same amount and maintain 
the original ratios. This increases the complexity of business records. 
Also, if there are imperfections in leasing, then the procedure of 
equalizing contributions among the partners would not serve to minimize 
total tenure imperfections. Furthermore, the partners are personally 
liable for debts of the partnership. Consequently, equalization of 
contributions among partners is partially defeated, if the partnership 
has not enough marketable assets to meet debt obligations should dis­
solution of the partnership become necessary. The failure of the legal 
format of partnership to acknowledge a continuous one to one corre­
spondence from voting power to sharing arrangement engenders lack of 
equivalence of the income objective of one partner with another. 
The basing of partnership on the concept of "one member one vote" 
generates complexity, conflicts of interest and instability when partners 
hold differing amounts of asset wealth. This is further augmented by 
the lack of provision in the legal format for setting of a time period 
under which the partnership is obligated to operate. A further aug­
menting factor is the ease with which dissolution of the partnership 
can occur, i.e. simply by request of one of the partners. Clearly, these 
factors limit the planning horizon and they induce the partnership to 
avoid all investments having payoffs extending beyond the limited 
planning horizon. 
The legal format of the partnership provides no limited liability 
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feature among partners. Accordingly, partners are motivated to carry 
partner liability insurance. This reduces the firm's operating capital 
and, inasmuch as this affects the use of resources, methods of pro­
duction and risk aversion, creates tenure imperfection by engendering 
lack of operating capital. 
In view of the preceding analysis, partnership contains negative 
elements as related to imperfections, it is clearly an inferior tenure 
form unless partners have complete faith in each other and ignore the 
implications of the legal format, it is anticipated that this is likely 
to be the case when partners are members of the same family. 
The legal courts could remove the more serious negative elements 
of partnership by recognizing a continuous correspondence between 
voting power and sharing arrangement. Accordingly, partnership would 
contain positive elements as compared to sole proprietorship. First, 
it could be used in reducing the capital barrier to entry through 
modifying the ratios by which contributions and net income are shared. 
Second, it could be used to combine labor, management and asset wealth 
in facilitating efficient adjustment in resources and scale. For 
example, the farm operator approaching retirement may be employing too 
few labor and management resources in comparison to asset wealth. By 
forming a partnership with younger operator, it is possible that re­
sources would once again be put into economic balance. 
As in the case of sole proprietorship, the partnership involves 
the use of tenure instruments which can affect the degree of tenure 
imperfections. 
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Corporation The family operated farm corporation involves a 
small number of shareholders and is referred to as the small closely 
held corporation (32, 34). There are no income tax disadvantages as this 
type of corporation need not be treated as a tax payer (32, p. 142). 
Assets are valued in terms of equity and introduced into the corporation 
as stock on which basis net earnings are allocated. Voting is in pro­
portion to amount of stock. Thus, the decision making power is controlled 
by the largest grouping of stock. There is limited liability among 
stockholders and provision for a specified planning period. These 
features of the corporation were lacking in partnership. Accordingly, 
corporation is a superior form of business organization as compared to 
partnership. Harl concluded that "from an economic standpoint, the 
corporation represents a perfect or near perfect form of business organ­
ization for multimember farm firms". This is feasible because the 
"corporate firm is encouraged to allocate resources in accordance with 
efficiency criteria and to impute income to factors of production in 
accordance with economic theory of factor compensation" (34, p. 950). 
Although the corporation is considered to be near perfect on the 
basis of economic theory of the firm, it has never become a popular form 
of business organization. Harl (34, p. 933) estimated that approximately 
15,000 U.S. farms were organized as closely held corporations in 1964. 
This amounted to approximately 0.5 per cent of the total number of U.S. 
farms. Probable explanations for failure of many farm firms to employ 
the corporate form of tenure are based on the fact that there is no 
trading market for share capital of family operated farms. 
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1. The farm firm is dependent on the family for its equity. 
Although the corporation facilitates the investment of 
equity of all the family members, it can not easily acquire 
equity outside the family. Accordingly, the farm corpo­
ration is dependent on tenure instruments such as alternative 
leasing contracts, and forms of credit. To the extent that 
tenure instruments engender economic imperfections, the 
family operated corporation may also be imperfect. For 
example, if the corporation requires the use of large amounts 
of credit, it reduces the chance of firm survival and the 
corporate members may have to sign personally in order to 
provide security interest in the form of asset equity.7 
This partially defeats the limited liability feature of the 
corporation, and increases aversion to risk of uncertain 
income expectations. Clearly, the incentive to incorporate 
family assets declines as the degree and number of imper­
fections increase. 
2. The amount of equity stock and corresponding dividend 
earnings belonging to nonfarm family members of the corpo­
ration may be virtually locked into the farm firm for the 
duration of the specified planning period. This could be 
the case, if the operator(s) of the firm control the largest 
group of stock and choose to expand operations rather than 
purchase the stock of nonfarm members or distribute dividend 
earnings on stock. Although this facilitates economic 
development of the firm, it interferes with the ends-in-view 
of the nonfarm members. Accordingly, the incentive to in­
corporate the family assets further declines, perhaps to 
the extent that the amount of incentive remaining can be 
offset by the fixed costs and more complicated bookkeeping 
associated with incorporation of the family assets. 
In view of the implications of no trading market, the family operated 
farm corporation contains some negative elements. It is hypothesized 
that the implications concerning the locked in stock of nonfarm members 
are the most severe in discouraging incorporation of the family assets. 
If a public market dealing in share capital of family operated farm corpo­
rations could be introduced satisfactorily, then negative elements could 
If the members sign personally, it also provides creditors with 
the added assurance that members can in no way benefit by withdrawing 
equity from the corporation and declaring the corporation to be bankrupt. 
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be reduced. Further, if tenure instruments could be improved, negative 
elements would be reduced still more. 
Once the corporate form of tenure has been selected by a farm 
family, both entry and economic efficiency are facilitated. 
The control set: tenure instruments 
Tenure forms are the framework of business organizations whereas 
tenure instruments perform functions within the framework that permit 
operator(s) or decision maker of the entrant farm firm to obtain control 
of productive assets, making economic activity possible. These instru­
ments were grouped and identified (p. 2) as ownership, credit, leasing 
contracts and forward conditional sale contracts as related to selected 
variable inputs. 
Ownership Ownership refers to the purchasing of resource inputs 
by the firm. For convenience ownership is broken down into ownership 
inventory of productive fixed, working and liquid assets. Fixed assets 
refer to land, buildings and other attached improvements to land. 
Working assets refer to breeding stock as well as machinery and equipment. 
Liquid assets refer to salable livestock, grain and feed, supplies and 
other forms such as cash, bank account and redeemable bonds or cer­
tificates. 
The capital formation of assets makes economic activity possible. 
Ownership of the three types of assets is but one means of obtaining 
them. It is probably the most desirable means when equity and alterna­
tive forms of financing are related in such a way that economic balance 
of assets is achieved, and the chance of firm survival is not reduced. 
p. 
Ownership, per se, does not engender imperfections, it is the methods 
of obtaining ownership that engender imperfections. 
Credit Forms of credit facilitate some degree of ownership. 
They correspond, more or less, to the breakdown of ownership inventory. 
Long term credit facilitates the purchase of fixed assets (land and 
attached improvements), it was introduced into the farm industry as 
means to facilitate ownership in fixed assets, and founded on the concept 
of the owner operated family farm as organized under sole proprietorship. 
This restricted the life span of the farm firm to the life span of the 
farm operator. Consequently, the longest pos-'ble repayment schedule 
that can be negotiated between buyer and seller is bounded by the 
expected life span over which the farm operator can repay the debt. 
For a farm operator age 21, the longest possible repayment schedule 
would be under 50 years, assuming his retirement from farming is not 
extended beyond age 70. In view of the enlarging value of fixed assets 
required by the economic farm business, it is anticipated that 50 years 
is too short a time span for the majority of operator entrants to obtain 
ownership control over all the fixed assets. Furthermore, the use of 
long term credit is likely to engender risk aversion by enlarging the 
debt/equity ratio, and it is likely to engender lack of operating 
capital. Miller, Chryst and Ottoson support the hypothesis "that prior 
commitments to land purchases force restrictions in the use of capital 
services" (71, p. 328). They conclude that "the amount of capital used 
falls short of the amount that would be most profitable for the average 
owner operator farm". 
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To the extent that partnership and corporation forms of tenure 
facilitate the aggregation of larger amounts of family equity by in­
volving more than a single participant in the farm business, ownership 
of fixed assets and economic efficiency within the firm are both 
facilitated. Presumably, limited term, fixed asset financing could be 
arranged to always correspond with the life span of the youngest legal 
operator. However, unless the youngest legal operator had enough equity 
for satisfactory security of the loan, all the operating and nonoperating 
members of the partnership or corporation would be responsible for the 
ensuing debt. 
Long term credit involves the use of mortgages and land installment 
contracts. A mortgage is a security interest in land or real property 
(land plus attached improvements), and attached to it is a mortgage 
note representing debt obligation of the mortgagor to mortgagee (8, 
pp. 87-88; 33» p. 6). The mortgage is held by the mortgagee to assure 
performance of the mortgagor's obligations. The down payment and re­
payment schedule are negotiated between buyer (mortgagor) and seller 
(mortgagee). The land installment contract and differences in relation 
to the mortgage were summarized by Reynolds (82, p. 2-3). 
"The land contract is simply a written agreement between 
the buyer and the seller to transfer ownership of land. The 
buyer promises to pay the agreed purchase price in installment 
payments over a period of time. The buyer takes possession of 
the property and assumes the cost of property taxes, insurance 
and maintenance of improvements. Under the land contract the 
seller usually does not transfer legal title to the buyer until 
the last installment has been completed or until terms of the 
contract permit a shift to mortgage financing. Under a deed 
and mortgage the title passes to the buyer when the transaction 
is made. 
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"The down payment under a land contract is usually smaller 
than is normally required when a mortgage is used. Although a 
low down payment is legal in a sale with either a mortgage or a 
land contract, few sellers are willing to accept a low down 
payment under a mortgage arrangement, in the case of a default 
under a mortgage, expensive and complicated legal foreclosure 
proceedings may be necessary before the seller can regain title 
to the property. The defaulting buyer has a redemption period 
of one year. If the buyer makes good his default during this 
period, he is allowed to retain the farm. 
"If the land contract of the defaulted buyer contains a 
forfeiture clause, the seller can repossess the farm on 30 days 
notice through the inexpensive legal process of forfeiture. 
The seller simply gives written notice to the buyer that the 
land contract will be forfeited within 30 days if the buyer 
doesn't fulfill the provisions in default. If the buyer reme­
dies his default within the 30 day grace period, he can maintain 
his rights to the farm." 
As these alternative forms of long term credit are employed to 
facilitate ownership in fixed assets, they engender in varying degrees 
aversion to risk of uncertain income expectations and lack of operating 
capital. 
Reynolds' work indicated the down payment on the land installment 
contract to be about 20 per cent, and on mortgage about 40 per cent. 
However, the term of contract was usually less, than for a mortgage. He 
attributed this to seller's risk as attached to the receiving of a low 
down payment. This is likely to be the case when land prices remain 
either at the same level or decline, but when land prices are rising as 
they have been for the past 20 years, then seller's risk is negligible. 
The worst possible experience for the seller would be to receive the 
down payment and then become the fortuitous repossessor of the land in 
case of default, obtaining in addition to the down payment a capital 
gain on the value of the land. If land values are expected to continue 
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rising, then selling land under the land contract could become more 
desirable than under the mortgage. Accordingly, the contract term would 
increase, the down payment would decline and the interest rate would 
become lower than on the mortgage. Also, in an era of rising land prices, 
the down payment under mortgage is likely to decline, and refinancing 
of the mortgage is likely to become possible without recourse to second 
mortgage and corresponding higher interest rates. 
Buyer's risk is larger with the land contract than the mortgage. 
Until a shift to mortgage financing can be made, the buyer's built up 
equity in land under the land contract is not available for refinancing. 
This tends to maintain a higher debt/equity ratio in comparison to 
mortgage. This engenders aversion to risk. However, the larger down 
payment on the mortgage may engender lack of operating capital. Whether 
or not the higher debt/equity ratio of the contract would have a larger 
negative effect on expected net income than the larger down payment of 
the mortgage depends as much on the magnitude of the value of the debt/ 
equity ratio for the mortgage as on the change to a higher level for 
the contract (figures 3-4, pp. 24-26). 
Intermediate term credit facilitates working assets and it in­
volves the use of the chattel mortgage. Beuscher (8, p. 308) draws 
analogy between chattel mortgage and real property mortgage. Productive 
farm assets that are purchased through intermediate term credit usually 
include breeding stock, machinery and equipment or farm buildings as 
related to profitable livestock operations. The term of the chattel 
mortgage is free to be negotiated between buyer and seller or between 
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buyer and intermediary such as a bank or production credit association. 
Generally, the note obligation attached to the chattel mortgage involves 
a repayment schedule of more than one year but not more than three on 
breeding stock as well as machinery and equipment, and greater than three 
but not more than ten on farm buildings. Usually, chattel mortgages are 
not obtainable for new buildings or improvements to buildings unless the 
mortgagor has written or legal proof of security of tenure. Exceptions 
are possible were buildings are portable and productive use of their 
facilities indicates a large short run payoff. The down payment on 
breeding stock or machinery and equipment under the chattel mortgage is 
often negotiated to zero. This chattel preference of sellers encourages 
operator ownership of the working assets which enlarges the debt/equity 
ratio engendering aversion to risk of uncertain income expectations. 
Furthermore, it is likely that entrant farm firms which have little 
equity in liquid assets would be unable to obtain short term credit and 
accordingly, would be motivated to increase working assets through 
intermediate term credit as long as the margins were profitable. This 
serves to explain why entrant firms appear to have no shortage of 
machinery and equipment and why livestock operations include breeding 
activities. It is also likely that prior commitments to purchasing of 
working assets force restrictions in the use of short term credit that 
would otherwise be available. 
Short term credit (one year or less) involves the use of either 
the chattel mortgage or promissory note. Depending on the economic 
performance of the farm business and the past record of the debtor, the 
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promissory note which is a simple written promise to pay at a specified 
date may be deemed satisfactory by the creditor. If working assets are 
encumbered as a result of intermediate term credit, then short term 
credit becomes dependent on equity in liquid assets and the corresponding 
value of the security interest in alternative productive cropping and 
livestock activities. Under these circumstances, Iowa farm business 
consultants indicate: 
1. Short term credit for purchases of feeder livestock and 
feed supplements is dependent on the firm's uncommitted 
feed and grain resources. Presumably, if feed and grain 
are available on the farm as uncommitted inputs, then the 
security interest in livestock products is satisfactory. 
2. Short term credit for purchases of feed, grain and supple­
ments depend on unencumbered chattels for security interest. 
This implies that 1 precludes 2. 
3. Short term credit for purchases of cropping inputs such as 
seed, fertilizer, herbicides and insecticides is dependent 
on unencumbered chattels or uncommitted feed and grain 
resources for security interest. This implies that 1 
precludes 3. 
Although intermediate and short term forms of credit facilitate 
ownership in working and liquid assets, they engender economic imper­
fections through the placing of preference for security interest in 
assets over expected productivity of loans. This effectively reduces 
the supply of operating credit below the most profitable amount which 
engenders lack of operating capital. To the extent that these credit 
forms compete for security interest in assets, interactions arise which 
further engender lack of operating capital. Interactions could be 
reduced through arrangement of credit forms to pool the total supply of 
credit available in relation to security interest in working and liquid 
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assets of the firm. Presumably, the firm's decision maker would make 
the wisest choice of how to employ this pool of credit. 
Leasing contracts A farm lessor-lessee arrangement is based on 
the concept of transfer of control over some fixed or working assets 
from a landlord (lessor) to a tenant (lessee) over a mutually agreeable 
period of time in return for negot iated and specified rental  payments 
from tenant to landlord. This transfer of control is made possible by 
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a legal device called a farm lease. Hurlburt (51, p. 7) has summarized 
the essential characteristics of the farm lease. 
a lease is a contract between a landlord and a tenant 
concerning use of resources, for a given time period, and for 
a specified payment. The lease may be either written or oral 
The landlord may share in the cash operating expenses, 
the ownership of livestock, or provide the use of machinery 
and equipment; or he may furnish only land, with or without 
buildings and improvements." 
In view of this, a farm lease may approach the sharing character­
istics of the partnership. The distinguishing feature between the farm 
lease and the partnership is the transfer of control. For example, a 
partner as a landlord may transfer control of some of his assets to the 
partnership through a farm lease but he does not transfer control from 
himself to his partner, except inasmuch as the partnership now shares 
the control over these assets for a specified period of time. If a 
farm lease does not transfer control of any productive asset for a 
specified period of time, then the farm lease is essentially a partner­
ship agreement in which the landlord and tenant are partners. 
O 
The economic functions of a lease are to provide a basis for com­
bining resources in production and to distribute income to resource 
owners (51, p. 8). 
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In the context of this study, we define a tenant as a farm firm 
which is organized under sole proprietorship, partnership or corporation. 
It may have leasing arrangements with one or more landlords and have 
ownership over some of the productive assets. Clearly, under partner­
ship or corporation a landlord could be a member of the firm's business 
organization which is itself a tenant. 
The legal format of the leasing contract, as related to Iowa, 
bounds the possible period of time of the farm lease to 20 years or 
less (94, p. 70). Leases can not be terminated without at least four 
months notice. As related to the conditions under which farming is 
carried on in Iowa, this implies that the smallest possible term of the 
lease is one year. Most farm leases are one year leases, and a large 
percentage of these are oral rather than written leases (94, p. 101). 
This limits the tenant's control over productive assets, as specified 
in the lease, to one year, and it is tantamount to limiting of the 
planning horizon to one year. From the tenant's viewpoint, this raises 
cost per unit of output for productive activities based on various 
types of desired investment that create flows of capital services, as 
related to land and attached improvements, that extend beyond one year. 
Since the landlord is legally entitled to land and attached improvements, 
the tenant is forced to write off capital services after one year. In 
effect, this raises costs and lowers net product prices. Suppose 
additional livestock facilities in the form of attached improvements 
to land have a 10 year life expectancy, then depreciation of these fa­
cilities to the tenant is equal to their total cost. It is not likely 
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that a tenant would find it profitable to write off a 10 year investment 
in one year. Further, suppose variable inputs, such as fertilizers and 
herbicides, have residual effects on cropland extending beyond one year, 
if the productivity of land rises beyond its productivity when the 
tenant moved on, then the tenant is not motivated to apply the full 
amount that would be economic under a longer planning horizon. Clearly, 
a short term leasing contract engenders imperfections but it also creates 
incentive for tenants to seek out more profitable alternatives. These 
alternatives may include among others: (1) bargaining with the landlord 
for compensation of expected net returns from unused capital services 
should the landlord terminate the lease, (2) seeking out alternative 
leasing arrangements with landlords that have the desired productive 
facilities, and (3) purchasing of land and desired productive facilities. 
Although short term leasing contracts limit the tenant's planning 
horizon, long term leasing contracts fix economic relationships to a 
point in time, engendering changes in relative prices to landlord and 
tenant. Accordingly, probable explanations for failure of landlords 
and tenants to negotiate longer term leases are based on the presumption 
that tenants and landlords attempt to avoid fixing of economic relation­
ships to a point in time, as implied in a leasing contract, in an effort 
to reduce imperfections and increase total net returns over time. 
1. If the nature of variable inputs change rapidly as related 
to advancing technological knowledge, then economic plans 
mutually satisfactory to tenant and landlord must be 
altered from one year to the next. This creates desire 
for flexibility in the lease as facilitated by shortness 
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of term. For suppose a new type of herbicide is marketed 
which effectively reduces the number of cultivations re­
quired in killing weeds and further suppose it does not 
enlarge expected yield, then depending on its cost the 
tenant with adequate operating capital may be motivated 
to use it, expanding his labor capacity in relation to 
other productive activities, whereas his landlord who we 
suppose to be sharing expected yields would not be moti­
vated to pay part of the cost. If the lease was written 
such that tenant and landlord share half the herbicide 
cost, the landlord would not be content with his tenant 
having a lease extending beyond one year. If the tenant 
wished to have his lease renewed, he obviously would not 
force the landlord to meet his legal obligations. 
Similarly, if a new hybrid seed is marketed which boosts 
yields, then given a share lease contract both tenant 
and landlord would be motivated to assess its economic 
importance. For the tenant is not likely to find hybrid 
seed profitable when he is obligated by the lease to 
part with half the increase in yield. Correspondingly, 
both tenant and landlord are motivated to modify the 
lease and include sharing half the cost of hybrid seed. 
These are but two in a large finite number of possible 
and probable input-output relationships that demand 
economic decisions causing reorganization of productive 
activities on a yearly basis. 
2. If the tenant accumulates equity in liquid assets, he 
would be induced to bargain with his landlord in order to 
alter the type of lease in favor of more tenant control over 
the decision making processes, i.e. as the tenant's owner­
ship inventory of liquid assets rises, he may no longer 
need the services of some of the landlord's assets. Pre­
sumably, the underlying motivations for a tenant to displace 
a landlord's assets with his own are probable opportunities 
If the tenant-landlord relationship was recently established, they 
may both wish to check on the suitability of each other as they fill the 
economic roles of tenant and landlord, respectively. Accordingly, they 
decide to try out the new relationship on the basis of a written one 
year lease. However, if the tenant-landlord relationship is found to 
be mutually satisfactory, then an oral lease could become acceptable to 
both and provide desired flexibility. Although an oral lease is always 
a one year lease, the satisfactory interaction of their economic roles 
as tenant and landlord could imply an economic planning horizon much 
longer than one year. Accordingly, it is anticipated that most tenants 
having oral leases are likely to feel greater security of tenure than 
many other tenants having written leases. 
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to make economic resource adjustments toward conditions 
of equilibrium by reducing tenure imperfections. 
Accordingly, the tenant is motivated not to request 
longer term leases. 
The legal format of leasing contracts allows for the inclusion of 
compensation from landlord to tenant for tenant's unused capital services 
embodied in the landlord's land and attached improvements. Generally, 
compensation is based on either of two methods: (1) depreciated cost of 
tenant's resources embodied in land and attached improvements or (2) 
discounted net returns resulting from embodied capital services. Both 
(1) or (2) provide incentive but only (2) provides perfect incentive for 
the tenant to commit resources that improve productivity of land as well 
as improvement and enlargement of productive facilities attached to the 
land. The landlord has no positive incentive for providing compensation 
unless the market value of land rises as a result of the tenant's capital 
services embodied in the land and attached improvements. Presumably, 
drainage tile and other items that directly increase productivity of 
land would increase the value of bare land so that compensation would 
be possible. However, uncertainty is attached to estimation of compen­
sation for productive facilities such as livestock housing under either 
method (1) or (2). This is due to advancing technology which causes 
obsolescence. It has been indicated that as farm enlargement takes 
place it is accompanied by consolidation of productive facilities. 
This causes facilities on some parcels of land to become obsolete due 
to their location- As a result, the value of land and attached pro­
ductive facilities would equal bare land value. Accordingly, the 
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landlord would be motivated to discount the tenant's expected net 
returns resulting from capital services embodied in these productive 
facilities to zero. This would be unacceptable to the tenant. Thus, 
tenants or firms are motivated to purchase some land in order to 
develop and consolidate productive facilities as attached to land. A 
further motivation, of course, is the additional security of tenure 
over productive facilities as related to ownership. In view of this, 
it is anticipated that compensation is seldom written into farm leasing 
contracts. 
Farm leasing arrangements have evolved into three basic types of 
contracts. 
The cash lease It involves fixed rental payment for 
services rendered by landlord's land and other productive assets. The 
rental payment for use of land is negotiated by landlord and tenant, 
and it is paid on a per acre basis. Rental payments for services of 
other productive assets like machinery or buildings are sometimes 
included in the per acre payment, or paid on a lump sum basis. The 
landlord has a lien on the tenant's assets as provided by the legal 
format.Consequently, the tenant bears all the risk attached to 
uncertain net income expectations. The fixed cash payment would tend 
to reduce equity in liquid assets which would engender two effects: 
(1) the debt/equity ratio would be larger than for other types of 
^^in most states, including Iowa, "landlord's lien statutes" 
secures the landlord's right to rent "against the claims of outsiders" 
(8, p. 120). This implies that the landlord has first claim on the 
tenant's assets to assure performance of the tenant's rent obligations. 
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leasing and (2) the amount of operating capital would be reduced by the 
amount of the fixed cash payment. Although the cash lease engenders 
some risk aversion and lack of operating capital, it does not engender 
lack of equivalence between the tenant and landlord income objectives 
as compared to other types of leasing. The tenant is free to make all 
the decisions without need to consult with the landlord over sharing 
costs of inputs and outputs.In view of this, it is possible for a 
tenant and landlord to negotiate a longer term lease. The only desired 
flexibility would be in relation to the fixed cash rental payment. 
Presumably, the cash payment should be tied to an index reflecting the 
business cycle in farming. Previous research indicates that cash rental 
payments lag the business cycle (17, p- 9). This fixity causes positive 
excess tenant net returns in periods of prosperity and negative excess 
tenant net returns in periods of recession. Negative excess net returns 
further increase the need for liquidity of equity which reduces equity 
in liquid assets and increases aversion to uncertainty. Tying the cash 
rental payment to the business cycle would help in reducing these 
The legal format of a leasing contract makes provision for the 
landlord to include limitations on cropping rotations and use of 
livestock and other facilities. This legally motivates the tenant 
to conduct cultural or husband-like practices that keep land in at 
least the same stated condition and productivity at the end of the 
leasing period as at the beginning, and maintain buildings and other 
productive assets in relation to "normal" depreciation. Thus, the 
tenant on a short term lease is not permitted to overdraw on the flows 
of capital services from landlord's land and other productive assets 
as included under the lease. This implies that the tenant operating 
under a short term cash lease may be obliged to sacrifice some maximal 
short run net returns. 
47 
imperfections but would have little meaning if the tenant operated 
under a short term lease. 
The crops share lease it involves crop share rental 
payments for services rendered by landlord's land. The rental payments 
consist of sharing of receipts of crop activities in the same or 
different proportions. The landlord may share some of the variable 
inputs such as fertilizers, herbicides, insecticides, seed and harvesting 
costs. The payment for services of landlord's other productive assets 
may be included in the crop share rental payments or handled through 
the cash lease. Sometimes the cash lease is used in relation to a 
particular cropping activity such as hay or pasture. 
The crops share lease spreads risk of uncertain crop income expec­
tations between tenant and landlord in relation to the ratio at which 
they share output of the various crops. To the extent that risk is 
spread, it lowers the firm's risk allowances first, by lowering the 
variance-covariances of net product prices and second, by lowering the 
debt/equity ratio or aversion to risk as compared to the cash lease. 
Although the crops share lease does not engender risk to the same 
extent as the cash lease, it does engender changes in relative prices 
which cause lack of equivalence between tenant and landlord income 
objectives. On the basis of previous research this imperfection can 
be reduced by adherence to economic incentive conditions which were 
summarized by Hurlburt (51, pp. 11-12). 
"... 1. The share of the factor of variable input must be 
the same as the share of output of product obtained from it. 
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... 2. The shares of all products must be the same. 
... 3- Each resource owner must receive the full share of 
the product earned by each unit of resource he contributes." 
In view of previous research and its extension to tenants and 
landlords through farm bulletins and personal contact with extension 
personnel, and in view of the income advantages to both tenant and 
landlord in negotiating and developing mutually satisfactory economic 
relationships, it is hypothesized that prevailing crops share leasing 
12 
contracts do not severely violate these three incentive conditions. 
The livestock share lease Analogously, it is like the 
crops share lease. However, instead of crops it involves sharing of 
receipts of one or more livestock activities and sharing of some vari­
able livestock inputs such as feed, veterinary and miscellaneous as 
well as purchasing cost of livestock. The landlord contributes the 
buildings, some equipment and some variable livestock inputs. The 
tenant contributes his labor and remaining variable inputs. The 
livestock share lease is often combined with the crops share lease to 
form a crops-livestock share lease. In this case, the landlord con­
tributes land, buildings and some equipment as well as some variable 
12 
A fourth incentive condition states that "each resource owner 
must have opportunity to receive return on investment made in one 
production period but not forthcoming until a subsequent period". 
As based on our preceding discussion of leasing contracts in which 
the nature of the leasing contract was found to be inconsistent with 
dynamic economic implications resulting from advancing technological 
knowledge, it is apparent that this incentive condition is consistently 
violated in order not to fix economic relationships to a point in 
time. This could severely inhibit the firm in gaining control over 
resources and in using these resources efficiently, if other tenure 
options were not open to the firm. 
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cropping and livestock inputs, and the tenant contributes his labor 
and remaining variable inputs. 
There is considerable overlapping of these basic types of 
leases. Crop(s) share leases include provision for fixed rental 
payment on one or more specified cropping activities, for example, 
hay. Livestock share leases include provision for sharing of crop 
receipts or fixed rental payment for one or more specified enter­
prises. The crops-livestock share type lease approaches a partner­
ship between landlord and tenant. Accordingly, the degree of tenant 
decision making power diminishes as the landlord's contributions 
to variable inputs increase. As the partnership is approached, the 
lack of equivalence between tenant and landlord income objectives 
would be reduced correspondingly. Presumably, as partnership is 
approached, the tenant and landlord would share the net income of 
most of the productive activities in relation to the ratio of their 
contributions, respectively. The main advantages over the partner­
ship would be: (1) limited liability between tenant and landlord 
and (2) conflicts of interest would be settled on the basis of the 
provisions for sharing as written into the leasing contract rather 
than on the basis of "one member one vote". These advantages 
could motivate retiring farmers to combine resources with an 
entrant farm firm under a leasing contract that closely simulates 
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a partnership. This would facilitate entry by lowering the capital 
barrier and, simultaneously, adjust resources in relation to advancing 
technological knowledge. 
Forward conditional sale contracts It is anticipated that many 
successful farm entrants are obtaining variable inputs such as feed and 
supplements, fertilizer, herbicides, insecticides and seed under forward 
conditional sale contracts. Beuscher (8, p. 308) draws analogy between 
the conditional sale contract and the land installment contract. The 
contractée obtains these variable inputs under two basic conditions: 
(1) that the contractor market the contractee's livestock or crops 
resulting from the inputs obtained under contract, and (2) that the 
contractée accept technical supervision of the use of these inputs and 
assume insurance costs to protect against loss of livestock or loss of 
crops. It is presumed that once the contractée has met his debt obli­
gations through sale of products to the contractor that further obli­
gation to market products is implied but not enforceable under the 
nature of the contract. This contract involves a security interest in 
livestock or crops and once the debt obligation has been satisfied the 
A farm corporation also provides these advantages and, in 
addition, provi-des a simple method of determining contributions and 
allocating of net earnings back to the contributors on the basis of 
stock holdings. However, the locked in stock of nonoperating members 
is a distinct disadvantage to the forming of a farm corporation. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that nonfamily would be induced to value 
their assets and incorporate them into an entrant farm firm. The 
entrant firm, however, may be organized as a corporation and combine 
resources with nonfamily under a leasing contract. Presumably, the 
tenure form under which the entrant firm is organized does not preclude 
its acquiring of one or more leasing contracts. 
security interest vanishes (8, p. 305). 
Conditional sale contracts are presumed to be complementary to 
alternative forms of short term credit. They are likely to be used in 
obtaining variable inputs when short term credit is not available. As 
previously discussed, forms of intermediate and short term credit 
engender lack of operating capital through placing preference for 
security in assets over expected productivity of loans. Consequently, 
credit is often not available for purchases of variable inputs as re­
quired to feed livestock and raise crops, in view of this, it is 
anticipated that conditional sale contracts are used and serve two 
primary purposes: (1) to obtain feed, grain and supplements for feeding 
of livestock and (2) to obtain seed, fertilizer, herbicides and in­
secticides for raising of crops. For either purpose (l) or (2) the 
contract price would be the cost of the variable inputs included under 
the contract plus carrying charges and additional insurance that may be 
required to protect against loss of livestock or loss of crops. Carry­
ing charges associated with the extension of variable inputs under 
contract are likely to exceed interest payments of an equivalent amount 
of short term credit, given a common interval of time. 
Whether or not conditional sale contracts would be an economically 
desirable means of obtaining variable inputs for alternative cropping 
and livestock activities on a given farm firm depends on (l) the amount 
by which contracts reduce net product prices, (2) the amount by which 
contracts reduce immediate capital requirements per unit of output 
through postponement of payment of inputs until the end of the production 
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period, (3) the level of technology specified under the terms of the 
contract and (4) the given firm's supply of operating capital where 
this supply does not include the amount of operating capital associated 
with inputs that are to be obtained under contract. Although these 
contracts facilitate economic activity by making inputs available, that 
otherwise may not be available, it is possible that contracts would be 
avoided by firms having a short supply of operating capital. For 
example, suppose technology is set at a high level as specified under 
the contract. Further, suppose the capital requirements of productive 
activities as related to this high level of technology, minus the capital 
embodied in the inputs as obtained under the contracts, are greater than 
the capital requirements of productive activities as related to lower 
levels of technology. Then, although net product prices are likely to 
be higher for productive activities as related to the high level of 
technology, it is not inconceivable that contracts would be avoided by 
the firm in order to make highest possible net returns from a given 
supply of operating capital. 
Other factors 
These were delimited and identified (pp. 2-3) as (1) savings ac­
cruing from nonfarm income earned by operator entrants or their wives, 
(2) family assistance involving gifts, credit, inheritance and machine 
use and (3) real and personal property taxation. We are concerned with 
them only to the extent that they aid entry into farming or obstruct 
the entrant farm firm in gaining control over a resource mix which earns 
at least its opportunity cost. 
Recent farm entry studies (22, 62) indicate that (1) and (2) above 
contain factors that aid entrants in breaking the lowest capital barrier 
to entry as related to alternative sets of tenure arrangements. Suc­
cessful entry is not expected to occur instantaneously. Clearly, if 
the farm entrant can not accumulate operating equity in productive assets, 
he has not yet broken the capital barrier to entry. Accordingly, these 
factors assist the farm entrant in accumulating equity in productive 
assets. They are often discontinued when the farm entrant has successful­
ly broken the capital barrier as related to a given set of tenure 
arrangements. 
Nonfarm employment Savings accrued from nonfarm employment is 
not anticipated to be a widely used factor for accumulating equity in 
productive assets in order to successfully break the capital barrier to 
entry. It is anticipated that the majority of farm entrants receive 
adequate intergeneration family assistance for breaking the capital 
barrier. Only when this assistance is not adequate will the entrant 
and his wife be motivated to use nonfarm employment in order to make 
possible the accumulation of productive assets. 
Family assistance Farm entry is dependent on some intergeneration 
assistance from parents and other close relatives. For a given entrant 
into farming it is anticipated that either his parents or his wife's 
parents are farming, semi retired or retired from farming. In entrant 
situations where this is not the case, it is anticipated that the entrant 
or his wife have close relatives that are farming. It is also anticipated 
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that entrants start farming with parents or relatives under a business 
agreement within the firm. The business agreement may be written or 
oral. They may become full participants in the business or leave the 
business to begin operating independently on their own or with some 
other participant. Some entrants may not start with parents or close 
relatives but start immediately on their own or with some other par­
ticipant. In either case, however, they are likely to have been 
dependent on intergeneration assistance in order to accumulate equity 
in productive assets. 
Gifts These are usually in the form of productive assets, 
such as land, machinery, breeding stock and supplies, rather than money. 
The kind of gift and amount depends on the degree of wealth held by 
parents and relatives as well as the number of family claimers to this 
wealth. Some families may extend the entrant's claim to their wealth 
through gifts and then later equalize the allocation of their wealth 
through inheritance. To the extent that this takes place, it could 
augment the problems of consolidating productive assets controlled but 
not owned by entrant farm firms. 
Family credit Indications are that family credit is ex­
tended on the basis of promissory notes. Depending on the need, family 
credit is likely to be obtained for down payment on land, for purchases 
of feed, grain and supplements or for purchases of cropping inputs such 
as seed, fertilizer, herbicides and insecticides. It is presumed to be 
complementary to alternative forms of credit and to conditional sale 
contracts which are themselves complementary. Furthermore, family 
credit is likely to be extended for as long as required (i.e., the 
repayment schedules are flexible) at less than market rates of interest. 
It is also anticipated that family members cosign some of the 
entrant's promissory notes held by private individuals and banking type 
institutions. In effect, this increases the security interest in the 
loans made under promissory notes. 
Inheritance This is not anticipated to be an important 
aid to entry for the majority of farm entrants. It is most likely that 
these farm entrants would have become established in farming and would 
be nearing retirement age before an intergeneration transfer of family 
assets would take place through inheritance. Although inheritance is 
not an important aid to entry, it is probable that the nature of inheri­
tance, based on "equal devolution of property" by the majority of U.S. 
farm property owners, could cause breakup of family farm estates. If 
this has happened, then it would not be surprising to find entrant farm 
firms leasing from several different landlords. To the extent that 
landlords may place different sets of restrictions on tenants, this 
adds to the complexity of farming operations, engendering additional 
imperfections. 
Machine use This is anticipated to involve an oral operat­
ing arrangement between the entrant and parents, close relatives or 
neighbors. The farm entrant pays for the machine use by means of his 
labor which is assumed not to be fully utilized by the productive assets 
of the firm. This permits the entrant to use security for raising of 
short term credit for purchases of variable inputs rather than tying it 
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up in purchases of machinery and equipment. Presumably, this method 
increases the entrant's farm earnings. 
Real and personal property taxation Taxes on property are based 
on the concept that all asset wealth is taxable. As Beuscher (8, p. 260-
261) indicates, this is an equitable approach to taxation only if it 
were possible to count all of the assets, which make up asset wealth, 
and accurately value them. Since this is likely to be an impossible 
task, "the standard of ability to pay has shifted from property to 
income". Although real and personal property taxes have no significance 
at the federal level of government, and declining significance at the 
state level, it still accounts for "over 90 per cent of all tax revenues" 
that support local government and school districts, in local farming 
communities real property tax is based on the value of land, whereas 
personal property tax is based on the value of chattels. Entrant farm 
firms whose taxable assets are likely to be encumbered pay taxes not on 
the equity in the assets but on the assessed value of them. This ob­
structs ownership in land and working chattels, and impedes accumulation 
of equity in productive assets as required in breaking the equity 
barrier to gaining control over a resource mix which earns at least 
its opportunity cost, in addition, the amount of real and personal 
property tax revenues earmarked for education exceeds its "economic 
share". As indicated by Owen (77, p. 61), over half the educative costs 
are paid through the local government budget when, as indicated by 
Lampman (67, p. 100), only 8 per cent of the students are likely to 
remain in farming. This implies that productive assets on the farm 
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finance economic development outside the farming industry. Consequently, 
local tax revenues as obtained through real and personal property taxes 
could obstruct the farm firm in gaining control over an optimal resource 
mix. 
The tenure continuum 
The control and organizational sets form a continuum of tenure 
relations as implied by the Cartesian product (105, pp. 8-16) which is 
illustrated in figure 5. This continuum of tenure relations is classi­
fied into three subcontinua of tenure arrangements, i.e. one subcontinuum 
for each tenure form. We define the beginning of the subcontinuum by the 
lowest capital barrier that permits satisfactory entry into farming, and 
the end by optimal formation and use of resources controlled by the 
entrant farm firm. 
The entire tenure continuum includes a larger set of tenure relations 
than the sum of the tenure arrangements implied, by the three subcontinua. 
This is the case since arrangements are implied by the interaction of 
tenure forms. However, in order to put the tenure continuum into an 
operational format for achTeving objectives of the study we use the sub­
continua approach. For example, if we assume an actual farm firm situ­
ation involving recent operator entry, then, given the tenure form or 
organizational format of the firm, tenure imperfections are minimized by 
translating alternative tenure instruments into activities for producing 
products and including them into the risk programming model 2.1, 2.2 and 
2.3, as modified for Hmè and corresponding economic bench marks. 
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Ownership inventory * * 
fixed assets 
• ' 
working assets 
• • 
1iquid assets 
• • 
Credit forms * * 
land installment 
contract - • 
mortgage 
• • 
chattel mortgage 
• 
promissory note 
• • 
Leasing contracts * * 
cash lease 
• • 
crops share lease 
• • 
livestock share 
lease 
• • 
Forward conditional 
sale contracts A * * 
feed and 
supplements . . . 
ferti1izer, 
herbicides, 
insecticides 
and seed 
Sole proprietorship Partnership Corporation 
Figure 5- Classification of the continuum of tenure relations into 
three subcontinua of tenure arrangements as illustrated by 
means of the Cartesian product of the control and organi­
zational sets 
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL 
The mode] developed and applied to alternative entrant farm firms 
for testing working hypotheses is based on the framework for analysis, 
it embodies the risk programming problem described by 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, 
and is operational ized through quadratic programming and simulation 
techniques. 
Introducing the Model 
For a given tenure form, instruments for producing products are 
translated into a set of constrained variables or activities. The model 
minimizes tenure imperfections through maximizing the entrant farm 
firm's expected net income when allowances for risk, as attached to 
uncertain net income expectations, are included. It employs a truncated 
minimax objective function subject to linear constraints (102). This 
objective function involves the maximizing of expected net income and 
simultaneously the minimizing of risk when the level of risk aversion is 
given. Expected net income is assumed to be inversely related to risk 
aversion. This is based on the behavioral assumption that the marginal 
utility of expected net income diminishes as risk increases. The degree 
of risk aversion is measured by the debt/equity ratio of the firm's 
productive inventory assets. 
It is implied that the firm's operator(s) make all of the decisions 
with singularity of purpose which is to maximize the firm's expected net 
income under conditions of uncertain income expectations. Essentially, 
60 
this assumes away tenure engendered lack of equivalence between the 
income objectives of the firm's participants. 
In development of the model it is assumed that alternative tenure 
forms have no affect on the translation of instruments into constrained 
activities. Thus, once the activities, constraints and corresponding 
input-output relationships are specified, they remain the same at a 
given interval in time regardless of the tenure form under which the 
firm is organized. It is also assumed that (1) the supply of inputs and 
demand for products are perfectly elastic, given the translation of 
instruments into constrained activities and (2) the costs of production 
and technical input-output relationships are known. 
The model handles contributions from and payments to resource owners 
outside the entrant farm firm according to the methods and terms speci­
fied by alternative tenure instruments. It pays resource owners within 
the firm in terms of net returns to (1) equity in productive inventory 
assets and (2) labor and management. All other resources are paid 
opportunity cost. By estimating opportunity cost for equity in pro­
ductive assets as well as labor and management, the resource mix can be 
evaluated in terms of whether or not it earns at least its opportunity 
cost. 
The model contains bench marks for land and labor. These are 
handled as upper bound constraints in the amount of land and labor con­
trolled by the entrant farm firm. These bench marks were taken from 
phase A of NC-53 (64) and adjusted in accordance to (1) the time period 
over which this model operates and (2) the number of full time operators 
I 
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within a given firm. 
The period over which the model operates is 20 years, beginning 
January 1, 1962 and ending December 31, 1981. The period is broken 
down into 4 5-year intervals. Interval k, where k = 1, 2, 3, or 4, is 
dependent on interval k-1, but interval k-1 is assumed to be independent 
of interval k. Accordingly, the model is one way recursive. In effect, 
the model determines the optimal expected net income, the optimal plan 
for production and the optimal use of tenure instruments (as these are 
translated into constrained activities belonging to vector X) for one 
year within interval k-1. Economic decisions, as reflected by the 
optimal solution vector (x^^^) are assumed to be static over interval 
k-1. 
Time intervals are included in the model through simulators 2 and 
Simulator 2 updates the supply levels of the resource and product 
constraints (vector b^_^) from interval k-1 to k. It includes (1) the 
essential characteristics and pertinent relationships associated with 
tenure instruments, (2) the estimated amount of net income required to 
meet federal and state income tax resulting from the firm's business 
activity when the tenure form is given and (3) the estimated amount of 
net income required to meet household or personal consumption needs. 
Simulator 3 determines the risk aversion factor (d/e) for each 
'^Simulator 1 provides the methods and procedures required in 
approximating the solution to the risk programming problem, as 
described by 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, through quadratic programming. 
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interval k-1. This d/e is constant within each interval of time, but 
variable over intervals. It is based on the debt/equity ratio of 
inventory ownership in fixed, working and liquid assets of the firm. 
Inventory ownership of fixed, working and liquid assets is taken at the 
beginning of each interval. 
The variance-covariance matrix (V) of net product prices is based 
on net returns per unit of alternative productive activities, over 5 
years (1962-1966 inclusive) and over entrant farm firms producing the 
same products but not necessarily in the same ways. Thus, this matrix 
is essentially based on time series and cross-sectional observations, 
as well as the ways in which products are produced. For cropping 
activities the unit is the acre, and for livestock the animal unit. 
The variance-covariances of matrix V are projected from interval k-1 = 0, 
the beginning interval, to each adjoining interval (k > 1). 
The input-output relationships of matrix A are based on the mean 
year of interval k-1 = 0, and projected to the mean year of adjoining 
intervals. 
The expected net product prices (vector C')are the average net 
product prices received over interval k-1 = 0. These average prices 
are projected to the mean year of adjoining intervals. 
The resource and product constraint levels are based on the entrant 
farm firm's records, as related to January 1, 1962. For the beginning^ 
of adjoining intervals, they are determined through simulator 2. 
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Method of Solution 
it was found that computer programming routines, as related to 
algorithms designed to solve general nonlinear programming problems, 
were inefficient as well as severely limited in terms of the number of 
variables they could handle, and in terms of accuracy. However, it was 
also found that special cases of the nonlinear programming problem were 
being solved satisfactorily by Zorilla (88), which was designed to 
maximize or minimize objective functions of quadratic form subject to 
linear constraints. Consequently, our method of solution involves an 
indirect approach. 
A given problem as described by 
max. f(x) = C'X - d/e (X'VX)* (2.1) 
AX < b (2.2) 
X > 0 (2.3) 
is solved indirectly by 
min. (X'VX) (3.1) 
AX < b •' (2.2) 
C'X = 'b (3.2a) 
X >_ 0 (2.3) 
where 'b denotes alternative levels of expected net income, and by 
evaluating f(x) = C'X - d/e (X'VX)^ for each level of expected net 
income and its corresponding solution vector, x . The highest 
positive value for f(x) solves the given problem 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. 
64 
For observe that expected net income is now incorporated into the 
constraint set as 3.2a. Our new constraint, 3.2a, forms a plane, for 
the ith level of expected net income as denoted by 'b, along which a 
solution exists which minimizes variance. As expected net income is 
enlarged, the plane moves out toward the boundary as described by 2.2. 
When this plane approaches the boundary of 2.2, the choice of alternative 
points on the boundary is determined by the highest positive value for 
f(x). Suppose our 2-product world as related to figure 1 (p. 21) and 
superimpose our indirect method of solution on figure 1, as observed in 
figure 6. It estimates the true solution for our given problem 2.1, 2.2 
and 2.3. Observe that evaluation of f(x) = C'X - d/e (X'VX)^ becomes 
our choice criterion as 3.2a moves out from the origin. Let us assume 
d/e = .84. Then,_by referring back to figure 4, we observe that the 
highest positive value for f(x) is where 'b = (ENl)j. At this point, 
i = *, where * is any finite number that provides a solution to our 
given problem. This indirect method of solution is operationalized 
through simulator 1 as described below. 
Simulator j_ (SM 1) 
The purpose of simulator 1 is to select one efficient point, xj^2] 
^ Î 
solution vector, from a set of efficient points, x , as generated 
through Zorilla (Q.P) which is called upon to minimize variance of net 
income independently for each level of expected net income, 'b^^^ ^ 
^ j_: Methods and procedures Simulator 1 calculates 'bj^j^ 
and evaluates f(x), choosing the largest f(x) value. Corresponding to 
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1 
*2 
2 . 2  
3.2a 
Figure 6. Hypothetical illustration 
given aversion to risk of 
by indirect method 
of maximum net income under 
uncertain net income expectations 
this value is a specific level of expected net income, and 
an x^^j solution vector. The procedures involved in the operation of 
QP-SM 1 are defined and summarized below. 
First, we define a possible set of levels of expected net incomes. 
This set is bounded at the larger end by y + 4 a and at the lower end by 
y - 2 a, where y and d are estimators of the mean net income, and its 
standard deviation. These estimators are calculated on the basis of 
five yearly observations of net income for an individual entrant farm 
firm, beginning in 1962 and ending in 1966. These estimators are used 
by SM 1 to calculate 13 alternative levels of expected net income. The 
first level is y - 2 a, the second y -^ and the thirteenth 
y + 4 a; i.e. each level, beginning with the lowest and ending with the 
highest, is separated by one-half the standard deviation of net income. 
For time interval k-l = 0, we illustrate and define procedure 1 ih 
figure 7- Let 'b^^^ ^ = ith level of expected net income where i = 1, 
2, a; in which case a is the first infeasible level of expected net 
income and, in addition, a ^  13. Once a is found, SM 1 selects the 
largest of all the f(x) values. 
Y 
Second, for interval k-l = 0, let °b be the level of expected 
131 » 0 
net income associated with the largest f(x) value (figure 7). We say 
that ^ °bigi Q is the highest level of expected net income unless there 
exists o > ^ which increases the value of f(x) still 
more (figure 8) where j = 1, 2, ... ,9- The difference between 
0 and ^ is defined equal to 5 per cent of the estimated 
9 9 
standard deviation of net income (a). As long as f(x) can be enlarged 
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d/e 
0.84 f(x) 
131.0 131.0 
Expected net income 
Figure 7, Hypothetical illustration of procedure 1 of QP-SM 1 routine 
for a given time interval k-1 = 0 
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f (x) 
* 
1 3 1 0  1 3 1 0  131,0 131.0 131,0 
Figure 8. Hypothetical illustration of procedure 2 of QP-SM 1 
routine for a given time interval k-1 = 0 
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by adding another 5 per cent of the standard deviation to the preceding 
highest level of expected net income, the process continues. Once f(x) 
declines SM 1 steps back, selecting the last level of expected net income 
that caused f(x) to increase in value. Accordingly, we have found close 
approximations for ^ and x'J". 
For intervals k, SM 1 selects the previous interval's b^^^ 
as the mean net income, employs the same a and follows the methods and 
procedures as outlined above. 
Limitations Our indirect method of solution will not yield 
shadow prices for the resources employed by the activities or variables 
to be specified. This follows since C' is included in the linear con­
straints, and not in the objective function 3-1. 
Our solution (x^^^) is an approximation of the true solution which 
always lies on the boundary of the linear constraint set (p. 21). If 
the approximation of the true solution is not on the boundary, then 
resources purchased and added to the supply levels of resources at a 
given interval of time may not be fully utilized in our solution (xj^^^); 
this unrealistic possibility can be avoided by reducing the difference 
between the true solution and our indirect solution x^*^. For example, 
we reduce this difference by adjusting the second procedure of SM 1 
through redefining the difference between and ^*^131 i^_] 
as equal to something less than 5 per cent of the estimated standard 
deviation of net income (a). Correspondingly, the number of solutions 
required in approximating, x^*^, is enlarged. 
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Other limitations are associated with the assumptions underlying 
the true solution, i.e. the optimal solution to the problem described 
by 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 (40, pp. 17-18). 
1. The total amount of resources used by the several activities 
entering the optimal solution is equal to the sum of the 
resources used by each activity which is characterized by 
constant proportions between inputs and outputs. Thus, 
doubling resources doubles production, implying constant 
returns to scale. This rules out interaction between activi­
ties. However, an activity can be defined to include inter­
actions. 
2. All resources and products defined by the constrained 
activities are continuously divisible. This implies that 
resources are used, and products produced, in fractional 
amounts. Similarly, resources are purchased in fractional 
amounts. Obviously, the optimal solution is not a perfect 
blueprint for conducting business enterprise. For suppose 
the solution specifies the purchase of 1.5 acres of land. 
It is unlikely that land would be available in such small 
amounts. The farm firm may have to purchase 40 acres, 80 
acres and etc. Fractional production can be realistically 
rounded down to the nearest whole number, but fractional 
resource use may be unrealistic, if a certain amount of the 
resource must be utilized in order to have any production 
at all. 
3. There is a finite number of constrained activities^ i.e. 
the number of activities and constraints are limited to a 
finite number. This is not a limitation, since any problem 
of choice must have a finite number of alternatives in 
order for a solution to exist. In this study, the number 
of activities (98) plus constraints (41) equals 139. 
4. Resource supply levels and input-output relationships are 
known, i.e. they are single value expectations at a point 
in time. However, our QP-SM 1 method of solution allows 
for stochastic net product prices. The optimal solution 
occurs anywhere on the boundary of the constraint set (if 
zero is not a maximizer), as compared to a corner point in 
the case of standard linear programming methods. 
The assumptions and limitations underlying linear programming 
also apply to our QP-SM 1 method of solution with but one exception. 
The exception concerns the randomness of net product prices. The 
QP-SM 1 method of solution allows for stochastic net product prices, 
whereas linear programming assumes single value expectations. 
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Organization of data input 
Given the problem 3.1, 2.2, 3.2a and 2.3, we show the organization 
of data input as required under Zorilla (88, p. 2) 
V ' - A' 
! (- c) 
$ 
A ' b 
' 0 
(c') ; ('b) 
in which submatrices V, A, C, - A', - C and $ form a square matrix. 
Given 41 constraints, as denoted by the vector b in which we let 'b 
belong to b, and 98 activities, as denoted by the vector X, this square 
matrix is 139 x 139. This implies that V is 98 x 98, A is 41 x 98 in 
which we let C' (1 x 98) belong to A. Correspondingly, the rows of A 
begin at 99 and end at 139- Similarly, the rows of b begin at 99 and 
end at 139. Consequently, we combine 2.2 and 3.2a into 3.2. However, 
A now includes one additional row that is comprised of expected net 
product prices, and b now includes one additional row that is comprised 
of alternative levels of expected net income where these alternative 
levels are generated by simulator 1 and injected one at a time as Zorilla 
is called upon to find values for activities belonging to X for each 
alternative level of expected net income. The equalities and inequalities 
to be defined by specification of 3 2 are coded as follows: (1) equality 
(=) code 0, (2) inequality (<) code + and (3) inequality W code - . 
Artificial or slack activities as related to (3) are not generated by 
Zorilla but "must be explicit input" (88, pp. 4-5). 
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Translation of Tenure Instruments 
into Constrained Activities 
Activities, resource and product constraints as well as corresponding 
input-output relationships are identified and illustrated in figure 9-
This figure specifies 3.2 which now includes 2.2 and 3.2a: (l) activities 
(columns) belong to X, where j = 1, 2, —, 98, (2) constraints (rows) 
b. belong to b, where i = 99, 100, —, 139, (3) input-output relation­
ships a.j as well as expected net product prices c.^ belong to A^^ and 
(4) equality and inequality relations between b and AX are given by the 
code 0 for (=), + for (_<) and - for (>^) . Activity Xg^ is an artificial 
activity as required by the (>) inequality relation of row 108. Activi­
ties Xj, Xg, ..., Xgy are real. 
Activities x^, x^, ..., Xgg are referred to as risk activities. 
Accordingly, ^ will contain 63 x 63 nonzero elements. The remaining 
rows and columns that enlarge ^ to 98 x 98 contain only zero elements. 
This is permissible as V^_j need only be positive semi défini te. The 
remaining activities Xg^, Xgg, ..., Xgg are referred to as nonrisk ac­
tivities. 
Abbreviations of figure 9 used in identifying activities and re­
sources are explained below. 
^^The zero subscript attached to a;j and cjj elements of A, 
refer to interval k-1 = 0. However, this in no way restricts the 
relationships indicated by figure 9 to the beginning interval. The 
elements and relationships contained in the figure are general, 
referring to any interval k-1 =0, 1, 2, or 3. 
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Abbreviation Explanation 
0 ownership 
CL cash lease 
SL share lease, implying crops share or 
crops-livestock share leases; also 
involves cash leasing of hay activities 
L leased, implying crops share leases or 
cash leases 
LF low ferti1izer 
HF high ferti1izer 
SHF super high fertilizer 
NST no soil treatment (implies no treatment 
of the soil with herbicides) 
ST soil treatment'7 
STC short term credit 
k months < STC-1 _< 1 year 
0 < STC-1 I 4 months 
ITC intermediate term credit 
3 < ITC-I _< 10 years 
1 < ITC-I I _< 3 years 
LTC long term credit 
10 _< LTC-LIC £ 50 years 
20 <_ LTC-MTG <_ 50 years 
Lie land installment contract 
MTG mortgage 
GDA government diverted acres 
LA 1iquid assets 
RP real  property,  refers  to  f ixed assets  
LTD long term debt 
LTD-I implies LTC-LIC 
LTD-1 I implies LTC-MTG 
ITD intermediate term debt 
ITD-I implies ITC-I 
ITD-1 I implies ITC-II 
'^Although it was not shown in figure 9, corn activities 2,3,4,6, 
7,8,10,11, and 12 include soil treatment with herbicides. 
The risk activities produce six products in alternative ways. 
These products are: corn, oats, soybeans, rotated hay, hogs and feeder 
18 
cattle. Nonrisk activities produce two products in alternative ways. 
These products are (l) improved hay and (2) government diverted acres 
through the federal land retirement program. All other nonrisk activi­
ties (with the exception of Xgg) supply inputs in various forms and ways. 
The constraints include (1) resources, (2) economic bench marks 
and (3) product mix guides. The resources are grouped according to 
(1) land, (2) livestock housing space, (3) labor, (4) capital, (5) 
machinery and equipment capacity and (6) product mix guides. Economic 
bench marks, as taken from phase A of NC-53 and adjusted for use in 
19 
this study, are translated and defined in relation to land and labor. 
Product mix guides are developed in relation to corn, soybeans, rotated 
hay, government diverted acres and feeder hogs. 
Land 
Land constraints (rows 99, 100, —, 105) include cropland and non-
cropland acres owned, cash leased and share leased by the firm at the 
beginning of interval k-1 as well as total cropland acres remaining that 
can be purchased (activities 92, 93, ., 95), cash leased (activity 96) 
or share leased (activity 97), which add to the supply level of rows 
99-100, 101-102 and 103-104, respectively. 
1 g 
These cropping and livestock enterprises were selected by Iowa 
farm business consultants as representative on farms in North Central Iowa. 
1 Q 
The assumptions underlying phase A analysis and adjustments in 
bench marks are discussed in chapter 4. 
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Cropland acres (rows 99, 101, 103) are used by activities 1, 2, 
45, 64, 65, , 81. The amount of land used per unit level of 
activity is 1.0 acre for all cropping activities (1, 2 45, 64, 
65, ••., 69), and is 0.005 acre for all livestock housing activities 
(70, 71, ..., 81). 
Total cropland acres remaining (row 105) is equal to the estimated 
1981 economic bench mark level of cropland acres minus the sum of the 
cropland acres controlled by the firm at the beginning of interval k-1. 
The 1981 economic bench mark level  i s  used over al l  intervals .  This  i s  
accepted on the grounds that some entrant farm firms may have already 
exceeded this bench mark level, if it was adjusted downward from I98I 
20 
to the beginning of interval k-1 =0. As land is obtained by the firm 
through activities 92, 93, .. , 97, total cropland acres remaining are 
reduced, becoming a bound on land procurement at the zero level. 
Livestock housing space 
Livestock housing space constraints (rows 110, 111, —, 118) are 
classified by owned, leased and share leased housing facilities. For 
each classification, we determine space supply levels which are associ­
ated with hog farrowing, hog growing and feeder cattle housing facilities. 
Space supply levels are converted into animal units for each kind of 
1ivestock. 
Hog farrowing space in terms of animal units is based on estimated 
20 
As indicated through phase A analysis, the estimated amount of 
land required by the economic farm business would double over the 20 
year period of this study. 
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number of farrowîngs possible during 1962. This estimate is determined 
by taking the number of farrowings possible at a point in time and 
multiplying it by 3. It is implied that 45 pound weaner hogs can be 
raised to market weight (220 pounds) in k months or less. 
Hog growing space in terms of animal units is based on estimated 
number of 220 pound market hogs that can be housed at a point in time 
during 1962, multiplying it by 3. 
Feeder cattle space in terms of animal units is based on estimated 
number of 1100 pound market steers that can be handled in loose housing 
facilities at a point in time during 1962. Steers are assumed to be on 
feed for approximately 10 months of the year. Usually, the farm firm in 
North Central Iowa markets most of the steers it has on feed before corn 
harvesting begins. 
These space supply levels, associated with owned, cash leased and 
share leased land, are used up by activities 46, 47, .., 63, and en­
larged by activities 70, 71, , 8l. As implied by activities 70, 72 
and 74, livestock housing facilities can be purchased and attached to 
owned land with zero down payment per unit of activity level. If suf­
ficient equity capital were available, then activities 71, 73 and 75 
may be utilized. 
It is unlikely that activities 76, 77 and 78 would enter optimal 
solutions because of the high cost per unit level of each activity, 
resulting from the firm's (tenant's) write off of capital services 
after the specified term of the lease which is usually one year. Credit 
is not available for these activities as the security interest is 
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inadequate. 
It is likely that activities 79, 80 and 81 would enter optimal 
solutions, especially when the supply level of liquid asset equity is 
low and no cropland is owned. These activities (79, 80, 81) are based 
on the presumption that landlord(s) will build housing facilities, if 
tenant(s) are willing to accept livestock share leasing contract(s). 
Accordingly, we observe (figure 9) that these activities would have zero 
cost and zero capital requirements insofar as the tenant is concerned. 
Labor 
Labor constraints (rows 120, 121, 122) include summer and winter 
labor hours of the firm's operator(s) as well as total labor hours 
remaining that can be hired for summer or winter labor requirements 
(activities 86, 87). It is assumed that each full time operator is 
willing to contribute 2080 hours of summer labor and 800 hours of winter 
labor. This is based on 8 months associated with summer labor at 260 
hours per month, and on 4 months associated with winter labor at 200 
hours per month. Family labor hours are treated as hired labor and 
paid wages. 
As illustrated in figure 9, summer labor is used by activities 1, 
2, ..., 69, and winter labor by activities 46, 47, —, 63. The amount 
of summer or winter labor used per unit level of these activities 
depends on techniques of production. 
Total labor hours remaining (row 122) is equal to the estimated 
economic bench mark level of labor hours, as adjusted for each interval 
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21 k-l, minus the sum of summer and winter operator(s) labor hours over 
interval k-l = 0. It is assumed that this sum of operator(s) labor 
hours available to be employed by the farm firm over the interval k-l = 
0, i.e. the 5 year period 1962 to 1966, inclusive, is a satisfactory 
estimate of future operator(s) labor available. As hired labor is 
obtained by the firm through activities 86, 87, total hours remaining 
are reduced, becoming a bound on labor procurement at the zero level. 
Capital 
Capital constraints (rows 123, 124) include the firm's liquid asset 
and fixed asset equity, respectively, at the beginning of interval k-l. 
Both liquid and fixed asset equity are inventory estimates. 
Fixed asset equity is the amount of equity built up in real proper­
ty, providing the firm, or its operator(s), hold title to the property. 
It is the sum of the bare land value plus attached improvements minus 
debt obligations resulting from long term credit on land installment 
contracts and mortgages. Fixed asset equity is used only for down 
payment on additional land (activities 93, 95), which adds to the supply 
levels associated with rows 99 and 100. 
Liquid asset equity is an estimate of the firm's operating equity 
capital. It is the sum of salable livestock, grain and feed, supplies 
and other forms of assets such as cash, bank account and redeemable 
bonds or certificates minus debt obligations resulting from use of short 
21 
As indicated through phase A analysis, the estimated amount of 
labor required by the economic farm business would decline by 
approximately 25 per cent over the 20 year period of this study. 
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term credit. As illustrated in figure 9, it is used by activities 
producing salable products (1, 2, 69), by activities (71, 73, 75) 
which add to the supply levels of owned livestock space (rows 110, 111, 
112), by activities (76, 77, 78) which add to the supply levels of 
leased livestock space (rows 113, 114, 115), by activities (83, 85) 
which add to the supply levels of machinery and equipment, (rows 129, 
130), by activities (86, 87) which add to the supply levels of summer 
and winter labor (rows 120, 121), by activities (92, 94) which add to 
the supply levels of owned land (rows 99, 100) and by activity (96) 
which adds to the supply levels of cash leased land (rows 101, 102). 
The amount of liquid asset equity used per unit level of the above 
activities depends on (l) techniques of production, (2) credit forms, 
(3) leasing contracts and (4) forward conditional sale contracts. 
Interrelationships among these variables are illustrated in figure 9. 
Debt capital rows 125, 126, 127 and 128 are transfer rows. Their 
value at the beginning of each interval is zero which assumes that all 
capital borrowing will be used up in the optimal plan. This may not 
always be the case, if our estimate of through the indirect method 
of solution is not within the neighborhood of the true 
Accordingly, if slack levels exist for these 4 rows they will be carried 
forward to adjoining intervals by simulator 2. There are no transfer 
rows associated with the use of short term credit, which is embodied 
^^if our estimate of 's not equal to the true x^t], then the 
estimated xj^f] may not lie on the boundary of the linear constraint set, 
since a quadratic objective function may be tangent to a linear con­
straint set at an interior point (102, p. 215). 
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within the specifications of the activities that use it. 
Machinery and equipment capacity 
Machinery and equipment capacity constraints (rows 129, 130) are 
(1) tillage and seeding capacity and (2) harvesting capacity. For each 
23 
group, the supply level is in terms of acre capacity. The initial 
supply levels (the beginning year of interval k-1 = 0) are based on 
operator(s) interpretation of realistic acre capacity of each group of 
machinery and equipment controlled by the farm firm. It is anticipated 
that realistic capacity, especially as related to tillage and seeding, 
will exceed the amount of capacity actually used by the firm. These 
supply levels can be increased through activities 82, 83, 84 and 85. 
As implied by activities 82 and 84, machinery and equipment can be 
purchased (adding to the supply levels of rows 129 and 130) with zero 
down payment per unit of activity level. 
Observe (figure 9) that the amount of tillage and seeding or 
harvesting capacity used per unit level of cropping activities (1, 2, 
—, 45, 64, 65, —, 69) is either 1.0 or 0.5 acre. 
Oats, rotated hay and government diverted acres (GDA) use 0.5 acre 
of tillage and seeding capacity. This is based on the empirical knowledge 
23 it was impossible to use the value of machinery and equipment in 
terms of capacity, because this value is not perfectly related to the 
capacity of machinery and equipment to perform productive services at a 
point in time. For example, a 3 year old tractor may perform productive 
services at a point in time equally as well as a new one which has greater 
value. Further, the maintenance and depreciation costs would be different. 
This would involve the derivation of new input-output relations for each 
entrant farm. We avoid these complications by using machine capacity in 
terms of acres and by including expected maintenance and depreciation into 
the costs associated with the various productive activities. 
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that oats and rotated hay are seeded together (the oats being the nurse 
crop for rotated hay), and that GDA activities require, on the average, 
about one-half the tillage as other cropping activities (i.e. in 
satisfying the conditions set out under the land retirement program, 
the firm must seed a cover crop whose basic ingredients are oats and 
hay). 
Improved hay uses no tillage and seeding capacity, but it uses 0.5 
acre of harvesting capacity. This is based on the empirical knowledge 
that harvesting of improved hay requires about half the capacity of 
rotated hay. The yield of improved hay is generally about one-third 
the yield of rotated hay. However, harvesting capacity is not reduced 
correspondingly due to field boundary and topographical abnormalities. 
Product mix guides 
Product mix guides involve constraints on production of corn, 
soybeans, rotated hay and government diverted acres. These cropping 
guides are applied to owned, cash leased or share leased cropland (rows 
106-109, 132-135, 136-139, respectively). They serve the purpose of 
causing realistic as well as satisfactory cropping rotations to enter 
optimal solutions; i.e. satisfactory In terms of the firm and its 
relationships through tenure instruments with resource owners outside 
the firm itself. 
The methods used in determining the supply levels of these cropping 
guides are summarized below. 
1. For each kind of crop excluding government diverted acres, 
the ratio of kind of crop in acres to total cropland acres 
(the sum of cropland acres owned, cash leased and share 
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leased) is predicted, as related to the beginning year of 
interval k-1. The prediction equation is based on time 
series and cross sectional observations as obtained from 
records of entrant farm firms over the 5 year period 1962 
to 1966, inclusive. 
2. Each predicted ratio, as determined above, is multiplied 
first by the amount of cropland owned, then cropland cash 
leased and finally cropland share leased. These nine 
results become the supply levels for corn, soybeans and 
rotated hay as related to cropland owned, cash leased and 
share leased. 
3. The supply level for government diverted acres is 20 per 
cent of corn acres as calculated in 2. We assume that 
corn base acreages, as determined under the government 
land retirement program, are approximately equal to supply 
levels of corn acres as related to cropland owned, cash 
leased and share leased. Typical participation in the 
government land retirement program is assumed to be 20 per 
cent of estimated corn base acreages. 
Rotated hay activities (40-41, 42-43, 44-45) are known empirically 
to be less profitable than corn, soybeans and government diverted acre 
activities for a given production period. Production of rotated hay 
serves two purposes: (1) it provides a minimum supply of roughage for 
livestock should it become impossible to buy and haul at reasonable 
market prices and (2) it is assumed to be complementary with production 
of corn and soybeans. Accordingly, the supply levels of rotated hay, 
as calculated under the methods discussed above, are forced into the 
optimal solution. 
Government diverted acre activities (64, 65, 66) as related to 
land which is owned, cash leased or share leased are likely to con­
sistently enter optimal solutions without being forced into the solution 
itself. The following explanations are posited: 
I 
I 
i 
i 
i 
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1. GDA are produced with relatively low capital and labor 
requirements. Thus, if the supply levels of labor or 
liquid asset equity are in short supply, the firm, as 
represented by our model, would be motivated to produce 
GDA. 
2. GDA are produced with relatively low costs. This may 
cause net product prices associated with GDA activities 
to exceed net product prices associated with corn and 
soybean activities based on low technology as related to 
land owned, cash leased and share leased, respectively. 
3. GDA are produced with almost no risk. For the sake of 
simplicity our model assumes no risk attached to net 
product prices as related to GDA activities. If the 
risk aversion factor was high, the relative weights 
(net product prices) attached to productive activities 
would change in favor of greater production of GDA. 
4. GDA may be complementary with corn and soybeans, since 
a cover crop including hay is raised on GDA for one 
production period. 
In view of the economic advantages of GDA, it is likely that rotated 
hay makes up a very small percentage of total cropland acres. 
The product mix guides also involve feeder hogs. An upper bound 
is placed on the animal units of market hogs sold (activities 48-49, 
52-53, 56-57) when these hogs were purchased as feeders. This upper 
bound is based on the following empirical knowledge: 
1. Feeder hogs purchased, raised to market weight and sold 
use less labor and more capital than hogs farrowed, 
raised to market weight and sold. For firms experiencing 
no shortage of capital it is realistic to assume that 
market hog production based on purchases of feeders might 
enter the optimal solution at high activity levels, even 
to the exclusion of market hog production based on 
farrowing. 
2. Iowa farm business consultants indicate there is a limited 
supply of feeder hogs. 
In view of the above, it is unrealistic not to place an upper bound 
on market hog production based on the purchases of feeder hogs. 
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The supply level of this upper bound constraint is estimated in 
terms of animal units on the basis of the average number of feeder hogs 
purchased per year over the sample of entrant farms and over the 5 year 
period, beginning January 1, 1962 and ending December 31» 1981. 
Adapting the Model to Time through Simulators 
In this study, simulators 2 and 3 are developed and utilized in 
adapting the model to time. The purposes are (1) to represent the 
essential characteristics and pertinent relationships associated with 
tenure instruments, (2) to represent the pertinent firm-household 
relationships when given the tenure form (i.e. to estimate the amount 
of net income required in meeting (a) federal and state income tax and 
(b) household or personal consumption needs), and (3) to explain and 
predict the effects of tenure instruments on attainment of optimal 
formation, and use, of resources over the period January 1, 1962 to 
December 31, 1981. 
Simulator 2 (SM 2) updates the supply levels of the resource and 
product constraints from interval k-1 to k. The initial supply levels 
(January 1, 1962, i.e. beginning of interval k-1 = 0) are determined 
exogenously, and injected directly into Q.P-SM 1. SM 2 receives infor­
mation from QP-SM 1 in the form of (1) the optimal solution vector 
(x**^), (2) the maximal expected net income (*b^g^ (3) the supply 
levels of resource and product constraints (b^^^) and (4) selected 
input-output relationships, and net prices, in relation to interval k-1. 
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It also receives information directly related to tenure instruments 
which is generated exogenously to the system. 
Simulator 3 determines initially, and updates, the risk aversion 
factor (d/e) over intervals, it receives information from two sources: 
(1) generated exogenously to the system and (2) simulator 2. 
Simulators 2 and 3 provide interinterval linkage over the four 
5 year decision intervals which begin January 1, 1962 and end December 
31, 1981. The entire operational system (which includes Q,P-SM 1 , SM 2 
and SM 3) is referred to as QP-SM, and is illustrated in figure 10. 
Simulator ^  (SM 2) 
The essential characteristics and pertinent relationships associated 
with tenure instruments, in combination with firm-household relation­
ships, are specified in accordance with our previous grouping and 
discussion of the relationships concerning the set of constrained ac­
tivities, as identified in figure 9-
SM 2 land equations 3.SM 2.1 computes the supply level of 
owned cropland acres for interval k. The level for interval k equals 
the level for k-1, plus the ratio of total cropland acres to total 
acres (w^) which is multiplied by the sum of cropland acres purchased 
in interval k-1, minus the amount of cropland used for building livestock 
facilities on owned land. 
The ratio (w^) is computed on the basis of (1) cropland and (2) 
total acres. Each is summed over all entrant farm firms in the selected 
sample before calculating w^. This is accepted, since the sample is 
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based on relatively homogenous soil type and topography. 
b,3.k = b,s.k-l + "l "j.k-I " -005 } Xj,k-, "here (3.SN 2.1) 
> » j=92 ' J5=70 •* ' 
W = total cropland acres ^ ^  
1 total acres 
3.SM 2.2 computes the supply level of owned noncropland acres for 
interval k. 
95 ~ 
bioo,k = bioo,k-l + ^ 2 / Xj,k-1 where (3.SM 2.2) 
' ' j=92 ' 
= 1 -
3.SM 2.3 computes the supply level of cash leased cropland for 
interval k. 
•^101,k " *^101,k-1 *9G,k-l " } *j,k-l (3.SM 2.3) 
' ' ' j=76 
3.SM 2.4 computes the supply level of cash leased noncropland 
for interval k. 
bi.2,k ° ki.z.k-, + "2 *,s,k-, <3.SM 2.4) 
3.SM 2.5 computes the supply level of share leased cropland for 
interval k. 
bi.:,k "  bi.s.k-, +  " 1  - -005 *j,k-l '5-5" 2.5) 
3.SM 2.6 computes the supply level of share leased noncropland 
for interval k. 
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bl,. ,k = ^o.,k- l  + "2 *3 7,k-1 (3 S" 2-6) 
3.SM 2.7 computes the supply level of total cropland acres 
remaining which the firm may choose to purchase, cash lease or share 
lease in interval k. When the amount remaining is reduced to zero, 
the firm has attained the given economic bench mark for land. 
" i .s,k= ' ' i .s.k- l  -  jÇ,, (3.SH2.7) 
SM 2 livestock housing space equations 3*SM 2.8 computes the 
supply level of owned hog farrowing space for interval k. The level 
for interval k equals the level for k-1, plus the sum of hog farrowing 
space purchased in terms of animal units and attached to owned land. 
^M.,k-\...k.r ".SM 2.8) 
3.SM 2.9 computes the supply level of owned hog growing space for 
interval k. 
^ii,k " ^111,k-1 *j,k-l 2-9) 
3.SM 2.10 computes the supply level of owned feeder cattle space 
for interval k. 
bii2,k " ^112,k-1 *j,k-1 (3-SM 2.10) 
3.SM 2.11 computes the supply level of leased hog farrowing space 
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for interval k. The level for interval k equals the level for k-1, 
plus the sum of hog farrowing space purchased in terms of animal units 
and attached to landlord(s) land. 
bii:,k ' *7s,k-l (3 SM 
3.SM 2.12 computes the supply level of leased hog growing space 
for interval k. 
(3.SM2.12) 
3.SM 2.13 computes the supply level of leased feeder cattle space 
for interval k. 
b,:s.k = "=115.k-1 + ^ s.k-l (3'S" 2.'3) 
3.SM 2.14 computes the supply level of share leased hog farrowing 
space for interval k. The level for interval k equals the level for 
k-1, plus the sum of hog farrowing space purchased in terms of animal 
units by landlord(s) who share lease to the farm firm. 
bii6,k " ''lie,k-1 *79,k-1 (3.SM 2.14) 
3.SM 2.15 computes the supply level of share leased hog growing 
space for interval k. 
bii7,k " ^117,k-1 ^ *60,k-1 (3.SM 2.15) 
3.SM 2.16 computes the supply level of share leased feeder cattle 
space for interval k. 
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bii8,k ^\i8,k-1 *8i,k-1 (3.SM 2.16) 
SM 2 labor equations 3.SM 2.17 computes the supply level of 
operator(s) summer labor for interval k. Once this level is determined 
for the beginning of interval k-1 = 0, it remains constant over all 
adjoining intervals. 
^a.,k - (3.SH2.17) 
3.SM 2.18 computes the supply level of operator(s) winter labor 
for interval k. As above, it remains the same over all intervals. 
b.2l,k = blil.k-, (3.S«2.18) 
3.SM 2.19 computes the supply level of total labor hours remaining 
which the firm can choose to hire in summer or winter in interval k. 
When the amount remaining is reduced to zero through hiring of summer 
or winter labor in interval k, the firm has attained the given economic 
bench mark for labor. 
LR is the estimated labor reduction per year over the 20 year 
period (January 1, 1962 to December 31, 1981). It is based on results 
of phase A analysis. 
(3.SM 2.19) 
^22,k = ^22,0 - "-R (5 k) 
SM 2 capital equations 3-SM 2.20 computes the supply level of 
equity capital (LA) for interval k. The level for interval k equals 
the level for k-1, plus expected net income in k-1, minus (1) debt and 
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interest payments in k-1 which are associated with alternative forms 
of credit (excluding short term credit), (2) cash lease payments on 
land which was cash leased in previous intervals (e.g. k-2), but 
utilized in k-1, (3) family living expenditures required to meet 
household and personal consumption needs in k-1 and (4) estimated 
federal and state income tax resulting from the firm's business 
activity in k-1. Variable names are identified below. 
DPLIC: debt payments on land installment contract. 
DPMTG: debt payments on mortgage. 
DPTCl: debt payments on intermediate term credit 
(ITC-I). 
DPTC2: debt payments on short intermediate term 
credit (iTC-ll). 
DILIC, DIMTG, 
DITCl and DITC2: refer correspondingly to debt interest 
payments associated with DPLIC, DPMTG, 
DPTCl and DPTC2. 
refers to cash lease payments on land cash 
leased in previous intervals, but which is 
continuing to be utilized in the current 
i nterval. 
family living expenses. 
estimated income tax. 
debt payments on real property as mortgaged 
for down payment on additional land. This 
is distinguished from the mortgage where the 
down payment comes out of liquid asset equity. 
The debt note attached to the mortgage is 
assumed to be paid in full within a given 
interval, whereas the debt note attached to 
LTC-MTG is paid over several intervals of 
time. 
CLP: 
FLE: 
EIT: 
DMTG2: 
IMTG2: refers to interest payments associated with 
DMTG2. 
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To determine the calculated value of any of the above variables 
on the  b a s i s  o f  a  s i n g l e  y e a r  w i t h i n  i n t e r v a l  k - 1 ,  w e  w o u l d  d i v i d e  b y  5 -
^123,k ^123,k-1 ^ ^131,k-1 (DPLIC)^_, + (DPMTG)^_^ (3.SM 2.20) 
+ (DPTC1)^_^ + (DPTC2)^_, + (DILiC)^_^ + (DIMTG)^_, 
+ (DITC1)^_^ + (DITC2)^_^ + (CLP)^_, + (FLE)^_, 
+ (E'T)k-l - DMTG2 - IMTG2 
3.SM 2.20a computes total debt payments on LTC-LIC for interval 
k-1 = 0. It is the sum of payments on old debt remaining on land 
installment contract in k-1 = 0, plus payments on new debt resulting 
from additional land purchased through capital borrowing under the land 
installment contract in k-1 = 0. 
$DRLIC is old debt remaining on land installment contract. It is 
determined exogenously from a given entrant farm firm's debt inventory 
records for January 1, 1962, and is injected into the Q.P-SM system. 
$RS is old repayment schedule in years associated with #DRLIC. 
RS is the repayment schedule in years associated with new debt. 
It is set arbitrarily and injected into the Q.P-SM system. 
DPLICq = 0DRLIC (y,) + d ^ (3.SM 2.20a) 
$RS ' 
If RS = 10, d = 0.5 
If RS = 20, d = 0.25 
If RS = 50, d = 0.10 
97 
If 0RS _> 5, Yo = 5 
If #RS < 5, Yg = 5 - $RS 
If $DRLIC = 0, 0RS = 1 
3.SM 2.20b computes total debt payments on LTC-LIC for interval 
k-1  =  1 .  
DPLIC, = eORLIC (y,) + d x„„ „ + d x„„ , (3.SM 2.20b) 
$RS ' **'1 
If #RS _> 10, Yj =5 
If 5 < $RS < 10, y^ = $RS - 5 
If 0RS ^  5, Yj = 0 
3.SM 2.20c computes total debt payments on LTC-LIC for interval 
k-1 = 2. 
Observe the conditional statement that if RS = 10, d x^g ^ vanishes, 
i.e. additional land purchased in interval k-1 = 0 is cleared of debt 
in interval k-1 = 1. 
DPLIC, = §DRLIC (y,) + d x,, ^  + d x,, ^  + d x,, ^  (3.SM 2.20c) 
If $RS > 15, y, = 5 
If 10 < #RS < 15, y2 = $RS - 10 
If $RS £ 10, y, = 0 
If RS = 10, d x vanishes 
' 88,0 
3.SM 2.20d computes total debt payments on LTC-LIC for interval 
k-1 = 3. 
Land purchases in intervals k-1 = 0 and k-1 = 1 are cleared of debt 
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by the time our QP-SM system reaches the final interval (k-1 =3). As 
above, observe the conditional statement: if RS = 10, d x and 
8 8 , 0  
d Xgg 1 vanish. 
D P L I C  =  $ D R L I C  ( y ) + d x  + d x  + d x  + d x  ( 3 . S M  2 . 2 0 d )  
3 fRS~ 88 ,0 88 ,1 88 ,2 88 ,3 
If 0RS > 20, y^ = 5 
If 15 < 0RS < 20, y g = mS - 15 
If $RS ,> 15, yg = 0 
If RS = 10, d X. . . and d x^^ , vanish 
'  8 8 , 0  8 8 , 1  
3.SM 2.20e computes total debt payments on LTC-MTG for interval 
k-1 =0. It is the sum of payments on old debt remaining on mortgage in 
interval k-1 = 0, plus payments on new debt resulting from additional 
land purchased through capital borrowing under the mortgage in k-1 = 0. 
$DRMTG is old debt remaining on mortgage. As in the case of 
0DRLIC, it is also determined exogenously from a given entrant farm 
firm's debt inventory records for January 1, 1962, and is injected into 
the Q.P-SM system. 
$RSM is old repayment schedule in years associated with $DRMTG. 
RSM is the new repayment schedule in years associated with new 
debt. As in the case of RS, it is set arbitrarily, and injected into 
the Q.P-SM system. 
DPMTG = $DRMTG (zj + g x (3.SM 2.20e) 
#RSM ' 
If RSM = 20, g = 0.25 
If RSM = 30, g = 0.167 
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If RSM = 50, g = 0.10 
If $RSM > 5, Zq = 5 
If 0RSM < 5, Zp = 5 - $RSM 
If #DRMTG = 0, SRSM = 1 
3.SM 2.20f computes total debt payments on LTC-MTG for interval 
k-1 = 1. 
DPMTG, = $DRMTG (zj + g „ + g , (3.SM 2.20f) 
' ORSM ' 
If 0RSM 2 10, = 5 
If 5 < $RSM < 10, = #RSM - 5 
If $RSM _< 5, Zj = 0 
3.SM 2.20g computes total debt payments on LTC-MTG for interval 
k-1 = 2. 
DPMTG, = SDRMTG (z ) + g x + g x + g x (3-SM 2.20g) 
$RSM ' 99,0 89,1 89,2 
If *RSM > 15, Zg = 5 
If 10 < #RSM < 15, z^ = 0RSM - 10 
If $RSM £ 10, z^ = 0 
3.SM 2.20h computes total debt payments on LTC-MTG for interval 
k-1 = 3. 
(3.SM 2.20h) 
DPMTG^ = WRMTG (z,) + 9 ^ + g + g *,,,2 + 9 
wRSn 
If $RSM .> 20, Zg = 5 
If 15 < $RSM <20, Zg = GRSM - 15 
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If 0RSM <_ 15, Zg = 0 
3.SM 2.20i computes total ciebt payments on ITC-I (associated with 
the chattel mortgage) for interval k-1 =0. It is the sum of payments 
on old debt remaining on ITC-I in interval k-1 = 0, plus payments on 
new debt resulting from additional livestock housing space purchases 
through capital borrowing under the chattel mortgage, as defined by 
ITC-I, in k-1 = 0. 
$DTC1 is old debt term credit 1, and it refers to the amount of 
this kind of debt remaining on January 1, 1962. It is determined 
exogenously from a given entrant farm firm's debt inventory records, 
and is injected into the QP-SM system. 
#RST is old repayment schedule in years associated with #DTC1. 
The new repayment schedule in years associated with new debt is 
assumed to be 10 years. Thus, one-half the new debt is always cleared 
in a given interval. Accordingly, the magnitude of the coefficient 
associated with the ITC-I capital borrowing activity is 0.5. 
DPTClg = ePTCl (g^) + 0.5 x^^ ^ (3.SM 2.20i) 
0RST ' 
If fRST 2 5, g^ = 5 
If $RST < 5, 9g = 5 - $RST 
If $DTC1 = 0, #RST = 1 
3.SM 2.20j computes total debt payments on ITC-I (associated with 
the chattel mortgage) for interval k-1 = 1. 
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DPTCl, = #DTC] (g,) + 0.5 x + 0.5 x (3.SM 2,20j) 
-#RST 9°'° 
If #RST = 10, g^ = 5 
If 5 < 0RST < 10, g^ = $RST - 5 
3.SM 2.20k computes total debt payments on ITC-i (associated with 
the chattel mortgage) for interval k-1 = 2. By definition of a 10 year 
repayment schedule, the first two terms (associated with 3.SM 2.20j) 
now vanish. Accordingly, 3.SM 2.20j is the sum of payments on new debt 
resulting from additional livestock housing purchases through capital 
borrowing under ITC-I in (1) k-1 = 1 and (2) k-1 = 2. 
DPTCl2 = 0.5 Xgo 1 + 0.5 Xg,2 (3.SM 2.20k) 
3.SM 2.201 computes total debt payments on ITC-I (associated with 
the chattel mortgage) for interval k-1 = 3- By definition of a 10 year 
repayment schedule, the first term (associated with 3.SM 2.20k) now 
vanishes. Accordingly, 3.SM 2.201 is the sum of payments on new debt 
resulting from additional livestock housing purchases through capital 
borrowing under ITC-I in (l) k-1 = 2 and (2) k-1 = 3-
DPTCl = 0.5 X + 0.5 X (3.SM 2.201) 
3 90,2 90,3 
3.SM 2.20m computes total debt payments on ITC-II (associated with 
the chattel mortgage) for interval lf-1 = 0. It is the sum of payments 
on old debt remaining on ITC-II in interval k-1 = 0, plus payments on 
new debt resulting from additional machinery and equipment capacity 
purchases through capital borrowing under the chattel mortgage, as 
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defined by ITC-II, in k-1 = 0. 
$DTC2 is old debt term credit 2, and it refers to the amount of 
this kind of debt remaining on January 1, 1962. It is determined 
exogenously from a given entrant farm firm's debt inventory records, 
and is injected into the Q.P-SM system. 
The repayment schedule is assumed to be 3 years. Thus, the old 
debt remaining (January 1, 1962) is cleared in interval k-1 = 0, and 
new debt is always cleared in a given interval. 
DPTC2 = $DTC2 + x (3.SM 2.20m) 
0 91,0 
3.SM 2.20n computes total debt payments on ITC-II (associated with 
the chattel mortgage) for interval k-1 = 1. 
DPTC2, = X  (3.SM 2.20n) 
1 91,1 
3.SM 2.20o computes total debt payments on ITC-II (associated with 
the chattel mortgage) for interval k-1 = 2. 
DPTC2 = X  (3.SM 2.20o) 
2 91,2 
3.SM 2.20p computes total debt payments on ITC-II (associated with 
the chattel mortgage) for interval k-1 = 3-
DPTC2g = Xgi 3 (3.SM 2.20p) 
3.SM 2.20q computes total interest payments on LTC-LIC for interval 
k-1 = 0. it is the estimated interest paid on old debt remaining on 
land installment contract for interval k-1 = 0, plus estimated interest 
paid on new debt resulting from additional land purchased through capital 
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borrowing under the land installment contract in k-1 = 0. Observe 
that since interest was paid on the new debt, as capital borrowing 
occurred, we subtract it from the estimated total interest payments. 
it is assumed that (l) debt payments are made on a yearly basis 
and (2) interest payments are calculated on the basis of declining debt 
balances. Accordingly, the average debt payment made in a given inter­
val is deducted from its corresponding principal before calculating.the 
interest. 
r^ is the interest rate on capital borrowed under the' land in­
stallment contract. It is estimated by the average interest rate on 
capital borrowed under LIC during 1962, and 1966, over the selected 
sample of entrant farm firms. it is written into the QP-SM system as 
0.0516. 
DILIC, = #DRLIC - 0DRLIC (yj 
2*RS 
(5 r^) (3.SM 2.20q) 
c  -  d  X  
88,0 J £ 
5 r - X 
8 8 , 0  
(r,) 
3.SM 2.20r computes total interest payments on LTC-LIC for interval 
k-1 = 1. 
DILIC^ = • SDRLIC - SDRLIC (y ) - 0DRLIC (y ) 
$RS 2$RS 
(5 r^) (3.SM 2.20r) 
*88,0 ^ *88,0 ^*88,0 (5 rj 
5  -  " s s . i  ( r . )  
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3.SM 2.20s computes total interest payments on LTC-LIC for interval 
k-1 = 2. 
Observe the conditional statement. If the repayment schedule equals 
10, then new debt occurring in interval k-1 = 0 is cleared. Accordingly, 
this debt balance becomes zero and no interest is paid on it in k-1 = 2. 
DILICg = ' 3DRLIC - #DRLIC (yj - $DRLIC (yj -
$RS $RS 
(3.SM 2.20s) 
GDRLIC (y ) 
2$RS ^ 
5 + X  - 2 d  X  -  d  X  
8 8 , 0  8 8 , 0  Y  8 8 , 0  
(5 r j  
X8,,i - d X8,,i - AXss,i 5 r, + * 8 8 , 2  "  J  * 8 8 , 2  
5 - *88.2 
If RS = 10, X  - 2 d X  - d X  
8 8 , 0  8 8 , 0  Y  8 8 , 0  
vanish 
3.SM 2.20t computes total interest payments on LTC-LIC for interval 
k-1 = 3. 
Observe the conditional statement that if RS = 10, then new debts 
occurring in intervals k-1 = 0 and k-1 = 1 are cleared, and no interest 
is paid on them in k-1 = 3- SM 2 20t) 
DILIC3 =  $DRLIC - $DRLIC (y^) - $DRLIC (y^) - fPRLIC (y^) 
#RS ms 0RS 
$DRLIC (y ) 
2$RS 
5 r, + *88,0 - 3 d X,,, - d X,,, (5 r^) 
X s , , !  -  2  d  * 8 8 , 1  -  4  * 8 8 , 1  5 r, + X  - d X  8 8 , 2  8 8 , 2  
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5 S + 
" . 8 , 8  - | \ » . 3  5 s " *88,8 ''"i> 
If RS = 10, X  -  3  d  X  - d x „  
88,0 88,0 J 88,0 
and 
8 8 , 1  
2 d x._ - d X .  
88,1 J 88,1 
van ish 
3.SM 2.20u computes total interest payments on LTC-MTG for interval 
k-1 = 0. It is the estimated interest paid on old debt remaining on 
mortgage for interval k-1 = 0, plus estimated interest paid on new debt 
resulting from additional land purchased through capital borrowing under 
the mortgage in k-1 = 0. 
The same methods are used in estimating total interest payments on 
LTC-MTG as in the case of LTC-LIC. 
r^ is the interest rate on capital borrowed under the mortgage. It 
is estimated by the same procedure used in estimating r^, and is written 
into the Qf-SM system as 0.0531. 
DIMTG = 
0 
#DRMTG - §DRMTG (z ) 
2$RSM 
5 + (3.SM 2.20u) 
£ *8 •8 9,0 ^ 9,0 5 '-2 - *88.. (r,) 
3.SM 2.20v computes total interest payments on LTC-MTG for interval 
k-1 = 1. 
DIMTG^ = #DRMTG - #DRMTG (z ) - SDRMTG (z ) 
$RSM 2$RSM 
5 (3.SM 2.20v) 
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(89,0 - 9 Xg, 0 5 r, + 
*89,1 ^ *89,1 
5 r„ - , (r„) 
3.SM 2.20w computes total interest payments on LTC-MTG for interval 
k-1 = 2: 
DIMTG = 
2 
$DRMTG - GDRMTG (z ) - #DRMTG (z ) - $DRMTG (zj 
fRSM 0RSM 20RSM 
(3.SM 2.20w) 
5 r. 
+  X  
89,0 2  9  "  l ^ s . o  5 + *89,1 ^ *89,1 
§ *89,1 5 + [ *8,,2 - I*,,,: ' ^ *"2 *89,2 ' 2' 
(r j  
3.SM 2.20x computes total interest payments on LTC-MTG for interval 
k-1 = 3. 
DlMTGj  =  ' #DRMTG - ODRMTG (z^) - GDRMTG (z^) 
$RSM 0RSM 
(3.SM 2.20x) 
#DRMTG (zJ - GDRMTG (z ) | 5 r\ + 
0RSM 20RSM 
*89,0 ^ ^  *8 9,0 
£ X 89,0 
5 ^ + X  - 2 g  X  -  g  X  
89,1 ^ 89,1 89,1 
5 ^ + 
89,2 
9 *89,2 - a *89,2 5 r, + ^9,3 " *89,3 5 ^2 - Xgg , (r,) 
3.SM 2.20y computes total interest payments on ITC-I for interval 
k-1 =0. It is the estimated interest paid on old debt remaining on 
ITC-I for interval k-1 = 0, plus estimated interest paid on new debt 
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resulting from additional livestock housing space purchases through 
capital borrowing under ITC-i in k-1 = 0. 
The same methods are used in estimating total interest payments 
on ITC-I, as in the previous cases of LTC-LIC-MTG. 
r^ is the interest rate on capital borrowed under ITC-I. It is 
estimated by the same procedure as used before in estimating r^ and 
r^, and is written into the QP-SM system as 0.0642. 
DITCl = 
0 
0DTC1 - #DTC1 (gj + x - 0.25 x 
2$RST 90,0 90,0 
5 r^ (3.SM 2.20y) 
- x,o.o (^3) 
3.SM 2.20z computes total interest payments on ITC-I for interval 
k-1 = 1. 
DITCl^ = ' GDTCl - GDTCl (g^) - 0DTC1 (g^) + x 
#RST 2$RST 90,0 
(3.SM 2.20z) 
5 x  -  0.25 X  5 r. 
3.SM 2.20za computes total interest payments on ITC-I for interval 
k-1 = 2. 
OITCI, - f X,.,, - 0.5 - 0.25 5 Tj + (3.SM 2.20za) 
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3.SM 2.20zb computes total interest payments on ITC-I for interval 
k-1 = 3. 
DITCI3 - No.2 - No,a 5 Tg + (3.SM 2.20zb) 
*90,3 - 0-25 X,o,3 5 r, - Xso.3 (r,) 
3.SM 2.20ZC computes total interest payments on ITC-I1 for interval 
k-1 = 0. It is the estimated interest paid on old debt remaining on 
ITC-II for interval k-1 = 0, plus estimated interest paid on new debt 
resulting from additional machinery and equipment capacity purchases 
through capital borrowing under ITC-II in k-1 = 0. 
As before, the same methods are used in estimating total interest 
payments on ITC-II. 
r^ is the interest rate on capital borrowed under ITC-II and is 
estimated by the same procedure as used in estimating r^, r^ and r^. 
It is written into the Q.P-SM system as 0.0632. 
DITC2q = #DTC2 - $DTC2 (r^) + (3.SM 2.20zc) 
*91,0 - 0-5 *91,0 3 ^  - *91.0 (r*) 
3.SM 2.20zd computes total interest payments on ITC-II for interval 
k-1 = 1. 
O'TCZ, = 1 -  Nl . l  3 ''t - Ni.i <%' (3.SM 2.20zd) 
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3.SM 2.20ze computes total interest payments on ITC-II for interval 
k-1 = 2. 
DITC22 = * , 1 , 2  -  " - S  3 r. - Xgi.z (r,) (3.SM 2.20ze) 
3.SM 2.20zf computes total interest payments on ITC-II for Interval 
k-1 = 3-
DITC23 = *91,3 -  0-5 *91,3 3 ^4 -  *91.3 (3.SM 2.20zf) 
3.SM 2.20zg computes total cash lease payments on land cash leased 
in previous intervals, but utilized in the current interval k-1 = 0. 
Total land cash leased in previous intervals is the summation of the 
supply levels of cropland and noncropland that is controlled by the 
farm firm under cash leases. This summation is multiplied by the cash 
rent per acre. 
The rent per acre on land cash leased in previous intervals is 
assumed to lag current cash rental rates by one interval. Accordingly, 
ÔCPPA (old cash payment per acre) is a historical rental rate taken 
from a given entrant farm firm's records, prior to January 1, 1962. If 
the firm has more than one cash lease, then the weighted average of the 
corresponding cash rental payments is used in determining $CPPA, which 
is injected into the Q.P-SM system. 
CLP, = (b 
1 0 1 , 0  
+ b 
1 0 2 , 0  
) (#CPPA) (5) (3.SM 2.20zg) 
3.SM 2.20zh computes total cash lease payments on land cash leased 
in previous intervals, but utilized in the current interval k-1 = 1. 
n o  
The cash rent per acre (c^^^ g) is taken from QP-SM 1. it lags 
the current rental rate c,„ , by one interval. 
131,96,1 ' 
CLP; = 
^*^101,1 ^\o2,I ^ ^^131,96,0^ (5) (3-SM 2.20zh) 
3.SM 2.20zi computes total cash lease payments on land cash leased 
in previous intervals, but utilized in the current interval k-1 = 2. 
CLP, = 
2 
(b + b. 1 0 1 , 2  1 0 2 , 2  ) (c. , )  (5) (3.SM 2.20zi) 
3.SM 2.20zj computes total cash lease payments on land cash leased 
in previous intervals, but utilized in the current interval k-1 = 3-
CLP 3 = (^\oi,3 ^  ^^102,3^ ^^131,96,2^ (5) (3.SM 2.20zj) 
3.SM 2.20zk computes family living expenditure (FLE) required to 
meet the household and personal consumption needs of one family in 
interval k-1. FLE is assumed to be a linear function of net farm income. 
FLE = 3442 + .1718 (net farm income) was determined by the re­
gression of family living expenditures on net farm income over the 5 year 
period 1962 to 1966, inclusive. It was adjusted for use in SM 2 through 
(1) multiplying the intercept by 5 and (2) translating net farm income 
into 5 bjgj^ - (CLP)^_p The correlation coefficient was 0.891. 
The data included five sets of yearly observations based on (1) 
average family living costs adjusted to include social security payments 
and (2) average net farm income over the period 1962 to I966. 
Average family living costs and average net farm income were taken 
m  
from "Family Living Expenditures of Iowa Farm Families" (54, p. 3; 
56, p. 3). Average family living costs were adjusted to include social 
security payments. Average social security payments were determined, 
and made available for use in this study, by the Central Iowa Farm 
Business Association. 
(FLE)^_, = 17210 + .1718 (5 "b^3^ - (CLP)^_^) (3.SM 2.20zk) 
3.SM 2.20zki computes family living expenditure required to meet 
the household and personal consumption needs of two families in interval 
k-1. Accordingly, 3.SM 2.20zki is derived by doubling the intercept of 
3.SM 2.20zk. 
(FLE)^_, = 34420 + .1718 (5 *biai ^-1 " (CLP)k-l) (3.SM 2.20zki) 
3.SM 2.20zkii computes family living expenditure required to meet 
the household and personal consumption needs of three families in 
interval k-1. Using the above procedure we derive 3.SM 2,20zkii by 
tripling the intercept of 3.SM 2.20zk, 
(FLE)^_, = 51630 + .1718 (5 *b^3^ - (CLP)^_^) (3.SM 2.20zkii) 
3.SM 2.20zl computes the estimated income tax (EIT) in interval k-1. 
EIT is taxable net income (TNl) multiplied by the average tax rate 
federal plus state (ATRFS). Estimates for TNI and ATRFS are based on 
the following assumptions: 
1. Nonfarm participants of the entrant farm firm do not withdraw 
net earnings except in amounts required to satisfy income tax 
obligations resulting from these earnings. 
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2. Amounts withdrawn to meet these income tax obligations are 
equal to the income tax obligations which would result if 
their net earnings were added to the net earnings of the 
farm participants. 
3- The entrant farm firm itself is not a taxpayer. 
TNI is net farm income minus (l) personal exemptions and (2) other 
deductions. 
Personal exemptions are based on a family size of 4.8 (54, p. 3). 
Accordingly, during a given interval, the personal exemptions of one 
family equal 4.8 (600) (5) or $14,400, two families $28,800 and three 
families $43,200. 
Other deductions are based on 10 per cent of net farm income up 
to $1,000. The upper limit ($1,000) is adjusted to $5,000 in relation 
to a given interval. The amount of this deduction is assumed to remain 
the same regardless of the number of families dependent on the entrant 
farm firm for their livelihood. 
The average federal tax rate is based on schedule II, p. 11, "1966 
24 
tax rate schedules". It was determined at the upper limit for each 
successive and accumulative $4,000 increment of taxable net income up 
to $24,000. 
The average state tax was based on state exemptions related to a 
family size of 4.8. The state tax base was calculated in accordance 
with the upper limit of each successive and accumulative $4,000 incre­
ment of taxable net income up to $24,000, a_ _l_a the federal tax rate 
schedule as identified above. 
24 Source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Federal Income Tax forms 
for 1966. 
113 
(E1T)^_^ = (TNI)^_, (ATRFS)^] (3.SM 2.20zl) 
(TN')k-l = 5 - (CLP),., - 14,400 -
"'0 (5 "bi3i,k-, 
(CLP)k-i - 5000 
(ATRFS),_, = .16745 if 0 < (ATNl),_j < 4000 where ATNI = 
= .19274 if 4001 < (ATNI), , < 8000 
—  K ~  I  —  
.21048 if 8001 £ (ATNI),_, £ 12000 
.22177 if 12001 £ (ATNI)^_, < 16000 
.23449 if 16001 £ (ATNl),_, £ 20000 
.24959 if 20001 £ (ATNl),_j £ 24000 
= .25000 if 24000 < (ATNi),_, 
3.SM 2.20zli computes taxable net income, given two families. it 
is derived from 3-SM 2.20zl through doubling personal exemptions. 
(TNI),_, = 5 - (CLP)k_i " 2*'800 - (3.SM 2.20zli) 
(5 \3, - (CLP)^., < 5000 
3.SM 2.20z]ii computes taxable net income, given three families. 
It is derived from 3-SM 2.20zl through tripling personal exemptions. 
(TNl)k_, = 5 *bi,i k-1 - (CLP)k-l - 43,200 - (3.SM 2.20zlii) 
[ (5 - (CLP'k-, 5 
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5000 
3.SM 2.20zm computes total debt payments on equity in real property 
withdrawn under the mortgage, as identified by DMTG2, for the purpose 
of financing the down payment on additional land in interval k-1. It 
is assumed that 100 per cent of the equity in real property may be with­
drawn under the mortgage for this purpose. The debt note attached to 
the mortgage is assumed to be paid in full within a given interval. 
(DMTG2)k_, (X93,k-l) 2.20zm) 
(*95,k-]) (^^24,95,k-1) 
3.SM 2.20zn computes the total interest payments associated with 
DMTG2 in interval k-1. An annual interest rate of 7.0 per cent was 
assumed, and applied to the debt on a yearly basis over a given interval, 
assuming declining debt balances. Interest was then totaled over the 
interval and divided by the debt in calculating the coefficient identi­
fied as 0.l40. 
(IMTG2)^_, = .140 (DMTG2)^_, (3.SM 2.20zn) 
3.SM 2.21 computes the supply level of equity capital (RP) for 
interval k, given a 10 year repayment schedule (RS = 10) associated 
with land purchased under LTC-LIC. The level for interval k equals the 
level for k-1 plus (1) the down payment on additional land purchased 
under (a) the land installment contract and (b) the mortgage, (2) total 
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debt payments on LTC-LIC, (3) total debt payments on LTC-MTG and (4) 
25 
capital gain or loss in land and improvements. 
it is assumed that a shift from the land installment contract to 
mortgage financing is possible when 50 per cent of the debt on LTC-LIC 
is cleared. Accordingly, given a 10 year repayment schedule, land can 
be purchased under LTC-LIC and shifted to mortgage financing within a 
single interval. Consequently, the firm, or its operator(s), would 
hold title to this additional land by the end of a given interval. 
Thus, the down payment and debt payments made on LTC-LIC add (along 
with those on LTC-MTG) to built up equity in real property for the 
beginning of interval k. 
''l24,k ° * 'N2,k-l''^12S,92,k-|' * 
(*,.,k-,)(a.2,,,,.k-,' + H. (DPLIC)^., + 
100 
AVLI Z b. , . 
'-k-' 
3.SM 2.21a computes.the supply level of equity capital (RP) for 
interval k = 1, given a 20 year repayment schedule (RS = 20) associated 
with land purchased under LTC-LIC. Since only 25 per cent of the debt 
25 
Capital gain or loss is the average amount by which the value of 
real property (land plus buildings and other permanent improvements to 
land) rises or falls over intervals k-1. Reynolds' study (81) showed 
that land values for the U.S. were increasing approximately linear with 
time over our 20 year period. However, in phase A analysis (NC-53) 
Kaldor-Saupe (63, 64) indicated that land values would fall over the 
period if the individual farm firm's resource mix was to earn at least 
its opportunity cost. Capital gain or loss is estimated in chapter 4 
in relation to (1) linear projected land values and (2) projected land 
values based on phase A results. In effect, (1) includes overcapital­
ization of land values whereas (2) excludes overcapitalization. 
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on land purchased under LTC-LIC is cleared by the end of interval 
k-1 = 0, there can be no shift to mortgage financing. Thus, the down 
payment and debt payments made on LTC-LIC do not add to built up equity 
in real property. 
b = b + (x )(a ) + DPMTG 
1 2 4 , 1  1 2 4 , 0  9 4 , 0  1 2 3 , 9 4 , 0  0  
(3.SM 2.21a) 
100 
+ AVLI E b. 
1 = 9 9  1,0 
3.SM 2.21b computes the supply level of equity capital (RP) for 
interval k = 2, given a 20 year repayment schedule (RS = 20) associated 
with land purchased under LTC-LIC. 
1 2 4 . 2  =  b l 2 4 . 1  +  ( * 9 4 . i ) ( a  1 2 3 , 9 4 ,  ^) + DPMTGj + 
( a . , , +  O P L I C ,  +  D P L I C ,  -  d  
(3.SM 2.21b) 
1 0 0  9  3  
AVLI Z b. AVLI Z x 
i = 9 9  1,1 1  =  9 2  j ,0 
3.SM 2.21c computes the supply level of equity capital (RP) for 
interval k = 3, given a 20 year repayment schedule (RS = 20) associated 
with land purchased under LTC-LIC. 
bl24,3 = bl24,2 + (*94,l) (*123,94,1) + + (3.SM 2.21c) 
+ OFLIC; - D + D X, 1 + 
8 8 , 1  
1 0 0  9 3  
AVLI Z b. - AVLI Z x. 
i = 9  9  '  j = 9  2  ^  
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3.SM 2.21d computes the supply level of equity capital (RP) for 
interval k = 4, given a 20 year repayment schedule (RS = 20) associated 
with land purchased under LTC-LIC. 
^^24,4 ^124,3 ^  (*94,3) (^123,94,3) + 
K 2 , 2 > ( ^ I 2 3 , S 2 , 2 >  +  ^ ^ 1 0 ,  "  d  X , ,  ,  +  d  
(3.SM 2.21d) 
1 0  0  9 3  
AVLI E b. - AVLI I x. , 
j = 9 2  J ' "  i  =  9 9  
3.SM 2.21e computes the supply level of equity capital (RP) for 
interval k, given a 50 year repayment schedule (RS = 50) associated with 
land purchased under LTC-LIC. 
b l 2 4 , l  =  " ^ 1 2 4  ,  0  +  ( * 9 4  , o ) ( 3 l 2 3  , 9 4  , o )  +  +  
100 
AVLI Z b. 
i = 9 9  
(3.SM 2.21e) 
b = b + (x )(a ) + DPMTG, + (3.SM 2.21f) 
1 2 4 , 2  1 2 4 , 1  9 4 , 1  1 2 3 , 9 4 , 1  1  
1  0  0  9 3  
AVLI Z b. AVLI E x. „ 
i = 9 9  j = 9 2  J ' °  
bi24,3 = ^ 12,2 + (*94,2)(ai23,,4,2) + DPMTG, + (3.SM 2.21g) 
1 0 0  
AVLI S b. - AVLI 
i = 9 9  ' '  
r 93 9 3  
E X .  + E X .  
I J 
1 = 9 2  j » °  i = 9 2  J  
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^2»,» " ^12., 3 <3,23,9,,,) * + (3.SM 2.21 h) 
100 
AVLI Z b. AVLI 
i = 9 9  
9  3  9  3  9  3  
2  X .  +  Z  X .  +  E  X .  
j = 92 ' j = 9 2  ' j = 9 2  -J '  
3.SM 2.22-25 compute the supply levels of debt capital (rows 125, 
126, 127 and 128) for interval k. These initial supply levels (interval 
k-1 = 0) are zero. If the primal slack values associated with these 
four rows are not zero, they are carried forward as the supply levels 
for interval k. We expect that they will be zero, but this may not 
always be the case, as explained on p. 84. 
•^125,k " ^125 k-1 = slack value (3.SM 2.22) 
bi26,k = bi26,k-l = slack value (3.SM 2.23) 
bi27,k = ^ 27,k-l = Slack value (3.SM 2.24) 
^28,k = bi28,k-l = Slack value (3.SM 2.25) 
SM 2 machinery and equipment capacity equations 3.SM 2.26 
computes the supply level of tillage and seeding capacity (Mach. I) for 
interval k. The level for interval k equals the level for k-1, plus the 
tillage and seeding capacity purchased in terms of acres in k-1. 
bi29,k = ^ 129 k-1 + *j,k-l (3.SM 2.26) 
3.SM 2.27 computes the supply level of harvesting capacity (Mach. II) 
for interval k. The level for interval k equals the level for k-1, plus 
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the harvesting capacity purchased in terms of acres in k-1. 
bi3o,k " '^130,k-1 } *j,k-l (S'SM 2.27) 
' ' j=84 
SM 2 product mix equations 3.SM 2.28 computes the supply level 
of owned corn acres for interval k. The level for interval k equals the 
predicted ratio (w^ total corn acres/total cropland acres, multiplied 
by the supply level of owned cropland acres in interval k. 
[*^3 k ~ 453.7126 + 5.0282 (t)j /lOOO was determined by regression 
of total corn acres/total cropland acres on time (t) over 5 years and 
26 
over 18 entrant farm firms. 
The correlation coefficient (r ) was 0.073* This equation was 
W 3 ,  t  
used in SM 2 through letting t = 5 k. It follows that in determining 
the initial supply level of owned corn acres, w , was predicted on the 
3  ,  K  
bas is of t = 1. 
("ss.k* (3.SH2.28) 
total corn acres 
w 3 , k  total cropland acres 
/1000 where 
t = 5 k  
w , = 453.7126 + 5.0282 (t) 
3 , k  
Although the total possible number of data observations equals 
90, the number of observations actually used was 74. Observations were 
pulled if the firm in a given year did not produce one or more of the 
following crops: corn, soybeans, rotated hay or government diverted 
acres. 
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3.SM 2.29 computes the supply level of owned soybean acres for 
interval k. 
bi.7,k = ",.k (b,9.k) k ^ 99,k' (3.SM 2.29) 
w 
_ total bean acres 
,k total cropland acres 
w . = 252.1699 + 10.3803 (t) /1000 
3.SM 2.30 computes the supply level of owned rotated hay acres 
for interval k. 
'l08,k ^S,k ^*^99,k^ 
w 
total hay acres 
5 , k  total cropland acres 
(3.SM 2.30) 
w . = 80.1136 - 3.7676 (t) 
I 5,K 
/1000 
3.SM 2.31 computes the supply level of government diverted acres 
(GDA) for interval k. The level for interval k equals 20 per cent of 
the supply level of owned corn acres in interval k. 
The sum of the predicted ratios (w. .) , where i = 3 to 5, plus 
I  ,  K  
.20 (w . ), must not exceed 1.0. Since these three predicted ratios are 
3 ,K 
based on time, this constraint would become effective before the 
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operations of the QP-SM system reach the final time interval of our 
previously identified period (January 1, 1962 to December 31, 1981). 
= -2° Ibi.s.k) (3.SM2.3I) 
For 3.SM 2.28, 29, 30, 31 
5 
E w. . + .20 (w, .) < 0.99999 
3.SM 2.32 computes the supply level of cash leased corn acres for 
interval k. The level for interval k equals predicted , multiplied 
by the supply level of cash leased cropland acres in interval k. 
= ":,k (3.SH 2.32) 
3.SM 2.33 computes the supply level of cash leased soybean acres 
for interval k. 
b.,,,k = ",,k (b....k) (3.SM2.33) 
3.SM 2.34 computes the supply level of cash leased rotated hay 
acres for interval k. 
\».k = \,k (3.SM2.3'.) 
3.SM 2.35 computes the supply level of cash leased GDA for 
interval k. 
b.ss.k = •2° (b%B2.k' (3 S" 2.35) 
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3.SM 2.36 computes the supply level of share leased corn acres 
for interval k. The.level for interval k equals predicted w . 
3  ,  K  
multiplied by the supply level of share leased cropland acres in 
interval k. 
= ":,k (3.SH 2.36) 
3.SM 2.37 computes the supply level of share leased soybean acres 
for interval k. 
b,3,.k - ",.k (3.SM2.37) 
3.SM 2.38 computes the supply level of share leased rotated hay 
acres for interval k. 
b.,..k = "s,k (ki.s.k* (3.SH2.38) 
3.SM 2.39 computes the supply level of share leased GDA for 
interval k. 
b.:,,k - -2° (b'ss.k) (3.SM 2.39) 
3.SM 2.40 computes the supply level of the share of owned, leased 
and share leased hog growing space in terms of animal units that can be 
devoted to raising hogs purchased as feeders for interval k. Once this 
level is determined for the beginning of interval k-1 = 0, it remains 
constant over all adjoining intervals, effectively placing an upper 
bound on the animal units of market hogs sold when these hogs were 
purchased as feeders (p. 88). 
123 
^\i9,k ~ *^119,k-1 
3.SM 2.4l Î S  determined b y  simulator 1. 
L 
° 1 3 1 , k - l  
Simulator 3_ (SM 3) 
SM 3 determines initially, and updates, the risk aversion factor 
(d/e) over intervals, i.e. at the beginning of each interval k-1. It 
receives information from three sources: (1) generated exogenously 
to the Qf-SM system, (2) simulator 2 and (3) Qf-SM 1 in the form of 
(a) the optimal solution vector and (b) selected input-output 
relationships. 
SM 1 calls on the calculated value of (d/e)^ injecting it into 
the objective function described by 2.1, given interval k-1. 
SM 3 risk aversion equations 3.SM 3-42 computes the risk 
aversion factor for interval k-1 =0. It is the summation of debt on 
inventory (excluding short term debt which was subtracted from the 
value of liquid assets), divided by the summation of equity on inventory, 
where inventory refers to January 1, 1962. 
In determining equity on inventory, we introduce one additional 
variable, i.e. $WAV: old working asset value. It includes the value 
of breeding stock, plus machinery and equipment on inventory January 1, 
1962. All other variables were introduced in the discussion and speci­
fication of Q.P-SM 1 and SM 2. 
(3.SM 2.40) 
(3.SM 2.41) 
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dq/eg = J 0DRLIC + fDRMTG + #DTC1 + 0DTC2 / 
*^123,0 + ^ 124 0 + ^ WAV - (SDTCl + $DTC2) 
(3.SM 3.42) 
3.SM 3.43 computes the risk aversion factor for interval k-1 = 1. 
The summation of debt on inventory is now estimated by adding new debt 
to old debt and subtracting debt payments. 
Equity on inventory now includes the amount of equity capital (LA) 
used in purchasing machinery and equipment capacity, and debt payments 
on ITC-II (i.e. the amount of credit used in purchasing machinery and 
equipment capacity). Other debt payments on LTC-LIC and LTC-MTG were 
added to equity in real property (b^^^ ^), in which the addition of debt 
payments on LTC-LIC to equity were made if the shift from land installment 
contract to mortgage financing was possible (pp. 114-118). Equity on 
inventory associated with livestock housing space purchases was assumed 
to be included in the market value estimate of equity in real property. 
$DRLIC + 0DRMTG + 0DTC1 + 0DTC2 + (3.SM 3.43) 
9 1  
E x . -  ( D P L I C „  +  D P M T G „  +  D P T C 1 „  +  D P T C 2 J  
J.88 J.° ° " " 
/ 
1 2 3 , 8 5 , 0  
) + DPTC2 
0  
3.SM 3.44 computes the risk aversion factor for interval k-1 = 2. 
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The same methods for estimating debt and equity on inventory apply in 
interval k-1 = 2, as in k-1 = 1. 
d/e^ = 
90 
GDRLIC + $DRMTG + 0DTC1 + E x. + 
j = 88 
(3.SM 3.44) 
9 1  
E x . -  ( D P L I C g  +  D P L I C i  +  D P M T G o  +  D R M I G j  +  D P T C l g  +  D P T C l ^  
j=88 
+ DPTC2^) ^123 2 + bi24 2 + - ($DTC1 + GDTC2) + 
(x.. J(a. % ^ fy ) ( a 
^ 8 3 , 0 '  ' ^ 1 2 3  ,  8 3  , 0 '  8 5 , o '  1 2 3  , 8 5  , 0 '  '  8 3 , 1 '  '  1 2 3  , 8 3  ,  1 '  
J + (x.  .  ) (a,„,  _  ) + 
(x.c J(a. 8 5 , 1 '  "  1 2 3  , 8 5  , 1  ) + DPTC2^ + DPTC2^ 
3.SM 3.45 computes the risk aversion factor for interval k-1 = 3. 
As above, the same methods were used in estimating the amount of debt 
and equity on inventory. 
8 9  9  0  
(3.SM 3.45) ^3/^3 = 
9 1  
GDRLIC + 0DRMTG +2 x. + E x. + 
j = 88 -J'" j = 88 J 
E x . -  ( D P L I C g  +  D P L I C i  +  D P L I C 2  +  D P M T G o  +  D P M T G ^  +  D P M T G ^  
j=8 8 J 
+ DPTCl^ + DPTCl^ + DPTC22) + b._. + 0WAV 1 2 3 , 3  1 2 4 . 3  
(fDTCl + $DTC2) + (Xgg o)(ai23,8 3,0' " " 8 5 , O' ^ "123, 85, 0 '  ,) + (x. c  „)(a,,= == J + 
,) + (x.r ,)(a,^, ,) + (x ,)(a,„, „) + ( * 8 3 , 1 ^ ( ^ 1 2 3 , 8 3 , 1 '  ' " 8 5 , 1 ' '  1 2 3 , 8 5 , 1 '  '  83,2'' 1 2 3 , 8 3 , 2 "  
(*85,:)(ai2a,8S,2) + mPTC^o + DPTCZi + »PTC2, 
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Coordinating the Model 
The algebraic format of QP-SM was translated into Fortran IV, and 
27 
adapted to the IBM OS/36O-65 computer system. The various parts of 
the QP-SM system were written as subroutines. Linkage between sub­
routines was maintained through the use of (l) common statements and 
(2) equivalence statements. The coordinator of these various parts was 
called a main program. 
The main program 
The main program coordinated the various parts of the QP-SM system, 
and established the sequence of operations (figure 10). 
Data input Two sources of data input were involved: (l) tape 
input and (2) card input. 
Tape input The quadratic programming routine (QP) received 
data directly from magnetic tape for interval k-1. This data was (1) 
variance-covariance relationships for the risk cropping and livestock 
activities and (2) input-output relationships for all activities as 
specified in figure 9. These relationships were determined exogenously 
of the QP-SM system for each interval k-1. The methods and procedures 
are described in detail in chapter 4. 
QP also received data from (1) the main program and (2) SM 1. 
From the main program it received (1) the row and constraint identi­
fications and (2) the supply level of the resource and product 
^^The QP-SM computer program is on file in the Numerical Analysis 
Section, Statistical Laboratory, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
Tape Input 
k'l - 0 
Tape Input k'\ - 1 
i 
A. I 
Tape Input 
k-1 - 2 
Tape Input 
k-1 . 3 
I 
Card Input 
constraints 
and resource 
supply 
Card Inpu^: 
, V 0 
éDKLIC éRS 
*DMTG MSH 
loTCl 4RTC 
«TC2 
éCLPPA 
•WAV 
RS 
RSM 
Rom and 
constraint 1.0. 
(1) 
Main 
111,1 IM ,1 
f i gu re  jO Schematic operations of QP-SM Model beginning Jan. I, I9S2 and ending Dec. 31* 1981 
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constraints, except alternative levels of expected net income ^ 
It received alternative levels of expected net income from SM 1. For 
each level of expected net income the main program called 
on Q,P to find the optimal solution and then called on SM 1 to 
evaluate the objective function as described by 2,1. The process con­
tinued until x^*^ and ^b^^^ were approximated for a given interval 
k-1. 
Card input The main program received card input, as 
initial input, before calling on the sequence of operations as illustrated 
in figure 10 by steps 2 to 18. The initial input is labeled step (1) 
and includes (a) the initial supply levels of the resource and product 
constraints, (b) the row and constraint identification, and (c) the 
20 
constants required by SM 2 and SM 3-
Sequence of Q.P-SM operations After receiving card input, the 
main program initiates and controls the sequence of operations which 
begin January 1, 1962 and end December 31, 1981. For a given interval 
k-1, the QP-SM operations are summarized below. 
First, SM 3 is called on to calculate (d/e)^ 
Second, after (d/e)^_^ is calculated, the program calls on (a) 
SM 1 to calculate values for 'b^gi (b) QP to determine x^^^ for 
each 'bj3j and (c) SM 1 to evaluate f(x), as described by 2.1, for 
each x*^^ and 'b^^^ ^ As shown in figure 10, SM 1 and Q,P are called 
on in an oscillating manner until x^*^ and *b^g^ are approximated. 
In figure 10, the constant $RTC should read 0RST, and #CLPPA 
should read 0CPPA. 
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Third, when xp", and "b . , are known, the program calls on 
'  k - 1  1 3  1 , K - 1  '  
SM 2 to update the supply levels of the resource and product constraints 
as denoted by b^^^. 
Format of Empirical Results 
Empirical results were obtained in interval k-1 for each entrant 
farm firm in the selected sample. At each interval (k-1) over the 
period January 1, 1962 to December 31, 1981, the empirical results 
included: (l) the optimal solution which contains the optimal 
combination, and levels, of the real activities (1, 2, , 97) at the 
mean year of interval k-1, (2) the maximal expected net income 
(*b^3i at the mean year of interval k-1, as determined under 
specified conditions of risk aversion (d/e)^_^, (3) the updated supply 
levels of the resource and product constraints (b^^^) which were 
required by Q,P for the beginning of the adjoining interval k and (4) 
the values of the variables, identified on p. 95, in which each vari­
able refers to the entire five year interval (k-1) instead of a single 
year within that given interval. 
Average net farm income in interval k-1 was determined from the 
above empirical results by subtracting the average cash lease payment 
[ (CLP)|^_j / 5 ] from expected net income "b^^^ |^_^. As previously 
defined in SM 2, (CLP)^_^ is the total cash lease payment (i.e. cash 
rent paid) on land cash leased in past intervals (e.g. k-2), but 
utilized in the current interval k-1. 
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The model (Q.P-SM) was designed to handle contributions from and 
payments to resource owners outside the entrant farm firm according to 
the methods and terms specified by alternative tenure instruments. It 
pays resource owners within the firm in terms of net returns to (1) 
labor and management and (2) equity in productive inventory assets. All 
other resources are paid opportunity cost. Accordingly, by estimating 
opportunity cost for labor and management as well as equity in pro­
ductive assets, the resource mix can be evaluated in terms of whether 
or not it earns at least its opportunity cost. 
Opportunity cost of labor and management 
The firm's business decisions, and related economic activities, are 
29 dependent on labor-management inputs. As the firm exists in the farm 
industry, these two kinds of inputs are provided by the firm's decision 
making unit. The decision making unit consists of one or more resource 
owners, in which the number of resource owners as well as the manner 
and degree to which they provide labor or management depend on the tenure 
form under which the firm is organized. 
The opportunity cost of the entrant farm firm's total labor-manage­
ment input is assumed to be a function of the amount and kind of 
inventory capital that is managed. The procedures used in estimating 
opportunity cost are consistent with phase A analysis of NC-53. 
29 
The term labor-management inputs excludes hired labor. In this 
study, hired labor is assumed to receive its opportunity cost in terms 
of the projected wage rates required by activities 86 and 87 of QP-SM 
over the 4 5-year decision intervals. 
i 
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Kaldor et al. (61, pp. 84-85) developed a manager weighting 
mechanism which they attached to the inventory levels of different 
types of productive assets. They wrote: 
"Capital in land and buildings was given a weight of one. 
Operating capital, such as machinery and equipment, was 
given a weight of four. A weight of six was applied to 
inventories of livestock and feed, in the case of farm 
businesses, and to inventories of grain and merchandise, 
in the case of cooperative elevators and farm supply 
companies." 
Utilizing this weighting mechanism, Saupe (84, pp. 72-73) computed 
a regression of manager salary on the weighted value of assets managed 
over 22 farm supply firms in Iowa, using the mean data from two years 
observations in measuring both variables. The corresponding regression 
equation is adapted and utilized in this study by (1) translating 
manager salary into labor-management input and (2) weighting the inven­
tory levels of the different types of productive assets in accordance 
with the Kaldor e^£l_. study cited above. 
The algebraic system An algebraic system v jas  developed to 
estimate the opportunity cost of the labor-management input for a single 
year within interval k-1 in relation to each entrant farm firm in the 
selected sample over the period January 1, 1962 to December 31, 1981. 
The system is based on the regression equation identified as 3.LM.46, 
and its relationships with QP-SM. 
3.LM.46 computes the opportunity cost of the total labor-management 
input for interval k-1. 
EOLM is the estimated opportunity cost of the entrant farm firm's 
labor-management input. It is determined on the basis of one year 
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within a given interval. 
WVA is the weighted value of productive inventory assets in k-1. 
(EOLM)^_, = 3721 + 0.0115 (WVA)^_^ (3.LM.46) 
3.LM.46a computes the weighted value of productive inventory 
assets for interval k-1. 
VLB is the inventory value of land and buildings. 
VME is the inventory value of machinery and equipment. 
VLA is the inventory value of liquid assets: (1) livestock, (2) 
grain and feed, (3) supplies and (4) other forms such as cash, bank 
account and redeemable bonds or certificates. 
(WVA)^_^ = (VLB)|^_^ H- 4 (VME)^_^ + 6 (VLA)^_^ (3.LM.46a) 
3.LM.46b computes the inventory value of land and buildings 
managed over interval k-1. it is the summation of land owned, cash 
leased and share leased by the entrant farm firm in interval k, 
multiplied by the per acre value of land and buildings (PAVLB) pro­
jected to the mean year of k-1. 
(VLB). , = b. . (PAVLB). . (3.LM.46b) 
i = 9 9  • '  
3.LM.46C computes the inventory value of machinery and equipment 
managed over interval k-1. It is the old value machinery and 
equipment (0VME), plus new purchases. PUCC is the per unit cost of 
capacity projected to the mean year of k-1. 
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8 3  
(VME)^_, = GVME + S Z x. (PUCCl) 
k = l  j = 8 2  j , k - l  k-1 
(3.LM.46c) 
4  8 5  
+  Z  I k . , ,  (PUCC 2 ) ,  -
k=i J=8. J'k-' k-; 
3.LM.46d computes the inventory value of liquid assets managed 
over interval k-1. Since QP-SM 1 borrows and clears all short term 
credit in computing the optimal solution (*^2]), the inventory value 
of liquid assets implies only equity. Accordingly, this value is the 
inventory value of equity capital in liquid assets ^ minus the 
amount of this capital not utilized in the optimal solution, i.e. the 
slack value of equity in liquid assets (SV), 
1 2 3 , k-1 
, minus the amount 
of this capital used in land as well as machinery and equipment 
purchases, plus old breeding stock value (fBSV). 
(VLA)^., • - (SV'b 
1 2 3  ,k-1 
( * 9 2 , k - l ) ( ^ 1 2 3 , 9 2 , k - 1  
(3.LM.46d) 
) + 
(*94,k-l^(^123,94,k-l^ (*83,k-l^ (^123 ,83 ,k-l^ 
(*85,k-l)(^123,85,k-l) + $BSV 
Opportunity cost of equity in productive assets 
Equity in productive assets was estimated by SM 3 in determining 
the debt/equity ratio in productive inventory assets for interval k-1. 
Refer to the denominators of SM 3 equations 42, 43, 44 and 45. The 
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structure of equity was (1) equity capital in liquid assets 
(2) equity capital in fixed assets ^ and (3) equity capital in 
working assets (it includes all of the remaining terms associated with 
the denominator of the debt/equity ratio in interval k-1). 
3.EPA.47 computes the opportunity cost of equity in productive 
assets in a single year for interval k-1 = 0. It is the summation of 
the calculated opportunity cost for (1) equity in fixed assets and (2) 
equity in liquid plus working assets. The slack value (SV) of equity 
in liquid assets is not included, since this type of equity could be 
invested off the farm. The opportunity cost rates selected were 5-05 
per cent on (1) and 6.50 per cent on (2). The following assumptions 
were made: 
1. It was assumed that the "yield on Moody's Baa Corporate 
Bonds in 1959" would represent a close approximation of 
the long term opportunity cost rate on equity in fixed 
assets (84, p. 68). 
2. It was assumed that "the Production Credit Association 
average cost of loans to borrowers" in 1959 would 
represent a close approximation of the average oppor­
tunity cost rate on equity in liquid plus working assets 
(84, pp. 68-69). 
OCEPA. = 0.0505 (b^ ) + 0.065 f b - (SV). + (3.EPA.47) 
0 12^,0 [ 123,0 ^23,k-l 
$WAV - ($DTC1 + #DTC2) 
3.EPA.48 computes the opportunity cost of equity in productive 
assets in a single year for interval k-1 = 1. 
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OCEPAj = 0.0505 + 0.065 i  " (5%)% + (3.EPA.48) 
123,k-l 
«AV - (tDTCl + MTC2) + (a,+ K,,.) (a,,, 
+ DPTC2, 
3.EPA.49 computes the opportunity cost of equity in productive 
assets in a single year for interval k-1 = 2. 
OCEPA, = 0.0505 (b ) + 0.065 b - (SV) 
1 2 4 , 2  1 2 3 , 2  
ÔWAV - ($DTC1 + $DTC2) + (x*, J(a 
+ (x.. J(a 
+ (3.EPA.49) 
1 2 3 ,k-1 
8 3 . 1 '  "  1 2 3 , 8 3  , 1  ^ (*85,1^ (®123 ,85 ,1 
8 3 ^ 0 '  ^ ' ^ 1 2 3  , 8 3 ,  0 ^  ^ ^ ^ 8  5  ,  0  ^  1  2  3  ,  8  5  ,  0  ^  
) + DPTC2„ + DPTC2, 
3.EPA.50 computes the opportunity cost of equity in productive 
assets in a single year for interval k-1 = 3. 
OCEPA, = 0.0505 (b_, ,) + 0.065 
1 2 4 . 3 '  - (SV'b + (3.EPA.50) 
1 2 3 ,k-1 
tWAV - (tDTCl 4. « D T C 2 )  +  (x,,  ,I  ( a , , +  (x„ (a^^ ,  
*  ( * 8 3 , 1 ^ ( ^ 1 2 3 , 8 3  , ( * 8 5 , ( ^ 1 2 3 , 8 5  , ^  ^ * 8  3  , 2 ^  ^ ^ 1 2  3  ,  8  3  ,  2 ^  ^  
( * 8 5 , 2 )  ( 3 1 2 3 , 8 5  ,:) + I'PTC2. + DPTC2, + DPTC2, 
Given the preceding format, empirical results were obtained for 
testing working hypotheses. These tests of hypotheses ané implications 
are discussed in chapter 5. 
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EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING 
AND PROCESSING DATA INPUT 
The QP-SM model was employed in obtaining empirical results in 
interval k-1 on individual entrant farm firms selected from within the 
total membership of the Central Iowa Farm Business Association. This 
chapter develops the empirical procedures used in obtaining, organizing, 
synthesizing and projecting data input required by the model, and it 
identifies the assumptions underlying these procedures. 
The Survey 
Questionnaire I (Appendix A) was designed to provide essential 
empirical information for selecting the sample of entrant farm firms. 
It was presumed that the majority of entrant farm operators would be 
under 50 years of age. Accordingly, the business consultant of the 
Central Iowa Farm Business Association provided a list of 43 members 
under 50 years of age. The 43 members represented 40 farm firms 
located in an area covering four counties: (1) Hamilton, (2) Wright, 
(3) Humboldt and (4) Webster. Each one of the 43 members completed 
questionnaire 1 through personal interview on the farm. 
Glossary and instructions used in completing questionnaire I are 
given in Appendix A. The coding methods for analyzing information on 
the questionnaires are also given in Appendix A. 
The information on the 43 questionnaires was analyzed in terms of 
its meeting predetermined criteria concerning selection of entrant farm 
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firms for application of the model. These criteria are stated below. 
1. Entry into farming by at least one participating member 
of the farm firm, between January 1, 1950 and January 1, 
1962, was required, if entry occurred after January 1, 
1962, the farm firm was not included in the selected 
sample. 
2. Age 21 years by January 1, 1962 was required of all 
entrants into farming. This implied that the entrant 
would assume legal managerial responsibility within the 
firm's decision making unit over the period January 1, 
I9&2 to December 31, 1981. 
3. At least 10 months employment per year within the farm 
firm was required of all entrants over the five year 
interval (1962 to I966). 
4. Continuous farm accounts, beginning January 1, 19^2 and 
ending December 31, 1966, was required. The farm accounts 
had to include (a) inventories of assets and debts, (b) 
expenditures and receipts and (c) crop and livestock pro­
duction records. 
5. Production of the same products over the five year inter­
val, 1962 to 1966, was required of each farm firm. These 
products were: corn, oats, soybeans, rotated hay, hogs 
and feeder cattle. 
Questionnaire II (Appendix B) was designed to obtain (l) relevant 
farm business data from the five years of continuous farm accounts 
(1962 to 1966) and (2) other relevant empirical information utilized 
in processing data input as required by the model. 
Farm business data were obtained from the following sources: 
(1) yearly summary cards which were prepared by the farm business con­
sultant and (2) yearly statements of farm business analysis as performed 
on the summary cards through data processing by the statistical labora­
tory, Iowa State University. 
Other relevant information required in processing data input as 
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required by the model was obtained through personal interview on the 
farm. 
Questionnaire II was completed for 9 entrant farm firms satisfying 
criteria 1 to 4, and for 18 satisfying criteria 1 to 5-^^ The model 
was applied only to the 18 farm firms.^' 
Glossary and explanation concerning the completion of questionnaire 
II are given in Appendix B. Coding methods for processing of data con­
tained in the questionnaires are also given in Appendix B. 
Estimated Economic Bench Marks 
Economic bench marks for land and labor were included in the model 
through supply levels associated with rows 105 and 122 (figure 9)• These 
bench marks were taken from phase A results and adjusted for use in this 
study (refer to pp. 79 and 82). 
Phase A (NC-53) characterized the I98O economic structure of the 
farm industry for subregions within 13 North Central States. It was 
based on selected economic optimality conditions. Within given subregions. 
The group of 9 farm firms satisfied criteria 5 only insofar as 
crops were concerned but not in relation to livestock products, as 2 
were specializing in turkeys, 1 in feeder hogs and 1 in dairy; the 
remaining 5 farms had gone in or out of production of one or more enter­
prises which included hogs, feeder cattle or poultry within the 5 year 
interval (1962 to I966). The purposes of obtaining data in this group 
of farm firms, in addition to the group satisfying all 5 criteria, were 
(1) to add depth in terms of empirical information that could be utilized 
in processing data input and (2) to indicate how tenure instruments were 
facilitating the procurement of inputs required by specialization of a 
single livestock enterprise. 
^'criteria 5 was basic in development of the model. 
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the 1980 structure of the farm firm was determined by dividing the 1980 
results of each subregion by the corresponding number of projected 
farms. Basic economic criteria employed in phase A are summarized below. 
1. Resource inputs were organized at minimum cost for each 
subregion in 1959, and then projected to 1980. The 1959 
minimum cost organization of resource inputs was based 
on farm samples in which each farm had resource earnings 
as large as (or larger than) corresponding resource 
opportunity cost. 
2. All nonland resource inputs earned opportunity cost as 
determined for 1959 and projected to I98O. 
3. Land resource inputs earned residual resource earnings, 
i.e. the amount remaining out of total resource earnings 
after all nonland inputs had received payments equal to 
opportunity costs. Opportunity cost for land was de­
termined by capitalizing residual resource earnings into 
land value and multiplying the resulting land value by 
thé long term mortgage rate. 
4. Market clearing prices were employed in the 1980 analysis. 
These prices were determined by allocating to each sub-
region the corresponding share of projected demand and 
supply of aggregate agricultural production. The product 
price index declined from 1.0 in 1959 to 0.70 in 1980, 
given a 2,0 per cent compounded productivity increase per 
year (64).32 
5. All inputs were organized under one management unit and 
treated in the analyses as if they were owned. In 
relation to this study, one management unit is perfectly 
correlated with a single operator. Accordingly, if farm 
partnerships and corporations involve two or more full 
time operators, then two or more management units are 
implied. Assuming constant returns to scale in farming, 
we obtain economic bench marks for a given farm firm by 
simply multiplying phase A bench marks (as adjusted for 
use in this study) by the number of full time operators. 
The phase A 1959 minimum cost solution at observed market prices 
included 372 acres of land and 21.1 months of labor (64), and the 
7 0  
Refer to table 2, Iowa subregion 2. 
Refer to table 1, Iowa subregion 2. 
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1980 minimum cost solution at market clearing prices included 677 acres 
of land and 16.3 months of labor (64).^^ 
The 1980 economic bench mark for land (677 acres) was adjusted to 
cropland acres for this study (658 acres). This adjusted bench mark 
was utilized in the model through determining the total cropland acres 
remaining that the individual farm firm could procure in interval k-1 
(p. 80). For interval k, total cropland acres remaining was determined 
by 3-SM 2.7 (p. 92). If a given firm involved two full time operators, 
the bench mark for cropland acres was doubled, and for three it was 
tripled. 
The 1959 and I98O bench marks for labor were converted to labor 
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hours. The rate of labor reduction per year was determined over the 
1959 to 1980 period. In accordance with this, the labor bench mark fo r  
January 1, 1962 was 2019-8 hours, and for December 31, 1981, 922.45 
hours. Variable labor bench marks in hours are utilized in the model 
through determining the total labor hours remaining that the individual 
farm firm may procure in interval k-1 (p. 82). For interval k, total 
labor hours remaining was determined by 3.SM 2.19 (p. 94). 
LR (p. 94) approximates the labor reduction per year over the 20 
year period (January 1, 1962 to December 31» 1981). it was written 
into SM 2 as 54.872, If a given firm involved two full time operators, 
34 
Refer to table 2, Iowa subregion 2. 
^^Each bench mark was converted to labor hours by assuming two-
thirds of the labor months to be summer labor, and the remaining one-
third winter labor. Labor hours per month were 260 in summer, and 200 
in winter (p. 82). 
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the bench mark for labor hours (January 1, 1962) was doubled, and for 
three it was tripled. 
Estimated Capital Gain or Loss 
Capital gain or loss was defined and introduced into SH 2 (pp. 115-
118). It was estimated in relation to (1) linear projected land values 
and (2) projected land values based on phase A results. 
Linear projected land values 
Land value as used in the context of this study includes the value 
of land plus buildings and other permanent improvements to land. Esti­
mated value of land and improvements per acre was determined for 
January 1, 1962 and 1967 from the data obtained by questionnaire I in 
relation to 27 entrant farm firms satisfying criteria 1 to 4 (p. 137). 
For each entrant farm firm, the inventory value of land and improvements 
owned plus leased was divided by the total acreage of land owned plus 
leased. The following regression equation was determined: 
VLl = 271.26 + 140.88 (t) where (4.1) 
VLI is the value of land and improvements per acre 
and t is time. The correlation coefficient was 0.756. 
This equation is adjusted for use in predicting the value of land 
^^In addition to estimating capital gain or loss, these two sets 
of land values are utilized independently by the model in order to test 
working hypotheses 1 (a) and (b). Land values are required in de­
termining the input-output coefficients for activities 92, 93, .., and 
96, and rows 123 and 124. 
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and improvements per acre to the mean year of each interval k-1 by 
letting t = k + 0.5. These values are: 
Value of land and improvements Interval k-1 
$482 per acre 0 
$623 per acre 1 
$764 per acre 2 
$905 per acre 3 
Capital gain (CG), reflecting the average amount by which the value 
of land and improvements rise over each interval k-1, was estimated as 
$l4l per acre and it was written into equations 3-SM 2.21, 3-SM 2.21a, 
3.SM 2.21b, ..., and 3.SM 2.21e (pp. 115-118). To determine the magni­
tude of capital gain per acre per year within interval k-1, we would 
divide by 5. 
Given linear projected land values and capital gain, the model was 
applied individually to 18 entrant farm firms satisfying criteria 1 to 
5 (p. 137). 
Land va 1ues based on phase ^  results 
The phase A 1959 minimum cost solution at observed market prices 
evaluated land at $331 per acre, and the I98O minimum cost solution at 
Of 
market clearing prices evaluated land at $167 per acre (64), given 
assumptions (p. 139). The rate of reduction in land values was de­
termined over the 1959 to I98O period. Accordingly, land values were 
37 
Refer to tables 1 and 2, Iowa subregion 2. 
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adjusted to the mean year of each interval k-1. These values are: 
Value of land and improvements interval k-1 
$292 per acre 0 
$253 per acre 1 
$214 per acre 2 
$175 per acre 3 
Capital loss (CL), reflecting the average amount by which the value 
of land and improvements decline over each interval k-1, was estimated 
as -39, and it was written into equations 3-SM 2.21, 3.SM 2.21a, 
3.SM 2.21b, ..., and 3-SM 2.21e (pp. 115-118), replacing the previously 
written AVLl = l4l. To determine the magnitude of the capital loss per 
acre per year within interval k-1, we would divide by 5. 
Given land values based on phase A results and capital loss, the 
model was again applied individually to entrant farm firms satisfying 
criteria 1 to 5 (p. 137). 
Empirical Procedures Utilized in Estimating 
Coefficients of Cropping Activities 
Four risk crops (corn, oats, soybeans and rotated hay) were defined 
and included in the model. Corn was produced through 12 activities, 
oats 6, soybeans 21 and rotated hay 6 (figure 9)- Net price, equity 
capital and labor coefficients (rows 131, 123 and 120, respectively) 
were developed in relation to cropping activities which were classified 
in accordance with (1) land ownership, (2) leasing contracts and (3) 
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forward conditional sale contracts. Techniques of production are the 
same within each of the above three classifications. Product price, 
yield and labor adjusters were developed from phase A analysis (NC-53), 
and were used for updating labor and net price coefficients. 
Development of coefficients for corn activities under 1 and ownership 
Net price, equity capital and labor coefficients, developed in 
relation to activities 1 to 4 for interval k-1 = 0, are given in 
table 1.^^ 
Under land ownership corn is produced by four different activities. 
Activities 3 and 4 employ identical technology, but activity 4 is based 
on the forward conditional sale contract as utilized in obtaining inputs 
of fertilizer, chemicals and seed. The amount of equity capital (row 
123) required by activity 4 per acre is reduced by the cost of these 
inputs, as compared to activity 3- Net price per acre associated with 
activity 4 is reduced by the contract price. The contract price was 
set at 1.0 per cent per month on the contractée's obligation. It was 
assumed that the average period of the contractee's obligation was six 
months. 
The amount of elemental fertilizer corresponding to low, high and 
super high fertilizer levels was 30-10-10, 80-36-15 and 120-60-60, 
respectively. The price per pound was set at for nitrogen, 9* for 
^^James' Midwest Farm Planning Manual (59). Howell, H. B., Everett 
Stoneberg and Harold Hill, Department of Economics, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa. Determining costs of production (excluding land taxes) and 
labor hours per acre. Private communication. 1968. 
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Table 1. Estimated net price, equity capital and labor coefficients 
in relation to corn activities 1 to 4 for the mean year 
of interval k-1 = 0 
I tern 
Activities 
2 3 
Expected product price per bus. 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 
Yield in bus. per acre 77 99 110 110 
Gross price 85.47 109.89 122.10 122.10 
Growing cost 10.49 11.19 11.19 11.19 
labor hrs. 2.99 2.18 2.18 2.18 
Harvesting and storage cost 13-86 16.38 17.65 17.65 
labor hrs. 1.19 1.47 1.57 1.57 
Fertilizer, chemicals & seed cost 7-90 17.94 26.70 28.30 
Farm operating overhead 2.58 3.64 4.44 4.57 
Land tax 4.74 4.74 4.74 4.74 
Total cost 39.57 53.89 64.72 66.45 
Net price 45.90 56.00 57.38 55-65 
Equity capital 39-57 53.89 64.72 39-75 
Labor hrs. 4.18 3-65 3-75 3-75 
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phosphate and 4* for potash. Corresponding corn yields per acre are 
39 
shown in table 1. 
Chemical herbicide was used with high and super high fertilizer. 
It was assumed that application of herbicide did not affect yields, but, 
instead, reduced the number of tillage operations required to control 
weeds. In effect, herbicides lowered tillage costs and reduced the 
amount of labor hours required per acre associated with growing costs. 
However, the reduced tillage operations did not offset the added growing 
costs of applying nitrogen by itself, as required under high and super 
high fertilizer use. Accordingly, growing costs were slightly lower in 
relation to activity 1 as compared to activities 2, 3 and 4. 
Seed costs were the same in relation to low and high fertilizer 
levels, but greater in relation to super high fertilizer. It was assumed 
that standard seeding rates as well as quality of seed could be limiting 
factors on yields in the case of super high fertilizer. In order to 
avoid this possibility, seeding rates and seed quality were adjusted 
upwa rd. 
Harvesting and storage costs per acre were based on a constant rate 
of $5.00, plus 11.5* per bushel which covered shelling (2c), hauling 
(1.5f), drying (5c) and storage (3*). Thus, harvesting and storage 
costs increased as yields went up. 
Labor hours associated with harvesting and storage were adjusted 
in relation to yield differences among the four activities. 
^^Voss, R. D., Agronomy Department, Iowa State University, Ames, 
Iowa. Determining corn yields. Private communication. 1968. 
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Farm operating overhead was based on 8 per cent of growing costs, 
plus harvesting and storage costs, plus fertilizer, chemicals and seed 
costs. 
Land tax (LT) was presumed to be a function of the value of land 
and improvements (VLl) (p. l4l). Estimated land tax per acre was 
determined for I962 and 1966 from data obtained by questionnaires I and 
II in relation to 16 entrant farm firms satisfying criteria 1 to 4 
(refer to item VIII glossary and explanation. Appendix B). Landlordfs) 
land tax was divided by total acreage of land leased by the entrant, 
farm firm. The following regression equation was determined: 
VLl was previously predicted at the mean year of each interval k-1 
(p. 142). Thus, land tax is determined in a corresponding manner and 
it is given below in relation to intervals k-1. 
LT = 1.228 + .0073 (VLl) (4.2) 
The correlation coefficient was 0.535. 
Land tax Interval k-1 
$4.74 per acre 
$5.78 per acre 
$6.80 per acre 
$7.83 per acre 
0 
2 
3 
Net price per acre for each activity was determined as follows: 
1. The expected product price of corn was determined by 
averaging the annual market price per bushel (58, 
p. 20) over the 5 year period, I962 to I966, inclusive. 
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2. The gross price per acre was determined through multi­
plying yield in bushels by expected price of corn. 
3. Net price was determined through subtracting total cost 
per acre from gross price per acre. 
Equity capital utilized by each activity was equal to the total 
cost, except in the case of activity 4 where fertilizer, chemical and 
seed costs as well as contract price were deducted from total cost. 
The product price adjuster Product price of corn was adjusted 
to the mean year of interval k through the following equation: 
(product price)^ = (product price)^ ^ 1 - 0.0143 (5 k) (4.3) 
The above equation was developed from phase A analysis (NC-53)• 
As given by the assumptions of phase A analysis (p. 139), the product 
price index declined from 1.0 in 1959 to O.JO in I98O. The rate of 
change in the price index was 0.0143 per year over the period 1959 to 
1980. Accordingly, the expected product price of corn (per bushel) was 
adjusted downward from interval k-1 to interval k. 
The yield adjuster Corn yields were adjusted upward from 
interval k-1 to the mean year of interval k by 4.4: 
(yield)|^ = (yield) (1.02)® (4.4) 
Equation 4.4 was based on 2 per cent compounded productivity 
increase per year as taken from phase A. 
The labor adjuster Labor utilized by each activity was 
adjusted downward from interval k-1 to the mean year of interval k 
through equation 4.5: 
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(labor coefficient)^^ = (labor coefficient) 
1 - 0.01083 (5 k) 
(4.5) 
The equation was developed from phase A results. Given assumptions 
as listed on page 139, the months of labor required by the farm firm 
declined from 21.1 months in 1959 to 16.3 months in I98O. A labor index 
was estimated in terms of 1959- It declined from 1.0 in 1959 to 0.77251 
in 1980. The rate of change in the labor index was 0.01083 per year 
over the period 1959 to 1980. 
Assumptions concerning adjustment of production costs over time 
Growing cost was assumed to be constant over intervals k-1. 
Harvesting and storage cost rates were assumed to be constant over 
intervals k-1. However, these rates were partially dependent on pro­
jected yields. Harvesting and storage cost increased in relation to 
projected yields. 
Fertilizer, chemical and seed costs were assumed to be constant 
over intervals k-1. 
Farm operating overhead cost rate of 8 per cent was assumed to be 
constant over intervals k-1. But, operating overhead increased in 
relation to the affects of harvesting and storage cost. 
A complete listing of estimated coefficients ^ J_a figure 9 is given 
for each interval k-1 in Appendix C. 
Development of coefficients for oats activities under land ownership 
Net price, equity capital and labor coefficients, developed in 
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relation to activities 13 and 14 for interval k-1 = 0, are given in 
iiQ 
table 2. " 
The amount of elemental fertilizer corresponding to low and high 
fertilizer was 15-18-10 and 30-36-35, respectively. Low fertilizer 
was assumed equal to the average carry-over from previous years. Thus, 
low fertilizer cost was zero. High fertilizer cost was determined in 
relation to the amount of elemental fertilizer required in addition to 
the average carry-over from previous years. Yields corresponding to 
4l 
low and high fertilizer are given in table 2. 
Growing costs were the same in relation to both oats activity 13 
and 14, but harvesting and storage costs per acre were based on a 
constant rate of $4.00, plus 4.5C per bushel which covered hauling 
(1.5*) and storage (3<j) • As in the case of corn activities 1 to 4, oats 
harvesting and storage costs increased as yields went up. 
Labor hours associated with the harvesting and storage of oats 
were adjusted in relation to yield differences among the two activities. 
Farm operating overhead was based on 8.5 per cent of growing costs, 
plus harvesting and storage costs, plus fertilizer and seed costs. 
Estimation and projection of the coefficients (table 2) over inter­
vals k-1 were carried out through the same methods and procedures as 
previously developed (pp. 147-149). 
40 
Howell, Stoneberg and Hill, 0£. cit. 
41 
Voss, op. cit. 
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Table 2. Estimated net price, equity capital and labor coefficients 
in relation to oats activities 13 and 14 for the mean year 
of interval k-1 = 0 
I tern 
Activities 
13 14 
Expected product price per bus. 0.66 0.66 
Yield in bus. per acre 62 74 
Gross price 40.92 48.84 
Growing cost 3.44 3-44 
labor hrs. .73 .73 
Harvesting and storage cost 6.79 - 7-33 
labor hrs. .67 .69 
Fertilizer and seed cost 2.50 6.37 
Farm operating overhead I.08 1.46 
Land tax 4.74 4.74 
Total cost 18.55 23.34 
Net price 22.37 25.50 
Equity capital 18.55 23.34 
Labor hrs. 1.40 1.42 
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Development of coefficients for soybean activities under 1 and ownership 
Net price, equity capital and labor coefficients, developed in 
relation to activities 19 to 25 for interval k-1 = 0, are given in 
hi 
table 3-
Under land ownership, soybeans are produced by seven different 
activities. Activities 24 and 25 employ identical technology, but 
activity 25 is based on the forward conditional sale contract as uti­
lized in obtaining inputs of fertilizer, chemicals and seed. As in 
the case of corn (p. 144), the amount of equity capital (row 123) 
required by activity 25 is reduced by the cost of these inputs, as 
compared to activity 24. The contract price was determined under the 
same assumptions as previously employed for corn activity 4 (p. 144). 
The amount of elemental fertilizer corresponding to low, high and 
super high fertilizer levels was 15-18-10, 15-26-35 and 15-40-40, re­
spectively. Low fertilizer was assumed equal to the average carry­
over from previous years corn production. Thus, low fertilizer cost 
43 
was zero. High and super high fertilizer costs were determined in 
relation to the amount of elemental fertilizer required in addition to 
the average carry-over from previous years. Yields corresponding to 
44 
low, high and super high fertilizer are given in table 3-
Chemical herbicide was used as soil treatment with activities 20, 
42 
Howell, Stoneberg and Hill, o£. cit. 
^^This also implies no fertilizer application costs in relation 
to growing costs of activities 19 and 20. 
44 
Voss, 0£. cit. 
Table 3. Estimated net price, equity capital and labor coefficients In relation to soybeans 
activities 19 to 25 for the mean year of interval k-1 = 0 
Act I vit les 
I tern 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Expected product price per bus. 2.54 2.54 2 .54 2.54 2. 54 2.54 2.54 
Yield In bus. per acre 26 26 32 32 35 35 35 
Gross price 66.04 66.04 81 .28  81.28 88. 90 88.90 88.90 
Growing cost 9.49 7.78 9 .99 7.78 9. 99 7.78 7.78 
labor hrs. 2.56 1.92 2 .56 1.92 2. 56 1.92  1.92 
Harvesting and storage cost 5.56 5.56 5 .92 5.92 6. 10 6.10 6.10 
labor hrs. . 65 .65 .69 .69 . 71 .71 .71 
Fertilizer, chemicals S seed cost 4.00 12.00 5 .72 13.72 7. 18 15.18 16.21 
Farm operating overhead 1.62 2.16 1 .85 2.33 1. 98 2.47 2.56 
Land tax 4.74 4.74 4 .74 4.74 4. 74 4.74 4.74 
Total cost 25.41 32.24 28 .22 34.49 29. 99 36.27 37.39 
Net price 40.63 33.80 53 .06 46.79 58. 91 52.63 51.51 
Equity capital 25.41 32.24 28 .22 34.49 29. 99 36.27 22.21 
Labor hrs. 3.21 2.57 3 .25 2.61 3. 27 2.63 2.63 
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22, 24 and 25- The cost per acre was set at $8.00 whereas in the case 
of corn it was set at $4.00. it was assumed that application of 
herbicide did not affect yields, but, instead, reduced the number of 
tillage operations required to control weeds. This lowered tillage 
costs and reduced the amount of labor hours required in relation to per 
acre growing costs. 
Harvesting and storage costs per acre were based on a constant 
rate of $4.00, plus per bushel which covered hauling (3*) and storage 
(3*). Accordingly, harvesting and storage costs increased as yields 
went up. 
Labor hours associated with harvesting and storage were adjusted in 
relation to yield differences among the seven soybean activities (19-25). 
Farm operating overhead was based on 8 per cent (the same rate as 
used in relation to corn) of growing costs, plus harvesting and storage 
costs, plus fertilizer, chemicals and seed costs. 
Estimation and projection of the coefficients (table 3) over 
intervals k-1 were carried out through the same methods and procedures 
as previously developed (pp. 147-149). 
Development of coefficients for rotated hay activities under 1 and ownersh 
Net price, equity capital and labor coefficients, developed in 
relation to activities 40 and 4l for interval k-1 = 0, are given in 
table 4.^^ 
The amount of elemental fertilizer corresponding to low and high 
45 
Howell, Stoneberg and Hill, op. cit. 
155 
Table h. Estimated net price, equity capital and labor coefficients 
in relation to rotated hay activities 40 and 41 for the 
mean year of interval k-1 = 0 
Activities 
I tern 
40 41 
Expected product price per ton 18.88 18.88 
Yield in tons per acre 3-1 4.0 
Gross price 58.53 75-52 
Growing cost 2.24 2.24 
labor hrs. 2.66 2.66 
Harvesting and storage cost 21.57 25.28 
labor hrs. 3-09 3.70 
Fertilizer and seed cost 8.50 14.37 
Farm operating overhead 2.32 3.37 
Land tax 4.74 4.74 
Total cost 39-37 50.00 
Net price 19-16 25.52 
Equity capital 39-37 50-00 
Labor hrs. 5-75 6.36 
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fertilizer levels was 20-8-32 and 20-60-60, respectively. Low fertilizer 
was equivalent to four ton of manure which was assumed to be applied to 
each acre of rotated hay. The cost of hauling manure was set at $1.25 
per ton. Since rotated hay was raised after oats (the nurse crop), there 
was assumed to be no carry-over of elemental fertilizer. High fertilizer 
was determined in relation to the amount of elemental fertilizer required 
in addition to the nutrients provided by the manure application. Yields 
corresponding to low and high fertilizer are given in table 4 in terms 
46 
of tons per acre. 
Growing costs were the same in relation to both rotated hay activi­
ties 40 and 4l, but harvesting and storage costs per acre were based on 
a constant rate of $6.72 to cover mowing, conditioning and raking, plus 
12.8c per bale which covered baling (10*), hauling (2c) and storage 
(.8*). In accordance with this, harvesting and storage costs increased 
as yields went up. 
Labor hours associated with harvesting and storage of hay were 
adjusted in relation to yield. 
Farm operating overhead was based on 8.5 per cent of growing costs, 
plus harvesting and storage costs, plus fertilizer and seed costs. 
Estimation and projection of the coefficients (table 4) over inter­
vals k-1 were carried out through the same methods and procedures as 
previously developed (pp. 147-149). 
46,, .. 
V O S S ,  0 £ .  C I t .  
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Development of coefficients for cropping activities under leasing contracts 
To develop coefficients for cropping activities under leasing con­
tracts, adjustments were made in equity capital and net price coefficients 
of corn, oats, soybeans and rotated hay activities based on land ownership. 
The nature of these adjustments is summarized below. 
1. Equity capital coefficients in relat ion to cropping 
activities were adjusted downward in accordance with 
landlord(s) contributions toward costs. 
2. Net price coefficients in relation to cropping activities 
were adjusted in accordance with landlord(s) contribution 
toward costs, and landlord(s) sharing of gross prices. 
In 1962, 27 entrant farm firms held 41 leasing contracts. The break­
down was 4 cash leases, 27 crops share leases and 10 livestock share 
leases. In 1966, the same farm firms held 44 leasing contracts in which 
6 were cash leases, 31 crops share leases and 7 livestock share leases. 
Essentially, the characteristics of the three types of leases remained 
the same between these two points in time. In view of this, we summed 
each of the three types of leases over the two points in time and examined 
the modal characteristics within each type. 
The cash lease Under the cash leasing contract, total cost per 
acre in relation to cropping activities declined by the amount of the 
land tax. Accordingly, equity capital coefficients were lowered by the 
amount of the land tax, and net price coefficients were enlarged by the 
same amount. The landlord(s) contribution was land tax and there was no 
landlord(s) sharing of gross prices. As summed over two points in time 
(1962 and 1966), cash leases accounted for 10 leasing contracts or ap­
proximately 12 per cent of the total number (85) of leasing contracts 
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held by 27 entrant farm firms satisfying criteria 1 to 4 (p. 137). 
The crops and crops-livestock share lease Under the crops or 
crops-livestock share leasing contracts, total cost per acre in relation 
to cropping activities declined by the amount of the land tax, plus the 
landlord(s) other contributions toward total cost. Equity capital coef­
ficients declined pari passu with landlord(s) contributions. Net price 
coefficients were adjusted in relation to both the landlord(s) contri­
butions toward total cost and the landlord(s) sharing of gross prices. 
Crops share leases accounted for 58 leasing contracts or 68 per cent of 
the total number and crops-livestock share leases accounted for 17 
leasing contracts or 20 per cent of the total. 
Sharing of crop production All crops and crops-livestock 
share leases included 50/50 sharing of corn production. Out of a total 
of 75 crops or crops-livestock share leases, 63 included 50/50 sharing 
of oats and soybean production, 12 included 40/60 sharing of oats in 
which 7 of these also included 40/60 sharing of soybean production (i.e. 
landlord(s) received 40 rather than 50 per cent of crop production). 
In view of the modal sharing arrangement (50/50), and Hurl hurt's 
second incentive condition that "the shares of all products must be the 
same" (p. 48), the gross prices in relation to corn, oats and soybean 
activities were halved. 
In relation to crops share leases, 97 per cent involved cash 
leasing of rotated hay acreage. Only 3 per cent involved a sharing 
arrangement for rotated hay. However, in relation to the crops-livestock 
share lease, only 13 per cent involved cash leasing in relation to 
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rotated hay, whereas 87 per cent involved a 50/50 sharing arrangement. 
Because rotated hay represented an extremely small enterprise in com­
parison to corn and soybeans, it was assumed that whether or not rotated 
hay was based on a cash leasing or share leasing arrangement it made 
little difference to the over-all cropping plan, and to net farm income. 
Accordingly, cash leasing was accepted as being the modal arrangement 
for both crops and crops-livestock share leases. The average cash rent 
paid on total rotated hay acreage in relation to 27 entrant farm firms 
was $10.31 per acre over the period 1962 to I966. As in the case of 
the regular cash leasing contract, landlord(s) contribution was land tax 
and there was no landlord(s) sharing of gross prices. Accordingly, 
total cost in relation to rotated hay activities increased by the amount 
of the cash rent paid less land tax. Equity capital coefficients also 
increased by the same amount and net price coefficients declined in 
relation to adjusted total cost. 
Sharing of operating expenditures All crops and crops-
livestock share leases included 50/50 sharing of fertilizer, chemicals 
and seed costs in relation to corn production. They also involved the 
sharing of some harvesting costs. The modal sharing arrangement was 
one-half the shelling costs. Total shelling cost agreed upon in the 
lease varied from 2* to h<^ per bushel. Variation in the rate reflected 
negotiations between landlord(s) and tenant(s) rather than the method 
of harvesting. Other sporadic arrangements, including half the drying 
costs, hauling and storage or combining, were involved throughout the 
75 crops and crops-livestock share leases. 
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In view of the modal arrangements, total cost per acre in relation 
to corn activities was adjusted downward by landlord(s) contributions 
which included (1) land tax, (2) one-half the shelling cost and (3) one-
half the fertilizer, chemicals and seed cost. Equity capital coefficients 
declined correspondingly with landlord(s) contributions. Net price coef­
ficients were determined on the basis of (1) adjusted total cost and (2) 
one-half the gross price. 
Out of 75 share leases, 63 included 50/50 sharing of fertilizer, 
chemicals and seed costs associated with both oats and soybean production, 
12 included no landlord(s) sharing of fertilizer, chemicals and seed 
costs associated with oats, and 7 out of the 12 included no landlord(s) 
sharing of fertilizer, chemicals and seed costs associated with soybean 
production. On the basis of the 75 share leases held by our 27 entrant 
farm firms, landlord(s) did not contribute toward fertilizer, chemicals 
and seed costs, if they received only 40 per cent of the corresponding 
production (refer to p. 158). 
The modal sharing arrangement concerning fertilizer, chemicals and 
seed costs associated with oats and soybean production was accepted. 
Total cost per acre in relation to oats and soybean activities was 
adjusted downward by landlord(s) contributions which included (1) land 
tax and (2) one-half the fertilizer, chemicals and seed cost. As in 
the case of corn activities, equity capital coefficients declined corre­
spondingly with landlord(s) contributions, and net price coefficients 
were determined on the basis of (l) adjusted total cost and (2) one-half 
the gross price. 
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It is obvious that both Hurl hurt's first and third incentive 
conditions (p. 4?) are violated by crops and crops-livestock share 
leasing arrangements held by our 27 entrant farm firms, since not all 
inputs are shared in the same proportion as outputs. The 12 share 
leases, previously referred to, violated in addition to the first and 
third, the second incentive condition. However, the affects on resource 
efficiency may be slight due to frequently occurring negotiations 
between landlord(s) and tenant(s). For example, when the landlord 
accepts only 40 per cent of production, it is likely that he has negoti­
ated the amounts and types of fertilizer, chemicals and seed applications 
in order to maintain high levels of production, reflecting efficient 
use of resources. 
Empirical Procedures Utilized in Estimating 
Coefficients of Livestock Activities 
Two risk 1ivestock enterprises (hogs and feeder cattle) were 
defined and included in the model. Hogs were produced through 12 
activities and feeder cattle 6 (figure 9). Net price, equity capital, 
labor and housing space coefficients were developed in relation to 
livestock activities which were classified in accordance with (1) 
ownership of land and housing facilities, (2) leasing contracts and 
(3) forward conditional sale contracts. As in the case of cropping 
activities, techniques of production are the same within each of the 
above three classifications. The previously developed adjusters 
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(pp. 147-149) were again used in updating labor and net price coefficients. 
The unit of production in relation to livestock activities was based 
on the animal unit. 
Defining the animal unit 
The animal unit is generally accepted as "the amount of feed consumed 
per head per year by . . . kind of livestock divided by the amount con­
sumed by one milk cow" (99, pp. 1-2). in relation to this definition of 
the animal unit, hogs on Iowa grain base rations produce 0.75 animal units 
per head per year, and feeder cattle on Iowa grain base rations produce 
2.5 animal units per head per year (99, p. 45). 
Marketable live pork per animal unit The amount of marketable 
live pork per animal unit was determined on the basis of (l) 220 pound 
market hogs and (2) market weight of hogs attained in 5*5 months from 
farrowing date. Accordingly, 2.18 hogs are produced in one year. The 
amount of marketable live pork per animal unit ( (2.18)(220)/0.75 ) is 
approximately equal to 640 pounds. 
Marketable live beef per animal unit The amount of marketable 
live beef per animal unit was determined on the basis of 2.054 pounds 
gain per day on feeder cattle. In one year this amounts to approximately 
750 pounds. Thus, by dividing 750 pounds by 2.5, the amount of market­
able live beef per animal unit is 300 pounds. 
Development of coefficients for hog activities under ownership 
Net price, equity capital, winter and summer labor coefficients, 
developed in relation to activities 46 to 49 for interval k-1 = 0, are 
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k l  
given in table 5-
Table 5. Estimated net price, equity capital, winter and summer labor 
coefficients in relation to hog activities 46 to kS for the 
mean year of interval k-1 = 0 
Activities 
Item 46 47 48 49 
Gross price per animal unit 112.92 112.92 119.35 119.35 
Feed inputs: corn 46.25 48.10 36.89 36.89 
hay 3.29 3.29 0.73 0.73 
supplements 
& minerals 22.85 23.76 13.12 13.12 
Cost of feeder pigs - - 45.77 44.87 
Other costs^ 15.03 15.03 10.79 10.79 
Total cost 87.42 90.18 107.30 106.40 
Net price 25.50 22.74 12.05 12.95 
Equity capital 87.42 21.08 62.43 106.40 
Labor hours: summer 5.17 5.17 2.14 2.14 
winter 2.58 2.58 1.07 1.07 
Other costs are insurance and taxes, breeding charges, veterinary 
and medical, machinery and equipment repairs and depreciation plus power 
and fuel, building depreciation plus building insurance and taxes, and 
miscellaneous (50, pp. 8, 11). Breeding charges are not applicable to 
activities 48 and 49. 
47 
Production costs and labor 
costs and returns for use in farm 
and Everett Stoneberg (50, pp. 5, 
with the animal unit. 
requirements were based on "suggested 
budgeting" as prepared by H. B. Howell 
8, 11) and were adjusted in accordance 
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Hog farrowing activities (46 and 47) employ identical technology, 
but activity 47 is based on the forward conditional sale contract as 
utilized in obtaining feed inputs of corn and supplements plus minerals. 
The amount of equity capital (row 123) required by activity 47 is reduced 
by the cost of these feed inputs, as compared to activity 46. Net price 
per animal unit associated with activity 47 is reduced by the contract 
price. The contract price was set at 1.0 per cent per month on the con­
tractée' s obligation. It was assumed that the average period of the 
contractée's obligation was four months. 
Feeder hog activities (48 and 49) imply that feeder pigs are 
purchased and raised to market weight, as differentiated from farrowing 
activities which imply that pigs are farrowed on the farm and raised to 
market weight. Feeder hog activities (48, 49) employ identical tech­
nology, but activity 48 is based on short term credit as utilized in 
obtaining the feeder pigs. Short term credit was assumed to be available 
for use in purchasing feeder pigs, providing the farm firm had enough 
feed inputs on inventory that would raise these pigs to market weight 
(p. 39). Consequently, short term credit utilized for the purpose of 
purchasing feeder pigs essentially precludes the need of the forward 
conditional sale contract in obtaining feed inputs required in raising 
them to market weight. 
The interest charge on short term credit used in purchasing feeder 
pigs was based on (1) simple interest rate at 6 per cent and (2) average 
period of the loan at 4 months. The interest charge was added to total 
cost, reducing the net price of activity 48 as compared to activity 49. 
lés 
Gross price was determined by averaging the annual value increase 
per animal unit in relation to entrant farm firms over the 5 year period, 
1962 to 1966, inclusive. The following equation (4.6) was developed: 
Gross price per animal unit = (640) e (hog value increase). / (4.6) 
i=l ' 
# 
E (hog weight increase-hog weight loss). 
i=l ' 
where # was defined in relation to the number 
of observations associated independently with 
(1) hog farrowing and (2) feeder pigs. 
Gross price was less for (1) than (2), since (1) included the value 
of both breeding stock and market hogs whereas (2) included only market 
hogs. 
Costs in relation to activities 46 and 47 were based on one sow and 
two litters given 7-5 pigs weaned per litter (50, pp. 8, 11). The number 
of animal units corresponding to 15 market weight hogs was determined 
[(220)(15)/64o) as 5.16, and divided into costs per item (table 5), in 
order to calculate costs per animal unit. 
Costs (excluding cost of feeder pigs) in relation to activities 48 
and 49 were based on 10 feeder pigs (50, pp. 8, 11) raised to market 
weight. As above, costs per animal unit were determined through dividing 
costs by ((220)(10)/640] or 3.43 animal units. 
48 
Refer to Appendix B, item X. 
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Cost of feeder pigs per animal unit was determined through multi­
plying average purchase price per pound by the average weight of a lot of 
10 feeder pigs (450 pounds), and dividing by 3.43. 
Cost of feeder pigs # 
per animal unit = Z (feeder pig value bought). / (4.7) 
3^ Ml 
# 
2 (feeder pig weight bought). 
i=l ' 
where # was defined in relation to the 
number of observations associated with 
the purchase of feeder pigs by entrant 
^ X- 49 farm firms. 
Costs associated with corn and hay were based on (1) the expected 
product prices of corn per bushel, and hay per ton, over the period 1962 
to 1966, inclusive, and (2) the physical amount of corn and hay required 
as feed inputs. 
Total labor hours required in raising market hogs, associated with 
(1) one sow and two litters and (2) 10 feeder pigs (50, p. 5), were 
converted to labor per animal unit, and allocated in accordance with the 
seasonal length of summer and winter, as defined in relation to labor 
supply levels (p. 82). Consequently, summer labor hours per animal unit 
was determined as two-thirds of total labor hours, and winter as one-third. 
49 
Refer to Appendix B, item XI. 
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Net price, equity capital as well as summer and winter labor coef­
ficients were projected to the mean year of interval k. 
Projected net prices were based on the following adjustments: 
1. Gross prices were projected to the mean year of interval k 
through the procedure of equation 4.3, i.e. gross price 
was substituted for product price. 
2. Corn and hay costs were based on (1) expected product 
prices of corn per bushel and hay per ton projected to the 
mean year of interval k through equation 4.3 and (2) the 
physical amount of corn and hay projected to the mean year 
of interval k by equation 4.8, i.e. in lieu of the as­
sumption of 2 per cent compounded productivity increase 
per year, we now assume 2 per cent compounded livestock 
feed efficiency increase per year. 
(physical amount of corn or hay)^ = (physical amount (4.8) 
of corn or hay)|^_^ (O.98)® 
3. Feeder pig costs were projected to the mean year of 
interval k through the procedure of equation 4.3, i.e. 
feed pig cost is substituted for product price. 
4. Supplements and minerals as well as other costs were 
assumed to be constant over intervals k-l. 
Equity capital coefficients were adjusted in relation to the changes 
in feed input costs and feeder pig costs over intervals. 
Labor coefficients (summer or winter) were adjusted downward from 
interval k-l to the mean year of interval k by equation 4.5. 
Hog farrowing and hog growing space coefficients were based on the 
animal unit as previously defined, and assumed to be constant over 
intervals. Space was converted from physical numbers to animal units 
2 la the previous methodology associated with livestock housing space 
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(pp. 80-81). 
A complete listing of estimated coefficients is given for each 
interval k-1 in Appendix C. 
Development of coefficients for feeder cattle activities under ownership 
Net price, equity capital, winter and summer labor coefficients, 
developed in relation to activities 58 and 59 for interval k-1 = 0, are 
given in table 6.^^ 
Table 6. Estimated net price, equity capital, winter and summer labor 
coefficients in relation to feeder cattle activities 58 and 59 
for the mean year of interval k-1 = 0 
1 tem Activities 
58 59 
Gross price per animal unit -70.86 70.86 
Feed inputs: corn 17.77 17.77 
hay 6.94 6,94 
supplements and minerals 2.76 2.76 
Cost of feeder steers 36.52 34.78 
Other costs^ 3.48 3.48 
Total cost 67.47 65.73 
Net price 3.39 5.13 
Equity capital 32.69 65.73 
Labor hours: summer 1.34 1.34 
winter 0.89 0.89 
^Other costs are insurance and taxes, veterinary and medical, 
machinery and equipment repairs and depreciation plus power and fuel, 
building depreciation plus building insurance and taxes, and miscel­
laneous (50, pp. 7, n). 
^^Howell and Stoneberg, op. cit. 
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Feeder cattle activities (58 and 59) employ identical technology, 
but activity 58 is based on short term credit as utilized in obtaining 
the feeder cattle. As in the case of feeder pigs, short term credit 
was available, providing the farm firm had enough feed inputs on inventory 
that could be used for feeding steers up to market weight. This pre­
cludes the need of the forward conditional sale contract in obtaining 
feed inputs. 
The interest charge on short term credit used in purchasing feeder 
cattle was based on (1) simple interest at 6 per cent and (2) average 
period of the loan at 10 months. The corresponding interest charge was 
added to total cost (through increasing the cost of feeder cattle 
purchases), reducing the net price of activity 58 as compared to activity 
59. 
Gross price was determined through the procedure of equation 4.6 
(p. 165). Feeder cattle value increase, weight increase and weight loss 
were substituted for hog value increase, weight increase and weight loss. 
The constant 300 was substituted for 640. The number of observations 
was 90. 
Costs in relation to activities 58 and 59 were based on 1100 pound 
market weight steers (50, pp. 7, 11), in which the average weight before 
going on feed was 542 pounds (50, p. 7).^^ The number of animal units 
corresponding to one 1100 pound market weight steer was (1100/300) or 
^^^Enterprise relationships associated with "steers fed-yearlings 
and steers fed-calves" were averaged. This procedure was based on the 
empirical findings that (1) the actual average weight of steers bought 
by 18 entrant farm firms was 544 pounds and (2) the average period on 
feed was 9.5 months. 
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3.81. Correspondingly, costs per animal unit were determined by dividing 
costs per item (table 6) by 3.81. 
Cost of feeder cattle per animal unit was determined in the manner 
of 4.7. The average cost of one feeder steer was $132.51. This cost 
was converted to animal unit basis by dividing it by 3.81. 
Costs associated with corn and hay were again based on expected 
product prices and the physical amount of corn and hay required as feed 
inputs. 
Total labor hours required in feeding one steer (50, p. 5) were 
converted to labor per animal unit, and, as in the case of hogs, allo­
cated in accordance with the defined seasonal length of summer and 
wi nter. 
Feeder cattle space coefficients were based on the animal unit, and 
assumed constant over intervals. Space was converted from physical 
numbers to animal units (p. 8I). 
Estimation and projection of coefficients (table 6) over intervals 
were carried out through procedures analogous to those used in relation 
to hog activities 46 to 49. 
Development of coefficients for 1ivestock activities under leasing 
contracts 
The nature of the adjustments required to develop livestock coef­
ficients under leasing contracts from previously developed livestock 
coefficients under ownership of land and housing facilities were 
essentially the same as those summarized in relation to crops (p. 157). 
The leasing contracts associated with livestock production were 
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the same three basic types dealt with under crops. In I962, livestock 
housing facilities were provided under 2 cash leases, 15 crops share 
leases and 7 crops-livestock share leases, in one case involving a 
crops share lease, the tenant paid cash rent for the building site, in 
all other cases, the tenant either shared livestock production with 
landlord(s) in return for landlord(s) contributions or was free to utilize 
the buildings as part of the leasing contract associated with crops. 
The cash or crops share lease Under cash or crops share leasing 
contracts, as compared to ownership of land and facilities, the total 
cost declined by the amount of the building depreciation plus insurance 
and taxes. Accordingly, equity capital coefficients were lowered by the 
amount of the building depreciation plus insurance and taxes per animal 
unit, and net price coefficients were enlarged by the same amount. 
Building depreciation plus insurance and taxes was the landlord(s) 
contribution, and there was no landlord(s) sharing of gross prices. 
Landlord(s) contributions per animal unit amounted to $3.88, $2.62 and 
$0.79 in relation to activities 46-47, 48-49 and 58-59, respectively. 
The crops-1ivestock share lease Under crops-livestock share 
leasing contracts, as compared to ownership of land and livestock fa­
cilities, the total cost declined in accordance with landlord(s) 
contributions of (1) building depreciation plus building insurance 
and taxes and (2) one-half the cost of (a) feed inputs, (b) feeder pigs 
or steers and (c) other costs excluding (1) above. Equity capital 
coefficients declined correspondingly with landlord(s) contributions. 
Net price coefficients were adjusted in relation to both the landlord(s) 
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contributions toward total cost and the landlord(s) compensation in 
terms of one-half the gross prices. 
Examination of 17 crops-livestock share leases associated with two 
points in time (1962 and 1966) provided the following information: 
1. All livestock enterprises included under these 17 leases 
involved 50/50 sharing of production implying that 
landlord(s) receive one-half the gross price per animal 
unit in relation to activities 54-57 and 62-63. 
2. All livestock enterprises involved 50/50 sharing of 
feed inputs and costs of procuring feeder pigs or steers. 
3. All livestock enterprises also involved 50/50 sharing 
of "other costs" with the exception of (a) building 
depreciation plus building insurance and taxes and (b) 
power and fuel associated with the use of tenant(s) 
machinery and equipment for purposes directly related 
to livestock production. 
The breakdown of 3 (a) and (b) into its parts was not available. 
In view of this, it was assumed that landlord(s) contributed 3 (a) and 
one-half the costs associated with 3 (b)• 
Estimating Variance-Covariances of Net Prices for 
Cropping and Livestock Activities 
Variance-covariances of net returns (i.e. net prices) per acre and 
per animal unit were estimated for the 63 activities previously discussed 
in relation to crops and livestock. Empirical procedures are given in 
Appendix D. Also included in Appendix D is a complete listing of variance 
covariances for each interval k-1. 
Variance-covariances were based on three sources of data: (1) yields 
per acre and value increase per animal unit associated with 18 entrant 
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farm firms satisfying criteria 1 to 5 (p. 137) over the 5 year period 
(1962 to 1966) as processed from item X, questionnaire II, Appendix B, 
(2) total cost per acre and per animal unit as previously estimated in 
relation to activities 1, 2, —, 63 and (3) annual market prices of corn, 
oats, soybeans (per bushel) and rotated hay (per ton) over the period 
1962 to 1966 (58, p. 20). 
Variation in yields, resulting from productivity increases over the 
5 year period, was taken out of the data used in calculating variance-
covariances for interval k-1 = 0. Afterwards productivity increase 
occurring between intervals was put back in through application of the 
yield adjuster (p. 148) to each observation. 
Annual market prices were adjusted individually from interval k-1 to 
k through application of the price adjuster (p. 148). 
Observations associated with value increase per animal unit were 
adjusted individually from interval k-1 to k through application of the 
price adjuster. 
In view of the above, gross returns per crop per acre over farms and 
years were calculated for a given interval k-1. This provided four arrays 
of observations: one array for each kind of crop. Net returns per acre 
were estimated by subtracting total cost associated with each cropping 
activity for a given interval from the pertinent crop array. For example, 
total cost associated with each corn activity was independently subtracted 
from the corn array of gross returns over farms and years, providing 12 
arrays of the same dimensions. Similarly, this was done in relation to 
oats, soybeans and rotated hay, providing 6, 21 and 6 arrays of the same 
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dimensions as corn. 
A parallel procedure was utilized in estimating net returns for 
kind of livestock per animal unit over farms and years, providing 12 and 
6 arrays of the same dimensions as corn. 
Four sets of 63 arrays of equal dimension were calculated: one for 
each interval k-1. Accordingly, four variance-covariance matrices (each 
one 63 X 63) were computed and arranged in the format required by the 
Q.P-SM model (figure 10). 
Empirical Procedures Utilized in Estimating 
Coefficients of Nonrisk Activities 
Thirty-five nonrisk activities were defined and included in the 
model. Nonrisk activities were grouped into 6 cropping, 12 livestock 
housing space, 16 general and 1 artificial (figure 9). 
Nonrisk cropping activities 
Nonrisk crops included land retirement through government diverted 
acres (activities 64, 65, 66) and production of improved hay (activities 
67. 68, 69). Net price, equity capital and labor coefficients (rows 131, 
123 and 120, respectively) were developed for these activities in ac­
cordance with the classifications of (1) land ownership and (2) leasing 
contracts. Techniques of production were the same within each of the 
above two classifications. 
Government diverted acres The gross price per acre in relation 
to GDA activities (64, 65, 66) was estimated by averaging over 1965, and 
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1966, the payments per GDA acre received by entrant farm firms in the 
land retirement program. The gross price was $72.16 per acre averaged 
over the two years (1965 to 1966), This gross price was used in interval 
k-1 = 0, and it was adjusted to interval k by equation 4.9. 
(4.9) (GDA gross price)^ = |^(corn gross price)^ / (corn gross price) 
|(1.02)® (GDA gross price)^ ^ 
Growing cost was estimated at $3.19 per acre and seed cost at $3.00. 
Both these costs were assumed to be constant over intervals k-1. 
Total cost under land ownership was $10.93 per acre. Over intervals 
total cost was affected by land tax. 
Landlord(s) contributed the land tax under leasing contracts, in 
the case of the cash lease, total cost declined by the amount of the land 
tax and net price increased by the same amount. However, in the case of 
the crops or crops-livestock share lease, landlord(s) contributed the 
land tax and received one-half the gross price. Net prices and equity 
capital coefficients were adjusted correspondingly. 
Labor hours per acre were estimated at 0.73, and were assumed to 
remain the same over intervals k-1. 
Improved hay Parallel procedures were used in estimating the 
pertinent coefficients for improved hay activities (67, 68, 69) as rotated 
hay (pp. 154-156, and p. 158). Assumptions used in the development of 
coefficients in relation to improved hay activities are summarized below. 
1. Yield (tons) per acre was assumed to be approximately one-half 
the yield of rotated hay produced with low fertilizer application 
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(table 4) in interval k-1 = 0, and yield was assumed to 
be unaffected by productivity increases in rotated hay 
yields. 
2. The expected product price per ton was assumed to be 
$15.00 as compared to $18.88 in the case of rotated hay 
in interval k-1 = 0. As in the case of rotated hay, the 
price adjuster was used in adjusting the product price 
per ton of improved hay to interval k. 
3. It was also assumed that no fertilizer was applied to 
acreage under improved hay. 
Growing costs were zero. Harvesting and storage of hay was estimated 
at $10.11 per acre, and assumed to be constant over intervals. Fertilizer, 
chemicals and seed costs were zero. Operating overhead was $0.80 per 
acre, and constant over intervals. 
Total cost under land ownership was $15.65 per acre, and over inter­
vals it was affected by land tax. 
Landlord(s) contributed the land tax under leasing contracts and 
received cash rent averaging $9.14 per acre for improved hay. Net price 
and equity capital coefficients were adjusted correspondingly. 
Labor hours per acre were developed from rotated hay (low fertilizer) 
in accordance with (a) the assumed yield of improved hay and (b) the 
assumed zero fertilizer applied to acreage in improved hay. Accordingly, 
labor hours per acre of improved hay were 2.70, and constant over inter­
vals . 
Nonrisk 1ivestock housing space activities 
The characteristics and assumptions associated with the inclusion 
of livestock housing space activities into the model were previously 
discussed (pp. 80-82). In view of this, we develop (l) the debt or equity 
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capital required to build one animal unit of hog farrowing, growing or 
feeder cattle space and (2) the cost of capital write off should it 
exceed normal depreciation of the housing space. 
Capital required for housing was based on new cost in accordance 
with the requirements of (I) one sow and two litters, (2) 10 feeder pigs 
and (3) one feeder steer (50, p. 11). Housing space capital requirements 
per animal unit were computed in relation to hog farrowing activities 
(70-71, 76, 79), growing activities (72-73, 77, 80) and feeder cattle 
activities (74-75, 78, 8l), and listed in Appendix C. 
The cost of normal capital write off was treated as building depreci­
ation in relation to previously discussed livestock activities 46, 47, 
..., 63. Accordingly, a zero price is attached to housing space activi­
ties (70, 71, —, 75) which build space on owned land, and to housing 
space activities (79, 80, 81) which build space on landlord(s) land when 
landlord(s) provide the capital as assumed under the livestock share 
lease. But, under the cash or crops share lease, the capital write off 
included the total cost of the new housing space. This was based on the 
modal term of leasing contracts which proved to be one year. Approxi­
mately 86 per cent of the leasing contracts held by 27 entrant farm firms 
were one year leases in which three-fifths were oral, and two-fifths 
written. Consequently, most of the leasing contracts violated Hurlburt's 
fourth incentive condition, since the flow of capital services provided 
by livestock and other productive facilities normally extend beyond one 
year. 
It was assumed that housing costs per animal unit would remain 
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constant over intervals k-1. 
Nonrisk general activities 
General activities include buying machinery and equipment capacity, 
hiring labor hours, borrowing capital in terms of dollars and buying or 
renting land. 
Machinery and equipment capacity activities It was assumed that 
debt or equity capital requirements for one acre of additional tillage 
and seeding capacity would be the same as one acre of additional harvesting 
capacity, A regression of machinery and equipment investment per acre 
on time was computed in relation to 18 entrant farm firms (satisfying 
criteria 1 to 5, p. 137) over two points in time (1962 and 1966). Ma­
chinery and equipment investment per acre was predicted by means of the 
regression equation (4.10) at the mean year of each interval, and the 
predicted results were divided by 2, providing the debt or equity capital 
coefficients for activities 82, 83, 84 and 85. The correlation coef­
ficient was 0.49. 
Machinery and equipment 
investment per acre = 18.3 + 15.8 (t) (4.10) 
where t was adjusted to k + 0.5 for purposes of predicting at 
the mean year of each interval. 
Cost of normal capital write off was treated as machinery and 
equipment depreciation and included in total cost as related to previously 
discussed cropping activities 1, 2, ..., 45, 64, 65, ..., 69. Accordingly, 
a zero price was attached to machinery and equipment activities in interval 
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k-1 = 0, but, due to increasing amounts of capital required in procuring 
one acre of additional machinery and equipment capacity, negative prices 
based on 10 per cent of the additional investment cost per acre were 
attached in succeeding intervals. 
Labor hiring activities It was assumed that equity capital 
requirements for one hour of hired summer labor would be the same as one 
hour of winter labor. A regression of monthly wage on time was computed 
in relation to 18 entrant farm firms (satisfying criteria 1 to 5, p. 137) 
over two points in time (1962 and 1966). Monthly wage was predicted at 
the mean year of each interval by means of 4.11, and the predicted results 
were divided by 200 hours, providing both the equity capital and negative 
price coefficients for activities 86 and 87. 
Monthly wage = 236.88 + 25.5 (t) (4.11) 
where t was adjusted to k + 0.5 for purposes of predicting 
at the mean year of each interval. 
Capital borrowing activities Interest rates r^, r^, r^ and r^^ 
estimated for use in SM 2 (pp. 102-109) were attached as negative prices 
to activities 88, 89, 90 and 91, respectively. It was assumed that 
interest rates would remain constant over intervals. 
Land buying activities Debt or equity capital requirements for 
one additional acre of land in interval k-1 was based on either linear 
projected land values or land values based on phase A results (pp. l4l-
143). In either one case or the other, it was assumed that the down 
payment on land installment contracts was 10 per cent of predicted land 
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values, and on mortgages 20 per cent. 
Zero prices were attached to activities 32 and 94, as they used equity 
capital for down payment. But, negative prices were attached to activities . 
93 and 95, as they used equity in real property obtained through the 
mortgage for down payment on additional land. Each negative price was 
computed on the basis of 7 per cent interest, multiplied by the down 
payment required for one additional acre of land. 
As land was purchased each acre added w acres to the supply level of 
cropland, and 1 - w^ to noncropland (SM 2, p. 90). Further, each acre 
added to the product mix supply levels. Coefficients were determined 
through equations 3.SM 2.28, 3»SM 2.29, 3.SM 2.30 and 3-SM 2.31 (pp. 119" 
121) which were adjusted for use in predicting the relative product mix 
at the mean year of interval k-1 by letting t = 5 (k) - 2, in lieu of t = 
5 k as used by SM 2. As in the case of SM 2 (p. 121), the following 
restriction was imposed on product mix relationships: 
5 
2 w. . + .20(w, . ) < 0.99999 
i = 3  '  
Land leasing activities Equity capital required to cash rent one 
additional acre of land in interval k-1 was computed on the basis of (1) 
5.31 per cent of predicted land value, (2) land tax and (3) miscellaneous 
costs estimated at $1.82 per acre. A negative price equivalent to the 
amount of capital required to pay cash rent was attached to activity 96. 
Zero equity capital and price coefficients were attached to share 
leasing of land (activity 97). 
Coefficients associated with cropland and noncropland acres as well 
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as product mix guides were identical for both land buying and leasing 
activities (92, 93, —, 97). 
Summary of Data Inputs 
The assumptions underlying the processing of data inputs required 
by the model involved the development of linear price, productivity and 
labor adjusters as well as economic bench marks from phase A (NC-53)• 
These adjusters and bench marks along with the assumptions and projections 
concerning costs and product mix guides simulated movement from an initial 
existing situation in interval k-1 = 0 to one involving market clearing 
in interval k-1 = 3-
Input-output coefficients required by the QP-SM model were organized 
in accordance with (1) linear projected land values and (2) land values 
based on phase A (NC-53). In effect, coefficients appertaining to land 
values based on phase A removed overcapitalization, causing costs of 
controlling land under ownership, or cash leasing contracts, to decline 
rather than increase as in the case of linear projected land values. 
However, under crops or crops-livestock share leasing contracts, the 
specified sharing arrangements (based on our examination of sharing ar­
rangements over the period 19&2 to 1966) remained unaffected by land 
values, i.e. in our processing of data input as required by the model, 
landlord(s) assumed the costs associated with ownership of land over 
intervals 0, 1, 2 and 3-
For linear projected land values, a complete listing of estimated 
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coefficients £j_a^ figure 9 is given for intervals 0, 1, 2 and 3 in 
Appendix C. Adjustments were.made in coefficients appertaining to land 
values based on phase A, and were again organized in the manner of the 
listing given in Appendix C. 
Variance-covariances are listed in Appendix D. 
Other data inputs required by the model were (1) the supply levels of 
the resource and product constraints appertaining to each one of 18 entrant 
farm firms satisfying criteria 1 to 5 (p. 137), (2) the row and constraint 
identification and (3) the constants required by SM 2 and SM 3 in relation 
to (a) each one of the 18 entrant farm firms and (b) assumptions concerning 
the repayment schedules (RS and RSM) associated with long term credit 
obtained under the land installment contract, and the mortgage. 
The initial supply levels (January 1, 1962) of the resource and 
product constraints for each farm firm are listed in Appendix E. Economic 
bench marks (rows 105 and 122), which are part of these initial supply 
levels, were adjusted in accordance with the number of full time operator 
managers that are included as decision maker of the farm firm. 
Family living expenditures (3-SM 2,202k) and estimated income tax 
(3.SM 2.20zl) were adjusted in accordance with the number of families 
supported by a given farm firm. 
The constants required by SM 2 and SM 3 (figure 10), with the ex­
ception of RS and RSM, are shown in table 7- The constants RS and RSM 
were held at 10 and 20 years, respectively, except as adjusted for 
testing hypothesis 2 (b). 
Table 7. Constants required by SM 2 and SM 3 in 
with the exception of constants RS and 
relation to 
RSM 
individual entrant farm f i rms 
Fa rm 
ID V» a 0DRL1C 0RS ODRMTG 0RSM ODTCI $RST $DTC2 $CPPA WAV 
010 28704 10212 24 27161 
020 18600 12602 11019 
030 24064 9930 20 21205 
040 6584 1340 6203 
050 9508 1752 4804 
060 7408 4810 11827 
070 19250 12399 15000 30 9928 
080 34409 20829 31939 11 15681 
090 6920 4830 10574 
100 6790 3711 4500 9491 
no 7142 7786 4500 15144 
120 18876 12002 37000 13 670 3 10065 
130 11308 6179 15000 17542 
140 11711 3858 9583 
150 11024 10321 31000 3 9 10820 
160 6436 4028 5400 10605 
170 13348 9181 10000 16550 
180 12907 8236 11197 
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In table 7, WAV Includes $VME plus $BSV. These two components of 
0WAV are required by equations 3.LM.46c and 3'LM.46d (p. 133). Ac­
cordingly, #WAV is broken down into its components in relation to 
individual entrant farm firms as shown in table 8. 
Table 8. Constants required by equations 3.LM.46c and 3.LM.46d in 
relation to individual entrant farm firms 
Farm 
ID 0VME $BSV 
010 25434 1727 
020 11019 
030 21045 160 
040 5553 650 
050 4804 
060 11827 
070 8021 1907 
080 12549 3132 
090 8384 2190 
100 9491 
110 13951 1193 
120 10065 
130 16492 1050 
140 8438 1145 
150 10820 
160 6136 4469 
170 15800 750 
180 10000 1197 
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APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
This chapter reports on tests of hypotheses (pp. 11-13)- It examines 
the continuum of tenure arrangements as means in facilitating successful 
farm entry and in achieving a resource mix which earns at least its oppor­
tunity cost in terms of tests of hypotheses. 
Tests of Hypotheses Formulated for 
Achieving Major Objectives 
Hypothesi s J_ W 
Hypothesis 1 (a) is tested by comparing net farm income (NFl)^' to 
the opportunity cost of equity in productive assets (OCEPA) plus the 
opportunity cost of labor-management (OCLM). If NFl ^  OCEPA + OCLM over 
intervals 0, 1, 2, 3 and over entrant farm firms, then the hypothesis is 
accepted. If NFl ^  OCEPA + OCLM, then the hypothesis would require 
additional testing through hypothesis 1 (b). 
Results for tests of hypothesis 1 (a) were obtained for 18 entrant 
farm firms, given linear projected land values. The results are contained 
in Appendix E in accordance with the format of empirical results developed 
in chapter 3. The farms are identified as 010, 020, ..., 180. Included 
with the results in Appendix E are (1) initial supply levels of resource 
and product constraints as previously identified in figure 9 and developed 
in chapter 3, (2) identification of the tenure form under which the farm 
firm is organized along with its number of management units and (3) the 
'^hn this study, we defined net returns to equity in productive assets 
and labor-management within the entrant farm firm itself as net farm income. 
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number of families supported by the firm. 
The comparative relationship of NFI to OCEPA + OCLM over intervals 
0, 1, 2, 3 is illustrated in figures 11-28 as related to farms 010, 020, 
180, respectively. Other pertinent relationships illustrated in 
these figures are capital gain (C6) on land owned by the farm firm and 
family living expenditures (FLE). The magnitudes of these relationships, 
as illustrated in figures 11-28, are based on one year within intervals 
0,1,2 and 3-
Farm 010 was operated under 50/50 family partnership, employing one 
full time operator manager as decision maker, and supporting two families. 
As observed in table 7 (p. 183), the partnership had no initial inter­
mediate or long term debts. Initially, it controlled land under ownership 
as well as cash and crops share leasing contracts as implied by the 
Initial supply levels of cropland and noncropland (rows 99, 100, ..., 104) 
for farm 010 in Appendix E. it purchased land in intervals 0 and 1, 
bringing its total supply of cropland up to the economic bench mark of 
658 acres. The down payments on land were provided through operating 
equity in liquid assets (row 123), as implied by land buying activities 
92 and Sk (figure 9)• 
The partnership purchased, and attached to land under its ownership, 
additional hog farrowing and hog growing space in interval 0 with oper­
ating equity, as implied by housing space activities 71 and 73, re­
spectively. it hired summer and winter labor (activities 86, 87) up to 
its economic bench marks for labor hours, as implied by the absence of 
primal slack levels for row 122 in intervals 0, 1, 2 and 3-
187 
The partnership had no shortage of operating equity, as indicated 
by the primal slack for row 123 in intervals 1, 2 and 3- It utilized 
considerably more operating equity in interval 3 because of the switch 
from hogs to feeder cattle. Given the assumptions concerning the develop­
ment and projection of net price coefficients, feeder cattle net price 
coefficients increased over intervals whereas hog net price coefficients 
remained relatively the same for feeder hog activities, but declined 
slightly for hog farrowing, implying that feeder cattle became relatively 
more competitive in terms of profit over intervals. 
As illustrated in figure 11, farm 010 earned at least opportunity 
cost for its resource mix in interval 0, but not over intervals 1, 2 and 
3. While NFI remained relatively the same over intervals, OCEPA + OCLM 
was rising. NFI failed to rise correspondingly with expected net income 
due to the successively higher cash lease payment per acre over intervals 
on land controlled by the firm under the cash lease. OCEPA + OCLM in­
creased over intervals 0, 1,2, primarily because of the increasing value 
of land and attached improvements as reflected in linear projected land 
values. The sharp increase in OCEPA + OCLM in interval 3 was partly due 
to the utilization of considerably more operating equity by the feeder 
cattle enterprise as compared to the hog enterprise. 
If capital gain (CG) on land owned by the firm is added to NFI, 
resource earnings exceed OCEPA + OCLM over intervals 0, 1 and 2. If 
capital gain on land cash leased by the firm is deducted from the cash 
lease payment (CLP), then NFI + CG would rise and resource earnings would 
exceed OCEPA + OCLM, implying that it is the costs of controlling land 
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Figure 11. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital gain on land 
over intervals for farm 010, given linear projected land 
values 
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under ownership or  cash leasing contracts in relation to linear projected 
land values that prevent earnings from equalling or exceeding the oppor­
tunity cost of this farm's resource mix. 
Observe that OCEPA + FLE exceeds NFI in interval 3, implying that 
when given linear projected land values the partnership would utilize 
some of the return belonging to equity in productive assets for family 
living expenditures. 
Farm 020 was operated under sole proprietorship. As observed in 
table 7, the firm had no initial intermediate or long term debts. 
Initially, it controlled land and livestock housing space under crop 
share leasing contracts. Additional land was obtained through land 
buying activities 92, 93, 95 in intervals 0, 1, 2 and share leasing 
activity 97 in intervals 1, 2, bringing its total supply of cropland 
within 17.54 acres of its economic bench mark for cropland acres. The 
down payments on land purchased were provided by operating equity in 
interval 0 and by equity capital in real property (row 124) in intervals 
1 and 2, implying that refinancing built up equity in real property is 
profitable when operating equity is below the amount that could be uti­
lized profitably by the firm. 
Land purchased in interval 0 was used for attaching hog farrowing 
and hog growing space (activities 70, 72) which was obtained through 
intermediate term credit (activity 90). Feeder cattle space was attached 
in interval 2 which was obtained through operating equity capital as 
implied by activity 75. Feeder cattle gradually displaced hogs over 
intervals 1, 2, 3, becoming the only livestock enterprise (activities 58, 
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59, 61) in interval 3-
As observed in the optimal solutions for farm 020 (Appendix E) and 
identified in figure 9, livestock products were produced through activi-
C O  
ties based on (1) feed contracts, (2) short term credit in purchasing 
livestock or (3) operating equity in purchasing feed or livestock in 
which these activities used leased or owned housing space. Given the 
specified constraints of the model, the amounts produced in relation to 
these activities depended on the supply level of operating equity. Ac­
cordingly, farm 020, as compared to farm 010, utilized more intensively 
those activities based on feed contracts or short term credit in pro­
ducing livestock products because of its smaller supply levels of 
operating equity over intervals. 
The additional land obtained over intervals 0, 1, 2 brought about 
the need in interval 2 for more tillage and seeding as well as harvesting 
capacity. Intermediate term credit (activity 91) was utilized in ob­
taining 26.90 acres of tillage and seeding capacity (activity 82). The 
remaining amounts of tillage and seeding as well as harvesting capacity 
were obtained by operating equity as implied by activities 83 and 85, 
respectively. 
The firm fully utilized operator's summer and winter labor but it 
did not hire labor up to the economic bench mark for labor hours in 
interval 0, as shown by the primal slack on row 122. 
As illustrated in figure 12, farm 020 earned at least opportunity 
cost for its resource mix over intervals 0, 1, 2, but not interval 3-
52 
The term feed contract implies the use of the forward conditional 
sale contract in obtaining feed inputs: corn, supplements and minerals. 
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Figure 12. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital gain on land 
over intervals for farm 020, given linear projected land 
values 
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Capital gain was not large. Consequently, NFI + CG OCEPA + OCLM in 
interval 3- Farm 020 did not cash lease land. Thus, the reasons why 
NFI + CG ^ OCEPA + OCLM in interval 3 are related to the adverse effects 
of share leasing arrangements on pertinent net price and operating equity 
capital coefficients. 
In the processing of data input, it was found that share leasing 
arrangements altered the relationships between net price and operating 
equity capital coefficients for productive activities under share leasing 
as compared to activities under ownership. Share leasing arrangements, 
examined and utilized in processing data input for the QP-SM model, 
violated Hurl hurt's first and third economic incentive conditions 
(p. l6l). This caused net prices to decline more than operating equity 
per unit level of production. As observed in Appendix C for both corn 
and soybean activities under ownership as compared to share leasing, the 
proportions by which net prices declined increased more than the pro­
portions by which equity capital declined in relation to activities based 
on low, high and super high cropping technology (figure 9). Consequently, 
activities under share leasing as compared to ownership required more of 
the firm's operating equity in generating net income from given pro­
duction, and the relative amounts of operating equity increased in 
relation to activities based on successively higher levels of cropping 
technology,causing OCEPA + OCLM to increase at a greater rate than 
53 
The severity of the adverse effects of share leasing arrangements 
on the utilization of operating equity in generating net farm income 
becomes stronger as activities based on higher technology substitute for 
those based on lower technology. This substitution takes place as 
operating equity increases. 
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NFI in the manner shown in interval 3, figure 12. For example, if super 
high cropping technology is used in place of high cropping technology in 
producing corn and soybeans, the adverse effects are (1) lower net prices 
and (2) higher capital requirements. Normally, this would exclude the 
use of super high technology in producing corn or soybeans under share 
leasing arrangements. However, the labor requirements for production of 
soybeans with super high technology are lower than with high technology. 
Consequently, if operating equity becomes large, the firm is motivated 
to produce soybeans with super high technology (activity 38) in order to 
save labor and put it to the highest and most profitable use, in the 
manner of farm 010 in intervals 0, 1, 2, 3 and farm 020 in intervals 1 
and 3. 
Farm 030 was operated under a 50/50 family partnership, employing 
two full time operator managers as decision maker, and supporting two 
families. The partnership had no initial intermediate or long term debts 
(table 7)• initially, it controlled land and livestock housing space 
under cash leasing contracts, but purchased and share leased additional 
land, bringing its total supply of cropland up to the economic bench mark 
of (2) (658) or 1316 acres (two full time operator managers). Additional 
land was purchased in intervals 0 and 1 by activities 92 and 93, and 
leased in interval 2 by activity 97. The down payments on land purchased 
were provided by operating equity in interval 0 as implied by activity 
92, and by both operating equity and equity capital in real property in 
interval 1 as implied by activities 92 and 93, respectively. 
Tillage and seeding as well as harvesting capacity were purchased 
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(activities 82, 84, 85) in interval 2 by means of intermediate term 
credit (activity 91) and operating equity. 
Practically all land purchased was used for expanding livestock 
enterprises by attaching to it additional hog farrowing and hog growing 
space (activities 70, 72) as obtained through intermediate term credit 
(activity 90) in intervals 0 and 1, and for attaching feeder cattle space 
in interval 3-^^ Feeder cattle production did not completely displace 
hogs in becoming the major livestock enterprise in interval 3 as compared 
to farms 010, 020, since the supply level of operating equity did not 
increase proportionately to the doubling of operator manager units. 
Observe that feeder cattle entered the optimal solution in interval 1, 
and was displaced in interval 2 because of share leasing 788.77 acres of 
land which essentially reduced operating equity available for livestock 
production. Operating equity increased from interval 2 to 3, and feeder 
cattle entered the optimal solution in interval 3-
In interval 0, the partnership also share leased additional hog 
farrowing and hog growing space (activities 79, 80). However, operating 
equity almost tripled from interval 0 to 1. Consequently, it dropped 
these additional share leased housing facilities, replacing them with 
^^The modal term of leasing contracts was one year. Accordingly, 
Hurlburt's fourth economic incentive condition was consistently 
violated by cash or crops share leases. This provided the firm with 
profit incentives to seek out livestock share leasing arrangements 
or purchase land for the purpose of attaching owned livestock housing 
facilities as required in expanding livestock enterprises. 
195 
more profitable owned housing facilities in interval 1.^^ 
As in the case of farm 020, activities based on feed contracts or 
short term credit for producing livestock products were used intensively 
at lower levels of operating equity in relation to leased and owned 
housing facilities, given the specified constraints of the model. 
Farm 030 earned at least opportunity cost for its resources over 
intervals 0, 1,2, but not interval 3, as shown in figure 13 by NFI £ 
OCEPA + OCLM in interval 3- Capital gain on land owned by the firm was 
insignificant. However, if the capital gain on land cash leased by the 
firm is deducted from the cash lease payment (CLP) in interval 3, then 
NFI would rise by approximately $4,766, causing NFI to exceed OCEPA + 
OCLM. If the adverse effects of share leasing arrangements could be 
removed, then NFI would rise still more in relation to OCEPA + OCLM. 
Farm 040 was operated under sole proprietorship. The firm had no 
initial intermediate or long term debts (table 7). Initially, it con­
trolled land under a single crops-livestock share lease. The livestock 
portion of the lease was dropped in intervals 1, 2, 3 as implied by the 
primal slacks on rows 116, 117 and 118. Additional land was obtained 
through land buying activities (92 or 93) in intervals 1, 2, 3 and share 
leasing activity 97 in intervals 2 and 3. The total amount of land 
^^Livestock share leasing arrangements did not seriously violate 
Hurlburt's fourth economic incentive condition, since landlord(s) 
provided the housing space. However, these arrangements violated his 
first and third economic incentive conditions, since not all inputs 
and outputs were shared in the same proportions. Accordingly, as the 
firm accumulated operating equity, the profit incentive to obtain the 
full share of the return on resources became stronger, motivating the 
firm to purchase land and attach to it owned livestock housing space. 
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gure 13- Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures over intervals for farm 
030, given linear projected land values 
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controlled by the firm increased from 116 cropland acres to approximately 
332 which is slightly over half the economic bench mark for cropland 
acres (one full time operator manager). 
The firm purchased tillage and seeding (activity 83) as well as 
harvesting capacity (activities 84, 85) in interval 3 as required to 
operate additional land through borrowing some intermediate term capital 
(activity 9 1 ) ,  and using operating equity a s  required b y activities 8 3  
and 85. 
Land was purchased only for the purpose of attaching hog farrowing 
and hog growing space in intervals 1, 2 and 3 through intermediate term 
credit (activity 90) in intervals 1 and 2, and operating equity in inter­
val 3. Feeder cattle activities did not enter any of the optimal 
solutions due to the shortage of operating equity (row 123). 
In interval 0, the firm also share leased additional hog farrowing 
and hog growing space (activities 79, 80). However, operating equity 
almost doubled from interval 0 to 1, and, accordingly, it dropped these 
additional share leased hog housing facilities along with initial share 
leased housing facilities, replacing them with more profitable owned 
housing facilities in interval 1. 
The results for this farm and the previous one indicate that 
livestock share leasing is not as profitable as owning livestock housing 
facilities and the land to which they are attached, except when the 
supply level of operating equity is very low as it was in interval 0. 
Also, activities based on feed contracts or short term credit for pro­
ducing livestock products were used intensively at lower levels of 
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operating equity in relation to both share leased and owned housing 
facilities. 
The firm utilized operator's labor and small amounts of hired labor 
(activities 86, 87) until interval 3 when it had obtained enough land, 
machinery and equipment capacity, livestock housing space and operating 
equity capital to fully utilize operator's plus hired labor up to the 
economic bench mark for labor hours. 
Farm 040 earned at least opportunity cost for its resources over 
intervals 0, 1, 2, 3, as shown in figure 14 by NFI _> OCEPA + OCLM. 
Capital gain was not significant. The adverse effects of share leasing 
arrangements had no significant impact at low levels of operating equity, 
since lower rather than higher levels of technology were used in crop 
production. 
Farm 050 was operated under sole proprietorship, having no initial 
intermediate or long term debts (table 7). Initially, it controlled 
land under both crops and crops-livestock share leases. As in the case 
of farm 040, the livestock portion was dropped in intervals 1, 2, 3 as 
implied by the primal slacks on rows 116, 117 and 118. Additional land 
was obtained through land buying activities (92 or 93) in intervals 0, 1, 
and land leasing activity 97 in interval 2, bringing the total amount of 
cropland controlled by the firm up to its economic bench mark. In the 
process of land buying, the down payments followed the familiar pattern 
of using operating equity and then refinancing the corresponding built 
up equity capital in land when operating equity is below the amount that 
could be utilized profitably by the firm. 
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Figure 14. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures over intervals for farm 
040, given linear projected land values 
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The firm purchased tillage and seeding as well as harvesting capacity 
as required to operate additional land, financing most of these machinery 
and equipment purchases with borrowed capital. 
Land was purchased for the purpose of attaching hog farrowing and hog 
growing space in intervals 0, 1 and a small amount of feeder cattle space 
in interval 3- Feeder cattle activity 58 entered the optimal solution 
(interval 3) at a low level, displacing a small amount of hog production. 
As in the case of farms 030 and 040, this farm firm also share leased 
additional hog farrowing and hog growing space (activities 79, 80) in 
interval 0, and as operating equity increased in adjoining intervals it 
dropped share leased hog housing facilities, replacing them with more 
profitable owned housing facilities. In both instances, however, feed 
contracts or short term credit played prominent roles in livestock 
production. 
The firm almost fully utilized operator's labor in interval 0, but 
did not achieve economic bench marks for labor hours through hired labor 
until interval 3 when it had accumulated enough operating equity to 
utilize most of its resources. 
Farm 050 earned at least opportunity cost for its resources over 
intervals 0, 1, 2, but not interval 3» as shown in figure 15 by NFI ^ 
OCEPA + OCLM. Capital gain on land owned by the firm was insignificant, 
and the firm did not cash lease land. Accordingly, the adverse effects 
of share leasing arrangements were likely responsible for this discrepancy 
as it was established that they would become more severe when operating 
equity increases inducing greater intensification of capital through 
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costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures over intervals for farm 
050, given linear projected land values 
A 
50,000 -
202 
higher levels of cropping technology, given the bounds or economic bench 
marks for cropland acres and labor hours.. 
Farm 060 was operated under sole proprietorship, having no initial 
intermediate or long term debts, and initially controlling land and 
livestock housing space under crops share leases. Additional land was 
obtained through land buying activities (92, 93, 95) in intervals 0, 1, 2 
and leasing activity 97 in intervals 1, 2, bringing the total amount of 
cropland controlled by the firm up to its economic bench mark. Again, 
the down payments on land purchases involved operating equity and then 
refinancing the built up equity in land when the amount of operating 
equity is below the amount that could be utilized profitably by the firm. 
Tillage and seeding as well as harvesting capacity needed for oper­
ating additional land were obtained through operating equity. 
Land was purchased for the purposes of (l) attaching hog farrowing 
and hog growing space in intervals 0, 1, (2) cropping and (3) attaching 
feeder cattle space in interval 3- As in the case of farms 020 and 030, 
there was a gradual change in livestock production from hogs to feeder 
cattle over intervals. Feeder cattle activities did not completely 
displace hog activities in interval 3- Feed contracts or short term 
credit were prominent in livestock production over intervals, especially 
intervals 0, 1 when the supply levels of operating equity were relatively 
low. 
The firm fully utilized operator's labor over intervals and it 
achieved the economic bench mark for labor hours through hired labor in 
interval s 1, 2 and 3-
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Farm 060 earned at least opportunity cost for its resource mix over 
intervals 0, 1, 2, but not interval 3, as shown in figure 16 by NFi ^ 
OCEPA + OCLM. Capital gain on land owned by the firm was not a large 
amount, and the firm did not cash lease land. Operating equity increased 
rapidly over intervals inducing higher levels of cropping technology and, 
correspondingly, making more severe the adverse effects of share leasing 
arrangements in terms of utilizing operating equity for generating net 
farm income. 
Farm 070 was operated under sole proprietorship. As observed in 
table 7, the firm had an initial long term mortgage debt of $15,000 on 
land and attached improvements, and initially controlled 148 acres of land 
under ownership. Additional land was purchased primarily for cropping 
purposes through land buying activity 93 in interval 0 and share leasing 
activity 97 in intervals 2, 3, bringing the total cropland under its 
control up to the economic bench mark for cropland acres. As implied by 
activity 93, the down payment on 66.47 acres of land purchased involved 
the refinancing of some of its built up equity in real property. 
Tillage and seeding capacity was purchased in interval 0 through 
borrowed capital, and again in intervals 2, 3 along with harvesting 
capacity, through both borrowed capital and operating equity. 
The firm fully utilized operator's labor over intervals, and achieved 
economic bench marks for labor hours through hired labor in intervals 2 
and 3. 
Although both farms 060 and 070 started out in interval 0 with about 
the same amount of operating equity, farm 060 accumulated operating 
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Figure 16. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital gain on land 
over intervals for farm 060, given linear projected land 
values 
205 
equity more rapidly than farm O7O because it had no initial long term 
debt and borrowed less long term capital (activities 88 or 89) over 
intervals. Accordingly, operating equity was not utilized as intensively 
by farm O7O. Both farms employed activities based on feed contracts or 
short term credit for livestock production, but farm 070 employed them 
more intensively. 
As illustrated in figure 17, farm 070 earned at least opportunity 
cost for its resources over intervals 0, 1.2, but not interval 3, as 
shown by NFI ^  OCEPA + OCLM in interval 3- When capital gain (CG) on 
land owned by the firm was added to NFI, the resulting amount was almost 
large enough to overtake OCEPA + OCLM. The firm did not cash lease land, 
so the discrepancy is attributed to the adverse effects of share leasing 
arrangements on use of operating equity in generating net farm income 
inasmuch as economic incentive conditions are violated by them. 
Farm O8O was operated under an equal sharing three way partnership, 
employing two full time operator managers as decision maker, and sup­
porting three families. The partnership had an initial long term mortgage 
debt of $31,939 on part of the land which was owned by the senior member 
of the partnership. Additional land was obtained through share leasing 
activity 97 in intervals 2 and 3» bringing the total cropland controlled 
by the partnership to within 184.33 acres of its economic bench mark of 
1316 cropland acres. Although the partnership did not achieve this 
economic bench mark, it was not because of lack of operating equity as 
implied by the primal slack on row 123 in interval 3- Instead, we put 
forth the arguments that it was because of (1) the high costs of 
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Figure 17- Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital gain on land 
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controlling land under ownership or cash leasing contracts, (2) the 
adverse effects of share leasing arrangements on the utilization of 
operating equity in generating net farm income, given the economic bench 
marks for labor hours which were essentially restricting over intervals 
0, 1, 2, 3 as implied by the absence of primal slacks on row 122, or (3) 
the larger net price attached to livestock activities based on operating 
equity as compared to activities based on feed contracts or short term 
credi t. 
Tillage and seeding as well as harvesting capacity were purchased 
in intervals 2, 3, through operating equity. 
Hog farrowing and hog growing space were obtained in interval 0 
through intermediate term credit, and feeder cattle space in interval 3 
through operating equity. These additions to housing facilities were 
attached to owned land. Activities based on feed contracts or short term 
credit were used intensively for producing livestock products in intervals 
0, 1, while the supply levels of operating equity were about one-half 
the level in interval 2, and one-quarter the level in interval 3» 
The effects of the risk aversion factor on the product mix are ob­
served in relation to farm 080. In interval 0, the risk aversion factor 
(d/e) was O.963. As anticipated, the QP-SM model reacted to it by 
diversifying the product mix. In contrast to farms previously examined, 
feeder cattle (activity 58) entered the optimal solution in interval 0 
along with other livestock and cropping activities. In comparing farms 
030 and 080, we discover in interval 0 that farm 030 had approximately 
the same expected net income as farm O8O even though farm O8O had almost 
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triple tlie amount of operating equity. However, in interval 1 both had 
about the same expected net income, and the same operating equity. The 
risk aversion factor for farm 000 declined toward its lower bound in 
interval 1 while remaining at its lower bound for farm 030. In view of 
this, it is implied that as risk aversion decreases, creating less need 
for diversification in the product mix, expected net income rises. 
The risk aversion factor declined to its lower bound and the mortgage 
debt was cleared in interval 2, allowing farm 080, as contrasted to farm 
030 which had cash lease payments, to accumulate operating equity more 
rapidly and utilize it more intensively in relation to crops in interval 
2, and crops as well as feeder cattle in interval 3-
Farm 080 (figure 18) earned at least opportunity cost for its 
resource mix in intervals 0, 1, 2, but not interval 3- In interval 3 
NFI ^  OCEPA + OCLM. NFI + CG is almost as large as OCEPA + OCLM in the 
final interval as shown in figure 18. The discrepancy is attributed to 
the adverse effects of share leasing arrangements on the utilization of 
operating equity in generating net farm income. 
Farm 090 was operated under sole proprietorship, having no initial 
intermediate or long term debts, and initially controlling its land under 
a single crops-livestock share lease in which the livestock portion of 
the lease was dropped in interval 0. The firm attained its economic 
bench mark for cropland acres through buying land (activity 92) in inter­
vals 0, 1 and share leasing land (activity 97) in intervals 0, 2, and 3. 
Operating equity provided the down payments on land purchased as implied 
by activity 92. 
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Figure 18. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital gain on land 
over intervals for farm 080, given linear projected land 
values 
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Tillage and seeding as well as harvesting capacity were obtained as 
required in operating additional land. Purchases of machinery and 
equipment to meet capacity requirements were made through intermediate 
term credit in interval 1, both intermediate term credit and operating 
equity in interval 2, and operating equity alone in interval 3-
Land was purchased for the purposes of (1) attaching hog farrowing 
(activity 70) and hog growing space (activity 72) in interval 0, (2) 
cropping and (3) attaching feeder cattle space (activity 75) in interval 
3- Feeder cattle activities did not appear in optimal solutions until 
interval 3, in which case feeder cattle (activities 58, 59) partially 
displaced hogs. These livestock housing facilities were obtained through 
borrowed capital (activity 90) in interval 0, and operating equity in 
interval 3- Activities based on feed contracts or short term credit were 
employed for producing livestock products in all intervals. 
The amount of operating equity was large enough in interval 0 to 
induce the purchase of land and hog housing facilities. The ability of 
the firm to generate net income from these additional resources was not 
sufficient to meet debt obligations resulting from borrowed capital on 
land (activity 88) and on hog housing facilities (activity 90), when 
given RS and RSM of 10 and 20 years, respectively. Accordingly, these 
repayment schedules were adjusted to 20 and 30 years and the model was 
again applied to farm 090. When given these adjusted repayment schedules, 
the model produced the results as given in Appendix E. 
The firm fully utilized operator's labor over intervals and it 
achieved the economic bench mark for labor hours through hired labor 
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over intervals. 
Farm 090 earned at least opportunity cost for its resources over 
intervals 0, 1, 2, but not interval 3, as shown in figure 19 by NFI ^  
OCEPA + OCLM. NFI + CG OCEPA + OCLM over intervals 0, 1,2, 3, implying 
that costs of controlling land under ownership were enough to prevent the 
firm from earning opportunity cost for its resources in interval 3- As 
in the case of farm 040, the adverse effects of share leasing arrangements 
had no significant impact, since not the highest levels of technology 
were used in crop production on land controlled under the share lease. 
Farm 100 was operated under sole proprietorship. Initially, it 
controlled land and livestock housing space under a single crops share 
lease, and had an intermediate term debt of $4,500 on machinery and 
equipment. The firm attained its economic bench mark for cropland acres 
through buying land (activities 92, 95) in intervals 1, 2, 3 and share 
leasing land (activity 97) in intervals 2 and 3* Because operating equity 
was below the amount which could be utilized most profitably by the firm, 
the familiar pattern of purchasing land through operating equity and then 
refinancing its corresponding built up equity was followed. 
Tillage and seeding as well as harvesting capacity were obtained in 
interval 3. The purchases of machinery and equipment to meet these 
additional capacity requirements were made through both intermediate term 
credit and operating equity. 
Land was purchased only for the purpose of attaching hog farrowing 
and hog growing space in interval 1, and feeder cattle space in interval 
3. Feeder cattle activities entered at low levels in interval 2 and 
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higher levels in interval 3, partially displacing hogs. As implied by 
livestock activities entering optimal solutions, feed contracts or short 
term credit played prominent roles in producing livestock products. 
The firm also share leased hog farrowing and hog growing space in 
interval 0, dropping these hog housing facilities in interval 1, as 
implied by the primal slacks on rows 116 and 117, and replacing them with 
owned facilities as described above. 
The firm did not fully utilize operator's winter labor in interval 0 
(primal slack on row 121), but achieved the economic bench marks for labor 
hours through hired labor in intervals 2 and 3-
Farm 100 earned at least opportunity cost for its resources over 
intervals 0, 1, 2, but not interval 3, as illustrated in figure 20. 
Capital gain on land owned by the firm was insignificant, and it did not 
cash lease land. As in previous cases, NFl ^  OCEPA + OCLM in interval 3, 
due to the adverse effects of share leasing arrangements on the utili­
zation of operating equity in generating net farm income. 
Farm 110 was operated under sole proprietorship. Initially, it 
controlled land under two crops-livestock share leases in which one 
involved crops and hogs, and the other crops and feeder cattle, and it 
had an intermediate term debt of $4,500 on machinery and equipment. The 
firm probably would have attained its economic bench mark for cropland 
acres in interval 3 if the model had continued to operate. However, due 
to technical difficulties, the computerized QP-SM system failed to read 
the data input from magnetic tape for interval 3, and, consequently, 
aborted after generating results for interval 2. 
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Because operating equity was below the amount which could be utilized 
most profitably, the firm followed the pattern of other sole proprietor­
ships, that initially controlled land through crops or crops-livestock 
share leases, by purchasing land for the purpose of attaching owned 
livestock housing facilities so that less profitable livestock facilities 
were dropped as implied by the corresponding primal slacks. Essentially, 
this amounts to dropping the livestock arrangements from the two initial 
crops-livestock share leases. Other land was obtained by the firm through 
share leasing (activity 97) in interval 2, which created the necessity 
for purchasing additional tillage and seeding as well as harvesting ca­
pacity through borrowing capital (activity 91) and using operating equity. 
Feeder cattle activities did not enter into the optimal solutions 
over intervals 0, 1 and 2. Hog activities based on feed contracts or 
short term credit were used in these intervals. 
The firm utilized operator's labor in intervals 0, 1, 2, but did not 
reach economic bench marks for labor hours until interval 2. 
Farm 110 earned at least opportunity cost for its resource mix over 
intervals 0, 1,2, as shown in figure 21 by NFI ^ OCEPA + OCLM. 
Farm 120 was operated under sole proprietorship, controlling land 
under ownership and crops share leases. Initially, the firm had a long 
term debt of $37,000 on land under land installment credit and an inter­
mediate term debt of $670 on livestock housing facilities. Additional 
land was obtained through share leasing in intervals 1 and 2. As in the 
case of farm 080, the firm did not attain the economic bench mark for 
cropland acres (primal slack on row 105 in interval 3) even though it 
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had accumulated a relatively large supply of operating equity. According­
ly, the same explanations are posited here as before for farm 080. 
However, this firm also had a relatively large amount of leased livestock 
housing space (included under crops share leases) which could be utilized 
without additional cost, inducing the use of operating equity and labor 
in the production of livestock products, rather than in the highest 
possible production of cropping products. 
The firm supplemented its leased livestock housing space by purchasing 
and attaching to owned land, hog farrowing and growing space in interval 
0 as well as feeder cattle space in intervals 2 and 3> Intermediate term 
credit was used in purchasing housing space in interval 0, but operating 
equity was used in intervals 2 and 3. 
Feeder cattle entered the optimal solutions over intervals 1, 2, 3, 
displacing hogs in interval 3- Feed contracts or short term credit was 
used for livestock production in intervals 0, 1, 2, but not in interval 
3, as implied by feeder cattle activities 59 and 61 which are based on 
using operating equity for the purchases of feeder cattle and feed. 
Farm 120 earned at least opportunity costs for its resources over 
intervals 0, 1, but not intervals 2, 3, as shown in figure 22 by NFI ^ 
OCEPA + OCLM. NFI + CG is larger than OCEPA + OCLM in interval 2, but 
not interval 3. Since the firm did not cash lease land, this discrepancy 
is attributed to the adverse effects of share leasing which become more 
severe for higher levels of cropping technology. 
Farm 130 was operated under sole proprietorship, having an inter­
mediate term debt of $15,000 on machinery and equipment, and initially 
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controlling land and livestock housing space under crops share leases. 
Additional land was purchased (activities 92 or 93) for the purpose of 
attaching hog farrowing and hog growing space in intervals 0, 2, and 
feeder cattle space in interval 3- Other land was obtained through share 
leasing in interval 3, bringing the total supply of cropland up to its 
economic bench mark. 
The firm also share leased additional hog farrowing and hog growing 
space in interval 1, dropping these housing facilities in interval 2 by 
replacing them with owned housing facilities. Activities based on feed 
contracts or short term credit for producing livestock products were used 
in intervals 0, 1,2, and also to a large extent in interval 3- Feeder 
cattle started displacing hogs in interval 2 and became the major 
1 ivestock enterprise in interval 3-
The firm did not fully utilize operator's winter labor in intervals 
0, 1, but attained economic bench marks for labor hours in intervals 2 
and 3. 
Farm 130 earned at least opportunity cost for its resource mix in 
intervals 0, 2, but not intervals 1, 3, as shown in figure 23 by NFI ^  
OCEPA + OCLM. Capital gain was insignificant and the firm did not cash 
lease its land. Accordingly, failure of the firm to earn at least oppor­
tunity cost for its resource mix is attributed to (1) the lack of 
operating equity and its counterpart of obtaining crop inputs through 
forward conditional sale contracts or (2) the adverse effects of share 
leasing arrangements. 
Under the assumptions of the model, the firm paid off the initial 
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debt on machinery and equipment in interval 0. This debt was relatively 
large ($15,000) and clearing It reduced the supply of operating equity in 
interval 1 as compared to the initial level. Accordingly, some owned 
and leased livestock housing facilities were left idle in interval 1, and 
were partially replaced by share leasing hog housing facilities. Given 
the supply level of operating equity in interval 1, producing hogs under 
share leasing arrangements proved to be the most profitable alternative, 
as landlord(s) contributed toward costs which correspondingly reduced the 
equity capital requirements per unit level of production. Although the 
firm did not earn opportunity cost for its resources in this interval it 
would have, if net price and equity capital coefficients had declined in 
the same proportions in relation to activities under share leasing ar­
rangements as compared to ownership, providing they declined far enough 
for the operator to fully utilize his labor by more production. This 
implies the need for greater landlord participation in the sharing of 
costs and returns when the firm's supply of operating equity is relatively 
low. 
On the other hand, given prevailing crop and livestock share leasing 
arrangements, the firm likely would have earned at least opportunity 
costs for its resources in interval 1, if it could have gained control 
over crop inputs of fertilizer, chemicals and seed through cropping 
activities based on forward conditional sale contracts,thereby utili­
zing the given supply of operating equity more efficiently by generating 
^^Needed adjustments in these contracts are discussed in testing 
hypothesis 2 (a). 
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greater net farm income. 
The firm more than doubled its supply level of operating equity 
from interval 1 to 2, which again doubled from interval 2 to 3> It 
earned opportunity cost for its resources in interval 2, but not in inter­
val 3- Since the firm dropped its livestock share leasing arrangements, 
the discrepancy is attributed to adverse effects of crop share leasing 
arrangements which become more severe for higher levels of cropping 
technology. 
Farm 140 was operated under sole proprietorship, having no initial 
intermediate or long term debts, and initially controlling land and 
livestock housing space under a single crops share lease. Additional 
land was purchased (activities 32 or 93) for the purpose of attaching hog 
farrowing and hog growing space in intervals 0, 1, and feeder cattle space 
in interval 3- Other land was obtained through share leasing in intervals 
2, 3, bringing the total supply of cropland up to its economic bench 
mark and creating the necessity of purchasing tillage and seeding as well 
as harvesting capacity through intermediate term credit (activity 91) 
and operating equity. 
The firm also share leased additional hog farrowing and hog growing 
space (activities 79, 80) in interval 0, dropping these facilities in 
interval 1 as the supply of operating equity increased. Activities based 
on feed contracts or short term credit for producing livestock products 
were used in intervals 0, 1, 2 and 3- Feeder cattle partially displaced 
hogs as a major enterprise in interval 3- Feed contracts or short term 
credit were used over all intervals. 
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The firm did not fully utilize operator's winter labor (primal slack 
on row 121), but it attained economic bench marks for labor hours through 
hired labor in intervals 2 and 3-
Farm 140 earned at least opportunity cost for its resources over 
intervals 0, 1,2, but not interval 3, as shown in figure 24 by NFI £ 
OCEPA + OCLM. Capital gain on land owned by the firm was insignificant 
and it did not cash lease land. Consequently, the discrepancy is at­
tributed to the adverse effects of share leasing arrangements. 
Farm 150 was operated under sole proprietorship. The firm had an 
initial long term debt of $31,000 on land under the land installment 
contract, and initially controlled land under ownership and a single cash 
lease. It achieved its economic bench mark for cropland acres through 
buying and share leasing land (activities 94 and 97) in interval 2. The 
down payments on land purchased were provided by operating equity. The 
necessary addition to tillage and seeding as well as harvesting capacity 
were also purchased by operating equity in interval 2. 
The firm bought and attached to land under its ownership additional 
hog farrowing and hog growing space in intervals 0, 1 and feeder cattle 
space in interval 3, using intermediate term credit for the hog housing 
and operating equity for the feeder cattle housing. Feeder cattle 
displaced hogs in interval 3, becoming the only livestock enterprise. 
Feed contracts or short term credit were used in producing hogs, and were 
gradually displaced by activities based on operating equity as its supply 
level increased over intervals. 
The firm did not fully utilize operator's winter labor in interval 
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0, but it attained its economic bench marks for labor hours through hired 
labor in intervals 1, 2 and 3. 
Farm 150 earned at least opportunity cost for its resources over 
intervals 0, 1, but not intervals 2, 3, as illustrated in figure 25 by 
NFI ^  OCEPA + OCLM. The situation here is similar to farm 010. By adding 
capital gain on land owned by the firm to NFI and subtracting capita? 
gain out of the cash lease payment (CLP), the firm would earn at least 
opportunity cost for its resources over all intervals. Further ad­
justments would be related to the adverse effects of share leasing 
arrangements. 
Farm l60 was operated under sole proprietorship, having an initial 
intermediate term debt of $5,400 on machinery and equipment, and initially 
controlling land under a single crops-livestock share lease. The livestock 
portion of the lease was dropped entirely in intervals 1,2, 3 as implied 
by the primal slacks on rows 116, 117 and 118. Land was purchased (ac­
tivities 92 or 93) for the purpose of attaching to it hog farrowing and 
hog growing space in intervals 0, 1, 2 and feeder cattle space in interval 
2 through the use of borrowed capital (activities 88, 90). Other land 
was obtained through share leasing in interval 3, bringing the total 
supply of cropland almost up to its economic bench mark, and creating the 
necessity of purchasing tillage and seeding as well as harvesting capacity 
(activities 83, 85). 
Activities, based on feed contracts or short term credit, were used 
over all intervals. Feeder cattle entered the optimal solutions in 
intervals 2 and 3, but they did not displace hogs as the firm's major 
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livestock enterprise. 
The firm did not fully utilize operator's winter labor in intervals 
0, 1, but it accumulated enough operating equity over these two intervals 
to attain economic bench marks for labor hours in intervals 2 and 3-
Farm 160 earned at least opportunity cost for its resources over 
intervals 0, 1, 2, but not interval 3, as illustrated in figure 26. This 
case was similar to farm 040. However, farm 040 as compared to farm 160 
accumulated less operating equity by interval 3 which, essentially, mini­
mized the adverse effects of share leasing arrangements on the utilization 
of operating equity in generating net farm income, allowing it to earn at 
least opportunity cost for its resources. 
Farm 170 was operated under sole proprietorship, having an initial 
intermediate term debt of $10,000 on machinery and equipment, and initial­
ly controlling land under a single crops-livestock share lease. The 
livestock portion of the lease was dropped in interval 0, used partially 
in interval 1, and dropped again in intervals 2, 3 as implied by the 
magnitudes of the primal slacks on rows 116, 117 and 118. Land was 
purchased for the purpose of attaching to it hog farrowing and hog 
growing space in intervals 0, 2 and feeder cattle space in interval 3 
through borrowed capital (activities 88, 90). Other land was obtained 
through share leasing in interval 3, bringing the total supply of crop­
land almost up to the economic bench mark and creating the necessity of 
purchasing machinery and equipment as related to tillage and seeding as 
well as harvesting capacity (activities 83, 84). 
Activities based on feed contracts or short term credit for producing 
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livestock products were used in relation to share leased and owned 
housing facilities over all Intervals. Feeder cattle entered the optimal 
solution in interval 3, displacing hogs as the firm's major enterprise. 
The firm did not fully utilize operator's winter labor in intervals 
0, 1, 2, but operating equity increased sufficiently for it to attain 
the economic bench mark for labor hours in interval 3-
Farm 170 earned at least opportunity cost for its resources only in 
interval 2, as illustrated in figure 27- The firm was unable to gain 
control over enough operating capital in intervals 0 and 1. This case 
is similar in many ways to farm 130. If the firm could have gained 
control over crop Inputs of fertilizer, chemicals and seed through 
cropping activities based on forward conditional sale contracts, or if 
net price and equity capital coefficients declined in the same pro­
portions (removing the adverse effects) in relation to activities under 
share leasing arrangements as compared to ownership, providing they 
declined far enough for the operator to fully utilize his labor by more 
production, then it would probably have earned at least opportunity cost 
for its resources in intervals 0, 1 and 3-
Farm 180 was operated under sole proprietorship, having no Initial 
intermediate or long term debts, and initially controlling land under 
ownership and a single crops share lease. It purchased land (activity 
92) for cropping purposes in interval 2, and obtained other land through 
share leasing in intervals 2 and 3, bringing the total supply of cropland 
controlled by the firm up to the economic bench mark. 
The firm bought additional hog farrowing and hog growing space in 
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interval 0, and feeder cattle space in interval 3- Feed contracts or 
short term credit played prominent roles in financing the production of 
livestock products over all intervals. Feeder cattle partially displaced 
hogs as a major enterprise in interval 3. 
Operating equity was large enough in each interval to induce full 
utilization of both operator and hired labor up to the economic bench 
mark for labor hours. 
Farm 180 earned opportunity cost for its resources over intervals 0, 
1, 2, but not interval 3, as illustrated in figure 28. However, capital 
gain on land owned by the firm was large in view of its controlling 480 
acres of land under ownership by the time it had reached interval 1. 
Accordingly, NFI + CG > OCEPA + OCLM over all intervals. 
For a given tenure form, these 18 case tests of hypothesis 1 (a) 
imply that prevailing tenure instruments, as translated into constrained 
activities, provide an imperfect continuum of arrangements for gaining 
control over resources and using these resources efficiently in relation 
to the initial supply level of operating equity and its growth over 
intervals. The following imperfections were isolated by our tests; 
1. Share leasing arrangements inhibited efficient use of 
resources. Activities, under share leasing as compared 
to ownership, required more of the firm's operating equity 
in generating net farm income and the relative amounts 
of operating equity required increased in relation to 
successively higher levels of technology. Accordingly, 
this caused resource opportunity costs to rise more quickly 
than resource earnings. This imperfection could be removed 
from the continuum, if share leasing arrangements were 
adjusted so that net price and equity capital coefficients 
declined in the same proportions in relation to activities 
under share leasing as compared to ownership. That is to 
say, if gross prices are halved, then operating costs as 
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reflected in capital requirements should also be halved. 
2. Share leasing arrangements inhibited gaining control over 
resources. If operating equity is relatively low in terms 
of the amount of land controlled under crops or crops-
livestock share leases, as in the case of farms 130 and 
170, then fixed sharing arrangements inhibit that amount 
of production which would fully utilize the firm's labor. 
This imperfection could be removed from the continuum, if 
sharing arrangements were flexible, responding to the 
capital needs of the firm. 
3. Forward conditional sale contracts associated with cropping 
activities inhibited gaining control over crop inputs. 
Needed adjustments in these contracts are discussed in 
testing hypothesis 2 (a). 
Although removing these imperfections from the continuum of tenure 
arrangements would facilitate gaining control over resources and using 
resources efficiently, it would not imply that our 18 farm cases would 
earn at least opportunity cost for their resources, because linear pro­
jected land values included overcapitalization, increasing land value 
beyond its value in terms of productivity. By removing overcapitali­
zation from land values, we test the prevailing continuum of tenure 
arrangements through hypothesis 1 (b). 
Hypothesis (W 
Results for tests of hypothesis 1 (b) were obtained for 14 entrant 
farm firms (020, 040, O5O, ..., 070, 090, 100, ..., I60, I8O), given 
land values based on phase A (NC-53).^^ The results are contained in 
In obtaining these results, the initial supply level of equity 
in real property (b^g^ 0^ was adjusted downward, in relation to individual 
entrant -farm firms, reflecting I962 land values based on phase A. This 
was achieved through multiplying the initial supply level of equity in 
real property by O.8O. Adjustments were also made in input-output coef­
ficients appertaining to land values based on phase A. In effect, these 
J 
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Appendix F in accordance with the format of empirical results developed 
in chapter 3. 
Farms (010, 030, O8O) operated under partnerships were excluded from 
tests of hypothesis 1 (b). Since partnerships induced a relatively larger 
amount of equity into the firm than sole proprietorships, it was decided 
that little additional information would be gained by obtaining results 
for these farms, given land values based on phase A. 
Farm I70 was not excluded from tests of hypothesis 1 (b), but results 
were not obtained beyond interval 0. Previous results obtained for this 
farm (Appendix E) indicated that its supply of operating equity was rela­
tively low as compared to the amount of land controlled under the crops-
livestock share lease. The severity of imperfections in share leasing 
arrangements were relatively stronger when costs of controlling land under 
ownership or cash leasing contracts were adjusted downward in relation to 
land values based on phase A. As a result of lower land ownership costs, 
the firm was motivated to drop entirely the livestock portion of the share 
lease in interval 0, replacing it with owned livestock housing facilities 
through the use of borrowed capital (activity 90). Consequently, debt 
obligations on livestock housing facilities plus initial debt obligations 
of $10,000 on machinery and equipment were larger than the capacity of 
57 (Continued) 
adjustments removed overcapitalization, causing costs of controlling land 
under ownership, or cash leasing contracts, to decline over intervals. 
However, under crops or crops-livestock share leasing contracts, the 
specified sharing arrangements remained unaffected by land values. Thus, 
over intervals the firm itself would be motivated by successively larger 
profit incentives to obtain control over land through ownership or cash 
leases rather than crops or crops-livestock share leases. 
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the firm to generate net farm income, causing operating equity to decline 
below a level that would permit the Qf-SM model to find a feasible so­
lution in interval 1. Repayment schedules (RS and RSM) associated with 
land installment contracts and mortgages were increased from 10 and 20 
years to 50 and 50 years, respectively, and the model was again applied. 
However, the effects of this were slight, as the firm purchased only 
enough land as required for attaching owned livestock housing facilities 
and, accordingly, a feasible solution was not possible in interval 1. 
If farm 170 had obtained crop inputs through forward conditional sale 
contracts, given prevailing share leasing arrangements, its supply level 
of operating equity (interval 1) would likely have been large enough to 
generate at least a feasible solution. 
The comparative relationship of NFI to OCEPA + OCLM over intervals 
0, 1,2, 3} is illustrated in figures 29-42 as related to farms 020, 040, 
050, ..., 070, 090, 100, ..., 160, 180, respectively. Other pertinent 
relationships illustrated in these figures are capital loss (CL) on land 
owned by the firm and family living expenditures (FLE). As before, the 
magnitudes of these relationships are based on one year within interval 
0, 1,2 and 3-
In obtaining results for our 14 tests of hypothesis 1 (b), irregular 
results were obtained for farms 100, 130, in interval 1 (Appendix P). 
As observed in figures 35, 38, these two farms did not earn at least 
opportunity cost for their resources in interval 1, even though their 
supply levels of operating equity were larger and risk aversion factors 
lower in interval 1 as compared to interval 0. in view of the above 
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Figure 31- Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures over intervals for farm 
050, given land values based on phase A 
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Figure 32. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures over intervals for farm 
060, given land values based on phase A 
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gure 33- Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital loss on land 
over intervals for farm 070, given land values based on 
phase A 
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gure 34. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures over intervals for farm 
090, given land values based on phase A 
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Figure 35. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures over intervals for farm 
100, given land values based on phase A 
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Figure 36. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures over intervals for farm 
110, given land values based on phase A 
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Figure 37. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital loss on land 
over intervals for farm 120, given land values based on 
phase A 
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Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital loss on land 
over intervals for farm 130, given land values based on 
phase A 
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Figure 39- Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures over intervals for farm 
140, given land values based on phase A 
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gure 40. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital loss on land 
over intervals for farm 150, given land values based on 
phase A 
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Figure 41. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital loss on land 
over intervals for farm 160, given land values based on 
phase A 
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Figure 42. Comparative relationships of net farm income to opportunity 
costs for equity in productive assets and labor-management, 
and to family living expenditures and capital loss on land 
over intervals for farm 180, given land values based on 
phase A 
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as well as lower costs of controlling land under ownership or cash leases, 
these farms should have earned considerably larger net farm incomes in 
interval 1, as compared to interval 0. However, this was not the case. 
Farm 100 generated only slightly more net farm income in interval 1 
as compared to interval 0, but utilized over 50 per cent more operating 
equity. 
Farm 130 generated almost 25 per cent less net farm income in inter­
val 1 as compared to interval 0, but utilized slightly more operating 
equity. This paradox is further compounded by observing that the risk 
aversion factor declined from 0.943 in interval 0 to its lower bound in 
interval 1, creating less need for diversification in the product mix 
and inducing a larger net farm income for a given level of operating 
equity. In view of less need for diversification in the product mix, a 
larger supply level of operating equity and lower costs of controlling 
land under ownership or cash leases in interval 1 as compared to interval 
0, net farm income should have went up rather than down from interval 0 
to 1. 
In view of these irregularities in results for farms 100, 130, it 
strongly suggests that our method of solution failed to find close 
approximations for the true solutions in interval 1. It is likely that 
both of these farms would have earned at least opportunity cost for 
their resources in interval 1, if the true solutions had been closely 
approximated. 
Farm 040 (figure 30) earned at least opportunity cost for its 
resources in intervals 0, 1,2, but not interval 3- The firm obtained 
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406 acres of land through cash leasing (activity 96) in interval 2, 
borrowing $23,264 (activity 91) for purchasing machinery and equipment 
as required to operate the additional land. The capacity of the firm 
to create net farm income did not increase correspondingly with this 
debt obligation. Accordingly, operating equity declined from $22,877 
in interval 2 to $19,048 in interval 3, causing net farm income to 
decline, while at the same time the firm managed a larger weighted inven­
tory of total capital, causing OCEPA + OCLM to rise. Farm 040 would have 
earned at least opportunity cost for its resource mix in interval 3, if 
it could have obtained enough operating capital to fully utilize its 
resources. This further implies the need for obtaining crop inputs 
through forward conditional sale contracts, saving operating equity so 
that, in effect, the firm could gain control of more operating capital 
in order to intensify farming operations and utilize idle labor. 
Farm O5O (figure 31) earned at least opportunity cost for its 
resources over intervals 0, 1 and 2. However, as in the case of farm 
110 (figure 21), the computerized QP-SM system failed to read data input 
from magnetic tape for interval 3 and, correspondingly, it aborted after 
generating results for interval 2. An error occurred in organizing data 
input appertaining to the initial supply levels of the resource and 
product constraints. The initial supply level of operating equity was 
read as $14,058 instead of $7,358. Accordingly, the results in Appendix 
E (farm 050) were based on $7,358 operating equity, given linear pro­
jected land values, and in Appendix F on $14,058 operating equity, given 
land values based on phase A. Thus, these results and corresponding 
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figures (15, 31) are not comparable in terms of denoting differences due 
to changes in land values alone. 
Other farms involved in tests of hypothesis 1 (b) earned at least 
opportunity cost for their resources over all intervals, as illustrated 
in figures 29, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 4l and 42. The margin by which 
NFI exceeded OCEPA + OCLM over intervals for a given farm depended on (1) 
the supply levels of operating equity or (2) the adverse effects of share 
leasing arrangements, if the farm firm attained its economic bench mark 
for cropland acres through ownership or cash leasing, and accumulated by 
interval 3 a relatively large supply level of operating equity, then the 
margin was wide in interval 3. On the other hand, if the farm firm 
attained its economic bench mark through some share leasing and accumulated 
a relatively large supply of operating equity by interval 3, then the 
margin was narrow in interval 3, reflecting the severity of the adverse 
effects of share leasing on the utilization of operating equity in gener­
ating net farm income. 
As observed in the results (Appendix F), share leasing land only 
occurred in interval 0, and depended on the initial levels of operating 
equity. After interval 0, the comparative advantages grew steadily more 
favorable for gaining control over land under ownership or cash leases, 
due to declining costs associated with land values based on phase A. 
These more favorable comparative advantages created sufficient profit 
incentive that all farms were motivated to gain control over cropland 
up to Its economic bench mark. Accordingly, if supply levels of operating 
equity were below the amounts which could be utilized most profitably by 
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firms, crop production displaced livestock production, leaving winter 
labor idle. Once economic bench marks for cropland acres were attained, 
and the supply levels of operating equity became larger, the firms 
intensified their farming operations by producing livestock products as 
well as crops. 
These tests of hypothesis 1 (b) complement the previous tests of 
hypothesis 1 (a) in two ways: (1) by removing overcapitalization from 
land values, the majority of farm firms earned at least opportunity cost 
for their resources and (2) by providing additional evidence supporting 
the tenure imperfections previously isolated. It is implied that by 
removing these imperfections from the continuum of tenure arrangements, 
NFI ^ OCEPA + OCLM over intervals 0, 1, 2, 3 and over farms would be 
achieved, satisfying our specified test in relation to hypothesis 1 (b). 
Hypothesis W 
Hypothesis 1 (c) is tested through results contained in Appendices 
E, F and related implications of tests of hypotheses 1 (a) and 1 (b). 
As operating equity increased, entrant farm firms substituted capital 
using-labor saving activities for labor using-capital saving activities 
or expanded the scale of farming operations up to the economic bench marks 
for land and labor. Risk aversion (d/e) seldomly increased above the 
lower bound of 0.253- If it was initially above the lower bound, it de­
clined toward the lower bound in relation to growth of operating equity, 
implying more risk acceptance by the firm. These adjustments occurred 
regardless of land values, but the profit incentives shifted in favor of 
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farm enlargement in terms of acres as land values declined, in which case 
capital using-labor saving activities became the dominant means of pro­
duction but only after attainment of the economic bench mark for cropland 
acres. 
Along with the above adjustments imperfections in the continuum of 
tenure arrangements both declined and increased. When the supply levels 
of operating equity were low relative to the amount of land controlled, 
the firm obtained additional livestock housing space under share leasing 
arrangements as required in maximizing expected net income. Although 
these sharing arrangements inhibited efficient use of resources through 
violating Hurl hurt's first and third economic incentive conditions, they 
also facilitated the highest and most profitable use of the firm's 
operating equity. Without this tenure option imperfections would have 
been more severe, due to a lack of operating capital. 
A larger level of operating equity induced the firm to earn the full 
share of return on its resource inputs used in livestock production by 
dropping share leased housing facilities, and replacing them with owned 
housing. If the firm did not own land, it purchased land for the purpose 
of attaching livestock housing. Thus, imperfections further declined, 
providing the firm could meet debt obligations accruing on land and 
livestock housing purchases. 
Growth in operating equity also induced the firm to obtain land. 
Given linear projected land values, the firm usually obtained land under 
share leases. Only at very high levels of operating equity was the firm 
induced to buy land beyond the amount required in relation to livestock 
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housing needs- As more operating equity became available, cropping 
activities based on higher levels of technology entered optimal solutions. 
Inasmuch as land was controlled under share leases, the adverse effects 
of share leasing arrangements became more severe, causing resource oppor­
tunity costs to rise more quickly than resource earnings, as discussed 
in tests of hypothesis 1 (a). 
Given land values based on phase A, the comparative advantages grew 
steadily more favorable for gaining control over land under ownership or 
cash leases. Accordingly, after interval 0 the firm always obtained its 
additional land under ownership or cash leases. Since firms now operated 
less land under share leases, the adverse effects of share leasing ar­
rangements did not prevent farms (figures 29-42) from earning at least 
opportunity cost for their resources, as operating equity increased to 
levels inducing the use of higher cropping technology. However, as the 
proportion of land controlled under share leases increased in relation to 
total land, the margin between NFI and OCEPA + OCLM narrowed, as illus­
trated in figures 33, 36 and 37, implying that imperfections were in­
creasing rather than declining as the growth in operating equity reached 
relatively high levels. 
Hypothes i s J_ W) 
Hypothesis 1 (d) is tested through comparing the.results of farms 
070 and 090 in Appendix E to the same farms, respectively, in Appendix G. 
Farms 070 and 090 are sole proprietorships, in 19&2, farm 070 owned the 
land it operated whereas farm 090 leased its land under a single crops-
livestock share leasing contract. Leasing activities 96 and 97 were 
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excluded from the QP-SM model by attaching arbitrarily large negative 
net prices, and results were again obtained for farm 070 (Appendix G). 
Afterwards, activities 96 and 97 were restored but land buying activities 
92, 93, 94 and 95 were excluded by attaching arbitrarily large negative 
net prices, and results were again obtained for farm 090 (Appendix G). 
if NFI - (OCEPA + OCLM) for farms 070 or 090 in Appendix E > NFI - (OCEPA 
+ OCLM) for farms 070 or 090 in Appendix G over intervals, then hypothesis 
1 (d) is accepted. 
The effects of preference for ownership of land as compared to the 
case involving optional arrangements are illustrated in figure 43 for 
farm 070. The relationship of NFI to OCEPA + OCLM resulting from prefer­
ence for ownership was overlaid on the corresponding relationship in 
figure 17. NFI and OCEPA + OCLM taken from figure 17 are denoted in 
figure 43 by E, and NFI and OCEPA + OCLM resulting from preference for 
ownership by G. 
As observed in figure 43, [nFI - (OCEPA + OCLM)}^ < (NFI - (OCEPA + 
OCLM)]g over all intervals. Further evidence is provided by the following 
cal cul at ions : 
fNFI - (OCEPA + 0CLM)1[ (NFI - (OCEPA + OCLM)]^ Interval 
$ 3791 $ 3800 0 
3966 5926 1 
584 2200 2 
-7120 -4653 3 
In view of this, hypothesis 1 (d) is not accepted in relation to 
farm 070. Although NFI was lower for G as compared to E in intervals 0, 
3, OCEPA + OCLM was also lower but by a larger magnitude, implying that 
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Figure 43- Effects of preference for ownership of land as compared to 
optional arrangements on the comparative relationships of net 
farm income to opportunity costs of equity in productive 
assets and labor-management over intervals for farm O7O, 
given linear projected land values 
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under preference for ownership a small sacrifice in NFI was accompanied 
by greater resource efficiency as related to farm 070. 
Given preference for ownership, farm 070 was motivated to intensify 
its livestock operations, while obtaining an additional 99-32 acres of 
land (activity 93) in interval 0 by financing the down payment through 
equity in real property, and 2.32 acres (activity 92) in interval 2 by 
financing the down payment through operating equity. The firm's total 
supply of cropland by interval 3 amounted to approximately one-third its 
economic bench mark as implied by the primal slack on row 105 (Appendix 
G). Economic bench marks for labor hours were attained in intervals 2 
and 3. 
As discussed in tests of hypothesis 1 (a), farm 070 achieved both 
the cropland and labor hours bench marks when leasing activities were not 
excluded from the continuum of tenure arrangements. Since the firm 
employed some share leasing in achieving its economic bench mark for 
cropland acres, the adverse effects of sharing arrangements caused OCEPA 
+ OCLM to rise more quickly than NFI, as operating equity increased to 
levels inducing activities based on higher levels of cropping technology 
to enter optimal solutions. Accordingly, given prevailing sharing ar­
rangements, it is implied that farm firms which initially control re­
sources in the manner of farm 070 would be wise to weight ownership more 
heavily than land leasing. Initially, farm 070 controlled 148 acres of 
land under ownership, in which the land was valued at $82,580 and the 
net worth in land was $67,580. This farm also had considerable livestock 
housing space and a large supply of operating equity relative to the 
259 
amount of land under its control. If long term debt on land had been 
considerably larger, or if operating equity had been lower, the firm would 
not likely have been wise to prefer ownership. 
The effects of preference for leasing land as compared to the case 
involving optional arrangements are illustrated in figure 44 for farm 090. 
The pertinent relationships are again denoted by E and G, where G now 
refers to preference for leasing instead of preference for ownership. 
As observed in figure 44, [NF! - (OCEPA + OCLM)]^ > (NFI - (OCEPA + 
OCLM))g over all intervals. Further evidence follows: 
fNFI - (OCEPA + OCLM)][ fNFI - (OCEPA + OCLM)!^ Interval 
$ 3224 $ 531 0 
4998 -1570 1 
4256 -6545 2 
-1328 -7085 3 
As compared to E, NFI is higher for G and OCEPA + OCLM is lower. 
Thus, hypothesis 1 (d) is accepted for farm O9O. , 
Given preference for leasing (Appendix G), farm 090 share leased 
392.20 acres of land (activity 97) in interval 0 and cash leased 19*84 
acres (activity SS) in interval 1, bringing the supply level of cropland 
acres up to its economic bench mark. Economic bench marks were attained 
for labor hours in all intervals. 
The firm share leased additional hog farrowing and hog growing space 
in interval 0, and feeder cattle space in interval 3- Feeder cattle 
activity 63 entered the optimal solution in interval 3, displacing hogs 
entirely. 
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Figure 44. Effects of preference for leasing land as compared to optional 
arrangements on the comparative relationships of net farm 
income to opportunity costs of equity in productive assets 
and labor-management over intervals for farm 090, given linear 
projected land values 
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Under preference for leasing as compared to optional tenure 
arrangements, farm 090 accumulated more than twice the amount of 
operating equity in intervals 2, 3, utilizing only about two-thirds of 
it as implied by the primal slacks on row 123. Accordingly, the in­
hibiting affects of crops and livestock share leasing arrangements on 
efficient use of resources reached their highest possible magnitudes. 
As illustrated in figure 44, farm 090 did not earn at least opportunity 
cost for its resources in intervals 1, 2, 3, as shown by [nF!  ^  OCEPA + 
0CLM}g, since OCLM + 0CEPA increased more quickly than NFI. 
It is implied that greater resource efficiency is achieved by farms 
when they are confronted with optional tenure arrangements and, except 
in special cases such as farm 070, they would be wiser from an economic 
standpoint not to attach preference to any given tenure instrument. 
Hypothes i s ^  W 
The security interest required under forward conditional sale 
contracts was based on future output of farm products whereas the security 
interest required under forms of short term credit was based on farm 
chattels. The contract price was set at 1.0 per cent per month on the 
value of inputs obtained and the interest rate on short term credit was 
set at 0.5 per cent per month. Accordingly, when operating equity is 
relatively low, both forward conditional sale contracts and short term 
credit would be employed by the firm. As operating equity increased 
relative to the economic bench marks for land and labor, activities based 
on operating equity alone would substitute first for activities based on 
contracts, and second, activities based on short term credit. 
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In view of this, hypothesis 2 (a) is tested by observing whether or 
not combinations of activities associated with forward conditional sale 
contracts and forms of short term credit entered the same optimal so­
lutions. If they did for at least one optimal solution, then the 
hypothesis is accepted. If one or more activities associated with 
forward conditional sale contracts failed to enter any of the optimal 
solutions over all intervals and all farms, and if one or more farms 
experienced a shortage of operating equity in liquid assets, then it 
implies that the specified levels of technology were too high as related 
to conditions associated with forward conditional sale contracts. 
Forward conditional sale contracts were used in obtaining feed 
inputs of corn, supplements and minerals for hogs farrowed and raised 
to market weight (activities hj, 51, 55), and in obtaining crop inputs 
of fertilizer, chemicals and seed for corn production (activities 4, 8, 
12) and soybean production (activities 25, 32, 39). 
Forms of short term credit were used in purchasing feeder hogs 
(activities 48, 52, 56) and feeder cattle (activities 58, 60, 62). 
These three activities included in each of the five sets refer to 
owned, leased and share leased livestock housing space in terms of kind 
of livestock as well as owned, cash leased and share leased land in 
terms of kind of crop. 
As discussed in tests of hypothesis 1 (a), livestock activities 
based on feed contracts or forms of short term credit frequently entered 
optimal solutions. The combination of these activities which entered 
optimal solutions depended"on (1) the supply levels of operating equity 
263 
relative to economic bench marks of land and labor, (2) the type of 
control over land and livestock housing facilities and (3) the relative 
profitability per unit level of production. For example, at relatively 
low levels of operating equity, the combinations of these activities were 
limited in terms of livestock housing facilities that were (a) share 
leased, (b) share leased or leased and (c) share leased or owned. At 
higher levels of operating equity share leased housing facilities were 
displaced by the more profitable owned housing facilities attached to 
land controlled under ownership. Accordingly, the combinations of activi­
ties now entering optimal solutions were in terms of leased or owned 
housing facilities. Also, at higher levels of operating equity capital 
using-labor saving activities displaced labor using-capital saving activi­
ties, bringing about a shift in livestock enterprises from hogs to feeder 
cattle. 
Cropping activities based on gaining control over inputs of ferti­
lizer, chemicals and seed did not enter any optimal solutions except for 
corn activity 12 in interval 3. In examining the net price and equity 
capital coefficients associated with these activities, errors were found 
in the equity capital coefficients (Appendix C, activities 4, 8, 12, 25, 
32, 39). While reading data input on magnetic tape total costs associated 
with each of these activities (except activity 12 in Interval 3) were 
used In lieu of the amount of operating equity actually utilized by each 
activity (refer to tables 1 and 2, chapter 3). Since these costs were 
slightly higher than the amounts of operating equity utilized by alterna­
tive cropping activities within the owned, cash leased and share leased 
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classifications, the effect was the same as forcing cropping activities 
based on contracts out of the model. In view of this, the essential 
changes were made on magnetic tape input and the model was again applied 
to farm 170 over intervals 0, 1, given linear projected land values. 
The results in^relation to these changes are summarized below in terms 
of the original results for farm 170 (Appendix E). 
1. Soybeans activity 39 substituted for soybeans activity 
33, increasing NFl by $642 in interval 0 and $1160 in 
interval 1. 
2. The discrepancy between NFl and OCEPA + OCLM was reduced 
but not enough for the firm to earn at least opportunity 
cost for its resources over intervals 0 and 1. 
3. Corn activity 12 did not substitute for activity 9. 
Although the net price on activity 12 was larger than 
on activity 9 (observe net prices for these two activities 
in Appendix C), its equity capital coefficient was also 
larger by a small amount. Since operating equity was 
relatively low, activity 9 entered the optimal solution 
instead of activity 12. 
Activity 12 was based on super high cropping technology as specified 
under the forward conditional sale contract, whereas activity 9 was based 
on low technology. If the specified level of cropping technology were 
lowered from super high to high for activity 12, its equity capital coef­
ficient would decline below that of activity 9- In effect, this would 
further increase NFl, reducing still more the discrepancy between NFl and 
OCEPA + OCLM. 
Farm 170 (figure 27) was selected, since it failed to earn at 
least opportunity cost for its resources in intervals 0 and 1. This 
was attributed to (a) failure to gain control over crop inputs through 
forward conditional sale contracts or (b) the inhibiting affects of 
share leasing arrangements on gaining control over resources. 
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Hypothesis ^  (W 
One hundred per cent credit was assumed to be extended on equity in 
real property (RP) for the purchase of additional land, providing the 
firm or its operator(s) held title to this property. It was included in 
the model through land buying activities 93 and 95 which were constrained 
by the amount of built up equity in real property (row 124). The supply 
level of built up equity (RP) was adjusted from interval k-1 to k through 
simulator 2, given specified values for RS and RSM (pp. 114-118). 
The down payments on land were 10 per cent of land value for activi­
ties 92 and 93 which were based on the land installment contract, and 20 
per cent for activities 94 and 95 which were based on the mortgage. 
Although activity 93 was based on the land installment contract, it 
obtained the down payments for purchases of additional land in the same 
manner as activity 95, i.e. by withdrawing built up equity in real 
property under the mortgage. The debt and interest payments on equity 
withdrawn under the mortgage (DMTG2 and IMTG2, respectively) were calcu­
lated through equations 3.SM 2.20zm and 3.SM 2.20zn (p. 114). 
Zero prices were attached to land buying activities 92 and 94, as 
they used operating equity for down payment. But, negative prices were 
attached to activities 93 and 95, as they used equity in real property 
obtained through the mortgage for down payment on additional land. 
Accordingly, at relatively low levels of operating equity activities 93 
or 95 would be used in obtaining additional land, providing built up 
equity in real property was above the zero supply level, but at higher 
levels of operating equity activities 92 or 94 would be used alone or 
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in combination with activities 93 or 95. 
Hypothesis 2 (b) is tested by observing whether or not activities 
93 or 95 entered some optimal solutions along with combinations of activi­
ties based on forward conditional sale contracts or forms of short term 
credit, given alternative specified values for repayment schedules RS 
and RSM. 
As discussed in tests of hypothesis 1 (a), combinations of land 
buying activities including 93 or 95 frequently entered optimal solutions 
along with combinations of livestock activities based on forward con­
ditional sale contracts (feed contracts) or forms of short term credit 
(feeder hogs or feeder cattle purchases). The possible combinations of 
these activities which could enter optimal solutions depended on (1) the 
supply levels of operating equity, (2) the supply levels of equity in 
real property and (3) the initial type of control over land-
Farms controlling land under leasing contracts were motivated through 
profit incentives to purchase land for the purpose of attaching owned 
livestock housing space as required in expanding livestock enterprises or 
in displacing share leased housing facilities. Since these farms did not 
initially own land, the down payments on land purchases were provided by 
operating equity. Afterwards (in adjoining intervals), the down payments 
on land purchases were provided by operating equity or by withdrawing 
built up equity in land previously purchased under the mortgage. If the 
supply levels of operating equity were relatively low, the emphasis was 
on withdrawing built up equity in land previously purchased for down 
payment on more land. Land buying activities which entered optimal 
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solutions most frequently were $2- or 93, since they required only a 10 
per cent down payment as compared to 20 per cent down payment required 
by activities 94 or 95- Activity 94 was used infrequently, since it used 
20 per cent down payment as provided by operating equity. 
It is implied that higher down payments would have seriously impeded 
farm firms in purchasing land for the purpose of attaching owned livestock 
housing space. In effect, higher down payments would maintain tenure 
imperfections resulting from livestock sharing arrangements over a longer 
period of time. 
Farms controlling land under ownership were induced to buy more land 
only if the supply levels of operating equity were relatively high. At 
very high levels land was purchased by activities using operating equity 
as down payments. At moderately high levels land was purchased by activi­
ties using operating equity or equity in real property as down payments. 
Enlarging repayment schedules RS and RSM had little effect in terms 
of increasing the growth rate of operating equity in relation to farms 
which purchased land only for the purpose of attaching owned livestock 
housing space. 
Special cases were encountered in which land was purchased for 
cropping purposes. In two of these cases (farm 090, Appendix E and farm 
070, Appendix G), results over all intervals were possible only when RS 
and RSM were raised from 10 and 20 years to 20 and 30 years, respectively. 
With RS and RSM at 10 and 20 years, these firms were unable to meet 
their annual debt obligations. This caused operating equity to decline 
as well as the capacity of these firms to generate net farm income. 
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forcing infeasible solutions in adjoining intervals. When RS and RSM 
were raised both firms experienced a positive growth rate. 
Tests of Hypotheses Formulated for 
Achieving Minor Objectives 
Hypothesis J_ 
Aids to entry were an integral part of entry into farming. They 
included (1) family assistance involving gifts, credit, inheritance and 
machine use and (2) savings accruing from nonfarm income earned by entrant 
operators or their wives. The magnitudes of aids to entry of 18 entrant 
farm firms are aggregated into family assistance received (1) when start­
ing to farm and (2) since starting to farm up to December 31, 1966, as 
well as savings accumulated from nonfarm income up to December 31, 1966, 
and given in table 9« 
When starting to farm, the average amount received (over farms) in 
gifts was $364, credit $3224, inheritance $1852 and machine use $154, and 
the average savings accruing from nonfarm income was $2875. Since start­
ing to farm the average amount received in gifts was $3148, credit $4289, 
inheritance $6l8l and machine use $365, and the average savings accruing 
from nonfarm income was $3550. 
Family assistance in terms of credit and machine use usually occurred 
in response to the entrant operator(s) capital needs. Similarly, savings 
accruing from nonfarm income occurred in response to capital needs. 
Entrant operator wives accounted for a larger proportion of savings ac­
cruing from nonfarm income than entrants themselves, since entrants were 
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Table 9- Aids to entry of 18 entrant farm firms 
Fa rm 
ID 
Family assistance received 
when starting 
to farm 
since starting 
to farm up to 
December 31, 
1966 
Savings accumulated 
from nonfarm income 
up to December 31, 
1966 
010 $ 19,250 $ 22,500 $ 0 
020 1,400 14,600 2,500 
030® 0 78,400 10,000 
040 400 1,000 5,850 
050 2,100 9,000 20,500 
060 1 ,000 1,500 7,000 
070 400 55,500 2,700 
O
 
00
 
o
 Û) 6,667 0 4,000 
090 2,200 900 3,500 
100 1,100 1,000 4,800 
no 1,500 2,450 23,000 
120 1,400 10,400 4,000 
130 7,000 20,000 6,600 
140 1,500 10,000 6,500 
150 50,000 11,797 700 
160 10,500 0 5,000 
170 5,500 0 4,000 
180 6,000 78,000 5,000 
^Farms 030 and 080 employed two entrant operators whereas other 
farms employed one only. 
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employed in farming at least 10 months of the year over the period 1962 
to 1966 (p. 137). 
Hypothesis 1 was tested indirectly during the process of obtaining 
results for farms 040, 050 and 130 in Appendix E. In all three cases 
solutions were possible only when either the weighted average family 
assistance or the weighted average savings from nonfarm income, or both, 
were added to the initial supply level of operating equity in liquid 
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assets. In the case of farm 050, only the addition of the weighted 
average family assistance was required in order to obtain a solution. 
Once a solution was obtained for interval i<-l = 0, the model continued 
to operate producing results over all intervals. 
Appendix H contains results for one entrant farm firm, given linear 
projected land values and given the addition of family assistance and 
savings from nonfarm income over the period January 1, 1962 to December 
31, 1966. The average family assistance plus savings from nonfarm 
employment over this period was weighted by 3.0, and added to the initial 
supply level of operating equity in liquid assets (b^^g g)• 
Hypothesis 1, associated with the first minor objective, is also 
tested by comparing the results obtained for farm 050 in Appendix E to 
results obtained in Appendix H. If NFl - OCEPA + OCLM for farm 050 in 
Appendix H > NFl - OCEPA + OCLM for the same farm in Appendix E over 
intervals, the hypothesis is accepted. 
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Average family assistance and average savings from nonfarm income 
over the period I962 to I966 were given yearly weights of 5 in 1962, 4 in 
1963, ..., 1 in 1966. The average of these weights (3.0) was used. 
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As observed in figure 45, (nFI  - (OCEPA + OCLM)]^ is > (nFI  - (OCEPA 
+ OCLM)]^ in intervals 0, 1, but the opposite is the case in intervals 2 
and 3. Observe the following calculations: 
fNFI - (OCEPA + 0CLM)1|| [NFI - (OCEPA + OCLM)!^. Interval 
$ 2438 $ 467 0 
4808 2617 1 
1616 6173 2 
-1887 -562 3 
The weighted average savings from nonfarm income amounted to $6,058 
for farm 050. This amount almost doubled the initial supply level of 
operating equity, which induced the firm to drop livestock share leasing 
arrangements. Owned housing facilities replaced share leased facilities 
in livestock production. Accordingly, tenure imperfections declined in 
intervals 0, 1 as implied by (NFI - (OCEPA + OCLM)]^ > (nFI - (OCEPA + 
OCLM))^. 
The firm achieved its economic bench mark for cropland acres by inter­
val 2 primarily through share leasing in both case H and E. However, in 
case H the firm accumulated $32,712 operating equity in interval 2 and 
$50,560 in interval 3, as compared to only $21,591 and $34,468 in case E. 
Accordingly, the firm responded to these larger amounts of operating 
equity by intensifying its crop production through cropping activities 
based on higher technology. Since the adverse effects of share leasing 
arrangements become stronger for higher levels of technology, OCEPA + 
OCLM increased more quickly than NFI, causing [NFI - (OCEPA + OCLM)]^ < 
[nFI - (OCEPA + OCLM))^ in intervals 2, 3 and implying an increase in 
tenure imperfections. 
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NFI 
OCEPA + OCLM 
50,000 
45,000 
40,000 
35,000 
30,000 
25,000 
20,000 
15,000 
10,000 
5,000 
0 2 3 
Intervals 
Figure 45. Effects of aids to entry on the comparative relationships 
of net farm income to opportunity costs of equity in 
productive assets and labor-management over intervals for 
farm 050, given linear projected land values 
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Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 associated with the second minor objective was not 
tested. However, implications arising from tests of hypothesis 1 (a) 
suggested that real property tax could inhibit the firm in earning at 
least opportunity cost for its resources. 
Personal property tax was assumed constant over intervals. Thus, 
it had negligible effects on the relationship of NFI to OCEPA + OCLM 
over intervals. 
Real property tax was assumed to be a function of land values, it 
was estimated by equation 4.2, and included as costs to the firm con­
trolling land under ownership or cash leases. It reflected overcapital­
ization of land in the case of linear projected land values. Accordingly, 
as real property tax increased over intervals, it had the effect of 
enlarging requirements of operating equity while reducing net farm 
income, ceteris paribus, in effect, this induced the firm to manage a 
greater inventory of capital which in turn had the effect of increasing 
OCEPA + OCLM. 
If real property tax had been held constant in relation to tests of 
hypothesis 1 (a), then the magnitudes of OCEPA + OCLM would have been 
lower and NFI higher over intervals 1, 2 and 3. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Results obtained for entrant farm firms (given linear projected 
land values) implied that the economic farm business In North Central 
Iowa would likely control an inventory of productive assets equalling or 
exceeding one-half million dollars by I98I. Successful farm entry 
largely depends on tenure forms and instruments that facilitate gaining 
control over a resource mix which earns at least its opportunity cost in 
relation to growth of the firm's operating equity. It was indicated 
that the most crucial problems confronting future entrant farm firms 
will be in (1) gaining control over larger amounts of land and capital 
resource inputs while utilizing proportionately lesser amounts of oper­
ating equity and (2) using these resources efficiently. 
The problem in this study was to isolate imperfections in tenure 
forms and instruments and to develop or indicate needed adjustments in 
them as related to entrant farm firms studied in North Central Iowa over 
the period January 1, 1962 to December 31, 1981. Objectives were (1) to 
test tenure forms and instruments in terms of their inhibiting and fa­
cilitating affects on gaining control over resources and on using these 
resources efficiently, (2) to discern, develop or indicate adjustments 
in tenure forms and instruments which facilitate (a) successful farm 
entry, (b) gaining control over resources and (c) using these resources 
efficiently and (3) to determine the affects of aids to entry,as 
well as real and personal property taxation on optimal formation and 
^^Aids to entry were identified as savings accruing from nonfarm 
income earned by operator entrants or their wives and (2) family 
assistance involving gifts, credit, inheritance and machine use. 
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use of resources. 
In this study, tenure forms were identified as sole proprietorship, 
partnership or corporation and tenure instruments as (1) ownership, (2) 
credit, (3) leasing contracts and (4) forward conditional sale contracts 
as related to selected variable inputs. 
A conceptual framework was developed for achieving objectives. Hy­
potheses were formulated (pp. 11-13) and analytical as well as empirical 
procedures were developed for testing these hypotheses. An underlying 
premise in the development of the conceptual framework was that for a 
given tenure form prevailing tenure instruments provided the farm firm 
with a continuum of optional arrangements for (1) gaining control over 
resources from resource owners outside the firm and (2) sharing risk as 
well as profit with these resource owners in relation to its growth in 
operating equity. For a given tenure form, the continuum of optional 
arrangements was specified, identified (figure 5) and translated into a 
model which was operationalized over the period January 1, 1962 to 
December 31, 1981, through analytical procedures based on quadratic 
programming and techniques of simulation. 
For a given tenure form, instruments for producing products were 
translated into a set of constrained variables or activities (figure 9). 
The model minimized tenure imperfections through maximizing the entrant 
farm firm's expected net income when allowances for risk, as attached to 
uncertain net income expectations, were included. It employed a truncated 
minimax objective function subject to linear constraints. This objective 
function involved the maximizing of expected net income and simultaneously 
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the minimizing of risk when the level of risk aversion was given. 
Expected net income was assumed to be inversely related to risk aversion. 
The degree of risk aversion was measured by the debt/equity ratio of 
the firm's inventory of productive assets. 
In development of the model, it was assumed that alternative tenure 
forms had no affect on the translation of instruments into constrained 
activities. Thus, once the activities, constraints and corresponding 
input-output relationships were specified, they remained the same at a 
given interval in time regardless of the tenure form under which the 
firm was organized. It was also assumed that (l) the supply of inputs 
and demand for products were perfectly elastic, given the translation of 
instruments into constrained activities and (2) the costs of production 
and technical input-output relationships were known. 
The model handled contributions from and payments to resource owners 
outside the entrant farm firm according to the methods and terms specified 
by alternative tenure instruments. It paid resource owners within the 
firm in terms of net returns to (1) equity in productive assets and (2) 
labor-management. All other resources were paid opportunity cost. Oppor­
tunity costs were estimated for equity in productive assets as well as 
labor-management. The firm's resource mix-was then evaluated in terms 
of whether or not it earned at least its opportunity cost. 
The model contained economic bench marks for land and labor. These 
were handled as upper bound constraints and were taken from phase A 
(NC-53) and adjusted in accordance to (1) the time period over which the 
model operated and (2) the number of full time operators within a given 
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fi rtn. 
The period over which the model operated was 20 years, beginning 
January 1, 1962 and ending December 31, 1981. The period was broken 
down into 4 5-year decision intervals, in effect, the model determined 
the optimal expected net farm income, the optimal plan for production 
and the optima? use of tenure instruments for one year within a given 
interval. Economic decisions were static over an interval and dependent 
on past intervals. Essentially, the model was one way recursive. 
Data required by the model were obtained through (1) personal 
interview with each operator entrant, (2) entrant farm firm account books 
extending over a 5 year interval, beginning January 1, 1962 and ending 
December 31, 1966, (3) farm management planning guides and (4) other 
pertinent sources of data which include results of phase A of NC-53. 
The assumptions underlying the processing of data inputs required 
by the model involved the development of linear price, productivity and 
labor adjusters as well as economic bench marks from phase A. These 
adjusters and bench marks along with the assumptions and projections 
concerning costs and product mix guides simulated movement from an initial 
existing situation to one involving market clearing in the final interval. 
Input-output coefficients required by the model were organized in 
accordance with (1) linear projected land values and (2) land values 
based on phase A. In effect, coefficients appertaining to land values 
based on phase A removed overcapitalization, causing costs of controlling 
land under ownership or cash leasing contracts to decline rather than 
increase as in the case of linear projected land values. However, under 
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crops or crops-livestock share leasing contracts, the specified sharing 
arrangements (based on our examination of sharing arrangements over the 
period 1962 to 1966) remained unaffected by land values. 
The significant findings of the study are summarized in terms of the 
tests of hypotheses formulated for achieving objectives. 
For a given tenure form, it was concluded through tests of hypotheses 
1 (a) and 1 (b) that prevailing tenure instruments, as translated into 
constrained activities, provided the farm firm with an imperfect continuum 
of arrangements for gaining control over resources and using these re­
sources efficiently in relation to the initial supply level of operating 
equity and its growth over intervals. Imperfections in the continuum 
were most severe when the supply levels of operating equity were either 
relatively low or high. In between, the continuum was less imperfect, 
allowing the farm firm to earn at least opportunity cost for its re­
sources. The most severe imperfections isolated through tests of 
hypotheses 1 (a) and 1 (b) were associated with crops and crops-livestock 
share leases. 
Share leasing arrangements strongly inhibited efficient use of 
resources at relatively high levels of operating equity. Activities 
under share leases as compared to ownership required more of the firm's 
operating equity in generating net farm income and the relative amounts 
of operating equity required increased in relation to successively 
higher levels of technology. Accordingly, these adverse effects caused 
resource opportunity costs to rise more quickly than resource earnings 
as operating equity increased, inducing activities based on higher 
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levels of technology to enter optimal solutions. This imperfection could 
be removed from the continuum if share leasing arrangements were adjusted 
so that net price and equity capital coefficients declined in the same 
proportions in relation to activities under share leases as compared to 
ownership. That is to say, if gross prices were halved, then operating 
costs as reflected in capital requirements should also be halved. 
Share leasing arrangements inhibited gaining control over resources, 
if operating equity was relatively low in terms of the amount of land 
controlled under crops or crops-livestock share leases, then fixed sharing 
arrangements inhibited the amount of production which would fully utilize 
the firm's labor. This imperfection could be removed from the continuum, 
if sharing arrangements were flexible, responding to the capital needs of 
the firm. 
The removal of overcapitalization from land values lowered costs of 
controlling land under ownership or cash leases. This induced farm firms 
to operate larger proportions of their total land under ownership or cash 
leases as compared to share leases. "The continuum became less imperfect 
in relation to higher levels of operating equity, allowing farm firms to 
earn at least opportunity cost for their resources. The margin by which 
resource earnings exceeded resource opportunity cost was inversely re­
lated to the amount of land share leased. 
it was concluded through tests of hypothesis 1 (c) that as operating 
equity increased entrant farm firms substituted capital using-labor saving 
activities for labor using-capital saving activities or expanded the scale 
of farming operations up to the economic bench marks for land and labor. 
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Risk aversion seldomly increased above the lower bound. If it was 
initially above the lower bound, it declined toward the lower bound in 
relation to growth of operating equity, implying more risk acceptance by 
the firm and greater profit, ceteris paribus. These adjustments occurred 
regardless of land values, but the profit incentives shifted in favor of 
farm enlargement in terms of acres as land values declined, in which case 
capital using-labor saving activities became the dominant means of pro­
duction but only after attainment of the economic bench mark for cropland 
acres. 
Along with the above adjustments, imperfections in the continuum of 
tenure arrangements both declined and increased. When the supply levels 
of operating equity were low relative to the amount of land controlled, 
the firm obtained additional livestock housing space under share leasing 
arrangements as required in maximizing expected net income. Although 
these sharing arrangements inhibited gaining control over resources and 
using resources efficiently, they also facilitated the highest and most 
profitable use of the firm's operating equity in relation to other possi­
ble tenure arrangements. Without this tenure option, imperfections would 
have been even more severe. 
A larger level of operating equity induced the firm to earn the full 
share of return on its resource inputs used in livestock production by 
dropping share leased housing facilities, and replacing them with owned 
housing, if the firm did not own land, it purchased land for the purpose 
of attaching livestock housing. Thus, imperfections further declined. 
Growth in operating equity also induced the firm to obtain land. 
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Only at very high levels of operating equity was the firm induced to buy 
land beyond the amount required in relation to livestock housing needs. 
As more operating equity became available, cropping activities based on 
higher levels of technology entered optimal solutions. Inasmuch as land 
was controlled under share leases, the adverse effects of share leasing 
arrangements became more severe, causing resource opportunity costs to 
rise more quickly than resource earnings. 
It was concluded through tests of hypothesis 1 (d) that greater re­
source efficiency is achieved by farm firms when they are confronted with 
optional tenure arrangements and, except in special cases involving 
ownership, they would be wiser from an economic standpoint not to attach 
preference to any given tenure instrument. 
Given preference for leasing contracts, it was concluded that imper­
fections increase with growth in operating equity. This was attributed 
to (1) the inhibiting affects of share leasing arrangements on efficient 
use of resources and (2) the inhibiting affects of short term leasing 
contracts which impeded the firm from obtaining owned livestock housing 
facilities, and earning the full return on its resources utilized in 
the production of livestock products. Consequently, as operating equity 
increased the firm attained its economic bench mark for cropland acres 
and then intensified cropping operations by capital using-labor saving 
activities, utilizing labor saved through expanding livestock operations 
under share leasing arrangements. The total effects inhibited efficient 
use of resources more severely than in the case of optional tenure 
arrangements. 
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It was concluded through tests of hypothesis 2 (a) that forward 
conditional sale contracts, as used in gaining control over variable 
crop or livestock inputs, were complementary with forms of credit when 
(1) the security interest required by contracts was based on future 
farm output rather than farm chattels and (2) the specified levels of 
technology under contracts facilitated more efficient use of operating 
equity in generating net farm income than competing alternatives. The 
combinations of contracts and credit entering optimal solutions depended 
on (l) the supply levels of operating equity relative to economic bench 
marks of land and labor, (2) the type of control over land and livestock 
housing facilities and (3) the relative profitability per unit level of 
production. 
it was concluded through tests of hypothesis 2 (b) that lowering 
down payments associated with long term financing of land and extending 
100 per cent credit on built up equity in land for purchase of additional 
land were complementary with other forms of credit and forward con­
ditional sale contracts. The possible combinations of these alternatives 
entering optimal solutions depended on the same three factors as in the 
case of only contracts and credit plus a fourth: the supply levels of 
built up equity in land. 
Farms controlling land under leasing contracts were motivated 
through profit incentives to purchase land for the purpose of attaching 
owned livestock housing space as required in expanding livestock 
enterprises or in displacing share leased housing facilities. Since 
these farms did not initially own land, the down payments on land 
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purchases were provided by operating equity. Afterwards (in adjoining 
intervals), the down payments on land purchases were provided by operating 
equity or by withdrawing built up equity in land previously purchased 
and refinanced under the mortgage. If the supply levels of operating 
equity were relatively low, the emphasis was on withdrawing built up 
equity in land previously purchased for down payment on more land. 
Long term financing of land was based on 10 per cent or 20 per cent 
down payment through the land installment contract or the mortgage, 
respectively. These down payment percentages were one-half the per­
centages determined by Reynolds (p. 36). However, 10 per cent down most 
frequently entered optimal solutions. It was implied that higher down 
payments would have seriously impeded farm firms in purchasing land for 
the purpose of attaching owned livestock housing space. In effect, 
higher down payments would maintain tenure imperfections resulting from 
livestock sharing arrangements over a longer period of time. 
Enlarging repayment schedules associated with long term financing 
of land had little effect in terms of increasing the growth rate of 
operating equity in relation to farms which purchased land only for the 
purpose of attaching owned livestock housing space. 
In special cases where the initial levels of operating equity were 
relatively high in relation to the amount of land controlled by the 
farm firm, land was purchased in large quantities, forcing annual debt 
obligations above the capacity of the firm to generate net farm income 
in meeting these obligations. Only when repayment schedules were raised 
could these special cases experience a positive growth rate in operating 
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equity. 
It was concluded that aids to entry were an integral part of entry 
into farming. Family assistance in terms of credit and machine use as 
well as savings accruing from nonfarm income usually occurred in response 
to capital needs in breaking the capital barrier to entry. Entrant 
operator wives accounted for a larger proportion of savings accruing 
from nonfarm income than entrants themselves. It was implied that entry 
into farming was as much a part of aids to entry as tenure forms and 
instruments. However, once the capacity of the firm to generate net 
farm income increased to a level where growth In operating equity was 
possible, the relative importance of aids to entry declined. 
It was concluded that real property tax reflected overcapitali­
zation of land. Inasmuch as real property tax increased as a result of 
overcapitalization, it had the effect of enlarging requirements of 
operating equity while reducing net farm income, ceteris paribus, in 
relation to land controlled by the firm under ownership or cash leases. 
Through tests of hypotheses this study has discerned, developed or 
indicated adjustments in tenure instruments which would facilitate 
successful farm entry, gaining control over resources and using these 
resources efficiently for a given tenure form. The implications of 
these adjustments suggest inferences for further research as indicated 
below. 
1. Share leasing arrangements strongly inhibited efficient use 
of resources at relatively high levels of operating equity. 
This imperfection could be avoided if share leasing ar­
rangements were adjusted so that net price and equity capital 
coefficients declined in the same proportions in relation to 
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activities under share leases as compared to ownership. That 
is to say, if gross prices were halved, then operating costs 
as reflected in capital requirements should also be halved. 
Research is required in determining how and in what manner 
share lease contracts could be modified to influence tenants 
and landlords into negotiating economic adjustments in prices 
and operating costs. 
2. Share leasing arrangements inhibited gaining control over 
resources. This imperfection could be avoided if sharing 
arrangements were flexible, responding to the capital needs 
of the firm. Accordingly, research is needed to determine 
how and in what manner share lease contracts could be further 
modified to induce flexible sharing arrangements without 
violating economic adjustments in prices and operating costs. 
3. Lowering down payment percentages, extending 100 per cent 
credit on built up equity in land for purchase of additional 
land and lengthening repayment schedules associated with long 
term financing reduced tenure imperfections by creating 
incentives for firms to purchase some land for the purpose of 
consolidating or expanding livestock operations. Research is 
needed to explain or develop relationships which would bring 
about these adjustments, providing the costs of bringing them 
about did not exceed expected benefits. 
4. The forward conditional sale contract was introduced as means 
for gaining control over cropping or livestock inputs when the 
security interest for the contract was provided by the firm in 
terms of future farm output. Research is needed to determine 
satisfactory economic technology and contract prices which 
would induce both farm firms and farm supply firms into these 
type of contractual agreements. 
If a half million dollar inventory of productive assets is required 
by the economic farm business by 1981, it strongly suggests the possi­
bility that tenure instruments will be hard pressed to provide these 
resources unless the initial operating equity of the future entrant farm 
firm is considerably larger than the majority of entrant farm firms 
studied in North Central Iowa. It is unlikely that aids to entry would 
increase substantially over their present levels. In effect, this 
suggests that the future entrant farm firm may be able to obtain adequate 
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equity for gaining control over an economic resource mix only if it is 
organized as a corporate firm, financing its equity requirements through 
a securities market. This is not likely to take place as long as farm 
land continues to be overcapitalized. As long as entrant operators 
accept less than full opportunity costs for their resource inputs 
overcapitalization will take place. As observed in figures 11-28, 
entrant farm firms not earning at least opportunity costs for their 
resources usually earned more than family living expenditures (FLE) 
plus opportunity cost in productive assets (OCEPA), implying that the 
majority of entrant operators could afford the luxury of placing non-
economic values on farming as a business and a way of life. 
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Questionnaire I 
AES - 1483 (NC-53) 
iSU, 1967 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FARM OPERATOR-ENTRY 
NAME DATE REC. NO. 
MAILING ADDRESS TELEPHONE NO. 
LOCATION: Q S T R ; COUNTY 
I. Preliminary survey of family, entry, and business characteristics of 
farm operator entrants. 
A. Family Characteristics 
1. What is your age? 
2. Are you married? Yes ( ) No ( ) Year Married 
3. Do you have brothers or sisters in nonfarm occupations? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) 
4. Are your parents farming? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Retired or semi-retired from farming? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
What year? 
5- Do you have brothers or brothers-in-law who have started to 
farm? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Expect to start farming? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
6. Are your wife's parents farming? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Retired or semi-retired from farming? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
What year? 
Entry Characteristics 
7. When did you start farming? (year) 
8. Did you start farming with your parents? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Wife's parents? Yes ( ) No { ) 
Other close relatives? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
What kind of business arrangement(s) did you have when you 
started farming? (check) Wage ( ), Payment in kind ( ), 
Enterprise ( ), Partnership ( ), Landlord-Tenant ( ), 
Corporate arrangement ( ). 
Was your business arrangement(s) written? ( ) Verbal ( ) 
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S. Did you start farming Independently of parents (own or wife's) 
or close relatives? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
What kind of business arrangement(s) did you have? (check) 
Partnership ( ), Landlord-Tenant ( ), Partnership ( ), 
Landlord-Tenant ( ), Owner-Operator ( ), Corporate 
arrangement ( ) 
10. Did you receive family assistance when you started farming? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) 
What kind of assistance did you receive? (check) 
Gifts (farm assets, money, etc.) ( ), Inheritance ( ), Family 
credit ( ), Use of some machinery in return for your labor ( 
11. Have you received family assistance since you started farming? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) 
What kind of assistance did you receive? (check) 
Gifts (farm assets, money, etc.) ( ), inheritance ( ), Family 
credit ( ), Use of some machinery in return for your labor ( 
12. Do you expect to receive additional family assistance in the 
future? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
What kind of assistance do you expect to receive? (check) 
Gifts (farm assets, money, etc.) ( T, inheritance ( ), Family 
credit ( ), Use of some machinery in return for your labor ( 
13- Have you purchased or expect to purchase farm assets from 
parents? Yes ( ) No ( ) Brothers or sisters? Yes ( ) 
No ( ) Other close relatives? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Business Characteristics 
14. How many months (number) are you employed on the farm each 
year ( ) 
15. Do you have continuous farm records from Jan. 1, 1962 to 
Jan. 1, 1967? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
16. How many acres did you own and rent when you started farming? 
Acres owned Acres rented 
By Jan. 1, 1962? Acres owned Acres rented 
By Jan. 1, 1967? Acres owned Acres rented 
Did you purchase land through a mortgage? ( ) 
Land installment contract? ( ) Other ( ) 
17. How many acres were operated by the enti re farm business (of 
which you were a member) when you started farming? 
Acres owned Acres rented 
By Jan. 1, 1962? Acres owned Acres rented 
By Jan. 1, 1967? Acres owned Acres rented 
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18. What kind of business arrangement(s) did you have in the year 
1962, 1966, and what do you expect will be the business ar­
rangement in the future? (check appropriate parts of table 
below) 
Business Arrangement(s) 1962 1966 Future 
Partnership () () () 
Landlord-Tenant: cash lease ( ) ( ) ( ) 
crop(s) share lease ( ) ( ) ( ) 
livestock share lease( ) ( ) ( ) 
Owner-Operator () () () 
Corporate arrangement ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Was your business arrangement(s) written? ( ) Verbal ( ) 
During the period 1962 to 1966, were you involved with con­
tractual arrangement(s)? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Consider here, for example, contractual arrangement(s) with 
suppliers of seed, fertilizer, chemicals, equipment for hire 
or rent, feeder hogs and cattle, as well as contractual ar­
rangement (s) with purchasers of farm products. 
19. In the table below rank (1,2,3) the three most important 
income earning farm enterprises for the entire farm business 
the year when you started farming, 1962, and I966? 
Type Enterprise When starting to farm 1962 1966 
Cash grain 
Beef cattle 
Feeder cattle 
Hogs 
Feeder hogs . 
Dairying 
Poultry 
During the period 1962 to 1966, was part of the income 
earning potential of one (or more) of these farm enterprises 
insured? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Consider here crop, hail, and livestock insurance. 
20. For each asset type listed in the table below, what was the 
total value for the entire farm business? 
Asset Value including debt 
Type When starting to farm Jan. 1, 1962 Jan. 1, 1967 
Value Value Value 
Land & 
Improvements 
Machinery & 
Equipment 
Livestock 
Corporate stock 
300 
For each asset type listed, what was the value of total operator 
ownership and what was your share of this? Do not include land­
lord ownership unless the landlord is also an operator of the 
f i rm. 
Asset When starting 
Type to farm Jan. 1 , 1962 Jan. 1, 1967 
Op. Your Op. Your Op. Your 
owner, share owner, share owner, share 
Land & Improve. 
Machinery & 
Equipment^ 
Livestock 
Corporate stock 
For each asset type listed, what was the amount of total operator 
debt and what was your share of this? Do not include landlord 
debt unless the landlord is also an operator of the firm. 
Asset When starting 
Type to farm Jan. 1, 1962 Jan. 1, 1967 
Op. Your Op. Your Op. Your 
debt share debt share debt share 
Land & Improve. 
Machinery £ 
Equipment 
Livestock 
Corporate stock 
Operator ownership includes operator(s)' equity plus debt, and 
it refers to the inventory value of farm assets owned by operator 
participants in the business. 
Operator debt represents obligations against farm assets owned 
by operator participants. 
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GLOSSARY AND INSTRUCTIONS 
This questionnaire is to be answered only by participants in farm business 
enterprise which appear on the list(s) submitted by consultants for Farm 
Business Associations in North Central Iowa. To aid interviewer(s) in 
taking this questionnaire several terms are defined, and suggestions made. 
I. A. k & 6 Semi-ratired refers to parents who have physically retired 
from farming, but who retain some management rights which may be written, 
verbal, or merely implicit. 
B. 7 Start farming refers to the year when the respondent first con­
tributed some labor, capital, and/or management to farm enterprise. 
B. 8 Payment in kind refers to expectation of payment(s) sometime in 
the future for labor, capital, and/or managerial services rendered to 
the farm family business upon the participants entry into farming. 
Enterprise arrangement refers to sharing of receipts (or receipts and 
expenses) of a single enterprise. 
Partnership refers to sharing of expenses and receipts for all the 
enterprises of the farm business in some fixed proportion among the 
partners, for example, 50/50, 60/40, 40/30/30, and etc. If the 
partnership pays rent, then check landlord-tenant as well as partner­
ship. If the landlord is a corporation in which the partners hold 
stock, then check partnership, landlord-tenant and corporate 
arrangement. 
Landlord-Tenant refers to the payment of rent (from tenant to landlord) 
for services rendered by landlord's land, buildings, machinery and 
equipment, and/or breeding stock. Rent can be a fixed payment or 
fixed share(s) (in the same or different proportions) of specified 
enterprise receipts. The landlord may share some of the expenses of 
specified enterprises. Three basic types of landlord-tenant leases: 
(i) cash lease - fixed rental payment for the use of landlord's land 
and other productive assets; the emphasis is on land. 
(ii) crop(s) share lease - share rental payment for use of landlord's 
land and other productive assets; the emphasis is on land. The 
rental payment consists of sharing of receipts of crop enter­
prises in the same or different proportions. 
(iii) livestock share lease - share rental payment for use of landlord's 
land and other productive assets; the emphasis may be spread over 
landlord's productive assets. The rental payment consists of 
sharing of receipts of livestock enterprises in the same or differ­
ent proportions. 
There is considerable overlapping of these basic leases. Crop(s) share 
leases include provision for fixed rental payment on one or more 
specified crop enterprises, for example, the hay enterprise. Livestock 
share leases include provision for sharing of crop receipts and/or fixed 
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rental payment for one or more specified enterprises. 
Corporate arrangement - refers to a respondent holding land, buildings, 
machinery and equipment, and/or breeding stock in the form of corporate 
stock. If the corporation pays rent, then check landlord-tenant as 
well as corporate arrangement. 
B. 9 Owner-Operator refers to the single proprietor who owns and 
operates land and other productive assets. If he pays rent on part of 
the land (and other assets) he operates, then he would be a part owner-
part tenant. If this should be the case, then check both owner-
operator and landlord-tenant arrangements. 
C. 15 There may be some situations in which the respondent may not 
keep records for the entire farm business (of which he is a member). 
For example, the respondent may be involved in a partnership in which 
a nonrespondent keeps the records. Hence, no matter who keeps the 
records, check "yes", if records are kept, continuous, and available 
for the respondent to use. 
C. 16 This implies the number of acres the respondent actually owned 
and/or paid rent on, i.e. interest in land as owned by operator 
interviewed. Do not request acres operated, since this is not a con­
sistent question unless the respondent is an owner-operator and/or 
tenant. 
C. 17 This refers to acres actually operated by the entire business. 
Break this down into acres owned and/or paid rent on. For example, 
two partners may each own 160 acres, and the partnership itself may 
lease 160 acres. The acres owned are 320, and the acres for which 
rent is paid is 160. 
C. 18 Refer to B. 8 and 9. Check as many parts of the table as 
needed to describe the respondent's business arrangements at the 
given points in time. In the case where a business arrangement 
involves two landlord-tenant leases of the same type check the 
appropriate part of the table twice, i.e. put two check marks in a 
single parentheses. 
C. 20 Total value for the entire farm business refers to the 
inventory value of farm assets (i.e. the sum of assets or resources 
owned, leased, and under contract) as employed by the farm 
operator(s) in his (their) farm operations. 
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Code for Questionnaire I 
I Preliminary Survey - l.D. reserve cols. 1 ... 5 
No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
A 1 6 1 Age groups: 26-30 
2 31-35 
3 36-40 
4 41-45 
5 46-50 
2 7 1 Year groups: not applicable 
2 before 1950 
3 1950-54 
4 1955-59 
5 i960 and after 
3 8 1 Brothers or sisters: yes 
2 no 
4 9 1 Parents farming: yes retired no 
2 no yes 
3 no no 
10 0 No answer given when retired 
1 Year groups: not applicable 
2 before 1950 
3 1950-54 
4 1955-59 
5 i960 and after 
5 11 1 Brothers started: yes expect yes 
2 yes no 
3 no yes 
4 no no 
6 12 0 No answer 
1 Not applicab le 
2 Wife's parents: yes retired no 
3 no yes 
4 no no 
13 0 No answer given when retired 
1 Year groups: not applicable 
2 before 1950 
3 1950-54 
4 1955-59 
5 i960 and after 
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No. 
Question Column Code T ranslat ion 
B 7 14 1 
2 
3 
4 
Started farming: before 1950 
1950-54 
1955-59 
i960 and after 
8 & 9 15 
16 
17 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1 
2 
3 
Your parents: yes wife's no relatives no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
Bus. arr. wage 
enterprise 
partnership 
Idl.-tenant 
wage + enterprise 
wage + Idl.-tenant lai
wage + enterprise + Idl.-tenant 
partnership + Idl.-tenant 
written 
verbal 
written + verbal 
10, 11 18-19 
& 12 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
n 
12 
13 
14 
15 
20-21 01 
02 
03 
04 
Type assistance at start: none 
gifts 
inheritance 
family credit 
machine use 
gifts + inheritance 
gifts + family credit 
gifts + machine use 
inheritance + family credit 
inheritance + machine use 
family credit + machine use 
gifts + inheritance + family credit 
gifts + inheritance + machine use 
inheritance + family credit + machine use 
gifts + inheritance + family credit + 
machine use 
Type assistance since starting: 
g ifts 
inheritance 
family credit 
none 
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No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
05 machine use 
06 gifts + inheritance 
07 gifts + family credit 
08 gifts + machine use 
09 inheritance + family credit 
10 inheritance + machine use 
11 family credit + machine use 
12 gifts + inheritance + family credit 
13 gifts + inheritance + machine use 
14 inheritance + family credit + machine use 
15 gifts + inheritance + family credit + 
machine use ( 
22-23 00 no answer 
01 Type assistance expected: none 
02 gifts 
03 inheritance 
04 family credit 
05 machine use 
06 gifts + inheritance 
07 gifts + family credit 
08 gifts + machine use 
09 inheritance + family credit 
10 inheritance + machine use 
11 family credit + machine use 
12 gifts + inheritance + family credit 
13 gifts + inheritance + machine use 
14 inheritance + family credit + machine use 
15 gifts + inheritance + family credit + 
machine use 
13 24 0 No answer 
1 Parents yes Brothers yes Relatives yes 
2 yes no yes 
3 yes yes no 
4 yes no no 
5 no yes yes 
6 no no yes 
7 no yes no 
8 no no no 
C 14 25 1 Months: less than 10 
2 10 
3 11 
4 12 
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Question Column Code Translation 
15 26 1 Records: yes 
2 no 
16 27-29 Enter When starting: acres owned 
30-32 raw acres rented 
33-35 data Jan. 1, 1962: acres owned 
36-38 acres rented 
39-41 Jan. 1, 1967: acres owned 
42-44 acres rented 
45 0 No answer 
1 Land bought via: none 
2 mortgage 
3 L.1.C. 
4 other 
5 mortgage + L.I .C. 
17 46-48 Enter When starting: acres owned 
49-51 raw acres rented 
52-54 data Jan. 1 , 1962: acres owned 
55-57 acres rented 
58-60 Jan. 1, 1967 : acres owned 
61-63 acres rented 
18 64 1 1962 Bus. arr. : partnership 
2 Idl.-tenant 
3 0.0. 
4 partnership + Idl.-tenant 
5 Idl.-tenant + 0.0. 
6 partnership + Idl.-tenant + 0.0. 
65 0 1962 Tenancy-type: no cash lease 
1 one cash lease 
2 two cash lease 
66 0 no crop share lease 
1 one crop share lease 
2 two crop share leases 
3 three crop share leases 
4 four crop share leases 
67 0 no livestock share lease 
1 one livestock share lease 
2 two livestock share leases 
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68 1 1966 Bus. arr.: partnership 
2 Idl.-tenant 
3 o.o. 
4 partnership + Idl.-tenant 
5 Idl.-tenant + o.o. 
6 partnership + Idl.-tenant + o.o. 
69 0 1966 tenancy-type: no cash lease 
1 one cash lease 
2 two cash leases 
3 three cash leases 
70 0 no crop share lease 
1 one crop share lease 
2 two crop share leases 
3 three crop share leases 
4 four crop share leases 
71 0 no livestock share lease 
1 one livestock share lease 
2 two livestock share leases 
72 1 Future bus. arr.: partnership 
2 Idl.-tenant 
3 o.o. 
4 partnership + Idl.-tenant 
5 Idl.-tenant + o.o. 
6 partnership + Idl.-tenant + o.o. 
73 1 written 
2 verbal 
3 written + verbal 
Ik 1 Contracts: yes 
2 no 
19 75 1 When starting: rank one cash grain 
2 beef cattle 
3 feeder cattle 
k hogs 
5 feeder hogs 
6 dairying 
7 poultry 
C 
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Question Column Code Translation 
76 0 No rank two given 
1 rank two cash grain 
2 beef cattle 
3 feeder cattle 
4 hogs 
5 feeder hogs 
6 dairying 
7 pou11 ry 
77 0 No rank three given 
1 rank three cash grain 
2 beef cattle 
3 feeder cattle 
4 hogs 
5 feeder hogs 
6 dairying 
7 poultry 
78 0 .. 7 1962: rank one as in column 75 
79 0 .. 7 rank two as in column 76 
80 0 .. 7 rank three as in column 77 
(Card 
No. 2) 
6 0 .. 7 1966: rank one as above 
7 0 .. 7 rank two as above 
8 0 .. 7 rank three as above 
9 1 
2 
insurance: yes 
no 
20 
(Card 
No. 3) 
11-80 
plus 
11-45 
in 7 
digit 
fields 
Enter 
raw 
data 
Starting: aggregate assets 
op. assets; indiv. share 
op. debt; indiv. share 
(Card 
No. 4) 
46-80 
plus 
11-80 
in 7 
digit 
fields 
Enter 
raw 
data 
Jan. 1, 1962: follow format above 
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Question Column Code Translat ion 
(Card 11-80 Enter Jan. 1, 1966: follow format above 
No. 5) plus raw 
11-45 data 
(Card In 7 
No. 6) digit 
fields 
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APPENDIX B 
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(Questionnaire I I 
AES - 1483 (NC-53) 
iSU, 1967 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FARM OPERATOR-ENTRY, CONT'D 
NAME DATE REC. NO. 
MAILING ADDRESS COUNTY 
II. Survey of Selected Operator Entrants 
A. General Characteristics of your (1966) Leasing Arrangements. 
1. Are your cropping practices the same on all the cropland you 
operate? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Are differences in cropping practices due (i) to differences 
in quality of land? Yes ( ) No ( ); (ii) to differences 
in landlord-tenant arrangements? Yes ( ) No ( ). 
Explain the nature of these differences in terms: 
(a) arrangements fixed by the lease 
- lease (i) 
- lease (ii)_ 
- lease (iii) 
(b) arrangements for incentives 
- lease (i) 
- lease (i i)_ 
- lease (iii) 
2. Do you have written agreement with the landlord to pay com­
pensation for any unused portion of resources invested by 
you in land or buildings? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Explain the nature of this compensation in terms: 
(a) depreciated cost of resources 
- lease (i) 
- lease (ii) 
- lease (iii) 
(b) discounted net returns 
- lease (i) 
- lease (ii) 
- lease (iii) 
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3. Do you have a long term leasing arrangement with your father 
(or other close relative) whereby you anticipate purchasing 
or inheriting part of the land? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Are your investments in permanent improvements (housing, 
livestock buildings, tiling, etc.) protected if the landlord 
(your father or other close relative) should die intestate? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) _ -
Explain the nature of this protection 
h. Do you prefer a written lease to a verbal lease? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) Indifferent ( ) 
Do you prefer a written long term lease to a short term lease? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) Indifferent ( ) 
Explain why you would not prefer a written lease? 
a written long term lease? 
B. General Characteristics of your (1966) Partnership Agreements. 
1. Do you have liability insurance? Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Amount of Premium $ Coverage $ 
Why don't you have liability insurance? 
2. Do you plan to continue operating under a partnership? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Why don't you plan to continue the partnership? 
3. What is your share of variable costs? ; 
fixed costs? ; and receipts? . 
What is your corresponding share of management? 
4. Is one of your partners also a landlord to the partnership? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Why did this partner not include all his asset services into 
the partnership? Explain in terms of 
(a) eliminating differential sharing 
(b) protecting equity from partnership 
5. What are the family relationships among the partners? 
C. Amount of Family Assistance. 
1. What was the nature and value of family assistance? 
(a) when starting to farm 
(i) gifts* 
(ii) inheritance 
^Includes any savings accrued as a result of purchasing farm assets 
below market price. 
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(Hi) credit 
(iv) labor in return for use of machinery 
(b) since starting to farm 
(i) gifts 
(ii) inheritance 
(iii) credit 
(iv) labor in return for use of machinery 
2. What will likely be the nature and value of family 
assistance during the next 10 years? Explain: 
Amount of Farm Equity Accumulated Exogenous 1 y of Family 
Assistance and Operator(s) Business. 
1. What was the amount of equity you contributed to the 
business when starting to farm? $ 
2. What was the amount of equity your wife contributed to 
the business at time of your marriage? $ 
3. Since starting to farm how much have you and your wife 
saved for investment in farm assets from employment 
exogenous to the business? $ 
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ill. Relationship of Landlord(s) and Tenant and Landlord(s)' Shares or Cash by 
Type of Lease as Related to Crop and Livestock Production and Operating 
Expenditures for 1962. 
Relationship of tenant Landlôrd(s) and Lease Types for 1962 
and landlord and Relationship: Relationship: Relationship: 
share(s) of production L-T L-T L-T 
or expense and/or Yrs. leased Yrs. leased Yrs. leased 
cash paid Term: Term: Term: 
Type of 
production Share Share Share 
or expense Acres or Cash Acres or Cash Acres of Cash 
Total Acres 
Crop Product ion(total acres) 
Corn 
Oats 
Beans _ 
Hay 
Pasture 
Corn silage 
Other cropland 
Permanent Past. 
Diverted acres 
Livestock Production 
Hogs 
Feeders 
Light < 850 ~ 
Heavy > 850 
Other 
Operating Expenditures 
General Farm: 
Machinery S equipment . 
Farm fuel £ oil . . . . 
Power & machine hire 
Seeding"? 
Harvesting** 
Labor hired 
Other 
Circle L-T embodying operator(s) building site(s). Check term if 
the L-T is written. 
Specify. 
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Relationship of tenant Landlord(s) and Lease Types for 1962 
and landlord and Relationship: Relationship: Relationship: 
share(s) of production L-T L-T L-T 
or expense and/or Yrs, leased Yrs. leased Yrs. leased 
cash paid Term: Term: Term: 
Type of 
production Share Share Share 
or expense Acres or Cash Acres or Cash Acres or Cash 
Operating Expenditures (cont'd) 
Crop: 
Hall insurance .... 
Fertilizer 
Lime 
Herbicides 
Seed 
Insecticides 
Livestock: 
Feed 
General & misc. . . . 
Feeder purchases . . . 
Hog purchases . . . 
Other 1ivestock 
purchases . . , . 
IV. Relationship of Landlord(s) and Tenant and Landlord(s)' Shares or 
Cash by Type of Lease as Related to Crop and Livestock Production 
and Operating Expenditures for 1966. 
SAME FORMAT AS ABOVE 
v. Inventory Values and Ownership by Type of Asset for Operator(s) and Landlord(s), January 1, 1962 
and 1967 and Machine Capacity for years 1962 and 1966.* 
— ——— —— 1 
Value of operator(s) and January 1, 1962 , 
landlord(s) assets Operator(s) Landlord(s) S Lease-types 
Type of I 1 2 L^T 
asset I Value Value Value Value Value 
Fixed Assets (land & improvements) 
Improvements (total) 
Working Assets (total ) 
Machinery & equipment (total) 
Breeding stock; (total) 
Hogs 
Other 
Liquid Assets (total) 
Livestock (total) 
Feeders 
Hogs 
Other 
Feed, grain & supplements 
Other Assets (cash, stock, bonds, account 
receivable, and other forms of equity) 
Machine capacity for seeding and cultivating No. acres possible 
Actual no. acres 
Machine capacity for harvesting and No. acres possible 
cultivating Actual no. acres 
Grain storage capacity Inadequate ( ) Amount of extra 
Adequate ( ) volume required bus. 
Same format as above for January 1, I967. 
VI. Debt-Type, Purpose, and Structure as related to Operator(s) Owned Productive Inventory Assets, 
January 1, 1962. 
Debt 
Structure 
Type of Debt 
and for What 
Purpose 
Spec i fy 
January 1, 1962 
Debtor Creditor Collateral Principal <u Repayment Schedule 
Sped fy 
family, 
private or 
the insti­
tution 
Specify 
kind or 
amount and 
value 
Orig. 
Amount 
Amount 
Re-
fO 
L. 0) 4J OL (/) 
ma I n ing a o) 
CO (Ù 
c 
Yrs. or Mos. 
Orig. 
Agree. 
Re-
maining 
Flexible 
or inflex. 
as related 
to farm 
income 
Land Installment 
Contract: 
Mortgage: 
Machinery in­
stallment contract: 
Chattle Mortgage: 
Lien: 
Promisory Note: 
Charge Accounts: 
VII. Debt-Type, Purpose, and Structure as related to Operator(s) Owned Productive Inventory Assets, 
January 1, 1967. 
SAME FORMAT AS ABOVE 
VliJ. Fixed Farm Expenses by Type for Operator(s) and Landlord(s) for years 1962-66. 
Value of 1962 ' 1963 1964 1965 1966 ~ 
Expense Op(s) Ldl(s) Op(s) Ldl(s) Op(s) (Ldl(s) Op(s) Ldl(s) Op(s) Ldl(s) 
uXpCnSG 
Depreciation; (total) 
Buildings S 
Improvements (total) 
Machinery & 
Equipment (total ) 
Cash Rent; (total) 
Cropland 
in grain 
hay 
pasture 
silage 
other 
BuiIdings 
Wasteland 
Taxes ; (total ) 
Real Property Tax 
Amount earmarked 
for education 
Interest Paid; (total) 
Insurance Paid (less hail 
ins, prem.) 
IX. General Farm, Crop, and Livestock Operating Expense by Type (as well as other pertinent 
information) for Operator(s) and Landlord(s) for years 1962-66. 
Value of Operating I963 1964 1965 1966 
Expense 
Operating Expense Op(s) Ldl(s) Op(s) Ldl(s) Op(s) Ldl(s) Op(s) Ldl (s) Op(s) Ldl(s) 
General Farm; (total) ' ^ 
Machinery & Equip. . . 
Farm Fuel & Oil (less 
gas tax rebate) . . 
Power & Machine Hire 
Seeding 
Harvesting . . . 
Labor Hired .... 
No. days hired 
Permanent improvement 
Repairs 
Other 
VJO 
Crop; (total ) ' Co 
Hail Insurance 
No. op(s) acres Ins: 
(i) rented 
(i i) owned 
Value of coverage: 
(i) (II) 
corn corn 
oats oats 
beans beans 
FertI1izer 
Lime 
Herbicides 
Seed 
InsectIcldes 
Livestock: (total) 
Feed 
General & Misc. 
Operator(s) Labor 
Family Labor 
X. Land-Use, Crop Production and Value for the Entire Farm Business for years 1962-66. 
Crop Production ' 1962 ' I963 ' 1964 1965 ' 1966 
I J 11 ^ Value Acres Yield Acres Yield Acres Yield Acres Yield Acres Yield 
Land-Use - ' 
Corn " 
Oats 
Beans __j 
Hay 
Pasture _j 
Corn silage 
Other cropland ' 
Permanent past. 
Total crop 
Diverted acres (Op(s)) c 
(Ldl (s)) 
Livestock, Amount Produced and Value for the Entire Farm Business for years 1962 -66. 
Amount Produced 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
& Value Weight Value Weight Value Weight Value Weight Value Weight Value 
Livestock incr. Incr. Incr. incr. Incr. Incr. Incr. Incr. Incr. Incr. 
Hogs 
Feeders 
Light < 850 
Heavy > 850 
Other . 
Operator(s) Receipts: 
custom work 
rent 
interest _ 
dividends _ 
gov't payments (less 
diverted acre payments) 
insurance & misc. _ 
Feed.fed to livestock 
Landlord(s) Receipts 
XI. Weight, Value, and Ave. Number Days on Feed for Feeder and Hog Purchases and Losses and Other 
Pertinent Information for the Entire Farm Business for years 1962-66. 
Weight, Value 6 Days ' 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Type of Feed Weight Value 
Purchase or Loss 
Weight Value Weight Value Weight Value Weight Value 
Feeder Purchases: (total) 
Light 1 No. 
2 No. 
3 No. 
Heavy 1 No. 
2 No. 
Feeder Losses: (total ) 
Light No. 
Heavy No. 
Hog Purchases: (total) 
Sows & Gilts No. 
Feeders No. 
Other No. 
Hog Losses; (total) 
Before weaning 
No. sows 
No. pigs 
After weaning 
No. hogs 
Other 
Other pertinent information: 
Feedlot capacity (as related 
to improve. & equip.) 
Farrowing space 
Growing space 
VJ ho 
1962 
No. Light 
No. Heavy 
No. Litters 
Actual No. 
Litters Produced 
No. 210# Hogs 
No. sq. feet 
1966 
No. Light 
No. Heavy 
No. Litters 
Actual No. 
Litters Produced 
No. 220# Hogs 
No. sq. feet 
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GLOSSARY AND EXPLANATION 
II. A. 1 If entrant and operator(s) lease land, then they were asked if 
they would do anything different on their own land and then to explain 
according to 1(a) and (b). 
A. 2 If the operator(s) had an oral agreement and a strong feeling 
that the landlord would honor the agreement, then oral was written 
into this question and it was marked "yes"; and then were asked to 
explain according to 2(a) and (b). 
A. 3 A long-term leasing arrangement need not be written to qualify 
for "yes". 
A. 4 The operator(s) were asked according to their feeling toward 
their leasing arrangement. 
C. 1 (a) (i) Gifts included savings accrued, etc. 
C. 1 (a) (iv) Was valued according to the cost of hiring machinery 
and equipment to complete farm operations. 
C. 1 (b) Referred to the total received since starting to farm. 
C. 2 If operator entrant(s) expected to receive assistance, they 
were asked to. put an expected value on it. 
D. 3 In those instances in which the wife spent earnings on food, 
housing, etc., then entrant(s) were asked to estimate the amount of 
money they would have had to withdraw from the business, if their 
wife had not worked. 
III. Because operator(s) insisted that they operated the farm as a unit, 
it was not possible to obtain a breakdown of cropland by crops for 
each lease type within the allotted time for the interview. This 
was not a serious limitation to the study, however, since the 
sharing ratios were almost homogeneous within lease types and also 
across lease types in terms of crop production. 
V. Because of data limitations in terms of breakdown, landlord assets 
were aggregated except in instances of dual LSL in which one 
involved hogs and other feeders. 
Machine capacity was estimated in terms A acres possible given 
present labor hours. Where machine capacity was in excess supply, 
the farm operations often involved custom work. 
Grain capacity was often inadequate, but not considered to be 
restrictive as operator(s), with but one exception, considered 
commercial storage as an economic alternative. 
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Vil I. It was not feasible within the interview time to breakdown taxes 
into personal and real for operator(s) and landlord. This is not 
serious, however, as estimates can be achieved through selection 
of records involving only personal or real property and making a 
per acre or per $ estimate. 
IX. It was impossible in most instances to breakdown crop expenses, 
as detailed description was lacking. However, most operator(s) 
had knowledge of type of seed, herbicides and chemicals used and 
the approximate cost per acre. Since these will be employed in 
the programming procedures, there is no need to consider the lack 
of breakdown as a serious limitation. Note that the breakdown 
between operator and landlord is available on a share basis. 
X. For the programming only landlord shares were needed, but for 
determining actual net operating income of operator(s), their 
landlords and the total farm over the 5 years of observations, 
actual crop share rent and 1ivestock share rent was needed. 
These were included at the bottom of X as CSR and LSR in which 
the latter was listed in terms of livestock and crops sold.* 
For purposes of operator(s) net operating income feed bought is 
to be subtracted from total feed fed. Weight increase included 
weight of dead and butchered animals. Value increase included 
value of butchered animals. 
XI. Feeders were purchased between 350-700# and were on feed from 
6-12 months. Hog purchases could not be stratified by type 
reliably. Hog losses could not be stratified by type reliably. 
The aggregate values listed, however, are reliable. Livestock 
capacities: (a) for feeders - no. on hand or could be, whichever 
is larger, for a given point in time, (b) for litters of hogs 
- no. that could be farrowed at a point in time — if summer was 
different from winter both estimates were determined, and (c) 
no. hogs (220#) were determined at a point in time without 
infringing on farrowing facilities — if summer was different 
from winter both estimates were determined. 
The breakdown is given in the adjoining code under operator(s) 
expenses to landlord(s), item X. The symbols are defined here: 
CSL = crops share lease 
LSL = crops-livestock share lease 
CSR = crop share rent 
LCS = landlord(s) corn sold 
LSS = landlord(s) soybeans sold 
HSR = hog share rent 
FSR = feeder cattle share rent 
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Code for Questionnaire 11 
I I Survey of Selected Operator Entrants - Part 1 
No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
1. D. 1-2 01...27 Farm no. 
3 0 Not individual 
4-•5 01... Card no. 
A 1 6 0 No leasing arrangements 
1 Differences: none 
2 Quality land yes Idl.-ten. arr. yes 
3 yes no 
4 no yes 
7 0 Arrangements: not applicable 
1 Fixed yes incentives yes 
2 yes no 
3 no yes 
2 8 0 Compensation: not applicable 
1 none 
2 written dep. cost yes disc. ret. yes 
3 yes no 
4 no yes 
5 oral dep. cost yes disc. ret. yes 
6 yes no 
7 no yes 
3 9 0 Long term leasing arr. not applicable 
1 yes 
2 no 
10 0 Protection of farm invest, not applicabl, 
1 yes 
2 no 
11 0 Nature of protection: not applicable 
1 own land where bldg. site located 
2 landlord(s) pays ali improvements 
3 1andlord(s)' will 
4 12 1 Lease preference: yes 
2 no 
3 indifferent 
325 
No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
13 0 Not applicable 
1 Why no or indifferent; family connections 
2 flexibi1ity 
3 good Idl.-ten. working arr. 
4 family connections + flexibility 
5 good Idl.-ten. working arr. + flexibility 
14 1 Length of lease preference: yes 
2 no 
3 indifferent 
15 0 Not applicable 
1 Why no or indifferent: family connections 
2 flexibility 
3 good Idl.-ten. working arr. 
4 family connections + flexibility 
5 good Idl.-ten. working arr. + flexibility 
B 1-5 Omit coding of partnership - only 4 farms involved 
C 1 16-20 Enter Family assis, when start, gifts 
21-25 raw inheritance 
26-30 data credit 
31-35 mach.-use 
36-40 Family assis, since start, gifts 
41-45 inheritance 
46-50 credit 
51-55 mach.-use 
2 56 0 Future fam. assis. none expected 
1 Nature: gifts 
2 inheritance 
3 credit 
57 1 Estimated value given 
2 No value given 
58-62 Enter Value expected 
raw 
data 
D 1 63-67 Enter Equity contrib. to bus. when starting 
raw 
data 
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Question Column Code Translation 
2 68-72 Enter wife at marriage 
raw 
data 
3 73-77 Enter op. + wife s ince start, from exogenous 
raw employment 
data 
Begin 111 6 0 1962 lease ( ; ) :  none 
(card no. 2) 1 landlord-immediate family 
Relationship 2 relative 
3 nonrelat ive 
L-T 7 0 not applicable 
1 cash lease 
2 c.s.l. 
3 l.s.l. 
. 4 cash lease + bldg. site 
5 c.s.l. + bldg. site 
6 l.s.l. + bldg. site 
Yrs. leased 8-9 00 not applicable 
Enter 
actual 
data 
Term 10 0 not applicable 
1 oral 
2 written - 1 yr. 
3 - 2 yrs. 
4 - 3 yrs. or more 
Total acres 11-13 000 not applicable 
Enter 
actual 
data 
Total acres 14-16 000 not applicable 
in crop Enter 
actual 
data 
Cash lease 17-18 00 Cash paid to Idl . : not applicable 
Enter 
actual 
amount pd./ 
total acre 
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No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
Crop production 
(share lease) 
corn 19 0 Share pd. to Idl.: not applicable 
1 1/2 
oats 20 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
2 2/5 
beans 21 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
2 2/5 
hay S 22 0 n.a. 
pasture 1 1/2 
2 cash 
23-24 00 n.a. 
Enter 
actual 
amount pd. 
/acre 
Corn 
s ilege 25 0 n.a. 
wheat 26 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
other: 27 0 n.a. 
perm. pasture 1 
turkey lot 2 
bldg. s ite 3 
28-29 00 n.a. 
Enter 
actual 
amount pd./ 
acre or bldg. 
s i te 
d iv. 30 0 n.a. 
acres 1 1/2 
2 all 
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No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
Livestock prod. 
hogs 31 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
feeders 32 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
other 33 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
Expend itures 
ma ch. 34 0 Share pd. by Idl.: n.a. 
1 1/3 
fuel 35 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
2 1/4 
power 36 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
seeding 37 0 n.a. 
(Harvesting) 
shel1ing 38 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
shelling S 
drying 39 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
trucking or 
storage 40 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
h. oats 41 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
h. beans 42 0 
1 
n.a. 
1/2 
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Question Column Code Translation 
baling hay 
or straw 43 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
lab. 44 0 n.a. 
1 i Ivstk. 
utilities 45 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
(Crop) 
hail ins. 46 0 n.a. 
ferti1izer 47 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
2 i on corn only 
1 ime 48 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
2 all 
herb. 49 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
2 1/3 
3 all 
(Seed) 
corn 50 0 n.a. 
1 1 /2 
oats 51 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
beans 52 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
grass 53 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
insecticides 54 0 n.a. 
1 1/2 
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No. 
Question Col utnn Code Translation 
(Livestock) 
feed 55 0 
1 
n.a. 
1/2 
gen. & misc. 56 0 
1 
n.a. 
1/2 
feeder purch. 57 0 
1 
n.a. 
1/2 
hog purch. 58 0 
1 
n.a. 
1/2 
other 59 0 
1 
n.a. 
1/2 
(card no. 3) 1962 lease (i i): 
Use above format 
(card no. 4) 1962 lease ( i i i): 
Use above format 
(card no, 5) 1966 lease (i): 
Use above format 
(card no. 6) 1966 lease (i i): 
Use above format 
(card no. 7) 1966 lease (iii): 
Use above format 
Begin V 
(card no. 8) 
Fixed Assets 
6-11 Enter 
actual 
data in 6 
digit 
fields 
Op(s) 6 Idl(s) Jan. 1, 1962 Inventory: 
operator(s) 
12-17 landlord(s) 
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No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
Improvements 18-22 Enter actual op.(s) 
data in 5 digit 
fields here and 
in the following 
23-27 Idl.(s) 
Working Assets 
Mach. S Equip. 28-32 op.(s) 
33-37 Idl.(s) 
Breeding stock 
hogs 38-42 op.(s) 
43-47 Idl.(s) 
other 48-52 op.(s) 
53-57 Idl.(s) 
Liquid Assets 
Livestock 
feeders 58-62 op.(s) 
63-67 Idl.(s) 
hogs 68-72 op.(s) 
73-77 Idl.(s) 
other 6-10 op.(s) 
(card no. 9) 11-15 Idl.(s) 
Feed, grain. 
op.(s) supple. S fert. 16-20 
21-25 Idl.(s) 
Equity 26-30 op.(s) 
Fixed Assets 31-36 Enter actual Op(s) & ld](s) Jan. 1, 196? Inv. 
data in 6 op.(s) 
digit fields 
37-42 Idl.(s) 
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No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
Improvements 43-47 Enter actual op.(s) 
data in 5 
digit fields 
here and in 
fol lowing 
48-52 Idl.(s) 
Working Assets 
Mach. & Equip. 53-57 op.(s) 
58-62 Idl.(s) 
Breeding stock 
hogs 63-67 op.(s) 
68-72 Idl.(s) 
other 6-10 op.(s) 
(card no. 10) 11-15 Idl.(s) 
Liquid Assets 
Livestock 
feeders 16-20 op.(s) 
21-25 Idl.(s) 
hogs 26-30 op.(s) 
31-35 Idl.(s) 
other 36-40 op. (s) 
41-45 Idl.(s) 
Feed, grain, 46-50 op.(s) 
supple. & fert. 51-55 Idl.(s) 
Equity 56-60 op.(s) 
Begin VI 
(card no. 11) 
L.I.C.: No. 6 0 Op(s) Jan. 1, 1962 Debt Structure 
How many: none 
1 one 
333 
No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
debtor 0 I.D.: not applicable 
1 operator 
2 partners 
3 father 
creditor 0 
1 
2 
3 
I . D. : n.a. 
family 
private 
institution 
col lateral 
10-15 
0 I.D.: n.a. 
1 real property 
Enter 
actual 
data 
Value 
principal 16 
17-22 
23-28 
0 Original amt.: n.a. 
1 no answer 
2 answer 
Enter 
actual 
data 
Enter 
actual 
data 
Amt. remaining 
s.i.r. 29-32 Enter deci 
mal S 3 
digits to 
right 
Transform actual data from 
fractional per cent to decimal 
per cent 
repay, 
schedule 
33 0 Original agree.: n.a. 
1 no answer 
2 answer 
34-35 Enter actual 
data 
years 
36-37 Enter actual 
data 
remaining years 
334 
No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
38 0 
1 
2 
3 
Flexibility: n.a. 
no answer 
flexible (F) 
inflexible (l-F) 
Mortgage: No. 39 0 
1 
How many: none 
one 
debtor 40 0 
1 
2 
3 
I.D.: not applicable 
operator 
partners 
father 
creditor 41 0 
1 
2 
3 
1 .D. : n.a. 
family 
private 
institution 
col lateral 42 0 
1 
I.D.: n.a. 
real property 
43-48 Enter 
actual 
data 
Value 
principal 49 0 
1 
2 
Original amt.: n.a. 
no answer 
answer 
50-55 Enter 
actual 
data 
56-61 Enter 
actual 
data 
Amt. remaining 
s.i.r. 62-65 Enter deci­
mal & 3 
digits to 
right 
Transform actual data from 
fractional per cent to decimal 
per cent 
335 
No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
repay. 66 0 Original agree.: n.a. 
schedule 1 no answer 
2 answer 
67-68 Enter years 
actual 
data 
69-70 Enter Remaining years 
actual 
data 
71 0 Flexibi1ity: 
1 
2 
3 
Only two farms had M.i.C. - only amount 
owing and interest rate are coded. 
M.I.e.; No. 72 0 How many: none 
1 one 
2 two 
principal 73-76 Enter Amt. owing 
actual 
data 
s.i.r. 77-80 Enter deci 
mal S3 
digits to 
right 
(card no. 12) 
C.M. : No. 6 0 How many: improvements: none 
1 one 
7 0 machinery: none 
1 one 
2 two 
8 0 1ivestock: none 
1 one 
2 two 
n.a. 
no answer 
flexible (F) 
inflexible (l-P) 
- Transform actual data from 
fractional per cent to decimal 
per cent 
336 
No. 
Question Column Code T ranslat ion 
0 
1 
mach. + Ivstk. none 
one 
10 0 
1 
mach. + Ivstk. + feed: none 
one 
n 0 
1 
Ivstk. + feed: 
(For improvements and/or machinery) 
debtor 
creditor 
12 
13 
collateral 14 
principal 15 
0 
1 
2 
3 
!.D.: not applicable 
operator 
partners 
father 
0 I.D.: n.a. 
1 family 
2 private 
3 institution 
0 I.D.: n.a. 
1 no answer 
2 turkey house 
3 machinery 
4 crop 
none 
one 
0 Original amt.: n.a. 
1 no answer 
2 answer 
16-20 Enter actual 
data 
21-25 Enter actual Amt. remaining 
data 
s.i.r. 26-29 Enter deci­ Transform actual data from 
mal S 3 fractional per cent to 
digits to decimal per cent 
right 
repay. 30 0 Original agree.: n.a. 
schedule 1 no answer 
2 answer 
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No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
31 Enter actual 
data 
years 
32 Enter actual 
data 
Remaining years 
33 0 
1 
2 
3 
Flexibility: n.a. 
no answer 
flexible (F) 
inflexible ( I -F) 
(For Ivstk. and/or feed) 
debtor 34 0 
1 
2 
3 
I.D.: not applicable 
operator 
partners 
father 
creditor 35 0 
1 
2 
3 
I.D.: n.a. 
family 
private 
institution 
col 1ateral 36 I.D.: n.a. 
principal 37 Original amount: n.a. 
38-42 Enter actual 
data 
Amount remaining 
s.i.r. 43-46 Enter decimal 
& 3 digits to 
right 
Transform actual data from 
fractional per cent to decimal 
per cent 
repay, 
schedule 
47 0 
1 
2 
3 
Original agree.: n.a. 
no answer 
one year 
less than one year 
48 Remaining years: n.a. 
49 0 
1 
2 
3 
Flexibility: n.a. 
no answer 
flexible (F) 
inflexible (i-F) 
338 
No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
(For mach. + Ivstk. and/or feed) 
debtor 50 0 I.D.: n.a. 
1 operator 
2 partners 
3 father 
creditor 51 0 I.D.: n.a. 
1 fam i1 y 
2 private 
3 institution 
collateral 52 0 I.D.: n.a. 
principal 53 0 Original amount: n.a. 
54-58 Enter actual Amount remaining 
data 
s.i.r. 59-62 Enter decimal Transform actual data from 
& 3 digits to fractional per cent to decimal 
right per cent 
repay. 63 0 Original agree.: n.a. 
schedule 1 no answer 
2 one year 
3 less than one year 
64 0 Remaining years: n.a. 
65 0 Flexibility: n.a. 
1 no answer 
2 flexible (F) 
3 inflexible (1-F) 
(card no. 13) 
P.N. No. 6 0 How many - notes: none 
1 one 
2 two 
(For nonfamily) 
debtor 7 0 I.D.: n.a. 
1 operator 
2 partners 
3 father 
339 
No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
cred i tor 8 0 
1 
2 
3 
I.D.: n.a. 
fam i1 y 
private 
institution 
col 1ateral 9 0 
1 
2 
I.D.: n.a. 
operator 
family backing 
principal 10 0 Original amount: n.a. 
11-15 Enter 
actual 
data 
Amount remaining 
s.i.r. 16-19 Enter deci­
mal & 3 
digits to 
right 
Transform actual data from 
fractional per cent to decimal 
per cent 
repay, 
schedule 
20 0 
1 
2 
3 
Original agree.: n.a. 
no answer 
one year 
less than one year 
21 0 Remaining years: n.a. 
22 0 
1 
2 
3 
Flexibility: n.a. 
no answer 
flexible (F) 
inflexible (I-F) 
purpose 23 0" 
1 
2 
3 
I.D.: n.a. 
buy improvements 
Ivstk. and/or feed 
improve. + Ivstk. and/or feed 
(For family) 
debtor 24 0 
1 
2 
3 
I.D.: n.a. 
operator 
partners 
father 
340 
No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
creditor 25 0 
1 
2 
3 
1.D.: n.a. 
family 
private 
institution 
col lateral 26 0 1 .D.: n.a. 
principal 27 0 
1 
2 
Original amount: n.a. 
no answer 
answer 
28-32 Enter actual 
data 
33-37 Amount remaining 
repay, 
schedule 
38 0 
1 
2 
Original agree.: n.a. 
no answer 
answer 
39-40 years 
41-42 Remaining years 
43 0 
1 
2 
3 
Flexibility: n.a. 
no answer 
flexible (F) 
inflexible (i-•F) 
purpose 44 0 
1 
2 
n.a. 
down payment on land 
mach. + Ivstk. and/or feed 
C.A. No. 45 0 
1 
How many: none 
one 
46-49 Amount remaining 
Begin VI I Op(s) Jan. 1, 1967 Debt Structure 
SAME FORMAT AS ABOVE 
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No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
Begin VIII 
(card no. 17) 
Depreciation 
1962 fixed expenses-op.(s) & Idl. (s) 
bldgs. S imps. 6-10 
11-15 
op.(s) 
Idl.(si 
mach. S equip. 16-20 
21-25 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
Cash rent 26-30 op.(s) 
Taxes 31-35 
36-40 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
Int. pd. 41-45 
46-50 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
ins. pd. 51-55 
56-60 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
Beg in IX 
(card no. 18) 
General farm 
1962 operating expenses-op.(s) & Idl 
mach. & equip. 6-10 
11-15 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
farm fuel 16-20 
21-25 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
power & mach. 
hr. 
26-30 
31-35 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
labor hired 36-40 
41-45 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
perm. imp. reps . 46-50 
51-55 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
other 56-60 
61-65 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
Crop 
fert. & 1ime 66-70 
71-75 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
342 
No. 
Question Column Code Translation 
(card no. 19) 
herb., seed, 
i nsect. 
6-10 
11-15 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
Livestock 
feed bought 16-20 
21-25 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
gen. S misc. 26-30 
31-35 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
total feed fed 36-45 op.(s) + Idl.(s) from bottom of X 
Expenses X 1962 op.(s) expenses to Idl.(s) 
CSR:CSL 46-50 CSR + Idl.(s) misc. rec. + Idl.(s) 
gov't, payments 
CSR:LSL 51-55 LCS + LSS + Idl.(s) other + ]dl.(s) 
misc. rec. + Idl.(s) gov't, payments 
HSR:LSL 56-60 (Idl.(s) share) x (value increase 
of hogs) 
FSRzLSL 61-65 (Idl.(s) share) x (value increase 
of feeders) 
Other LSR:LSL 66-70 (Idl.(s) share) x (value increase 
of other) 
(card no. 20) 1962 op.(s) + Idl.(s) crop prodn. values 
Crop prodn. X 
corn*: acres 
yield 
6-10 
11-15 
Enter 
actual 
data 
in 5 
digit 
field 
no decimal place for acres 
one decimal place for yields 
oats; acres 
yield 
16-20 
21-25 
beans: acres 
yield 
26-30 
31-35 
Includes corn silage. 
343 
No. 
Quest ion Column Code Translation 
hay: acres 
yield 
Lvstk. prodn. X 
hogs: wt. incr. 
val. incr. 
(XI) wt. loss 
feeders: wt. incr. 
val. incr. 
(Xi) wt. loss 
(card no. 21) 
Other crop prodn. 
pasture: acres 
val ue 
div. ac.: acres 
value 
Op.(s) receipts 
Other lvstk. prodn. 
Livestock bought XI 
hogs: wt. 
value 
36-40 
41-45 
46-51 
52-56 
57-61 
62-67 
68-72 
73-76 
6-10 
11-15 
16-20 
21-25 
26-30 
31-36 
37-40 
42-46 
Enter 
actual 
data-no 
dec i ma 1 
places 
requi red 
1962 op.(s) + 
prodn. values 
Idl.(s) lvstk. 
Other 1962 op.(s) + Idl.(s) 
crop S lvstk. prodn. values 
Enter 
actual 
data in 
5 digit 
fields-
no deci­
mal places 
requ i red 
op.(s) 
op.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
Idl.(s) 
acres 
value 
Op.(s) receipts = custom work 
+ rent + dividends + gov't, 
payments (less diverted acre 
payments) + insurance and misc. 
+ Idl.(s) misc. receipts (ex­
cluding CSR, Idl.(s) gov't, 
payments, LCS, LSS, and Idl.(s) 
other) 
Enter 
actual 
value-
no deci­
mal place 
requ ired 
As 
above 
1962 op.(s) 
purchases 
+ Idl.(s) lvstk. 
344 
Question Column Code Translation 
feeder hogs 47 0 not applicable 
1 yes 
2 no 
feeders: no. 48-50 Enter 
wt. 51-56 actual 
value 57-61 value-
no deci­
mal place 
requ i red 
Go to VIII of questionnaire II and use above format for 1963, then 1964, etc. 
345 
APPENDIX C 
Input-Output, Intervals 0,1,2,3 
346 
1nput-Output 
1ntervals ; 0 1 2 3 
Col. Row 
1 99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
106 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 4.17999 3.95400 3-72699 3.50099 
123 39-56999 41.59999 43-73999 46.00999 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 45-89999 45.94999 45.55999 44.46998 
2 99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
106 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.65000 3.45200 3.25400 3.05699 
123 53-88999 56.18998 58.55999 61.07998 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 56.00000 56.07998 55.43998 53.75999 
3 99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
106 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.75000 3.54700 3.34400 3.14100 
123 64-71998 67.11999 69.75999 72.52999 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 57-37999 57.50999 57-53999 56.22999 
4 99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
106 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3-75000 3.54700 3.34400 3.14100 
123* 66.44999 68.84999 71.48999 74.25999 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 55-64999 55.77999 55.80999 54.50000 
5 101 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 4.17999 3-95400 3.72699 3.50099 
123 34.82998 35-81999 36.93998 38.17999 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 50.63999 51.72999 52.35998 52.29998 
132 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
6 101 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.65000 3.45200 3.25400 3.05699 
123 49.14999 50.40998 51.75999 53.25000 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 60.73999 61.85998 62.23999 61.58999 
132 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
7 101 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.75000 3.54700 3.34400 3.14100 
123 59-97999 61.33999 62.95999 64.69999 
Col. 4, row 123, over intervals 0,1,2,3, should read 39-75, 42.15, 
44.79 and 47.56, respectively. 
347 
1nput-Output 
Intervals -» 0 1 2 3 
Col. Row 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 » 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 62.11999 63.28999 64.33999 64.05999 
132 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
8 101 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.75000 3.54700 3.34400 3.14100 
123* 61.70999 63.06999 64.68998 66.42999 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 60.38999 61.55999 62.60998 62.32998 
132 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
9 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 4.17999 3.95400 3.72699 3.50099 
123 30.10998 31.01998 32.04998 33.18998 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 12.62999 12.62999 12.75999 12.04999 
136 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
10 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.65000 3.45200 3.25400 3.05699 
123 39.18998 40.34999 41.58999 42.95999 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 15.75000 15.79000 15.41000 14.45999 
136 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
11 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.75000 3.54700 3.34400 3.14100 
123 45.52999 46.77999 48.26998 49.86999 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 15.52000 15.54000 15.37999 14.50999 
136 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
12 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.75000 3.54700 3.34400 3.14100 
123* 46.45999 47.70999 49.19999 15.62999 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 14.58999 14.61000 14.45000 13.58000 
136 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
13 99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.91000 2.75200 2.59499 2.43699 
123 18.54998 19.87999 21.25000 22.66999 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 22.36999 21.59999 21.50000 20.48999 
* Cols. 8 and 12, row 123, over intervals 0,1,2,3, should read 35.01 
36.37, 37.99, 39.73 and 33.11, 34.36, 35.85, 37.45, respectively. 
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1nput-Output 
1ntervals ; 0 1 2 3 
Col. Row 
14 99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.92999 2.77100 2.61200 2.45400 
123 23.33999 24.76998 
- 26.17999 27.64999 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 25.50000 25.25000 25.11999 23.82998 
15 101 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.91000 2.75200 2.59499 2.43699 
123 13.80999 14.09999 14.45000 14.83999 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
16 
131 27.10998 27.37999 28.29998 28.31999 
101 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.92999 2.77100 2.61200 2.45400 
123 18.59999 18.98999 19.37999 19.81999 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 30.23999 31.02999 31.91999 31.65998 
17 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.91000 2.75200 2.59499 2.43699 
123 12.55999 12.84999 13.20000 13.58999 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
18 
131 7.90000 7.88999 8.17999 7.99000 
103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.92999 2.77100 2.61200 2.45400 
123 15.41999 15.80999 16.19999 16.63999 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 9.00000 9.20000 9.45000 9.09999 
19 99 1.00000 1.00000 I.00000 1.00000 
107 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.20999 3.03599 2.86200 2.68800 
123 25.40998 26.63999 27.85998 29.07998 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 40.62999 41.79998 41.89999 40.91999 
20 99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
107 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.57000 2.43100 2.29200 2.15199 
123 32.23999 33.46998 34.67999 35.90998 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 33.79998 34.96998 35.07998 34.08999 
21 99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
349 
Input-Output 
Intervals , 
Col. Row 
107 
120 
123 
129 
130 
131 
22 99 
107 
120 
123 
129 
130 
131 
23 99 
107 
120 
123 
129 
130 
131 
24 99 
107 
120 
123 
129 
130 
131 
25 99 
107 
120 
123 * 
129 
130 
131 
26 101 
120 
123 
129 
130 
131 
133 
27 101 
120 
123 
129 
0 
1.00000 
3.25000 
28.21998 
I.00000 
1.00000 
53.05999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.61000 
34.48999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
46.78999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
3.27000 
29.98999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
58.90998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.62999 
36.26998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
52.62999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.62999 
37.38999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
51.50999 
1.00000 
3.20999 
20.66999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
45.36999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.57000 
27.50000 
I.00000 
1 
1.00000 
3.07399 
29.44999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
53.14999 
].00000 
1.00000 
2.46799 
35.72999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
46.86999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
3.09299 
31.28999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
60.75000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.48800 
37.56999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
54.46998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.48800 
38.68998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
53.34999 
1.00000 
3.03599 
20.85998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
47.57998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.43100 
27.68998 
1.00000 
2 
1.00000 
2.89800 
30.72999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
54.28999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.32700 
37.00999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
48.00999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.91599 
32.56999 
1.00000 
].00000 
61.16999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.34499 
38.84999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
54.88999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.34499 
39.96998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
53.76998 
1.00000 
2.86200 
21.05999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
48.69999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.29200 
27.87999 
1.00000 
3 
1.00000 
2.72199 
32.01998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
53.97999 
I.00000 
1.00000 
2.18600 
38.29998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
47.69999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.73899 
33.91999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
62.07998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.20299 
40.20999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
55.78999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.20299 
41.31999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
54.67999 
1.00000 
2.68800 
21.25000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
48.75000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.15199 
28.07998 
1.00000 
Col. 25, row 123, over intervals 0,1,2,3, 
24.79 and 26.14, respectively. 
should read 22.21, 23.51, 
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Input-Output 
Intervals 
Col. Row 
130 
131 
133 
28 101 
120 
123 
129 
130 
131 
133 
29 101 
120 
123 
129 
130 
131 
133 
30 101 
120 
123 
129 
130 
131 
133 
31 101 
120 
123 
129 
130 
131 
133 
32 IQt. 
12Q 
123* 
129 
130 
131 
133 
33 103 
120 
123 
129 
130 
131 
137 
0 
1.00000 
38.53999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
3.25000 
23.47999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
57.79998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.61000 
29.75000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
51.52999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
3.27000 
25.25000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
63.64999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.62999 
31.52999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
57.36999 
1.00000 
Î.ÛQQ09. 
2.62999 
32.64999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
56.25000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
3.20999 
18.66999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
14.34999 
1.00000 
1 
1.00000 
40.75000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
3.07399 
23.66999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
58.92999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.46799 
29.94999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
52.64999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
3.09299 
25.50999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
66.52999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.48800 
31.78999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
60.25000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.48800 
32.90998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
59.12999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
3.03599 
18.85998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
15.36000 
1.00000 
2 
1.00000 
41.87999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.89800 
23.92999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
61.08999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.32700 
30.20999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
54.80999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.91599 
25.76998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
67.96998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.34499 
32.04998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
61.68998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.34499 
33.16999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
60.56999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.86200 
19.05999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
15.87000 
1.00000 
3 
1.00000 
41.91999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.72199 
24.18998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
61.80999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.18600 
30.46998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
55.52999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.73899 
26.08999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
69.90998 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.20299 
32.37999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
63.61999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.20299 
33.48999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
62.50999 
1.00000 
1.00000 
2.68800 
19.25000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
15.75000 
1.00000 
Col. 32, row 123, over intervals 0,1,2,3, 
17.99 and 18.31, respectively. 
should read 17.47, 17.73, 
351 
1nput-Output 
1 Intervals 0 2 3 
Col. Row 
34 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.57000 2.43100 2.29200 2.15199 
123 21.50000 21.68998 21.87999 22.07998 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 10.52000 12.53000 13.04999 12.91999 
137 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
35 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.25000 3.07399 2.89800 2.72199 
123 20.01998 20.80999 21.06999 21.32998 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 . 20.01998 20.48999 21.43998 21.66999 
137 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
36 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.61000 2.46799 2.32700 2.18600 
123 22.88999 23.08999 23.34999 23.60998 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 17.75000 18.20999 19.15998 19.38999 
137 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
37 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 3.27000 3.09299 2.91599 2.73899 
123 21.65998 21.91999 22.17999 22.50000 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 22.78999 24.09999 24.68998 25.50000 
137 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
38 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.62999 2.48800 2.34499 2.20299 
123 23.93998 24.19999 24.45999 24.78999 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 20.50999 21.81999 22.40998 23.20999 
137 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
39 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.62999 2.48800 2.34499 2.20299 
123* 24.54998 24.80999 25.06999 25.38999 
129 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 19.89999 21.20999 21.79998 22.60998 
137 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
40 99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
108 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 5.75000 5.43800 5.12700 4.81600 
*CoI. 39, row 123, over interval s 0,1,2,3, should read 16.44, 16.70, 
16.96 and 17-28, respectively. 
352 
1nput-Output 
Intervals 0 1 2 3 
Col . Row 
123 39.36999 41.37999 44.25999 47.45999 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
41 
131 19.15998 18.21998 17.21998 14.83000 
99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
108 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 6.36000 6.01600 5.67100 5.32599 
123 50.00999 52.98998 56.64999 60.32998 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
42 
131 25.52999 24.15998 22.14999 19.76998 
101 1.00000 1.00000 1 .00000 1.00000 
120 5.75000 5.43800 5.12700 4.81600 
123 34.62999 35.59999 37.45999 39.62999 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 23.89999 24.00000 24.01998 22.65998 
134 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
43 101 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 6.36000 6.01600 5.67100 5.32599 
123 45.26998 47.20999 49.84999 52.49999 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 30.25998 29.92999 22.63999 19.75998 
134 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
44 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 5.75000 5.43800 5.12700 4.81600 
123 44.93998 46.76998 49.56999 52.75999 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 13.58999 12.83000 11.91000 9.53000 
138 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
45 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 6.36000 6.01600 5.67100 5.32599 
123 56.96998 59.76998 63.34999 67.01998 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
130 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
131 18.54998 17.35999 16.93000 13.05999 
138 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
46 110 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 
111 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 5.16799 4.88800 4.60800 4.32799 
121 2.58400 2.44399 2.30400 2.16400 
123 87.41999 79.36999 72.39999 66.42999 
131 25.50000 25.47999 24.38999 22.28999 
353 
1nput-Output 
1ntervals -*• 0 1 2 3 
Col. Row 
47 110 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 
111 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 5.16799 4.88800 4.60800 4.32799 
121 2.58400 2.44399 2.30400 2.16400 
123 21.07998 20.25999 19.52999 18.91999 
131 22.73999 23.01998 22.18998 20.30999 
48 III 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
119 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 2.13800 2.02199 1.90599 1.79099 
121 1.06899 1.01100 0.95300 0.89500 
123 62.42999 56.21998 50.81999 46.15998 
131 12.04999 12.94000 13.00999 12.34999 
49 111 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
119 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 2.13800 2.02199 1.90599 1.79099 
121 1.06899 1.01100 0.95300 0.89500 
123 106.39999 97.04998 88.50999 80.70999 
131 12.94000 13.77000 13.79000 13.05999 
50 113 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 
114 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 5.16799 4.88800 4.60800 4.32799 
121 2.58400 2.44399 2.30400 2.16400 
123 83.53999 75.48999 68.52999 62.54998 
131 29.37999 29.35998 28.25999 26.16999 
51 113 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 
114 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 5.16799 4.88800 4.60800 4.32799 
121 2.58400 2.44399 2.30400 2.16400 
123 17.19999 16.37999 15.66000 15.04000 
131 26.61999 26.88999 26.06999 24.18998 
52 114 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
119 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 2.13800 2.02199 1.90599 1.79099 
121 1.06899 1.01100 0.95300 0.89500 
123 59.80999 53.59999 48.19999 43.53999 
131 14.66999 15.55999 15.63999 14.98000 
53 114 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
119 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 2.13800 2.02199 1.90599 1.79099 
121 1.06899 1.01100 0.95300 0.89500 
123 103.77999 94.42999 85.88999 78.07998 
131 15.57000 16.38999 16.40398 15.69000 
54 116 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 
117 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 5.16799 4.88800 4.60800 4.32799 
354 
1nput-Output 
Intervals ; 0 1 2 3 
Col. Row 
121 2.58400 2.44399 2.30400 2.16400 
123 41.76998 52.41999 48.39999 44.35998 
131 14.75000 14.66999 14.13999 13.08000 
55 116 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 0.20540 
117 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 5.16799 4.88800 4.60800 4.32799 
121 2.58400 2.44399 2.30400 2.16400 
123 8.66999 8.19000 7.83000 7.52000 
131 13.24000 13.44000 13.04000 12.09999 
56 117 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
119 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 2.13800 2.02199 1.90599 1.79099 
121 1.06899 1.01100 0.95300 0.89500 
123 29.90998 26.79998 24.09999 21.76998 
131 7.32000 7.78000 7.82000 ' 7.49000 
57 117 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
119 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 0.79460 
120 2.13800 2.02199 1.90599 1.79099 
121 1.06899 1.01100 0.95300 0.89500 
123 51.79998 47.21998 42.93998 39.03999 
131 7.87000 8.19000 8.20999 7.83999 
58 112 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 1.33900 1.26600 1.19300 1.12099 
121 0.89200 0.84400 0.79500 0.74700 
123 32.67999 28.69999 25.28999 22.15998 
131 3.38999 4.79999 5.62999 6.19000 
59 112 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 1.33900 1.26600 1.19300 1.12099 
121 0.89200 0.84400 0.79500 0.74700 
123 65.71998 59.37999 53.60998 48.08999 
131 5.12999 6.41000 7.12000 7.58000 
60 115 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 1.33900 1.26600 1.19300 1.12099 
121 0.89200 0.84400 0.79500 0.74700 
123 31.88999 27.90998 24.50000 37.2699s 
131 4.17999 5.58999 6.41999 6.96999 
61 115 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 1.33900 1.26600 1.19300 1.12099 
121 0.89200 0.84400 0.79500 0.74700 
123 64.92999 58.58999 52.81999 47.29998 
131 5.91999 7.20000 7.91000 8.37000 
62 118 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 1.33900 1.26600 1.19300 1.12099 
121 0.89200 0.84400 0.79500 0.74700 
123 15.94000 13.95999 12.25000 10.67999 
355 
1nput-Output 
Intervals i ->• 0 1 2 3 
Col. Row 
131 2.08000 2.79999 3.20999 4.02000 
63 118 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 1.33900 1.26600 1.19300 1.12099 
121 0.89200 0.84400 0.79500 0.74700 
123 32.46998 29.28999 26.40998 23.66999 
131 2.95000 3.61000 3.95000 5.08999 
64 99 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
109 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 0.73000 0.69000 0.65100 0.61100 
123 10.92999 11.96999 12.99000 14.02000 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
65 
131 61.22999 61.98999 61.56999 61.73999 
101 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 0.73000 0.69000 0.65100 0.61100 
123 6.19000 6.19000 6.19000 6.19000 
129 0.50000 0.50000 , 0.50000 0.50000 
131 65.96998 67.76998 68.36999 69.56999 
135 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
66 103 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 0.73000 0.69000 0.65100 0.61100 
123 6.19000 4.69000 4.69000 4.69000 
129 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
131 29.88999 30.78999 31.44999 31.86999 
139 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
67 100 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.70000 2.55400 2.40800 2.26100 
123 15.65000 16.68998 17.70999 18.73999 
130 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
131 8.34999 5.59999 2.87000 0.11000 
68 102 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.70000 2.55400 2.40800 2.26100 
123 10.91000 10.91000 10.91000 10.91000 
130 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
131 13.08999 11.37999 9.66999 7.94000 
69 104 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
120 2.70000 2.55400 2.40800 2.26100 
123 20.04998 20.04998 20.04998 20.04998 
130 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
131 3.95000 2.24000 0.53000 
-1.20000 
70 99 0.00500 0.00500 0.00500 0.00500 
110 -1.00000 -1.00000 -1.00000 
-1.00000 
127 54.25999 54.25999 54.25999 54.25999 
71 99 0.00500 0.00500 0.00500 0.00500 
110 -I.00000 -1.00000 -1.00000 
-1.00000 
123 54.25999 54.25999 54.25999 54.25999 
356 
1nput-Output 
Intervals ; -9-
Col. Row 
72 99 
111 
127 
73 99 
111 
123 
74 99 
112 
127 
75 99 
112 
123 
76 101 
113 
123 
131 
77 101 
114 
123 
131 
78 101 
115 
123 
131 
79 103 
116 
80 103 
117 
81 103 
118 
82 128 
129 
131 
83 123 
129 
131 
84 128 
130 
131 
85 123 
130 
131 
86 120 
122 
123 
0 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
n.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
n. 54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
54.25999 
54.25999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
11.54999 
11.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000, 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
21.00000 
-1.00000 
0.00000 
21.00000 
-1.00000 
0.00000 
21.00000 
-1.00000 
0.00000 
21.00000 
-1.00000 
0.00000 
-1.00000 
1.00000 
1.37599 
1 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
11.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
11.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
54.25999 
-54.25999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
-37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
11.54999 
-11.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
28.90000 
-1.00000 
-0.79000 
28.90000 
-1.00000 
-0.79000 
28.90000 
-1.00000 
-0.79000 
28.90000 
-1.00000 
-0.79000 
-1.00000 
1 .00000 
1.50400 
2 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
11.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
11.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
54.25999 
-54.25999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
-37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
11.54999 
-11.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
0.Ô0500 
-1.00000 
36.80000 
-1.00000 
-1.58000 
36.80000 
-1.00000 
-1.58000 
36.80000 
-1.00000 
-1.58000 
36.80000 
-1.00000 
-1.58000 
-1.00000 
1.00000 
1.63100 
3 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
11.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
11.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
54.25999 
-54.25999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
37.89999 
-37.89999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
11.54999 
-11.54999 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
0.00500 
-1.00000 
44.70000 
-1.00000 
-2.37000 
44.70000 
-1.00000 
-2.37000 
44.70000 
-1.00000 
-2.37000 
44.70000 
-1.00000 
-2.37000 
-1.00000 
1.00000 
1.75900 
357 
1nput-Output 
Intervals 1 
Col. Row 
131 
87 121 
122 
123 
131 
88 125 
131 
89 126 
131 
90 127 
131 
91 128 
131 
92 99 
100 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
123 
125 
93 99 
100 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
124 
125 
131 
94 99 
100 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
123 
126 
95 99 
100 
105 
106 
0 
-1.37599 
-1.00000 
1.00000 
1.37599 
-1.37599 
-1.00000 
-0.05160 
-1.00000 
-0.05310 
-1.00000 
-0.06420 
-1.00000 
-0.06320 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.45567 
-0.27538 
-0.06688 
-0.09113 
48.27999 
434.46997 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.45567 
-0.27538 
-0.06688 
-0.09113 
48.27999 
434.46997 
-3.37999 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.45567 
-0.27538 
-0.06688 
-0.09113 
96.54998 
386.19995 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.45567 
1 
-1.50400 
-1.00000 
1.00000 
1.50400 
-1.50400 
-1.00000 
-0.05160 
-1.00000 
-0.05310 
-1.00000 
-0.06420 
-1.00000 
-0.06320 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48011 
-0.32582 
-0.04857 
-0.09602 
62.37999 
561.36987 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48011 
-0.32582 
-0.04857 
-0.09602 
62.37999 
561.36987 
-4.36700 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48011 
-0.32582 
-0.04857 
-0.09602 
124.75000 
499.00000 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48011 
2 
-1.63100 
-1.00000 
1.00000 
1.63100 
-1.63100 
-1.00000 
-0.05160 
-1.00000 
-0.05310 
-1.00000 
-0.06420 
-1.00000 
-0.06320 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48500 
-0.33591 
-0.04492 
-0.09700 
76.47999 
688.26977 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48500 
-0.33591 
-0.04492 
-0.09700 
76.47999 
688.26977 
-5.35399 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48500 
-0.33591 
-0.04492 
-0.09700 
152.94999 
611.79980 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48500 
3 
-1.75900 
-1.00000 
1.00000 
1.75900 
-1.75900 
-1.00000 
-0.05160 
-1.00000 
-0.05310 
-1.00000 
-0.06420 
-1.00000 
-0.06320 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48500 
-0.33591 
-0.04492 
-0.09700 
90.57998 
815.16992 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48500 
-0.33591 
-0.04492 
-0.09700 
90.57998 
815.16992 
-6.34100 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48500 
-0.33591 
-0.04492 
-0.09700 
181.14999 
724.59985 
-0.97200 
-0.02800 
1.00000 
-0.48500 
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Input-Output 
i ntervals 0 1 2 3 
Col. Row 
107 -0.27538 -0.32582 -0.33591 -0.33591 
108 -0.06688 -0.04857 -0.04492 -0.04492 
109 -0.09113 -0.09602 -0.09700 -0.09700 
124 96.54998 124.75000 152.94999 181.14999 
126 386.19995 499.00000 611.79980 724.59985 
131 -6.75999 -8.73399 -10.70799 -12.68199 
96 101 -0.97200 -0.97200 -0.97200 -0.97200 
102 -0.02800 -0.02800 -0.02800 -0.02800 
105 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
123 32.18998 40.71998 49.22999 57.73999 
131 -32.18998 -40.71998 -49.22999 
-57.73999 
132 -0.45567 -0.48011 -0.48500 -0.48500 
133 -0.27538 -0.32582 -0.33591 -0.33591 
134 -0.06688 -0.04857 -0.04492 -0.04492 
135 -0.09113 -0.09602 -0.09700 -0.09700 
97 103 -0.97200 -0.97200 -0.97200 -0.97200 
104 -0.02800 -0.02800 -0.02800 -0.02800 
105 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
136 -0.45567 -0.48011 -0.48500 -0.48500 
137 -0.27538 -0.32585 -0.33591 -0.33591 
138 -0.06688 -0.04857 -0.04492 -0.04492 
139 -0.09113 -0.09602 -0.09700 -0.09700 
98 108 -1.00000 -1.00000 -1.00000 -1.00000 
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APPENDIX D 
360 
The Objective and Empirical Procedures 
Our objective is to provide numerical variance-covariance data 
(interval k-1 = 0,1,2 and 3) in terms of net returns per crop acre and 
per livestock animal unit for 63 crop and livestock activities as required 
by the QP-SM model (figure 10). Zero variance is assumed for the re­
maining 35 activities as observed in figure 9. Empirical procedures 
fol low: 
A. To find gross returns / crop acre for different crops and / livestock 
a.u. for different livestock / farm / year. 
1. Crops 
(a) read in yields'" for corn, oats, beans and hay and corre­
sponding prices"" / farm / year. This gives 4 arrays (90x1), 
each composed of 5 sub arrays, i.e. 1 sub array for each 
year. 
(b) remove technology trend within interval 0, as follows: 
(i) for each kind of crop and its corresponding yield / farm 
in 1962 multiply yield by (1.02)^; 4 sub arrays (18x1) 
i.e. 1 array for each kind of crop. 
(îi) as above . . . in 1963 . . . (1.02) ; 4 sub arrays (18x1) 
(i i i) as above . . . in 1964 . . . (1.00) ; 4 sub arrays (18x1) 
(iv) as above . . . in 1965 . . . ( .98) ; 4 sub arrays (18x1) 
(v) as above . . . in 1966 . . . (.98)" ; 4 sub arrays (18x1) 
Only the first 18 farms. 
** 
The following 5 sets of prices / unit :, corresponding to years 1962-
66, are: 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
corn $1.09 $1.09 $1.05 $1 .12 $1. 19 
oats .65 .67 .65 .66 68 
beans 2.31 2.44 2.46 2.59 2. 90 
hay 17.40 17.70 1 7.90 20.60 20. 80 
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Note: b(i-v) Implies k arrays (90x1) in which each array 
is composed of 5 sub arrays, each (18x1). 
introducing technology between intervals 
(i) interval 1: to update each adjusted yield (b(iv)) 
multiply by (1.02)^; 4 arrays (90x1), each array 
composed of 5 sub arrays (18x1). 
(ii) interval 2: update each adjusted yield (c(i)) 
multiply by (1.02)®; 4 arrays (90x1), each array 
composed of 5 sub arrays. 
(iii) interval 3: update each adjusted yield (c(i i)) 
multiply by (1.02)®; 4 arrays (90x1), each array 
composed of 5 sub arrays. 
introducing price changes between intervals 
(i) interval 1: multiply each price read as in (Ic) 
by (1-.0143(5)). 
(ii) interval 2: multiply each price read as in (Ic) 
by (]-.0143(10)). 
(iii) interval 3: multiply each price read as in (Ic) 
by (1-.0143(15)). 
gross returns 
(i) interval 0: multiply each sub array as adjusted in 
(Al.b(i-v)) by its corresponding price, e.g. the corn 
array (90x1) has 5 sub arrays, one for each year. 
There are 5 prices of corn, one for each year. Since 
there are 4 kinds of crop, then there will be 4 arrays 
(90x1). 
(ii) interval 1: multiply each sub array as adjusted in 
(Al.c(i)) by its corresponding price (Ad(i)). 
(iii) interval 2: multiply each sub array as adjusted in 
(Al.c(ii)) by its corresponding price (Ad(ii)). 
(iv) interval 3: multiply each sub array as adjusted in 
(Al.c(iii)) by its corresponding price (Ad(iii)). 
Note; At this stage there should be 4 arrays (90x1) for 
each interval or 16 arrays in total. 
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2. Livestock 
(a) read in wt. incr. and value incr. for hogs and feeder 
cattle / farm / year*; 4 arrays (90x1), each composed of 5 
sub arrays (18x1), i.e. 1 sub array for each year. 
(b) determine internally value / a.u. 
(i) hogs: value / a.u. = value incr. x . ; 1 array 
^ wt. incr. ' 
(90x1) composed of 5 sub arrays as above. 
(ii) feeder cattle: value / a.u. = value incr. x —— ; 
wt. incr. 
1 array (90x1) composed of 5 sub arrays as above. 
(c) for each kind of livestock adjust value / a.u. / farm / year 
by (1-.Ol43(t)) where t = 0,5,10,15; i.e. 2 arrays (90x1), 
each composed of 5 sub arrays (18x1) , for each intervaJ which 
implies a total of 8 arrays (90x1). 
Note: At this stage there should be 6 arrays for each interval 
or 2k arrays in total."" 
B. To find net returns / crop acre for different crops and / livestock 
a.u. for different livestock / farm / year. 
1. read in costs as related to intervals and activities 
activities accumulated 
(a) interval 0: corn 12 12 
oats 6 18 
beans 21 39 
hay 6 45 
hogs 12 57 
feeder cattle 6 63 
These values are included on the same cards as crop yields, item X, 
code for questionnaire II, Appendix B. 
Each card read in which has one or more zero values in relation to 
kind of crop or livestock is rejected. Consequently, the dimension of the 
24 arrays will become ((90 - rejects)xl} . 
363 
-implications: this implies 12 different costs for raising corn; 
6 for oats; ... ; 6 for feeder cattle — from each corn obser­
vation (gross returns / farm / year)* subtract first cost 1 
(dimension), then cost 2 (dimension), . . . , then cost 12 
(dimension); and we use the same procedure for oats, beans, 
. . . , feeder cattle. 
63 arrays 
((90-rejects)xl) 
6 arrays, i.e. 
each over 18 
farms and 5 
years less 
observât ions 
excluded as 
rejects 
•^1 ^12 
CO 0 CO 
0
 h^g .  .  .  .hi^g hgs^g. .hgSg^ ^^58••* *^^63 
(b) interval 1: use above format for different set of costs. 
(c) interval 2: as above. 
(d) interval 3: as above. 
C. From B1(a) calculate variance-covariance matrix (63x63) for interval 0; 
from B1(b) calculate variance-covariance matrix (63x63) for interval 1 ; 
... ; and from B1(d) the variance-covariance matrix (63x63) for 
interval 3* For each variance-covariance write out and dimension. 
D. Punch variance-covariances on cards: i.e. one deck for each time 
interval according to Zorilla format. 
"Before subtracting corn costs 9,10,11 and 12, multiply each corn ob­
servation (gross returns / farm / year) by 0.5, and similarly, before sub­
tracting oat costs 17,18, bean costs 33,3^,35,36,37,39, hay costs 44,45, hog 
costs 54,55,56,57 and feeder cattle costs 62,63. This is necessary so that 
the resulting variance-covariance matrix will correspond with productive 
activities involving tenant-landlord sharing of production. 
364a 
Va r i ance-Cova r i ance, Intervais 0,1,2,3 
364b 
Va r i ance-Cova r î ance 
Intervais 
Col. 
1 
Row 
1 237.392 249.489 259.093 
2 237.392 249.482 259.088 
3 237.393 249.485 259.088 
4 237.396 249.488 259.095 
5 237.392 249.485 259.095 
6 237.393 249.489 259.091 
7 237.386 249.488 259.094 
8 237.393 249.485 259.087 
9 118.716 124.755 129.562 
10 118.715 124.756 129.564 
11 118.713 124.751 129.559 
12 118.712 124.750 129.558 
13 117.595 123.588 128.327 
14 117.597 123.591 128.330 
15 58.811 61.795 64.177 
16 58.803 61.791 64.173 
17 58.812 61.795 64.178 
18 58.810 61.792 64.175 
19 96.716 101.622 105.537 
20 96.720 101.620 105.536 
21 96.718 101.623 105.543 
22 96.718 101.627 105.545 
23 96.719 101.627 105.537 
24 96.719 101.622 105.540 
25 96.719 101.627 105.546 
26 96.713 101.626 105.542 
27 96.718 101.623 105.539 
28 96.718 101.620 105.543 
29 96.720 101.623 105.540 
30 96.716 101.627 105.540 
31 96.720 101.625 105.543 
32 96.716 101.626 105.540 
33 48.370 50.835 52.784 
34 48.371 50.836 52.786 
35 48.371 50.837 52.784 
36 48.370 50.837 52.785 
37 48.370 50.835 52.783 
38 48.369 50.836 52.785 
39 48.368 50.837 52.784 
40 68.546 72.031 74.793 
41 68.541 72.026 74.789 
42 68.545 72.030 74.793 
43 68.543 72.029 74.791 
44 68.543 72.030 74.791 
45 68.541 72.027 74.789 
265.313 
265.319 
265.321 
265.315 
265.321 
265.313 
265.321 
265.313 
132.674 
132.674 
132.670 
132.669 
131.431 
131.436 
65.714 
65.710 
65.715 
65.712 
108.084 
108.084 
108.082 
108.087 
108.087 
108.093 
108.084 
108.085 
108.084 
108.091 
108.085 
108.085 
108.082 
108.084 
54.053 
54.052 
54.052 
54.052 
54.054 
54.053 
54.053 
76.588 
76.584 
76.587 
76.585 
76.586 
76.583 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals 0 
Row 
46 
-98.897 
47 -98.898 
48 -98.901 
49 -98.901 
50 -98.898 
51 -98.898 
52 -98.899 
53 -98.899 
54 -49.444 
55 -49.442 
56 -49.443 
57 -49.442 
58 -106.236 
59 -106.235 
60 
-106.235 
61 
-106.235 
62 
-53.114 
63 -53.113 
2 237.393 
3 237.398 
4 237:395 
5 237.395 
6 237.392 
7 237.395 
8 237.395 
9 118.717 
10 118.715 
11 118.712 
12 118.711 
13 117.598 
14 117.598 
15 58.810 
16 58.804 
17 58.812 
18 58.810 
19 96.720 
20 96.726 
21 96.719 
22 96.720 
23 96.720 
24 96.720 
25 96.723 
26 96.720 
27 96.719 
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1 2 3 
-94.109 -88.546 -82.108 
-94.110 -88.548 -82.109 
-94.111 -88.549 -82.109 
-94.111 -88.550 -82.107 
-94.111 -88.550 -82.107 
-94.111 -88.547 -82.107 
-94.113 -88.549 -82.107 
-94.110 
-88.547 -82.109 
-47.051 -44.262 
-41.059 
-47.051 -44.263 -41.059 
-47.050 -44.261 -41.057 
-47.050 -44.261 -41.056 
-101.115 
-95.145 -88.229 
-101.115 
-95.143 -88.228 
-101.115 -95.144 -88.229 
-101.115 -95.143 -88.228 
-50.554 -47.562 -44.122 
-50.553 -47.562 -44.121 
249.486 259.094 265.313 
249.486 259.094 265.315 
249.484 259.094 265.318 
249.481 259.093 265.308 
249.482 259.088 265.318 
249.488 259.091 265.316 
249.485 259.094 265.312 
124.756 129.564 132.675 
124.754 129.563 132.673 
124.751 129.559 132.669 
124.750 129.558 132.669 
123.591 128.332 131.433 
123.591 128.330 131.434 
61.793 64.177 65.712 
61.790 64.173 65.710 
61.794 64.177 65.713 
61.792 64.175 65.711 
101.622 105.545 108.085 
101.626 105.546 108.088 
101.627 105.543 108.087 
101.626 105.546 108.090 
101.625 105.542 108.084 
101.627 105.543 108.087 
101.626 105.550 108.087 
101.622 105.546 108.082 
101.625 105.542 108.087 
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Var i ance-Cova r i ance 
Intervals ->• 
Col Row 
28 96.716 101.625 105.543 108.085 
29 96.723 101.622 105.542 108.084 
30 96.722 101.626 105.546 108.087 
31 96.720 101.625 105.543 108.081 
32 96.716 101.625 105.545 108.087 
33 48.369 50.834 52.784 54.052 
34 48.369 50.834 52.784 54.050 
35 48.369 50.835 52.784 54.050 
36 48.369 50.835 52.785 54.050 
37 48.369 50.833 52.783 54.052 
38 48.368 50.834 52.784 54.050 
39 48.368 50.835 52.784 54.051 
40 68.545 72.030 74.793 76.587 
41 68.541 72.026 74.789 76.584 
42 68.546 72.031 74.794 76.587 
43 68.543 72.028 74.790 76.584 
44 68.542 72.029 74.791 76.585 
45 68.541 72.026 74.789 76.583 
46 
-98.898 
-94.110 -88.548 
-82.109 
47 -98.898 
-94.111 -88.548 
-82.110 
48 -98.896 
-94.111 
-88.545 -82.108 
49 -98.899 
-94.111 -88.549 
-82.107 
50 -98.897 
-94.111 
-88.547 -82.110 
51 -98.898 
-94.111 -88.548 
-82.110 
52 -98.901 
-94.113 -88.546 
-82.107 
53 -98.898 
-94.110 
-88.547 
-82.107 
54 -49.444 
-47.052 -44.262 
-41.060 
55 -49.443 
-47.052 -44.263 
-41.059 
56 -49.444 
-47.051 -44.261 
-41.059 
57 -49.443 
-47.052 -44.262 
-41.058 
58 -106.236 
-101.116 
-95.145 -88.230 
59 -106.236 -101.116 
-95.144 
-88.231 
60 -106.236 
-101.115 
-95.144 
-88.230 
61 -106.235 
-101.116 
-95.144 -88.230 
62 
-53.114 
-50.555 -47.562 -44.122 
63 -53.113 
-50.554 -47.562 -44.122 
3 237.401 249.491 259.098 265.326 
4 237.401 249.494 259.097 265.325 
5 237.396 249.484 259.094 265.312 
6 237.393 249.484 259.094 265.321 
7 237.396 249.485 259.094 265.322 
8 237.399 249.488 259.095 265.319 
9 118.716 124.755 129.562 132.674 
10 118.713 124.753 129.561 132.672 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals -> 0 
Row 
11 118.712 
12 118.711 
13 117.597 
14 117.596 
15 58.810 
16 58.803 
17 58.811 
18 58.809 
19 96.720 
20 96.725 
21 96.722 
22 96.725 
23 96.722 
24 96.726 
25 96.728 
26 96.720 
27 96.725 
28 96.718 
29 96.725 
30 96.720 
31 96.723 
32 96.723 
33 48.368 
34 48.369 
35 48.368 
36 48.368 
37 48.368 
38 48.367 
39 48.367 
40 68.544 
41 68.541 
42 68.545 
43 68.542 
44 68.542 
45 68.540 
46 -98.898 
47 -98.899 
48 -98.898 
49 -98.899 
50 -98.898 
51 -98.898 
52 -98.897 
53 -98.894 
54 -49.444 
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1 2 3 
124.751 129.558 132.670 
124.750 129.558 132.669 
123.590 128.330 131.433 
123.590 128.329 131.433 
61.793 64.176 65.712 
61.791 64.173 65.711 
61.793 64.176 65.713 
61.791 64.174 65.711 
101.625 105.540 108.085 
101.630 105.550 108.091 
101.629 105.549 108.093 
101.632 105.550 108.095 
101.627 105.545 108.093 
101.630 105.549 108.094 
101.632 105.549 108.095 
101.626 105.542 108.088 
101.626 105.542 108.088 
101.627 105.546 108.088 
101.629 105.547 108.090 
101.625 105.542 108.085 
101.630 105.547 108.091 
101.630 105.547 108.094 
50.834 52.783 54.052 
50.834 52.782 54.050 
50.834 52.783 , 54.050 
50.834 52.783 , 54.050 
50.833 52.782 54.051 
50.833 52.782 54.050 
50.834 52.782 54.050 
72.029 74.791 76.586 
72.026 74.788 76.583 
72.030 74.792 76.588 
72.027 74.790 76.584 
72.028 74.790 76.585 
72.026 74.789 76.583 
-94.110 
-88.549 -82.109 
-94.111 -88.549 -82.109 
-94.110 
-88.547 -82.108 
-94.110 
-88.547 -82.107 
-94.111 -88.549 -82.109 
-94.112 -88.549 -82.109 
-94.109 -88.545 -82.107 
-94.107 -88.546 
-82.107 
-47.052 -44.262 -41.060 
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Variance-Covariance 
Intervals 0 
Row 
55 -49.444 
56 -49.444 
57 -49.443 
58 -106.236 
59 -106.236 
60 -106.236 
61 -106.236 
62 -53.114 
63 -53-114 
4 237.402 
5 237.398 
6 237.395 
7 237.402 
8 237.396 
9 118.716 
10 118.714 
11 118.712 
12 118.711 
13 117.598 
14 117.597 
15 58.810 
16 58.803 
17 58.811 
18 58.809 
19 96.723 
20 96.726 
21 96.722 
22 96.725 
23 96.726 
24 96.728 
25 96.728 
26 96.722 
27 96.728 
28 96.723 
29 96.725 
30 96.723 
31 96.726 
32 96.728 
33 48.368 
34 48.368 
35 48.368 
36 48.368 
37 48.368 
38 48.367 
39 48.367 
1 2 3 
-47.052 -44.264 
-41.059 
-47.052 -44.262 
-41.058 
-47.052 -44.263 -41.058 
•101.116 
-95.145 -88.230 
•101.116 
-95.145 -88.230 
•101.115 
-95.145 -88.230 
101.115 
-95.145 -88.230 
-50.554 -47.562 -44.122 
-50.554 -47.562 -44.122 
249.497 259.100 265.325 
249.488 259.091 265.316 
249.488 259.093 265.318 
249.489 259.095 265.321 
249.492 259.098 265.322 
124.756 129.562 132.673 
124.754 129.561 132.672 
124.751 129.558 132.670 
124.750 129.558 132.669 
123.591 128.330 131.433 
123.591 128.329 131.433 
61.793 64.175 65.712 
61.791 64.173 65.710 
61.793 64.176 65.713 
61.792 64.174 65.711 
101.629 105.545 108.093 
101.633 105.552 108.093 
101.632 105.550 108.093 
101.635 105.552 108.093 
101.629 105.549 108.091 
101.632 105.549 108.094 
101.633 105.553 108.094 
101.630 105.543 108.088 
101.630 105.546 108.088 
101.629 105.543 108.091 
101.633 105.547 108.093 
101.626 105.546 108.085 
101.630 105.546 108.093 
101.632 105.550 108.093 
50.834 52.783 54.051 
50.834 52.783 54.050 
50.834 52.782 54.050 
50.835 52.783 54.050 
50.833 52.782 54.051 
50.834 52.782 54.050 
50.834 52.782 54.050 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals ^ 0 
Row 
40 68.544 
41 68.541 
42 68.545 
43 68.542 
44 68.542 
45 68.540 
46 
-98.899 
47 -98.899 
48 
-98.897 
49 -98.899 
50 -98.899 
51 -98.898 
52 -98.897 
53 -98.895 
54 -49.444 
55 -49.443 
56 -49.444 
57 -49.443 
58 -106.236 
59 -106.236 
60 -106.236 
61 -106.236 
62 
-53.114 
63 -53.114 
5 237.396 
6 237.396 
7 237.396 
8 237.395 
9 118.716 
10 118.716 
11 118.713 
12 118.711 
13 117.595 
14 117.597 
15 58.811 
16 58.804 
17 58.812 
18 58.809 
19 ' 96.715 
20 96.720 
21 96.716 
22 96.723 
23 96.716 
24 96.722 
25 96.720 
26 96.718 
369 
1 2 3 
72.029 74.791 76.586 
72.026 74.788 76.583 
72.031 74.792 76.588 
72.028 74.790 76.585 
72.028 74.790 76.585 
72.026 74.789 76.583 
-94.110 -88.548 
-82.109 
-94.111 -88.549 
-82.110 
-94.109 -88.547 
-82.108 
-94.109 -88.547 -82.108 
-94.110 -88.549 
-82.109 
-94.110 -88.549 
-82.110 
-94.108 -88.546 
-82.107 
-94.107 -88.546 
-82.108 
-47.051 -44.263 
-41.059 
-47.052 -44.264 
-41.059 
-47.051 -44.262 
-41.059 
-47.051 -44.263 
-41.058 
101.116 
-95.145 -88.230 
101.115 
-95.145 -88.230 
101.115 
-95.145 -88.230 
101.115 
-95.145 -88.230 
-50.554 -47.563 
-44.122 
-50.554 -47.562 
-44.123 
249.492 259.100 265.319 
249.488 259.095 265.312 
249.486 259.091 265.318 
249.488 259.095 265.312 
124.755 129.559 132.672 
124.756 129.565 132.675 
124.751 129.559 132.670 
124.750 129.558 132.669 
123.587 128.328 131.430 
123.591 128.331 131.434 
61.795 64.178 65.714 
61.791 64.174 65.711 
61.795 64.178 65.715 
61.793 64.175 65.711 
101.622 105.542 108.084 
101.626 105.542 108.081 
101.620 105.543 108.079 
101.623 105.545 108.079 
101.623 105.540 108.082 
101.622 105.543 108.090 
101.622 105.545 108.085 
101.625 105.547 108.085 
370 
Variance-Covariance 
I n t e r v a l s  - > 0  1  2  
Col. Row 
27 96.718 101.625 105.546 
28 96.722 101,623 105.549 
29 96.718 101.620 105.539 
30 96.722 101.626 105.547 
31 96.716 101.620 105.543 
32 96.718 101.623 105.540 
33 48.370 50.834 52.784 
34 48.372 50.836 52.786 
35 48.371 50.837 52.783 
36 48.370 50.837 52.787 
37 48.371 50.835 52.784 
38 48.369 50.836 52.785 
39 48.369 50.837 52.786 
40 68.546 72.030 74.794 
41 68.541 72.026 74.789 
42 68.543 72.029 74.793 
43 68.543 72.029 74.791 
44 68.543 72.030 74.792 
45 68.541 72.026 74.789 
46 -98.898 -94.110 
-88.547 
47 -98.897 -94.109 -88.546 
48 
-98.899 -94.111 
-88.549 
49 -98.902 -94.114 -88.549 
50 -98.899 -94.113 -88.547 
51 -98.899 -94.113 -88.549 
52 -98.901 -94.114 
-88.549 
53 -98.898 -94.110 -88.549 
54 -49.444 -47.051 -44.261 
55 -49.442 -47.051 -44.263 
56 -49.443 -47.050 -44.260 
57 -49.442 -47.050 -44". 261 
58 -106.236 -101.115 
-95.144 
59 -106.235 -101.115 -95.143 
60 
-106.235 -101.115 
-95.144 
61 -106.235 -101.115 
-95.143 
62 
-53.114 -50.554 -47.562 
63 -53.113 -50.553 -47.561 
6 237.396 249.482 259.093 
7 237.398 249.485 259.091 
8 237.393 249.486 259.090 
9 118.716 124.755 129.562 
10 118.715 124.754 129.563 
11 118.713 124.751 129.559 
12 118.711 124.750 129.558 
13 117.597 123.590 128.328 
3 
108.081 
108.081 
108.084 
108.084 
108.084 
108.081 
54.052 
54.050 
54.050 
54.052 
54.053 
54.053 
54.053 
76.588 
76.584 
76.587 
76.585 
76.586 
76.583 
-82.108 
-82.109 
-82.111 
-82.110 
-82.109 
-82.109 
-82.109 
-82.110 
-41.059 
-41.059 
-41.058 
-41.057 
-88.229 
-88.229 
-88.228 
-88.228 
-44.122 
-44.122 
265.319 
265.319 
265.315 
132.674 
132.674 
132.670 
132.669 
131.433 
371 
Col. 
:-Covar iance 
s -»• 0 1 2 3 
Row 
14 117.597 123.592 128.330 131.435 
15 58.811 61.794 64.177 65.713 
16 58.803 61.790 64.173 65.710 
17 58.812 61.794 64.177 65.714 
18 58.809 61.792 64.175 65.712 
19 96.715 101.622 105.540 108.085 
20 96.719 101.622 105.542 108.085 
21 96.716 101.623 105.537 108.087 
22 96.720 101.629 105.542 108.087 
23 96.719 101.623 105.537 108.087 
24 96.720 101.622 105.543 108.085 
25 96.722 101.627 105.542 108.085 
26 96.720 101.620 105.539 108.084 
27 96.715 101.626 105.540 108.084 
28 96.716 101.625 105.539 108.084 
29 96.718 101.626 105.542 108.087 
30 96.716 101.625 105.540 108.084 
31 96.719 101.627 105.539 108.084 
32 96.716 101.625 105.542 108.090 
33 48.369 50.835 52.784 54.054 
34 48.370 50.835 52.784 54.052 
35 48.370 50.835 52.783 54.052 
36 48.369 50.835 52.785 54.051 
37 48.369 50.834 52.783 54.053 
38 48.369 50.834 52.784 54.052 
39 48.368 50.835 52.784 54.052 
40 68.546 72.030 ' 74.792 76.588 
41 68.541 72.026 74.789 76.584 
42 68.545 72.030 74.790 76.587 
43 68.543 72.028 74.790 76.585 
44 68.543 72.029 74.791 76.586 
45 68.541 72.026 74.789 76.583 
46 
-98.898 -94.110 -88.548 -82.108 
47 -98.898 -94.111 -88.549 -82.109 
48 -98.898 -94.113 -88.547 -82.107 
49 -98.902 -94.110 -88.549 -82.107 
50 -98.896 -94.110 -88.547 -82.108 
51 -98.898 -94.111 -88.548 -82.108 
52 -98.899 -94.111 -88.549 -82.107 
53 -98.898 -94.110 -88.549 -82.109 
54 -49.443 -47.052 -44.263 -41.059 
55 -49.443 -47.052 -44.263 -41.059 
56 -49.443 -47.051 -44.261 -41.058 
57 -49.443 -47.051 -44.262 -41.057 
58 -106.236 -101.115 -95.145 -88.230 
372 
Variance-Covarîance 
Intervals 0 
Row 
59 -106.236 
60 -106.235 
61 } -106.235 
62 -53.114 
63 -53.114 
7 237.395 
8 237.396 
9 118.716 
10 118.714 
11 118.712 
12 118.711 
13 117.598 
14 117.597 
15 58.810 
16 58.804 
17 58.811 
18 58.809 
19 96.720 
20 96.723 
21 96.720 
22 96.723 
23 96.722 
24 96.726 
25 96.728 
26 96.722 
27 96.722 
28 96.719 
29 96.722 
30 96.722 
31 96.722 
32 96.720 
33 48.368 
34 48,369 
35 48.369 
36 48.368 
37 48.368 
38 48.368 
39 48.367 
40 68.545 
41 68.541 
42 68.546 
43 68.542 
44 68.542 
45 68.540 
46 -98.898 
47 -98.898 
1 2 3 
101.116 
-95.144 
-88.229 
101.115 
-95.145 
-88.229 
101.115 
-95.144 -88.228 
-50.555 
-47.562 -44.122 
-50.554 
-47.562 
-44.122 
249.484 259.095 265.318 
249.485 259.095 265.315 
124.756 129.563 132.674 
124.754 129.562 132.673 
124.751 129.558 132.670 
124.750 129.558 132.669 
123.591 128.332 131.434 
123.591 128.330 131.434 
61.794 64.176 65.713 
61.791 64.173 65.710 
61.794 64.177 65.714 
61.792 64.174 65.711 
101.625 105.539 108.084 
101.627 105.546 108.085 
101.626 105.543 108.084 
101.627 105.550 108.091 
101.627 105.543 108.090 
101.632 105.546 108.093 
101.627 105.552 108.093 
101.622 105.540 108.082 
101.625 105.540 108.087 
101.623 105.542 108.085 
101.626 105.543 108.088 
101.623 105.539 108.081 
101.625 105.545 108.081 
101.627 105.543 108.088 
50.835 52.784 54.053 
50.835 52.784 54.050 
50.835 52.783 54.050 
50.835 52.784 54.050 
50.833 52.782 54.052 
50.834 52.783 54.051 
50.834 52.783 54.051 
72.029 74.792 76.587 
72.026 74.788 76.584 
72.031 74.793 76.588 
72.028 74.790 76.584 
72.028 74.790 76.585 
72.026 74.789 76.583 
-94.110 
-88.548 
-82.109 
-94.111 
-88.549 -82.109 
373 
Va r i ance-Cova r î ance 
Intervais -» 
Col, Row 
48 -98.896 -94.108 -88.546 
-82.108 
49 -98.898 -94.109 -88.546 
-82.107 
50 -98.898 -94.110 -88.548 
-82.109 
51 -98.898 -94.110 
-88.548 
-82.109 
52 -98.898 -94.110 
-88.546 
-82.107 
53 -98.896 -94.110 -88.546 
-82.107 
54 -49.443 -47.051 -44.262 
-41.059 
55 -49.444 -47.051 -44.263 
-41.059 
56 -49.444 -47.051 -44.262 
-41.059 
57 -49.443 -47.051 -44.262 
-41.058 
58 -106.236 -101.115 
-95.145 -88.230 
59 -106.236 -101.116 
-95.144 -88.230 
60 
-106.236 -101.115 
-95.145 -88.230 
61 -106.236 -101.115 
-95.145 -88.230 
62 
-53.114 -50.554 
-47.562 -44.122 
63 -53.114 -50.554 
-47.562 -44.123 
8 237.395 249.488 259.094 265.316 
9 118.716 124.756 129.563 132.674 
10 118.714 124.754 129.562 132.672 
11 118.712 124.751 129.558 132.670 
12 118.711 124.750 129.558 132.669 
13 117.598 123.591 128.331 131.433 
14 117.597 123.591 128.330 131.433 
15 58.810 61.793 64.177 65.713 
16 58.803 61.791 64.173 65.710 
17 58.811 61.794 64.176 65.714 
18 58.809 61.792 64.174 65.711 
19 96.720 101.626 105.545 108.085 
20 96.726 101.629 105.546 108.085 
21 96.722 101.626 105.545 108.084 
22 96.725 101.629 105.549 108.094 
23 96.722 101.625 105.545 108.084 
24 96.728 101.630 105.545 108.093 
25 96.726 101.632 105.547 108.091 
26 96.723 101.623 105.543 108.084 
27 96.722 101.627 105.543 108.085 
28 96.719 101.625 105.542 108.088 
29 96.720 101.629 105.542 108.088 
30 96.719 101.626 105.547 108.085 
31 96.722 101,630 105.543 108.087 
32 96.725 101.629 105.546 108.091 
33 48.368 50.834 52.784 54.051 
34 48.369 50.834 52.784 54.050 
35 48.369 50.835 52.783 54.050 
36 48.368 50.835 52.784 54.050 
374 
Va r i ance-Cova r î ance 
Intervais 0 1 2 3 
Co1. Row 
37 48.368 50.833 52.783 54.051 
38 48.367 50.833 52.783 54.050 
39 48.367 50.835 52.783 54.050 
40 68.544 72.030 74.792 76.587 
41 68.541 72.026 74.788 76.584 
42 68.545 72.031 74.793 76.587 
43 68.542 72,028 74.790 76.584 
44 68.542 72.028 74.790 76.585 
45 68.540 72.026 74.789 76.583 
46 -98.898 -94.110 -88.548 
-82.109 
47 -98.899 -94.111 -88.549 -82.110 
48 
-98.897 -94.109 -88.546 
-82.109 
49 -98.897 -94.109 -88.545 -82.108 
50 -98.898 -94.110 -88.548 
-82.109 
51 -98.898 -94.111 -88.548 
-82.110 
52 -98.896 -94.109 -88.545 -82.106 
53 -98.895 -94.109 -88.546 -82.106 
54 -49.444 -47.052 -44.262 
-41.060 
55 -49.443 -47.052 -44.263 
-41.059 
56 -49.444 -47.051 -44.262 
-41.059 
57 -49.443 -47.051 -44.262 -41.058 
58 -106.237 -101.116 
-95.145 -88.231 
59 -106.236 -101.115 -95.144 -88.230 
60 -106.236 -101.115 
-95.145 -88.230 
61 -106.236 -101.115 
-95.144 -88.230 
62 
-53.114 -50.554 -47.562 -44.122 
63 -53.113 -50.554 -47.561 -44.123 
9 59.364 62.381 64.786 66.342 
10 59.363 62.380 64.785 66.341 
11 59.361 62.377 64.783 66.339 
12 59.361 62.377 64.783 66.339 
13 58.801 61.797 64.167 65.720 
14 58.801 61.797 64.166 65.720 
15 29.406 30.897 32.089 32.858 
16 29.403 30.896 32.087 32.857 
17 29.406 30.897 32.089 32.858 
18 29.405 30.896 32.088 32.857 
19 48.367 50.835 52.786 54.056 
20 48.367 50.834 52.786 54.056 
21 48.366 50.835 52.788 54.056 
22 48.367 50.834 52.787 54.056 
23 48.367 50.834 52.786 54.056 
24 48.366 50.833 52.785 54.056 
25 48.366 50.834 52.786 54.055 
26 48.368 50.834 52.787 54.056 
375 
Va r î ance-Cova r i ance 
Intervais 0 1 2 3 
C o l .  R o w  
27 48.368 50.835 52.787 54.057 
28 48.367 50.835 52.787 54.057 
29 48.367 50.835 52.787 54.057 
30 48.368 50.835 52.787 54.057 
31 48.366 50.834 52.786 54.055 
32 48.367 50.834 52.787 54.056 
33 24.184 25.424 26.396 27.029 
34 24.184 25.424 26.395 27.028 
35 24.184 25.424 26.395 27.028 
36 24.184 25.424 26.395 27.028 
37 24.184 25.424 26.395 27.028 
38 24.183 25.424 26.395 27.028 
39 24.183 25.424 26.395 27.028 
40 34.273 36.013 37.411 38.300 
41 34.271 36.011 37.409 38.298 
42 34.274 36.013 37.412 38.301 
43 34.272 36.012 37.410 38.299 
44 34.272 36.012 37.411 38.299 
45 34.271 36.010 37.409 38.298 
46 -49.458 -47.066 -44.265 -41.056 
47 -49.458 -47.067 -44.265 -41.056 
48 
-49.457 -47-066 -44.264 -41.056 
49 -49.458 -47.065 -44.264 
-41.055 
50 -49.457 -47.066 -44.265 -41.056 
51 -49.458 -47.066 -44.265 -41.056 
52 -49.457 -47.065 -44.264 
-41.055 
53 -49.456 -47.064 -44.264 -41.055 
54 -24.726 -23.531 -22.127 -20.530 
55 -24.726 -23.531 -22.127 -20.531 
56 -24.726 -23.530 -22.126 -20.530 
57 -24.726 -23.531 -22.126 -20.530 
58 -53.125 -50.572 -47.570 -44.110 
59 -53.124 -50.572 -47.569 -44.110 
60 
-53.125 -50.572 -47.570 -44.110 
61 -53.124 -50.571 -47.570 -44.109 
62 -26.560 -25.284 -23.780 -22.058 
63 -26.560 -25.284 
-23.779 -22.059 
10 59.362 62.379 64.785 66.339 
11 59.361 62.377 64.783 66.339 
12 59.361 62.377 64.783 66.339 
13 58.800 61.796 64.166 65.719 
14 58.799 61.795 64.166 65.719 
15 29.405 30.896 32.088 32.857 
16 29.403 30.896 32.088 32.857 
376 
Var iance-Covar i ance 
I n t e r v a l s  - > 0  1  2  3  
Col. Row 
17 29.406 30.896 32.088 32.857 
18 29.405 30.896 32.088 32.857 
19 48.364 50.832 52.786 54.054 
20 48.364 50.832 52.785 54.054 
21 48.364 50.832 52.786 54.055 
22 48.364 50.832 52.785 54.054 
23 48.365 50.832 52.785 54.054 
24 48.364 50.831 52.784 54.054 
25 48.363 50.832 52.785 54.053 
26 48.365 50.833 52.786 54.055 
27 48.365 50.833 52.786 54.054 
28 48.365 50.833 52.786 54.055 
29 48.364 50.832 52.786 54.055 
30 48.365 50.833 52.786 54.054 
31 48.364 50.832 52.785 54.054 
32 48.364 50.832 52.785 54.054 
33 24.183 25.423 26.395 27.028 
34 24.183 25.423 26.395 27.027 
35 24.183 25.423 26.395 27.027 
36 24.183 25.423 26.395 27.027 
37 24.183 25.422 26.394 27.028 
38 24.182 25.422 26.394 27.027 
39 24.182 25.423 26.394 27.027 
40 34.272 36.012 37.411 38.299 
41 34.271 36.011 37.409 38.298 
42 34.272 36.012 37.411 38.300 
43 34.271 36.011 37.410 38.299 
44 34.271 36.011 37.410 38.299 
45 34.271 36.010 37.409 38.298 
46 -49.459 
-47.067 -44.265 
-41.057 
47 -49.459 
-47.067 -44.266 
-41.057 
48 
-49.458 -47.066 
-44.265 
-41.056 
49 -49.459 -47.066 
-44.265 
-41.056 
50 -49.459 -47.067 -44.265 
-41.056 
51 -49.459 -47.067 -44.265 
-41.057 
52 -49.458 -47.066 -44.264 
-41.056 
53 -49.458 -47.066 -44.265 
-41.056 
54 -24.727 -23.532 -22.127 
-20.531 
55 -24.726 -23.532 -22.127 
-20.531 
56 -24.726 
-23.531 -22.127 
-20.530 
57 -24.726 -23.531 -22.127 
-20.530 
58 -53.125 -50.572 
-47.570 -44.110 
59 -53.125 -50.572 -47.570 -44.110 
60 
-53.125 -50.572 
-47.570 -44.110 
61 
-53.125 -50.572 -47.570 -44.110 
377 
Va r i ance-Cova r i ance 
Intervais 
C o l .  
11 
Row 
62 
63 
11  
12 
13 
14 
15 
1 6  
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
-26.560 
-26.560 
59.361 
59.361 
58.798 
58.798 
29.405 
29.403 
29.406 
29.405 
48.362 
48.362 
48.362 
48.362 
48.362 
48.362 
48.362 
48.363 
48.362 
48.362 
48.362 
48.363 
48.362 
48.362 
24.182 
24.182 
24.182 
24.182 
24.182 
24.182 
24.182 
34.271 
34.271 
34.271 
34.271 
34.271 
34.270 
-49.460 
-49.460 
-49.459 
-49.460 
-49.460 
-49.460 
-49.459 
-49.459 
-25.284 
-25.284 
62.378 
62.377 
61.794 
61.794 
30.896 
30.896 
30.896 
30.896 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
50.829 
25.422 
25.422 
25.422 
25.422 
25.421 
25.422 
25.422 
36.010 
36.011 
36.011 
36.011 
36.011 
36.010 
-47.068 
-47.068 
-47.068 
-47.068 
-47.068 
-47.068 
-47.068 
-47.068 
-23.779 
-23.779 
64.783 
64.783 
64.164 
64.164 
32.088 
32.087 
32.088 
32.088 
52.781 
52.781 
52.782 
52.781 
52.781 
52.781 
52.781 
52.782 
52.781 
52.782 
52.781 
52.782 
52.781 
52.782 
26.393 
26.393 
26.393 
26.393 
26.393 
26.393 
26.393 
37.409 
37.409 
37.410 
37.409 
37.410 
37.409 
-44.267 
-44.267 
-44.267 
-44.267 
-44.267 
-44.267 
-44.267 
-44.267 
-22.058 
-22.058 
66.339 
66.339 
65.718 
65.718 
32.857 
32.857 
32.857 
32.857 
54.051 
54.051 
54.051 
54.051 
54.051 
54.051 
54.051 
54.052 
54.051 
54.052 
54.052 
54.051 
54.051 
54.051 
27.026 
27.026 
27.026 
27.026 
27.026 
27.027 
27.026 
38.299 
38.298 
38.299 
38.298 
38.299 
38.298 
-41.058 
-41.058 
-41.057 
-41.057 
-41.058 
-41.058 
-41.057 
-41.057 
378 
Va r i ance-Cova r i ance 
Intervais 
Co1. Row 
12 
54 -24.727 -23.532 -22.128 
-20.531 
55 -24.727 -23.532 -22.128 -20.531 
56 -24.727 -23.532 -22.128 
-20.531 
57 -24.727 -23.532 -22.128 -20.531 
58 -53.125 -50.573 -47.571 -44.111 
59 -53.125 -50.572 -47.571 -44.111 
60 
-53.125 -50.572 -47.571 -44.111 
61 -53.125 -50.572 -47.571 -44.111 
62 -26.560 -25.284 
-23.780 -22.059 
63 -26.560 -25.284 
-23.780 -22.059 
12 59.361 62.377 64.783 66.339 
13 58.798 61.793 64.164 65.717 
14 58.798 61.794 64.164 65.717 
15 29.405 30.896 32.088 32.857 
16 29.403 30.896 32.087 32.857 
17 29.405 30.896 32-088 32.857 
18 29.405 30.896 32.088 32.857 
19 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.050 
20 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.050 
21 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.050 
22 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.050 
23 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.051 
24 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.050 
25 48.361 50.829 52.781 54.051 
26 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.050 
27 48.361 50.829 52.781 54.050 
28 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.051 
29 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.051 
30 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.051 
31 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.050 
32 48.361 50.828 52.781 54.051 
33 24.182 25.421 26.393 27.026 
34 24.182 25.421 26.393 27.026 
35 24.182 25.422 26.393 27.026 
36 24.182 25.422 26.393 27.026 
37 24.182 25.421 26.393 27.026 
38 24.182 25.422 26.393 27.026 
39 24.182 25.422 26.393 27.026 
40 34.271 36.010 37.410 38.299 
41 34.271 36.010 37.409 38.298 
42 34.271 36.010 37.409 38.298 
43 34.271 36.011 37.409 38.298 
44 34.271 36.011 37.409 38.298 
45 34.270 36.010 37.409 38.298 
46 -49.460 -47.068 -44.267 -41.058 
379 
Va r i ance-Covar i ance 
Intervais 0 1 2 3 
Col. Row 
47 -49.460 -47.069 -44.267 -41.058 
48 -49.460 -47.068 -44.267 -41.058 
49 -49.460 -47.068 -44.267 -41.058 
50 -49.460 -47.068 -44.267 -41.058 
51 -49.460 -47.069 -44.267 -41.058 
52 -49.460 -47.069 -44.267 -41.058 
53 -49.460 -47.068 -44.267 -41.058 
54 -24.727 -23.532 -22.128 -20.531 
55 -24.727 -23.532 -22.128 -20.531 
56 -24.727 -23.532 -22.128 -20.531 
57 -24.727 -23.532 -22.128 -20.531 
58 -53.126 -50.573 -47.571 -44.111 
59 -53.125 -50.573 -47.571 -44.111 
60 -53.125 -50.573 -47.571 -44.111 
61 -53.125 -50.573 -47.571 -44.111 
62 -26.560 -25.284 -23-780 -22.059 
63 -26.560 -25.284 -23.780 -22.059 
13 13 135.682 142.587 148.048 151.639 
14 135.682 142.586 148.047 151.639 
15 67.840 71.287 74.032 75.809 
16 67.838 71.285 74.031 75.807 
17 67.840 71.287 74.033 75.809 
18 67.839 71.286 74.032 75.808 
19 46.593 48.979 50.859 52.095 
20 46.593 48.978 50.859 52.094 
21 46.593 48.979 50.860 52.094 
22 46.593 48.979 50.859 52.095 
23 46.594 48.979 50.859 52.094 
24 46.593 48.977 50.858 52.095 
25 46.593 48.978 50.859 52.094 
26 46.591 48.978 50.856 52.094 
27 46.594 48.979 50.859 52.095 
28 46.594 48.979 50.860 52.095 
29 46.594 48.979 50.860 52.095 
30 46.594 48.979 50.860 52.095 
31 46.593 48.979 50.859 52.094 
32 46.593 48.979 50.859 52.095 
33 23.311 24.497 25.429 26.053 
34 23.311 24.497 25.429 26.052 
35 23.311 24.498 25.429 26.052 
36 23.311 24.497 25.429 26.052 
37 23.311 24.497 25.428 26.053 
38 23.311 24.497 25.429 26.052 
39 23.310 24.497 25.428 26.052 
40 66.253 69.621 72.307 74.070 
380 
Var iance-Covarîance 
Intervals -» 
C o l .  Row 
14 
41 66.251 69.619 72.305 74.068 
42 66.253 69.622 72.308 74.071 
43 66.251 69.619 72.306 74.068 
44 66.251 69.620 72.306 74.069 
45 66.250 69.618 72.305 74.068 
46 -65.202 -62.064 
-58.340 -54.144 
47 -65.202 -62.065 -58.340 
-54.145 
48 -65.202 -62.064 
-58.339 -54.145 
49 -65.202 -62.064 -58.339 -54.144 
50 -65.202 -62.064 -58.340 -54.144 
51 -65.202 -62.064 -58.340 -54.144 
52 -65.201 -62.063 
-58.338 -54.143 
53 -65.200 -62.063 -58.338 -54.144 
54 -32.602 -31.038 -29.164 
-27.085 
55 -32.601 -31.038 -29.165 -27.085 
56 -32.601 -31.037 -29.164 
-27.085 
57 -32.601 -31.038 -29.165 -27.084 
58 -67.865 -64.606 -60.765 
-56.362 
59 -67.865 -64.606 -60.765 -56.362 
60 -67.865 -64.606 
-60.765 -56.362 
61 -67.865 -64.605 -60.765 
-56.361 
62 -33.940 -32.309 
-30.376 -28.185 
63 -33.940 -32.309 
-30.375 -28.186 
14 135.681 142.586 148.047 151.639 
15 67.840 71.287 74.032 75.809 
16 67.838 71.286 74.031 75.808 
17 67.840 71.287 74.032 75.809 
18 67.840 71.286 74.031 75.808 
19 46.593 48.979 50.858 52.095 
20 46.593 48.978 50.858 52.095 
21 46.592 48.979 50.858 52.095 
22 46.592 48.978 50.857 52.095 
23 46.593 48.978 50.858 52.095 
24 46.592 48.977 50.857 52.095 
25 46.592 48.978 50.858 52.094 
26 46.593 48.979 50.858 52.096 
27 46.593 48.979 50.858 52.095 
28 46.593 48.979 50.858 52.096 
29 46.593 48.979 50.858 52.096 
30 46.593 48.979 50.859 52.096 
31 46.592 48.978 50.857 52.095 
32 46.593 48.978 50.858 52.095 
33 23.311 24.497 25.428 26.053 
34 23.311 24.497 25.428 26.052 
35 23.311 24.497 25.428 26.052 
381 
Va r î ance-Cova r i ance 
Intervais -» 
C o l .  
15 
Row 
36 23.310 24.497 25.428 26.052 
37 23.311 24.496 25.428 26.053 
38 23.310 24.496 25.428 26.052 
39 23.310 24.497 25.428 26.052 
40 66.252 69.621 72.306 74.069 
41 66.250 69.618 72.305 74.068 
42 66.253 69.621 72.307 74.071 
43 66.251 69.619 72.306 74.069 
44 66.251 69.619 72.306 74.069 
45 66.250 69.618 72.305 74.068 
46 -65.202 -62.064 
-58.340 
-54.144 
47 -65.203 -62.065 
-58.341 
-54.145 
48 -65.202 -62.064 
-58.340 
-54.144 
49 -65.203 -62.064 
-58.340 
-54.144 
50 -65.202 -62.064 
-58.341 
-54.144 
51 - -65.202 -62.065 
-58.340 
-54.144 
52 -65.202 -62.064 
-58.339 -54.144 
53 -65.201 -62.063 
-58.339 -54.144 
54 -32.601 -31.038 
-29.165 -27.085 
55 -32.601 -31.038 -29.165 -27.085 
56 -32.601 
-31.038 
-29.165 
-27.084 
57 -32.601 -31.038 -29.165 
-27.084 
58 -67.866 -64.606 -60.766 
-56.362 
59 -67.866 -64.606 -60.766 -56.362 
60 -67.865 -64.606 -60.766 
-56.362 
61 -67.865 -64.605 -60.766 
-56.361 
62 
-33.940 -32.309 
-30.375 -28.185 
63 -33.940 -32.309 
-30.375 -28.185 
15 33.920 35.640 37.021 37.899 
16 33.919 35.640 37.020 37.899 
17 33.920 35.641 37.021 37.899 
18 33.920 35.640 37.021 37.899 
19 23.306 24.499 25.429 26.049 
20 23.305 24.499 25.429 26.048 
21 23.305 24.499 25.429 26.048 
22 23.306 24.499 25.429 26.048 
23 23.306 24.499 25.429 26.048 
24 23.305 24.498 25.428 26.048 
25 23.305 24.499 25.429 26.048 
26 23.306 24.500 25.430 26.049 
27 23.306 24.500 25.429 26.048 
28 23.306 24.500 25.430 26.049 
29 23.306 24.499 25.429 26.049 
30 23.306 24.500 25.430 26.049 
31 23.306 24.499 25.429 26.048 
382 
Varîance-Covarîance 
Intervals -» 
Col 
16 
Row 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
23.305 
11.659 
11.660 
11.660 
11.660 
11.660 
11 .660  
11.660 
33.125 
33.124 
33.125 
33.124 
33.124 
33.124 
-32.597 
-32.597 
-32.596 
-32.596 
-32.596 
-32.596 
-32.596 
-32.596 
-16.298 
-16.298 
-16.298 
-16.298 
-33.950 
-33.950 
-33.950 
-33.950 
-16.978 
-16.978 
33.918 
33.919 
33.919 
23.304 
23.304 
23.304 
23.304 
23.304 
23.304 
23.304 
23.304 
23.304 
23.304 
24.499 
12.253 
12.253 
12.253 
12.253 
12.253 
12.253 
12.253 
34.819 
34.819 
34.819 
34.819 
34.819 
34.818 
-30.997 
-30.997 
-30.997 
-30.997 
-30.997 
-30.997 
-30.997 
-30.996 
-15.501 
-15.501 
-15.501 
-15.501 
-32.298 
-32.298 
-32.298 
-32.298 
-16.152 
-16.152 
35.640 
35.640 
35.640 
24.496 
24.496 
24.496 
24.496 
24.496 
24.496 
24.497 
24.496 
24.496 
24.496 
25.429 
12.714 
12.714 
12.714 
12.714 
12.714 
1 2 . 7 1 k  
12.714 
36.142 
36.141 
36.142 
36.141 
36.141 
36.141 
-29.200 
-29.200 
-29.199 
-29.199 
-29.199 
-29.200 
-29.199 
-29.199 
-14.597 
-14.597 
-14.597 
-14.597 
-30.397 
-30.397 
-30.397 
-30.397 
-15.195 
-15.195 
37.020 
37.020 
37.020 
25.426 
25.426 
25.426 
25.426 
25.426 
25.426 
25.426 
25.426 
25.426 
25.426 
26.049 
13.027 
13.026 
13.026 
13.026 
13.027 
1 3 . 0 2 6  
13.026 
37.013 
37.013 
37.014 
37.013 
37.013 
37.013 
-27.067 
-27.067 
-27.066 
-27.066 
-27.067 
-27.067 
-27.066 
-27.066 
-13.539 
-13.539 
-13.539 
-13.539 
-28.186 
-28.186 
-28.186 
-28.187 
-14.095 
-14.095 
37.899 
37.899 
37.899 
26.046 
26.046 
26.046 
26.046 
26.046 
26.046 
26.046 
26.046 
26.046 
26.046 
383 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals •> 
Col 
17 
Row 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
23.304 
23.304 
23.304 
23.304 
11.659 
11.660 
11.660 
11.660 
11.660 
11.659 
11.659 
33.121 
33.121 
33.121 
33.121 
33.121 
33.120 
-32.616 
-32.616 
-32.616 
-32.616 
-32.616 
-32.616 
-32.616 
-32.616 
-16.308 
-16.308 
-16,308 
-16.308 
-33.942 
-33.942 
-33.942 
-33.942 
-16.975 
-16.975 
33.920 
33.920 
23.307 
23.306 
23.306 
23.306 
23.306 
23.306 
23.306 
23.307 
24.496 
24.496 
24.496 
24.496 
12.252 
12.253 
12.253 
12.253 
12.253 
12.253 
12.253 
34.818 
34.818 
34.818 
34.818 
34.818 
34.818 
-30.998 
-30.998 
-30.998 
-30.998 
-30.998 
-30.998 
-30.998 
-30.998 
-15.502 
-15.502 
-15.502 
-15.502 
-32.299 
-32.299 
-32.299 
-32.299 
-16.152 
-16.152 
35.641 
35.640 
24.500 
24.500 
24.499 
24.499 
24.499 
24.499 
24.499 
24.500 
«1 
25.426 
25.426 
25.426 
25.426 
12.713 
12.713 
12.713 
12.713 
12.713 
12.713 
12.713 
36.141 
36.141 
36.141 
36.141 
36.141 
36.141 
29.201 
29.201 
29.201 
29.201 
29.201 
29.201 
29.201 
29.201 
14.598 
4.558 
14.598 
14.598 
•30.398 
30.398 
30.398 
30.398 
•15.195 
•15.195 
37.021 
37.021 
25.429 
25.429 
25.430 
25.429 
25.429 
25.429 
25.429 
25.430 
26.046 
26.046 
26.046 
26.046 
13.026 
13.026 
13.026 
13.026 
13.026 
13.026 
13.026 
37.013 
37.013 
37.013 
37.013 
37.013 
37.013 
-27.068 
-27.068 
-27.067 
-27.067 
-27.067 
-27.068 
-27.067 
-27.067 
-13.540 
-13.540 
-13.540 
-13.540 
-28.187 
-28.187 
-28.187 
-28.187 
-14.096 
-14.096 
37.899 
37.899 
26.050 
26.049 
26.050 
26.049 
26.050 
26.049 
26.049 
26.050 
384 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals 
Col. Row 
27 23.307 24.500 25.430 
28 23:306 24.500 25.430 
29 23.307 24.500 25.430 
30 23.307 24.500 25.430 
31 23.306 24.500 25.429 
32 23.306 24.500 25.429 
33 11.660 12.253 12.714 
34 11.660 12.253 12.714 
35 11.660 12.253 12.714 
36 11.660 12.254 12.714 
37 11.660 12.253 12.714 
38 11.659 12.253 12.714 
39 11.660 12.253 12.714 
40 33.125 34.819 36.142 
41 33.124 34.819 36.141 
42 33.125 34.819 36.143 
43 33.124 34.819 36.142 
44 33.124 34.819 36.141 
45 33.124 34.818 36.141 
46 -32.596 
-30.997 -29.199 
47 -32.596 -30.997 -29.200 
48 
-32.596 -30.996 -29.199 
49 -32.596 -30.996 -29.199 
50 -32.596 -30.997 -29.199 
51 -32.596 -30.997 -29.199 
52 -32.596 -30.997 -29.198 
53 -32.595 -30.996 -29.199 
54 -16.298 -15.501 -14.597 
55 -16.298 -15.501 -14.597 
56 -16.298 -15.501 -14.597 
57 -16.298 -15.501 -14.597 
58 -33.950 -32.298 -30.397 
59 -33.949 -32.298 -30.397 
60 
-33.949 -32.298 -30.397 
61 
-33.949 -32.298 -30.397 
62 
-16.978 -16.152 -15.195 
63 -16.978 -16.152 
-15.195 
18 33.920 35.640 37.020 
19 23.304 24.498 25.427 
20 23.304 24.497 25.427 
21 23.304 24.498 25.427 
22 23.304 24.498 25.427 
23 23.304 24.498 25.427 
24 23.304 24.497 25.427 
25 23.304 24.497 25.427 
3 
26.050 
26.050 
26.050 
26.050 
26.049 
26.049 
13.027 
13.027 
13.027 
13.027 
13.027 
13.027 
13.027 
37.014 
37.013 
37.014 
37.013 
37.014 
37.012 
-27.066 
-27.067 
-27.066 
-27.066 
-27.066 
-27.066 
-27.066 
-27.066 
-13.539 
-13.539 
-13.539 
-13.539 
-28.186 
-28.186 
-28.186 
-28.186 
-14.095 
-14.095 
37.899 
26.047 
26.047 
26.047 
26.047 
26.047 
26.047 
26.047 
Varîance-Covarîance 
Intervals 0 
Col. Row 
26 23.304 
27 23.305 
28 23.304 
29 23.305 
30 23.305 
31 23.304 
32 23.304 
33 11.659 
34 11.660 
35 11.660 
36 11.660 
37 11.660 
38 11.659 
39 11.660 
40 33.124 
41 33.124 
42 33.124 
43 33.124 
44 33.124 
45 33.124 
46 -32.597 
47 -32.597 
48 -32.597 
49 -32.597 
50 -32.597 
51 -32.597 
52 -32.597 
53 -32.597 
54 -16.298 
55 -16.298 
56 -16.298 
57 -16.298 
58 -33.950 
59 -33.950 
60 -33.950 
61 -33.950 
62 -16.978 
63 -16.978 
19 19 197.934 
20 197.936 
21 197.934 
22 197.937 
23 197.937 
24 197.938 
385 
1 2 3 
24.498 25.427 26.047 
24.498 25.427 26.047 
24.498 25.427 26.047 
24.498 25.427 26.047 
24.498 25.427 26.047 
24.497 25.427 26.047 
24.497 25.427 26.047 
12.252 12.713 13.026 
12.253 12.713 13.026 
12.253 12.713 13.026 
12.253 12.713 13.026 
12.253 12.713 13.026 
12.253 12.713 13.026 
12.253 12.713 13.026 
34.818 36.141 37.013 
34.818 36.141 37.013 
34.818 36.141 37.013 
34.819 36.141 37.013 
34.818 36.141 37.013 
34.818 36.141 37.013 
-30.998 -29.200 
-27.067 
-30.998 -29.201 
-27.067 
-30.998 -29.200 
-27.067 
-30.998 -29.200 
-27.067 
-30.998 -29.200 
-27.067 
-30.998 -29.200 
-27.067 
-30.997 -29.200 -27.067 
-30.997 -29.200 
-27.067 
-15.501 
-14.597 -13.540 
-15.502 
-14.597 -13.540 
-15.501 -14.597 -13.540 
-15.501 
-14.597 
-13.539 
-32.298 -30.398 -28.187 
-32.298 -30.398 -28.187 
-32.298 -30.398 -28.187 
-32.298 -30.398 -28.187 
-16.152 
-15.195 -14.096 
-16.152 -15.195 -14.096 
208.027 216.010 221.222 
208.027 216.010 221.222 
208.027 216.014 221.220 
208.029 216.014 221.225 
208.024 216.010 221.226 
208.029 216.011 221.225 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals ->• 0 
Col. Row 
25 197.938 
26 197.936 
27 197.934 
28 197.930 
29 197.941 
30 197.933 
31 197.936 
32, 197.937 
33 98.977 
34 98.977 
35 98.977 
36 98.976 
37 98.977 
38 98.976 
39 98.975 
40 17.586 
41 17.581 
42 17.587 
43 17.583 
44 17.583 
45 17.581 
46 -49.713 
47 -49.714 
48 -49.713 
49 -49.716 
50 -49.712 
51 -49.713 
52 -49.713 
53 -49.713 
54 -24.855 
55 -24.854 
56 -24.854 
57 -24.854 
58 -95.173 
59 -95.173 
60 -95.173 
61 -95.173 
62 -47.585 
63 -47.585 
20 20 197.944 
21 197.937 
22 197.943 
23 197.937 
24 197.940 
386 
1 2 3 
208.027 216.014 221.222 
208.026 216.008 221.222 
208.024 216.008 221 .222 
208.026 216.008 221.223 
208.030 216.007 221.220 
208.021 216.007 221.220 
208.027 216.011 221.220 
208.026 216.010 221.223 
104.023 108.020 110.619 
104.023 108.020 110.617 
104.023 108.019 110.617 
104.023 108.020 110.617 
104.021 108.018 110.619 
104.022 108.019 110.617 
104.023 108.019 110.618 
18.453 19.167 19.632 
18.449 19.164 19.629 
18.454 19.168 19.633 
18.451 19.165 19.629 
18.452 19.166 19.630 
18.450 19.165 19.628 
-47.318 -44.524 
-41.276 
-47.320 -44.525 -41.278 
-47.321 -44.524 
-41.279 
-47.321 -44.527 -41.274 
-47.318 -44.525 
-41.277 
-47.320 -44.525 
-41.277 
-47.322 -44.524 
-41.277 
r47.3l8 -44.526 
-41.279 
-23.641 
-22.257 -20.644 
-23.641 -22.258 -20.644 
-23.641 -22.256 
-20.643 
-23.641 
-22.257 -20.642 
-90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
-90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
-90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
-90.606 -85.222 
-79.038 
-45.288 
-42.599 
-39.528 
-45.287 -42.599 
-39.529 
208.034 216.017 221.226 
208.029 216.018 221.223 
208.033 216.015 221.228 
208.031 216.014 221.226 
208.030 216.017 221.229 
387 
Variance-Covarîance 
intervals 0 1 2 
Co 1. Row 
25 197.941 208.033 216.020 
26 197.934 208.030 216.008 
27 197.937 208.029 216.011 
28 197.936 208.029 216.014 
29 197.937 208.031 216.013 
30 197.936 208.026 216.014 
31 197.940 208.029 216.013 
32 197.944 208.033 216.014 
33 98.977 104.022 108.019 
34 98.977 104.022 108.020 
35 98.977 104.023 108.019 
36 98.976 104.022 108.020 
37 98.976 104.021 108.018 
38 98.976 104.022 108.019 
39 98.976 104.022 108.019 
40 17.586 18.453 19.167 
41 17.582 18.449 19.164 
42 17.587 18.454 19.168 
43 17.583 18.451 19.166 
44 17.583 18.452 19.166 
45 17.581 18.449 19.165 
46 -49.713 -47.319 -44.524 
47 -49.713 -47.320 -44.525 
48 -49.712 -47.319 -44.522 
49 -49.712 -47.319 -44.523 
50 -49.712 -47.319 -44.524 
51 -49.713 -47.319 -44.525 
52 -49.713 -47.318 -44.521 
53 -49.712 -47.318 -44.524 
54 -24.854 -23.641 -22.256 
55 -24.854 -23.641 -22.258 
56 -24.854 -23.641 -22.256 
57 -24.854 -23.641 -22.257 
58 -95.174 -90.606 -85.222 
59 -95.174 -90.607 -85.221 
60 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
61 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
62 -47.585 -45-288 -42.599 
63 -47.585 -45.287 -42.599 
21 197.938 208.031 216.014 
22 197.937 208.030 216.021 
23 197.937 208.030 216.014 
24 197.940 208.031 216.017 
25 197.943 208.031 216.021 
26 197.933 208.026 216.015 
3 
221.231 
221.223 
221.225 
221.225 
221.228 
221.220 
221.222 
221.225 
110.618 
110.617 
110.616 
110.617 
110.618 
110.617 
110.617 
19-631 
19.629 
19.632 
19.629 
19.630 
19.628 
-41.277 
-41.278 
-41.277 
-41.276 
-41.277 
-41.277 
-41.276 
-41.276 
-20.644 
-20.644 
-20.643 
-20.643 
-79.040 
-79.039 
-79.039 
-79.039 
-39.529 
-39.529 
221.222 
221.225 
221.225 
221.226 
221.228 
221.219 
388 
Va r i ance-Cova r i ance 
Intervais -> 
Col 
22 
Row 
27 197 937 208.033 216.013 221.220 
28 197 933 208.030 216.015 221.220 
29 197 940 208.029 216.015 221.225 
30 197 937 208.029 216.015 221.219 
31 197 936 208.029 216.015 221.222 
32 197 936 208.026 216.017 221.222 
33 38 976 104.022 108.021 110.6)8 
34 98 977 104.023 108.021 110.617 
35 98 977 104.023 108.020 110.616 
36 98 976 104.023 108.020 110.617 
37 98 977 104.022 108.019 110.618 
38 98 975 104.022 108.020 110.617 
39 98 975 104.023 108.020 110.617 
40 17 586 18.453 19.168 19.632 
41 17 581 18.449 19.165 19.629 
42 17 587 18.455 19.170 19.633 
43 17 583 18.451 19.166 19.629 
44 17 583 18.452 19.167 19.630 
45 17 581 18.449 19.165 19.628 
46 
-49 713 -47.318 -44.523 -41.276 
47 -49 714 -47.320 -44.524 
-41.278 
48 
-49 713 -47.319 -44.521 
-41.276 
49 -49 716 -47.319 -44.523 -41.276 
50 -49 713 -47.319 -44.523 
-41.277 
51 -49 713 -47.319 -44.523 
-41.277 
52 -49 715 -47.321 -44.521 -41.276 
53 -49 713 -47.318 -44.523 -41.276 
54 -24 855 -23.641 -22.256 -20.644 
55 -24 854 -23.641 -22.257 -20.644 
56 -24 854 -23.640 -22.255 
-20.643 
57 -24 854 -23.640 -22.256 -20.642 
58 
-95 174 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
59 -95 173 -90.606 -85.221 
-79.039 
60 
-95 173 -90.606 -85.221 -79.039 
61 
-95 173 -90.606 -85.221 
-79.039 
62 
-47 585 -45.287 
-42.599 -39.528 
63 -47 585 -45.287 -42.598 
-39.529 
22 197 941 208.034 216.020 221.229 
23 197 944 208.030 216.017 221.228 
24 197 943 208.034 216.018 221.231 
25 197 940 208.036 216.021 221.231 
26 197 936 208.029 216.014 221.223 
27 197 934 208.031 216.017 221.222 
28 197 937 208.033 216.014 221.223 
29 197 940 208.036 216.013 221.228 
389 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals ->• 
Col 
23 
Row 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
197.940 
197.938 
197.940 
98.976 
98.977 
98.976 
98.976 
98.976 
98.975 
98.975 
17.585 
17.582 
17.586 
17.583 
17.583 
17.581 
-49.713 
-49.714 
-49.712 
-49.712 
-49.713 
-49.713 
-49.712 
-49.710 
-24.854 
-24.854 
-24.854 
-24.854 
-95.174 
-95.174 
-95.173 
-95.173 
-47.585 
-47.585 
197.938 
197.940 
197.943 
197.938 
197.940 
197.934 
197.938 
197.934 
197.936 
197.940 
208.029 
208.029 
208.036 
104.022 
104.022 
104.022 
104.023 
104.021 
104.022 
104.022 
18.453 
18.449 
18.454 
18.451 
18.452 
18.449 
-47.319 
-47.320 
-47.318 
-47.318 
-47.319 
-47.319 
-47.318 
-47.316 
-23.641 
-23.641 
-23.641 
-23.641 
-90.606 
-90.606 
-90.606 
-90.606 
-45.288 
-45.287 
208.029 
208.030 
208.034 
208.021 
208.029 
208.030 
208.029 
208.031 
208.031 
208.029 
216.014 
216.013 
216.015 
108.020 
108.020 
108.019 
108.020 
108.018 
108.019 
108.019 
19.168 
19.164 
19.169 
19.166 
19.166 
19.165 
-44.523 
-44.525 
-44.522 
-44.522 
-44.524 
-44.524 
-44.521 
-44.521 
-22.256 
-22.258 
-22.256 
-22.256 
-85.222 
-85.222 
-85.222 
-85.221 
-42.599 
-42.599 
216.013 
216.014 
216.018 
216.007 
216.011 
216.013 
216.014 
216.013 
216.013 
216.011 
221.222 
221.225 
221.226 
110.618 
110.617 
110.617 
no.617 
110.618 
110.617 
110.617 
19.631 
19.629 
19.633 
19.629 
19.630 
19.628 
-41.277 
-41.278 
-41.276 
-41.275 
-41.278 
-41.277 
-41.274 
-41.276 
-20.644 
-20.644 
-20.643 
-20.642 
-79.039 
-79.039 
-79.039 
-79.038 
-39.528 
-39.529 
221.225 
221.231 
221.229 
221.219 
221.222 
221.220 
221.223 
221.225 
221.218 
221.225 
390 
Col 
24 
.-Covar lance 
s -> 0 1 2 3 
Row 
33 98.977 104.022 108.019 110.619 
34 98.977 104.022 108.020 110.617 
35 98.977 104.022 108.019 110.617 
36 98.977 104.023 108.020 110.617 
37 98.977 104.021 108,018 110.619 
38 98.976 104.022 108.019 110.617 
39 98.975 104.022 108.018 110.617 
40 17.586 18.453 19.167 19.631 
41 17.581 18.449 19.164 19.629 
42 17.587 18.454 19.169 19.633 
43 17.583 18.451 19.166 19.629 
44 17.583 18.452 19.166 19.630 
45 17.581 18.449 19.164 19.628 
46 
-49.713 -47.319 -44.524 
-41.276 
47 -49.713 -47.320 -44.525 -41.278 
48 -49.712 
-47.319 -44.523 -41,276 
49 -49.713 -47.321 -44.524 -41,274 
50 -49.713 -47-319 -44.525 
-41,277 
51 -49.712 
-47.319 -44.525 
-41.277 
52 -49.712 -47.321 -44.523 -41.274 
53 -49.712 -47.318 -44,524 
-41.276 
54 -24.854 -23.641 
-22.257 -20.644 
55 -24.854 -23.641 -22.258 
-20.643 
56 -24.854 -23.641 -22.256 
-20.643 
57 -24.853 -23.641 -22.257 -20.642 
58 -95.174 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
59 -95.174 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
60 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
61 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.038 
62 
-47.585 -45.288 -42.599 
-39.528 
63 -47.585 -45.287 -42.599 
-39.529 
24 197.944 208.034 216.015 221.234 
25 197.943 208.036 216.021 221.231 
26 197.940 208.029 216.011 221.225 
27 197.940 208.027 216.013 221.222 
28 197.938 208.027 216.010 221.226 
29 197.940 208.027 216.014 221.225 
30 197.941 208.030 216.011 221.222 
31 197.941 208.031 216.014 221.228 
32 197.938 208.033 216.017 221.229 
33 98.976 104.021 108.018 110.618 
34 98.977 104.022 108,019 110.617 
35 98.977 104.022 108,018 110.616 
36 98.976 104.022 108,019 110.616 
391 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals -> 
Col 
25 
Row 
37 98.976 104.020 108.018 110.618 
38 98.975 104.021 108.018 110.617 
39 98.975 104.022 108.018 110.617 
40 17.586 18.452 19.166 19.631 
41 17.582 18.449 19.164 19.629 
42 17.586 18.453 19.167 19.632 
43 17.583 18.451 19.165 19.629 
44 17.583 18.451 19.166 19.630 
45 17.581 18.449 19.165 19.628 
46 
-49.713 -47.320 -44.524 
-41.277 
47 -49.714 -47.321 -44.525 
-41.278 
48 
-49.712 -47.319 -44.524 
-41.276 
49 -49.713 -47.320 -44.524 
-41.275 
50 -49.712 -47.320 
-44.525 
-41.277 
51 -49.713 -47.320 
-44.525 
-41.277 
52 -49.712 
-47.319 -44.523 
-41.275 
53 -49.710 -47.319 -44.523 
-41.275 
54 -24.854 -23.641 
-22.257 -20.644 
55 -24.854 -23.642 -22.258 
-20.644 
56 -24.854 -23.641 
-22.257 -20.643 
57 -24.854 -23.642 -22.257 -20.642 
58 -95.174 -90.607 
-85.223 
-79.039 
59 -95.174 -90.607 -85.222 
-79.039 
60 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
61 
-95.173 -90.607 -85.223 
-79.038 
62 
-47.585 -45.288 
-42.599 
-39.529 
63 -47.585 -45.287 
-42.599 
-39.529 
25 197.943 208.036 216.023 221.232 
26 197.934 208.027 216.017 221.228 
27 197.938 208.029 216.013 221.223 
28 197.936 208.036 216.017 221.223 
29 197.940 208.034 216.011 221.228 
30 197.940 208.030 216.017 221.225 
31 197.940 208.034 216.020 221.226 
32 197.944 208.033 216.018 221.232 
33 98.976 104.022 108.020 110.618 
34 98.977 104.022 108.020 110.616 
35 98.976 104.023 108.019 110.616 
36 98.976 104.023 108.020 110.616 
37 98.976 104.021 108.019 110.617 
38 98.975 104.022 108.019 110.617 
39 98.975 104.022 108.019 110.617 
40 17.585 18.453 19.168 19.631 
41 17.581 18.450 19.164 19.629 
42 17.586 18.454 19.169 19.632 
392 
Va rî ance-Cova r i ance 
Intervais 
Col 
26 
Row 
43 17.583 18.451 19.166 19.629 
44 17.583 18.452 19.166 19.630 
45 17.581 18.450 19.165 19.628 
46 
-49.713 -47.319 -44.524 
-41.277 
47 -49.714 -47.320 -44.525 
-41.278 
48 
-49.712 -47.318 -44.522 
-41.277 
49 -49.713 -47.319 -44.522 
-41.276 
50 -49.713 -47.319 -44.524 
-41.277 
51 -49.713 -47.319 -44.524 
-41.277 
52 -49.711 -47.318 -44.520 
-41.275 
53 -49.712 -47.316 -44.521 
-41.276 
54 -24.855 -23.641 
-22.257 -20.644 
55 -24.854 -23.641 -22.258 
-20.644 
56 -24.855 -23.641 -22.256 
-20.643 
57 -24.854 -23.641 -22.256 
-20.643 
58 -95.174 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.040 
59 -95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
60 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
61 
-95-173 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
62 
-47.585 -45.288 
-42.599 
-39.529 
63 -47.585 -45.287 -42.599 
-39.529 
26 197.933 208.027 216.011 221.225 
27 197.934 208.029 216.008 221.220 
28 197.933 208.026 216.011 221.222 
29 197.936 208.030 216.011 221.220 
30 197.934 208.026 216.013 221.222 
31 197.936 208.026 216.011 221.218 
32 197.930 208.029 216.011 221.223 
33 98.977 104.024 108.020 110.619 
34 98.978 104.023 108.021 110.618 
35 98.978 104.023 108.020 110.617 
36 98.977 104.024 108.021 110.617 
37 98.977 104.022 108.019 110.620 
38 98.976 104.022 108.020 110.618 
39 98.976 104.023 108.020 110.619 
40 17.587 18.453 19.168 19.632 
41 17.582 18.450 19.164 19.629 
42 17.587 18.452 19.167 19.633 
43 17.584 18.452 19.166 19.630 
44 17.583 18.452 19.166 19.631 
45 17.581 18.450 19.165 19.627 
46 -49.712 -47.318 -44.524 
-41.276 
47 -49.713 -47.320 -44.525 
-41.277 
48 
-49.715 -47.318 -44.526 
-41.279 
49 -49.716 -47.322 -44.527 
-41.279 
Var î ance-Covar î ance 
Intervals -> 0 
Row 
50 -49.713 
51 -49.713 
52 -49.715 
53 -49-713 
54 -24.854 
55 -24.854 
56 -24.854 
57 -24.853 
58 
-95.173 
59 -95.173 
60 
-95.173 
61 
-95.173 
62 
-47.585 
63 -47.585 
27 197.938 
28 197.937 
29 197.937 
30 197.936 
31 197.938 
32 197.937 
33 98.977 
34 98.978 
35 98.978 
36 98.977 
37 98.977 
38 98.976 
39 98.976 
40 17.586 
41 17.582 
42 17.587 
43 17.584 
44 17.583 
45 17.581 
46 
-49.713 
47 -49.713 
48 
-49.712 
49 -49.715 
50 -49.712 
51 -49.712 
52 -49.712 
53 -49.713 
54 -24.854 
55 -24.854 
56 -24.854 
393 
1 2 3 
-47.319 -44.526 
-41.277 
-47.318 -44.524 
-41.277 
-47.322 -44.524 
-41.277 
-47.321 -44.527 
-41.277 
-23.641 -22.256 -20.644 
-23.641 -22.258 -20.643 
-23.641 -22,256 -20.642 
-23.641 -22.256 -20.641 
-90.606 
-85.222 
-79.038 
-90.606 
-85.221 
-79.039 
-90.606 
-85.222 
-79.038 
-90.606 
-85.221 
-79.038 
-45.288 
-42.599 -39.528 
-45.287 
-42.599 
-39.529 
208.033 216.013 221.220 
208.030 216.011 221.222 
208.030 216.011 221.225 
208.030 216.011 221.219 
208.026 216.013 221.218 
208.029 216.011 221.222 
104.023 108.020 110.619 
104.023 108.021 110.617 
104.024 108.019 110.617 
104.023 108.020 110.617 
104.022 108.019 110.619 
104.022 108.020 110.618 
104.023 108.019 110.617 
18.453 19.168 19.632 
18.450 19.165 19.629 
18.455 19.169 19.633 
18.452 19.166 19.629 
18.452 19.166 19.630 
18.449 19.165 19.628 
-47.318 -44.524 -41.276 
-47.320 -44.525 -41.278 
-47.319 -44.524 -41.277 
-47.319 -44.523 -41.277 
-47.318 -44.524 
-41.277 
-47.319 -44.525 -41.277 
-47.321 -44.523 -41.277 
-47.318 -44.524 -41.279 
-23.640 -22.257 -20.644 
-23.641 -22.258 -20.644 
-23.640 -22.256 -20.643 
394 
Variance-Covarîance 
Intervals -»• 0 1 2 
Col. Row 
57 -24.853 -23.641 -22.256 
58 -95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
59 -95.173 -90.606 -85.221 
60 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
61 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.221 
62 
-47.585 -45.287 
-42.599 
63 -47.585 -45.287 -42.598 
28 197.933 208.029 216.008 
29 197.934 208.027 216.013 
30 197.936 208.030 216.014 
31 197.934 208.027 216.013 
32 197.936 208.029 216.015 
33 98.977 104.023 108.021 
^4 98.978 104.023 108.021 
35 98.978 104.024 108.020 
36 98.977 104.024 108.021 
37 98.977 104.022 108.019 
38 98.976 104.022 108.020 
39 98.976 104.024 108.020 
40 17.586 18.453 19.168 
41 17.582 18.450 19.165 
42 17.587 18.453 19.168 
43 17.584 18.451 19.166 
44 17.583 18.452 19.167 
45 17.581 18.450 19.164 
46 
-49.713 -47.318 -44.523 
47 -49.713 -47.319 -44.524 
48 
-49.713 -47.319 -44.523 
49 -49.715 -47.321 -44.524 
50 -49.713 -47.319 -44.524 
51 -49.712 -47.319 -44.524 
52 -49.715 -47.321 -44.523 
53 -49.713 -47.316 -44.524 
54 -24.855 -23.641 -22.256 
55 -24.854 -23.641 -22.258 
56 -24.854 -23.640 -22.255 
57 -24.853 -23.640 -22.256 
58 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
59 -95.173 -90.606 -85.221 
60 
-95.173 -90.605 -85.221 
61 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.221 
62 
-47.585 -45.288 
-42.599 
63 -47.585 -45.287 -42.598 
29 197.940 208.034 216.014 
3 
-20.642 
-79.039 
-79.039 
-79.039 
-79.038 
-39.528 
-39.528 
221.225 
221.226 
221.219 
221.223 
221.222 
110.619 
110.618 
110.618 
110.618 
110.620 
110.618 
110.619 
19.632 
19.629 
19.634 
19.630 
19.631 
19.628 
-41.276 
-41.277 
-41.276 
-41.276 
-41.276 
-41.277 
-41.279 
-41.277 
-20.643 
-20.643 
-20.642 
-20.641 
-79.038 
-79.038 
-79.038 
-79.038 
-39.528 
-39.528 
221.225 
395 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals 
Col 
30 
Row 
30 197.938 208.027 216.018 221.223 
31 197.938 208.026 216.011 221.223 
32 197.937 208.029 216.014 221.225 
33 98.977 104.023 108.021 110.619 
34 98.978 104.023 108.020 110.617 
35 98.978 104.023 108.019 110.617 
36 98.977 104.023 108.020 110.618 
37 98.976 104.022 108.019 110.619 
38 98.976 104.022 108.020 110.617 
39 98.976 104.023 108.020 110.618 
40 17.586 18.453 19.168 19.632 
41 17.582 18.449 19.164 19.629 
42 17.587 18.454 19.169 19.633 
43 17.584 18.452 19.166 19.629 
44 17.583 18.452 19.166 19.631 
45 17.581 18.450 19.165 19.628 
46 
-49.713 -47.318 -44.523 
-41.276 
47 -49.713 -47.320 -44.525 
-41.277 
48 -49.712 -47.319 -44.523 -41.276 
49 -49.715 -47.319 -44.524 
-41.276 
50 -49.712 -47.319 -44.524 
-41.277 
51 -49.712 -47.319 -44.524 
-41.277 
52 -49.713 -47.321 -44.523 
-41.274 
53 -49.712 -47.321 -44.524 -41.276 
54 -24.854 -23.641 -22.256 -20.643 
55 -24.854 -23.641 -22.258 -20.644 
56 -24.854 -23.640 -22.255 -20.643 
57 -24.853 -23.641 -22.256 -20.642 
58 -95.174 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
59 -95.173 -90.606 -85.221 -79.038 
60 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 -79.038 
61 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.221 
-79.038 
62 
-47.585 -45.288 -42.599 -39.528 
63 -47.585 -45.287 -42.598 
-39.528 
30 - 197.933 208.031 216.015 221.218 
31 197.934 208.031 216.011 221.222 
32 197.938 208.029 216.014 221.219 
33 98.978 104.023 108.021 110.619 
34 98.978 104.023 108.021 110.617 
35 98.977 104.023 108.020 110.617 
36 98.977 104.023 108.021 110.617 
37 98.977 104.022 108.019 110.619 
38 98.976 104.023 108.020 110.618 
39 98.976 104.023 108.020 110.618 
40 17.587 18.453 19.168 19.632 
396 
Va r i ance-Cova r î ance 
Intervais 0 1 2 
Col. Row 
41 17.582 18.450 19.165 
42 17.588 18.455 19.169 
43 17.584 18.451 19.166 
44 17.584 18.452 19.166 
45 17.581 18.450 19.165 
46 
-49.713 -47.318 
-44.523 
47 -49.713 -47.319 -44.524 
48 -49.712 -47.318 -44.524 
49 -49.715 -47.321 
-44.523 
50 -49.711 -47.318 
-44.523 
51 -49.712 -47.320 -44.524 
52 -49.713 -47.321 -44.521 
53 -49.715 -47.319 -44.524 
54 -24.854 -23.64t' ' -22.256 
55 -24.854 -23.641 -22.257 
56 -24.854 -23.640 
-22.255 
57 -24.853 -23.640 -22.256 
58 -95.174 -90.606 -85.222 
59 -95.173 -90.606 -85.221 
60 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.221 
61 
-95.172 -90.606 -85.221 
62 
-47.585 -45.288 
-42.599 
63 -47.585 -45.287 
-42.599 
31 197.938 208.031 216.014 
32 197.937 208.031 216.011 
33 98.977 104.022 108.020 
34 98.977 104.022 108.019 
35 98.977 104.023 108.019 
36 98.976 104.023 108.019 
37 98.976 104.021 108.018 
38 98.976 104.022 108.019 
39 98.975 104.022 108.019 
40 17.586 18.453 19.167 
41 17.581 18.449 19.164 
42 17.587 18.454 19.168 
43 17.583 18.451 19.166 
44 17.583 18.452 19.166 
45 17.581 18.450 19.165 
46 
-49.713 -47.319 -44.524 
47 -49.713 -47.320 -44.525 
48 -49.712 -47.319 -44.524 
49 -49.713 -47.319 -44.524 
50 -49.713 -47.319 -44.525 
51 -49.713 -47.319 -44.525 
52 -49.713 -47.321 -44.523 
3 
19.629 
19.634 
19.630 
19.631 
19.627 
-41.276 
-41.278 
-41.277 
-41.277 
-41.277 
-41.277 
-41.276 
-41.276 
-20.644 
-20.644 
-20.642 
-20.642 
-79.039 
-79.039 
-79.039 
-79.038 
-39.528 
-39.528 
221.220 
221.222 
110.618 
110.617 
110.616 
110.617 
110.618  
110.617 
110.617 
19.631 
19.629 
19.633 
19.629 
19.630 
19.628 
-41.277 
-41.278 
-41.276 
-41.276 
-41.278 
-41.278 
-41.277 
397 
Va r î ance-Cova r i ance 
Intervais -» 
Col Row 
32 
33 
53 -49.712 -47.318 -44.524 
-41.277 
54 -24.854 -23.641 -22.257 -20.644 
55 -24.854 -23.641 -22.258 -20.644 
56 -24.854 -23.641 -22.256 -20.643 
57 -24.854 -23.641 -22.257 -20.643 
58 -95.174 -90.607 -85.222 
-79.039 
59 -95.173 -90.607 -85.222 
-79.039 
60 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.223 
-79.039 
61 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 
-79.039 
62 
-47.585 -45.288 -42.599 
-39.529 
63 -47.585 -45.287 -42.599 
-39.529 
32 197.938 208.029 216.014 221.226 
33 98.977 104.022 108.020 110.619 
34 98.977 104.022 108.020 110.617 
35 98.977 104.023 108.019 110.617 
36 98.976 104.022 108.020 110.617 
37 98.976 104.021 108.018 110.619 
38 98.975 104.022 108.019 110.617 
39 98.975 104.022 108.019 110.617 
40 17.585 18.453 19.168 19.632 
41 17.581 18.449 19.164 19.629 
42 17.586 18.454 19.168 19.633 
43 17.583 18.451 19.166 19.629 
44 17.583 18.452 19.166 19.630 
45 17.581 18.449 19.164 19.628 
46 
-49.713 -47.318 -44.523 -41.276 
47 -49.714 -47.320 -44.525 
-41.277 
48 
-49.712 -47.318 -44.521 -41.276 
49 -49.715 -47.319 -44.521 -41.274 
50 -49.713 -47.319 -44.524 -41.277 
51 -49.713 -47.320 -44.524 
-41.277 
52 -49.712 -47.319 -44.521 -41.274 
53 -49.712 -47.319 -44.524 -41.276 
54 -24.855 -23.641 -22.257 -20.644 
55 -24.854 -23.641 -22.258 -20.644 
56 -24.855 -23.641 -22.256 -20.643 
57 -24.854 -23.641 -22.256 -20.642 
58 -95.174 -90.607 -85.222 
-79.039 
59 -95.174 -90.606 -85.222 -79.039 
60 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.222 -79.039 
61 
-95.173 -90.606 -85.221 -79.038 
62 
-47.585 -45.288 -42.599 -39.529 
63 -47.585 -45.287 -42.598 -39.528 
33 49.489 52.012 54.013 55.309 
398 
Va r î ance-Covar î ance 
Intervais 
Col. Row 
34 
34 49.489 52.012 54.013 55.308 
35 49.489 52.012 54.013 55.308 
36 - 49.489 52.012 54.013 55.308 
37 49.489 52.011 54.012 55.309 
38 49.488 52.011 54.012 55.308 
39 49.488 52.012 54.012 55.308 
40 8.778 9.236 9.570 9.818 
41 8.776 9.234 9.568 9.816 
42 8.779 9.237 9.570 9.819 
43 8.777 9.235 9.569 9.816 
44 8.777 9.235 9.569 9.817 
45 8.776 9.234 9.568 9.816 
46 -24.876 -23.676 -22,266 
-20.646 
47 -24.876 -23.677 -22.266 
-20.647 
48 -24.875 -23.676 -22.265 -20.646 
49 -24.876 -23.676 -22.265 
-20.645 
50 -24.875 -23.676 -22.266 -20.646 
51 -24.876 -23.677 -22.266 -20.646 
52 -24.875 -23.676 -22.264 
-20.645 
53 -24.875 -23.675 -22.265 -20.646 
54 -12.437 -11.829 -11.130 
-10.326 
55 -12.437 -11.829 -11.131 -10.326 
56 -12.436 -11.828 -11.130 
-10.325 
57 -12.436 -11.829 -11.130 -10.325 
58 -47.594 -45.314 -42.613 
-39.523 
59 -47.594 -45.314 -42,613 
-39.523 
60 
-47.594 -45.314 -42.613 
-39.523 
61 
-47.593 -45.314 -42.613 
-39.523 
62 
-23.796 -22.649 -21.300 
-19.766 
63 -23.796 -22.649 -21.300 
-19.766 
34 49.489 52.011 54.013 55.307 
35 49.489 52.011 54.012 55.307 
36 49.489 52.012 54.012 55.307 
37 49.489 52.011 54.012 55.308 
38 49.489 52.011 54.012 55.307 
39 49.488 52.011 54.012 55.308 
40 8.778 9.236 9.570 9.817 
41 8.776 9.234 9.568 9.815 
42 8.779 9.236 9.571 9.817 
43 8.777 9.235 9.569 9.816 
44 8.777 9.235 9.569 9.816 
45 8.776 9.234 9.568 9.816 
46 -24.876 
-23.677 -22.266 -20.647 
47 -24.876 -23.677 -22.266 -20.647 
48 -24.875 -23.676 -22.265 -20.647 
399 
Var i ance-Covar i ance 
I n t e r v a l s  - > 0  1  2  3  
Col. Row 
49 -24.875 -23.676 -22.265 -20.646 
50 -24.875 -23.676 -22.266 -20.647 
51 -24.875 -23.677 -22.266 -20.647 
52 -24.875 -23.676 -22.265 -20.646 
53 -24.874 -23.675 -22.265 -20.646 
54 -12.437 -11.829 -11.130 -10.326 
55 -12.437 -11.829 -11.131 -10.326 
56 -12.436 -11.829 -11.130 -10.326 
57 -12.436 -11.829 -11.130 -10.325 
58 -47.594 -45.314 -42.613 -39.524 
59 -47.594 -45.314 -42.612 -39.524 
60 -47.594 -45.314 -42.613 -39.524 
61 -47.594 -45.314 -42.612 -39.523 
62 -23.796 -22.649 -21.300 -19.766 
63 -23.795 -22.648 -21.300 -19.766 
35 35 49.489 52.012 54.013 55.307 
36 49.489 52.011 54.012 55.307 
37 49.489 52.011 54t012 55.308 
38 49.489 52.011 54.012 55.307 
39 49.489 52.011 54.012 55.307 
40 8.778 9.236 9.570 9.817 
41 8.776 9.234 9.568 9.816 
42 8.779 9.237 9.570 9.817 
43 8.777 9.235 9.569 9.816 
44 8.777 9.235 9.569 9.817 
45 8.776 9.234 9.568 9.816 
46 -24.876 -23.676 -22.266 -20.647 
47 -24.876 -23.677 -22.267 -20.648 
48 -24.875 -23.676 -22.265 -20.647 
49 -24.875 -23.676 -22.266 -20.647 
50 -24.875 -23.676 -22.266 -20.647 
51 -24.876 -23.676 -22.266 -20.647 
52 -24.875 -23.675 -22.265 -20.646 
53 -24.874 -23.675 -22.265 -20.647 
54 -12.437 -11.829 -11.130 -10.326 
55 -12.437 -11.829 -11.131 -10.326 
56 -12.436 -11.828 -11.130 -10.326 
57 -12.436 -11.829 -11.130 -10.325 
58 -47.594 -45.314 -42.613 -39.524 
59 -47.594 -45.314 -42.613 -39.524 
60 -47.594 -45.314 -42.613 -39.524 
61 -47.594 -45.313 -42.613 -39.524 
62 -23.796 -22.649 -21.300 -19.766 
63 -23.796 -22.649 -21.300 -19.766 
36 36 49.489 52.011 54.013 55.307 
400 
Va r i ance-Covar i ance 
Intervais 
Col. Row 
37 
37 49.489 52.011 54.012 55.308 
38 49.489 52.011 54.012 55.307 
39 49.488 52.011 54.012 55.307 
40 8.778 9.236 9.570 9.817 
41 8.776 9.234 9.568 9.815 
42 8.778 9.236 9.570 9.817 
43 8.777 9.235 9.569 9.816 
44 8.777 9.235 9.569 9.816 
45 8.776 9.234 9.568 9.816 
46 -24.876 -23.676 -22.266 
-20.647 
47 -24.876 -23.677 -22.266 
-20.648 
48 -24.875 -23.676 -22.265 
-20.647 
49 -24.876 -23.676 -22.265 
-20.646 
50 -24.876 -23.676 -22.266 
-20.647 
51 -24.876 -23.676 -22.266 
-20.647 
52 -24.875 -23.675 -22.264 
-20.646 
53 -24.875 -23.675 -22.265 
-20.647 
54 -12.437 -11.829 
-11.130 
-10.326 
55 -12.437 -11.829 -11.131 -10.326 
56 -12.436 -11.829 
-11.130 
-10.326 
57 -12.436 -11.828 -11.130 
-10.325 
58 -47.594 -45.314 
-42.613 
-39.524 
59 -47.594 -45.314 -42.613 
-39.524 
60 
-47.594 -45.314 -42.613 
-39.524 
61 
-47.594 -45.314 -42.613 
-39.524 
62 
-23.796 -22.649 
-21.300 
-19.766 
63 -23.796 -22.648 -21.300 
-19.766 
37 49.489 52.011 54.012 55.309 
38 49.488 52.011 54.012 55.308 
39 49.488 52.011 54.012 55.307 
40 8.778 9.235 9.569 9.818 
41 8.776 9.234 9.568 9.816 
42 8.778 9.236 9.570 9.818 
43 8.777 9.235 9.569 9.816 
44 8.777 9.235 9.569 9.817 
45 8.776 9.234 9.568 9.816 
46 -24^876 
-23.677 -22.266 
-20.646 
47 -24.876 -23.678 -22.267 
-20.647 
48 
-24.875 
-23.677 -22.266 
-20.646 
49 -24.875 
-23.677 -22.266 
-20.646 
50 -24.875 
-23.677 -22.266 
-20.646 
51 -24.876 
-23.677 -22.266 -20.646 
52 -24.875 
-23.677 -22.265 
-20.645 
53 -24.874 -23.676 -22.266 
-20.645 
54 -12.437 -11.829 
-11.130 -10.326 
401 
Va r î ance-Cova r i ance 
Intervais -»• 0 1 2 
Col. Row 
55 -12.437 -11.830 
-11.131 
56 -12.436 -11.829 
-11.130 
57 -12.436 -11.829 
-11.130 
58 -47.594 -45.314 
-42.613 
59 -47.594 -45.314 
-42.613 
60 
-47.594 -45.314 
-42.613 
61 
-47.594 -45.314 
-42.613 
62 
-23.796 -22.649 
-21.300 
63 -23.796 -22.649 
-21.300 
38 49.488 52.010 54.012 
39 49.488 52.011 54.012 
40 8.778 9.236 9.569 
41 8.776 9.234 9.568 
42 8.778 9.236 9.570 
43 8.777 9.235 9.569 
44 8.777 9.235 9.569 
45 8.776 9.234 9.568 
46 -24.876 
-23.677 -22.266 
47 -24.876 
-23.677 -22.266 
48 -24.875 
-23.676 
-22.265 
49 -24.876 
-23.676 
-22.265 
50 -24.876 
-23.676 -22.266 
51 -24.876 
-23.677 -22.266 
52 -24.875 -23.676 
-22.265 
53 -24.875 -23.676 -22.265 
54 -12.437 -11.829 
-11.130 
55 -12.437 -11.829 
-11.131 
56 -12.437 -11.829 
-11.130 
57 -12.437 -11.829 
-11.130 
58 -47.594 -45.314 -42.613 
59 -47.594 -45.314 
-42.613 
60 
-47.594 -45.314 -42.613 
61 
-47.594 -45.314 
-42.613 
62 
-23.796 -22.649 
-21.300 
63 -23.796 -22.648 
-21.300 
39 49.488 52.011 54.012 
40 8.778 9.236 9.570 
41 8.776 9.234 9.568 
42 8.778 9.236 9.570 
43 8.777 9.235 9.569 
44 8.777 9.235 9.569 
45 8.776 9.234 9.568 
46 -24.876 
-23.676 -22.266 
47 -24.877 
-23.677 -22.266 
48 -24.876 
-23.676 -22.265 
3 
-10.326 
-10.325 
-10.325 
-39.523 
-39.523 
-39.523 
-39.523 
-19.766 
-19.766 
55.307 
55.307 
9.817 
9.815 
9.818 
9 .816  
9.817 
9.815 
-20.647 
-20.648 
-20.646 
-20.646 
-20.647 
-20.647 
-20.646 
-20.646 
-10.326 
-10.326 
-10.325 
-10.326 
-39.524 
-39.524 
-39.524 
-39.523 
-19.766 
-19.766 
55.307 
9.817 
9.816 
9.817 
9.816 
9.817 
9.815 
-20.647 
-20.647 
-20.646 
402 
Variance-Covarlance 
Intervais ->• 
Col. Row 
40 
41 
49 -24.876 -23.676 
-22.265 
-20.646 
50 -24.876 -23.676 -22.266 
-20.647 
51 -24.876 -23.676 -22.266 
-20.647 
52 -24.876 -23.675 -22.265 
-20.646 
53 -24.875 -23.675 -22.265 
-20.646 
54 -12.437 -11.829 
-11.130 
-10.326 
55 -12.437 -11.829 -11.131 
-10.326 
56 -12.437 -11.829 
-11.130 
-10.325 
57 -12.437 -11.828 -11.130 
-10.325 
58 -47.594 -45.314 -42.613 
-39.524 
59 -47.594 -45.314 -42.613 
-39.524 
60 
-47.594 -45.314 -42.613 
-39.524 
61 
-47.594 -45.313 -42.613 
-39.523 
62 
-23.796 -22.649 
-21.300 
-19.766 
63 -23.796 -22.648 
-21.300 
-19.766 
40 427.881 449.672 466.976 478.198 
41 427.878 449.670 466.974 478.197 
42 427.881 449.672 466.977 478.199 
43 427.879 449.670 466.975 478.197 
44 427.879 449.671 466.975 478.198 
45 427.877 449.669 466.973 478.196 
46 157.402 149.823 140.925 130.708 
47 157.402 149.822 140.925 130.707 
48 157.403 149.823 140.926 130.708 
49 157.403 149.823 140.926 130.708 
50 157.403 149.823 140.925 130.708 
51 157.403 149.823 140.925 130.708 
52 157.403 149.823 140.927 130.709 
53 157.404 149.824 140.926 130.709 
54 78.693 74.919 70.451 65.347 
55 78.693 74.918 70.450 65.347 
56 78.693 74.919 70.451 65.348 
57 78.694 74.919 70.451 65.348 
58 124.524 118.511 111.499 103.416 
59 124.524 118.511 111.499 103.416 
60 124.524 118.511 111.499 103.416 
61 124.524 118.511 111.500 103.417 
62 62.247 59.251 55.745 51.701 
63 62.247 59.251 55.746 51.701 
41 427.877 449.669 466.973 478.196 
42 427.878 449.670 466.974 478.196 
43 427.878 449.669 466.974 478.196 
44 427.878 449.669 466.973 478.196 
45 427.877 449.669 466.973 478.197 
46 157.400 149.821 140.923 130.706 
403 
Var i ance-Covar i ance 
Intervals ->• 
Col. Row 
47 157.400 149.821 140.923 
48 157.401 149.821 140.923 
49 157.400 149.821 140.923 
50 157.400 149.821 140.923 
51 157.400 149.821 140.923 
52 157.400 149.821 140.923 
53 157.401 149.821 140.923 
54 78.692 74.918 70.450 
55 78.692 74.918 70.450 
56 78.692 74.918 70.450 
57 78.692 74.918 70.450 
58 124.523 118.510 111.498 
59 124.523 118.509 111.498 
60 124.523 118.509 111.498 
61 124.523 118.510 111.498 
62 62.247 59.251 55.745 
63 62.247 59.251 55.745 
42 427.882 449.674 466.978 
43 427.879 449.671 466.975 
44 427.880 449.672 466.976 
45 427.877 449.669 466.973 
46 157.403 149.824 140.926 
47 157.403 149.823 140.925 
48 157.404 149.824 140.927 
49 157.403 149.824 140.926 
50 157.404 149.824 140.925 
51 157.403 149.823 140.926 
52 157.404 149.824 140.927 
53 157.405 149.825 140.927 
54 78.693 74.919 70.451 
55 78.694 74.919 70.451 
56 78.694 74.920 70.452 
57 78.694 74.920 70.452 
58 124.524 118.511 111.500 
59 124.525 118.511 111.500 
60 124.524 118.511 111.500 
61 124.525 118.512 111.500 
62 62.247 59.251 55.746 
63 62.247 59.252 55.746 
43 427.878 449.670 466.975 
44 427.878 449.671 466.975 
45 427.877 449.669 466.974 
46 157.401 149.822 140.924 
47 157.401 149.821 140.924 
48 157.402 149.822 140.924 
3 
130.706 
130.706 
130.706 
130.706 
130.706 
130.706 
130.706 
65.347 
65.347 
65.347 
65.347 
103.414 
103.415 
103.414 
103.415 
51.701 
51.701 
478.200 
478.197 
478.198 
478.195 
130.709 
130.708 
130.709 
130.709 
130.708 
130.709 
130.710 
130.709 
65.348 
65.348 
65.348 
65.349 
103.416 
103.417 
103.417 
103.417 
51.701 
51.701 
478.197 
478.197 
478.196 
130.707 
130.706 
130.707 
Va r i ance-Cova r î ance 
Intervais -»• 0 
Row 
49 157.402 
50 157.401 
51 157.401 
52 157.402 
53 157.402 
54 78.692 
55 78.692 
56 78.693 
57 78.693 
58 124.523 
59 124.523 
60 124.523 
61 124.524 
62 62.247 
63 62.247 
44 427.878 
45 427.877 
46 157.401 
47 157.401 
48 157.402 
49 157.401 
50 157.401 
51 157.401 
52 157.402 
53 157.402 
54 78.692 
55 78.692 
56 78.692 
57 78.693 
58 124.523 
59 124.523 
60 124.523 
61 124.523 
62 62.247 
63 62.246 
45 427.877 
46 157.399 
47 157.399 
48 157.400 
49 157.399 
50 157.399 
51 157.399 
52 157.399 
53 157.400 
54 78.692 
404 
1 2 3 
149.822 140.925 130.707 
149.822 140.924 130.707 
149.822 140.924 130.706 
149.823 140.925 130.707 
149.823 140.925 130.707 
74.918 70.450 65.347 
74.918 70.450 65.347 
74.919 70.450 65.347 
74.918 70.450 65.347 
118.510 111.498 103.415 
118.510 111.499 103.415 
118.510 111.499 103.415 
118.510 111.499 103.415 
59.251 55.745 51.701 
59.251 55.745 51.701 
449.671 466.975 478.197 
449.669 466.973 478.196 
149.822 140.925 130.707 
149.822 140.924 130.707 
149.823 140.925 130.707 
149.823 140.925 130.708 
149.823 140.924 130.707 
149.822 140.924 130.707 
149.823 140.926 130.708 
149.823 140.926 130.708 
74.918 70.450 65.347 
74.918 70.450 65.347 
74.919 70.451 65.347 
74.918 70.450 65.347 
118.510 111.499 103.416 
118.511 111.499 103.416 
118.510 111.499 103.415 
118.510 111.499 103.416 
59.251 55.745 51.701 
59.252 55.745 51.701 
449.669 466.974 478.196 
149.820 140.923 130.705 
149.820 140.923 130.706 
149.820 140.923 130.705 
149.820 140.923 130.705 
149.820 140.923 130.705 
149.820 140.923 130.705 
149.820 140.923 130.705 
149.821 140.923 130.705 
74.918 70.450 65.346 
405 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals -» 
Col. Row 
46 
47 
55 78.692 74.918 70.450 65.346 
56 78.692 74.918 70.450 65.346 
57 78.692 74.918 70.450 65.346 
58 124.522 118.509 111.498 103.414 
59 124.523 118.509 111.498 103.414 
60 124.522 118.509 111.498 103.414 
61 124.522 118.509 111.498 103.414 
62 62.247 59.251 55.745 51.701 
63 62.247 59.251 55.745 51.701 
46 889.027 766.404 652.984 548.530 
47 889.026 766.402 652.983 548.530 
48 889.026 766.403 652.984 548.531 
49 889.023 766.403 652.984 548.531 
50 889.026 766.404 652.984 548.530 
51 889.027 766.403 652.983 548.530 
52 889.024 766.401 652.985 548.531 
53 889.025 766.404 652.985 548.531 
54 444.513 383.229 326.470 274.287 
55 444.513 383.229 326.470 274.287 
56 444.513 383.229 326.471 274.288 
57 444.514 383.229 326.471 274.288 
58 334.330 288.211 245.575 206.287 
59 334.330 288.211 245.576 206.287 
60 334.330 288.211 245.576 206.287 
61 334.330 288.212 245.576 206.287 
62 167.153 144.099 122.765 103.129 
63 167.153 144.099 122.765 103.130 
47 889.026 766.402 652.983 548.529 
48 889.026 766.403 652.984 548.530 
49 889.024 766.403 652.984 548.530 
50 889.027 766.403 652.983 548.530 
51 889.026 766.403 652.983 548.529 
52 889.025 766.404 652.984 548.531 
53 889.026 766.403 652.984 548.530 
54 444.513 383.228 326.470 274.287 
55 444.513 383.228 326.469 274.287 
56 444.513 383.229 326.470 274.288 
57 444.513 383.229 326.470 274.287 
58 334.330 288.211 245.575 206.286 
59 334,330 288.211 245.575 206.286 
60 334.330 288.211 245.575 206.287 
61 334.330 288.211 245.575 206.287 
62 167.153 144.098 122.765 103.129 
63 167.153 144.099 122.765 103.129 
406 
Varîance-Covariance 
Intervals -*• 
Col. Row 
48 
49 
50 
48 889.025 766.400 652.983 548.531 
49 889.023 766.398 652.984 548.532 
50 889.025 766.402 652.984 548.531 
51 889.023 766.402 652.984 548.530 
52 889.023 766.399 652.984 548.531 
53 889-022 766.400 652.983 548.531 
54 444.513 383.229 326.471 274.287 
55 444.514 383.229 326.470 274.287 
56 444.514 383.229 326.472 274.288 
57 444.514 383.229 326.471 274.289 
58 334.330 288.212 245.576 206.287 
59 334.331 288.212 245.576 206.288 
60 334.331 288.212 245.576 206.288 
61 334.331 288.212 245.576 206.288 
62 167.153 144.099 122.765 103.130 
63 167.153 144.099 122.765 103.130 
49 889.023 766.398 652.982 548.532 
50 889.023 766.402 652.984 548.531 
51 889.023 766.401 652.984 548.531 
52 889.022 766.401 652.983 548.532 
53 889.022 766.400 652.983 548.531 
54 444.513 383.229 326.471 274.288 
55 444.513 383.229 326.470 274.288 
56 444.513 383.229 326.472 274.289 
57 444.514 383.229 326.471 274.289 
58 334.330 288.211 245.576 206.288 
59 334.331 288.212 245.577 206.288 
60 334.331 288.211 245.576 206.288 
61 334.331 288.212 245.576 206.288 
62 167.153 144.099 122.765 103.130 
63 167.153 144.099 122.765 103.130 
50 889.026 766.404 652.983 548.530 
51 889.026 766.403 652.983 548.530 
52 889.024 766.399 652.984 548.531 
53 889.024 766.400 652.984 548.531 
54 444.513 383.229 326.470 274.287 
55 444.513 383.229 326.470 274.287 
56 444.514 383.229 326.471 274.288 
57 444.514 383.229 326.471 274.288 
58 334.330 288.211 245.575 206.287 
59 334.331 288.211 245.576 206.287 
60 334.331 288.211 245.576 206.287 
61 334.331 288.212 245.576 206.287 
62 167.153 144.099 122.764 103.130 
63 167.153 144.099 122.765 103.130 
Va r i ance-Cova r i ance 
Intervais 0 
Col. Row 
51 51 889.027 
52 889.025 
53 889.024 
54 444.513 
55 444.513 
56 444.513 
57 444.514 
58 334.330 
59 334.330 
60 334.330 
61 334.330 
62 167.153 
63 167.153 
52 52 889.026 
53 889.023 
54 444.513 
55 444.514 
56 444.514 
57 444.514 
58 334.330 
59 334.331 
60 334.331 
61 334.331 
62 167.153 
63 167.153 
53 53 889.022 
54 444.514 
55 444.514 
56 444.514 
57 444.515 
58 334.331 
59 334.331 
60 334.331 
61 334.332 
62 167.153 
63 167.153 
54 54 222.256 
55 222.256 
56 222.256 
57 222.256 
58 167.153 
59 167.154 
60 167.154 
61 167.154 
62 83.571 
407 
1 2 3 
766.403 652.983 548.530 
766.402 652.985 548.531 
766.402 652.985 548.531 
383.229 326.470 274.287 
383.229 326.470 274.287 
383.229 326.471 274.288 
383.229 326.471 274.288 
288.211 245.575 206.286 
288.211 245.576 206.287 
288.211 245.576 206.287 
288.211 245.576 206.287 
144.098 122.765 103.129 
144.099 122.765 103.130 
766.401 652.984 548.532 
766.399 652.982 548.530 
383.229 326.472 274.288 
383.229 326.471 274.288 
383.230 326.472 274.289 
383.229 326.472 274.289 
288.212 245.576 206.288 
288.212 245.577 206.288 
288.212 245.577 206.288 
288.212 245.577 206.288 
144.099 122.765 103.130 
144.099 122.766 103.130 
766.400 652.983 548.530 
383.230 326.471 274.287 
383.229 326.471 274.288 
383.230 326.472 274.289 
383.230 326.472 274.289 
288.212 245.576 206.287 
288.212 245.576 206.288 
288.212 245.577 206.288 
288.212 245.577 206.288 
144.099 122.765 103.130 
144.099 122.765 103.130 
191.628 163.224 137.154 
191.628 163.224 137.154 
191.628 163.225 137.155 
191.628 163.224 137.155 
144.098 122.766 103.154 
144.098 122.767 103.154 
144.098 122.766 103.154 
144.098 122.767 103.154 
72.045 61.372 51.570 
408 
Variance-Covariance 
Intervals ->• 
Col. Row 
63 83.571 72.046 61.372 51.570 
55 55 222.256 191.627 163.224 137.155 
56 222.256 191.628 163.224 137.155 
57 222.256 191.628 163.224 137.155 
58 167.153 144.098 122.766 103.154 
59 167.154 144.098 122.766 103.155 
60 167.154 144.098 122.766 103.154 
61 167.154 144.098 122.766 103.155 
62 83.571 72.045 61.371 51.570 
63 83.571 72.045 61.372 51.570 
56 56 222.256 191.628 163.225 137.155 
57 222.257 191.628 163.225 137.156 
58 167.154 144.098 122.767 103.155 
59 167.154 144.098 122.767 103.155 
60 167.154 144.098 122.767 103.155 
61 167.154 144.098 122.767 103.155 
62 83.571 72.045 61.372 51.570 
63 83.571 72.045 61.372 51.570 
57 57 222.257 191.628 163.225 137.156 
58 167.154 144.098 122.767 103.155 
59 167.154 144.098 122.767 103.155 
60 167.154 144.098 122.767 103.155 
61 167.154 144.098 122.767 103.156 
62 83.571 72.045 61.372 51.571 
63 83.571 72.045 61.372 51.571 
58 58 393.084 338.895 288.755 242.551 
59 393.084 338.895 288.755 242.551 
60 393.084 338.895 288.755 242.551 
61 393.084 338.895 288.755 242.551 
62 196.535 169.431 144.367 121.275 
63 196.535 169.431 144.367 121.275 
59 59 393.084 338.895 288.756 242.551 
60 393.084 338.895 288.756 242.551 
61 393.084 338.895 288.756 242.551 
62 196.535 169.431 144.367 121.275 
63 196.535 169.432 144.367 121.275 
60 60 393.084 338.895 288.755 242.551 
61 393.085 338.895 288.756 242.551 
62 196.535 169.431 144.367 121 .275 
63 196.536 169.432 144.367 121.275 
61 61 393.084 338.895 288.756 242.551 
62 196.535 169.431 144.367 121.275 
63 196.535 169.432 144.367 121.275 
62 62 98.264 84.708 72.178 60.637 
63 
63 98.264 84.708 72.178 60.637 
63 98.264 84.708 72.178 60.637 
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APPENDIX E 
Results Given Linear Projected Land Values 
Results Given Linear Projected Land Values 
Farm 010 - partnership: 1 management unit, 2 families 
1 
(d/s'k-l 
EMI 
Equity In productive assets: 
Fixed assets 
Working assets 
CLP/5) 
) 
Liquid assets (bigs^k-l 
OCEPA 
OCLM 
0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 
32,672.99 35,507.98 37,775.96 37,775.94 
27,913 27,782 28,003 25,961 
123,894 162,289 208,497 250,385 
27,161 27,161 27,161 27,161 
SVk-,) 71,274 63,176 57,946 92,534 
12,654 14,067 16,061 19,775 
13,507 14,246 15,241 18,786 
3 94.14 3 106.23 3 110.41 3 104.37 
7 110.10 7 114.92 7 119.75 7 119.75 
10 88.99 10 92.90 10 96.80 10 96.80 
16 26.56 16 14.41 14 2.09 24 76.47 
23 54.46 24 67.84 16 2.26 31 82.94 
30 63.00 31 72.98 23 76.47 38 67.04 
38 51.01 38 58.99 30 37.92 40 10.22 
40 15.31 40 13.35 31 45.02 42 11.09 
42 18.32 42 14.70 38 67.04 44 8.96 
44 14.81 44 11.89 40 10.22 59 1280.58 
46 358.78 46 352.75 42 11.09 64 22.08 
48 34.41 49 34.41 44 8.96 65 23.95 
64 18.83 64 21.24 46 341.79 66 19.36 
65 22.02 65 22.98 49 34.41 86 1040.09 
66 17.80 66 18.58 64 22.08 87 156.59 
71 42.05 86 1648.49 65 23.95 
73 181.18 87 96.92 66 19.36 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
0 
Optimal solution (Continued) 86 1855.92 
87 163.88 
88 13998.85 
89 3195.61 
92  32 .22  
94 8.27 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
99 20.50 
100 53.13 
103 21.38 
104 6.00 
105 18.55 
112 1333.50 
124 123894.00 
129 128.46 
130 120.29 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
0 1 
99 165.00 99 203.24 
100 52.00 100 53.65 
101 240.00 101 240.00 
103 194.00 103 194.00 
104 6.00 104 6.00 
105 59.04 105 18.55 
106 75.69 106 97.32 
107 43.32 107 61.80 
108 12.60 108 12.45 
1 
89 
94 
9255.94 
18.55 
86 
87 
1450.75 
20.28 
99 1 .08 
100 53.65 
103 11.65 
104 6.00 
110 1.24 
111 1333.50 
123 49617.25 
124 162289?25 
130 77.27 
100 53.65 
103 1.83 
104 6.00 
110 3.49 
111 13.50 
112 1333.50 
123 96034.74 
124 208497.50 
129 53.57 
130 68.95 
99 8.12 
100 53.65 
101 2.26 
103 1.83 
104 6.00 
106 6.04 
110 73.69 
111 312.43 
112 52.92 
119 27.34 
123 111510.52 
124 250385.37 
129 61.78 
130 79.34 
product constraints (b|^_|) 
2 3 
99 221.27 99 221.27 99 221.27 
100 53.65 100 53.65 100 53.65 
101 240.00 101 240.00 101 240.00 
103 194.00 103 194.00 103 194.00 
104 6.00 104 6.00 104 6.00 
106 110.41 106 110.41 106 110.41 
107 76.47 107 76.47 107 76.47 
108 10.22 108 10.22 108 10.22 
109 22.08 109 22.08 109 22.08 
0 1 
Initial and 109 11.81 109 19.46 
updated supply 110 31.64 110 73.69 
level 5 ( 111 131.25 111 312.43 
(Cont i nued) 112 1333.50 112 1333.50 
119 27.34 119 27.34 
120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
121 800.00 121 800.00 
122 2019.80 122 1745.41 
123 71274.00 123 112793.12 
124 123894.00 124 162289.25 
129 657.00 129 657.00 
130 657.00 130 657.00 
132 110.10 131 8168.25 
133 63.01 132 114.92 
134 18.32 133 72.98 
135 22.02 134 14.70 
136 89.00 135 22.98 
137 50.93 136 92.90 
138 14.81 137 58.99 
139 17.80 138 11.89 
139 18.58 
SM 2: FLE 
0 
57538.26 
EIT 25149.92 
DPLIC 6999.42 
DPMTG 798.90 
DPTC1 0.0 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 1986.44 
DIMTG 572.69 
DITCl 0.0 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 28800.00 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 
* * A >V * * * A /' t A A A Î k A A A A A A A 1 
0.0 
A A A A : 
2 3 4 
110 73.69 110 73.69 110 73.69 
111 312.43 111 312.43 111 312.43 
112 1333.50 112 1333.50 112 1333.50 
119 27.34 119 27.34 119 27.34 
120 2080.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
121 800.00 121 800.00 121 800.00 
122 1471.03 122 1196.68 122 922.45 
123 153980.69 123 204044.19 123 250475.06 
124 208497.50 124 250385.37 124 292273.25 
129 657.00 129 657.00 129 657.00 
130 657.00 130 657.00 130 657.00 
131 8877.00 131 9443.99 131 9443.98 
132 119.75 132 119.75 132 119.75 
133 82.94 133 82.94 133 82.94 
134 11.09 134 11.09 134 11.09 
135 23.95 135 23.95 135 23.95 
136 96.80 136 96.80 136 96.80 
137 67.04 137 67.04 137 67.04 
138 8.96 138 8.96 138 8.96 
139 19.36 139 19.36 139 19.36 
1 2 3 
58285.07 58474.71 56720.27 
26234.87 26510.39 22511.90 
6999.42 0.0 0.0 
3112.89 3112.89 3112.89 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
902.92 590.48 198.72 
2189.05 1854.07 1027.60 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
38627.96 48863.98 59075.99 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
A A A A A A A : 
0.0 
'( A A A A A 
0.0 
A A A A A A A : 
Farm 020 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)^_, 0.253 
EN I k-l) 11,038.50 
NF' - (:LP/5)k-, '''039 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets k-l^ ^ 
Working assets 11,019 
Liquid assets ^-1 " SV^_pi7,779 
OCEPA ' 1,871 
OCLM 7,445 
Optimal solution (xr\) 9 144.05 
S3 82 
activity and level 23*97 
47 326.68 
51 102.70 
66 15.60 
70 67.10 
72 259.58 
86 1154.94 
87 309.50 
88 730.10 
90 13478.82 
92 1.68 
1 management 
I 
0.253 
16,079.49 
16,079 
365 
11,019 
29 ,812  
2,672 
9,523 
, 1 family 
2 
0.253 
18,599.98 
18,600 
2,372 
11,019 
55,318 
4,432 
14,493 
3 
0 .253  
19,608.17 
19,608 
7,233 
21,543 
91,774 
7,730 
18,097 
2 2.81 
10 191.71 
14 .41 
23 1.91 
38 123.54 
44 23.42 
47 304.14 
51 102.70 
52 34.41 
60 188.62 
64 .56 
66 38.34 
86 1357.11 
87 388.30 
88 3285.16 
93 5.85 
97 86.13 
3 10.30 
10 303.85 
23 7.18 
37 210.45 
40 .96 
44 28.14 
51 102.70 
52 34.41 
58 52.48 
60 800.10 
64 2.07 
66 60.77 
75 52.48 
82 26.90 
83 30.85 
85 200.87 
86 1323.82 
87 147.21 
10 303.85 
38 210.45 
40 
.95 
44 28.14 
58 12.18 
59 536.84 
61 800.10 
64 2.05 
66 37.18 
75 496.53 
86 988.90 
87 207.78 
Optimal solution (Continued) 
0 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .05 100 
103 47.96 103 
104 46.00 104 
105 342.36 105 
106 .76 108 
107 .46 110 
108 .11 111 
109 .15 114 
114 101.32 115 
115 800.10 129 
119 27.34 130 
122 555.36 
129 273.74 
130 109.56 
139 13.21 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and product 
0 1 
103 314.00 100 .05 99 
104 46.00 103 314.00 100 
105 344.04 104 46.00 103 
113 21.09 105 342.36 104 
114 182.93 110 67.10 105 
115 800.10 111 259.58 106 
119 27.34 113 21 .09 107 
120 2080.00 114 182.93 108 
121 800.00 115 800.10 109 
122 2019.80 119 27.34 110 
1 2 3 
89 9490.71 
91 941.46 
95 15.51 
97 217.33 
.21 100 .64 99 15.03 
20.70 103 5.74 100 .64 
48.41 104 54.50 103 29.34 
250.38 105 17.54 104 54.50 
.28 106 .07 105 17.54 
4.63 110 67.10 106 10.23 
17.90 111 259.58 107 7.09 
73.98 114 73.98 110 67.10 
611.48 111 259.58 
168.66 113 21 .09 
16.20 114 182.93 
119 27.34 
124 9387.92 
129 29.29 
130 17.48 
139 23.59 
constraints (bk-
2 3 4 
5.69 99 20.50 99 18.02 
.21 100 .64 100 .64 
397.71 103 608.96 103 608.96 
48.41 104 54.50 104 54.50 
250.38 105 17.54 105 17.54 
2.84 106 10.23 106 8.99 
1.96 107 7.09 107 6.23 
.26 108 
.95 108 .83 
.57 109 2.05 109 1.80 
67.10 110 67.10 110 67.10 
Initial and up­
dated supply levels 
(Cont i nued) 
0 1 
123 17799.00 120 2080.00 
129 520.00 121 800.00 
130 360.00 122 1745.41 
136 144.04 123 29812.98 
137 82.44 124 365.05 
138 23.97 129 520.00 
139 28.81 130 360.00 
131 2759.62 
136 150.36 
137 95.48 
138 19.24 
139 30.07 
SM 2: FLE 26692.07 
BIT 6898.64 
DPLIC 365.05 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 6739.41 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 103.60 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITC1 , 2379.68 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
2 3 4 
111 259.58 111 259. 
113 21 .09 112 52. 
114 182.93 113 21 . 
115 800.10 114 182. 
119 27.34 115 800. 
120 2080.00 119 27. 
121 800.00 120 2080. 
122 1471.03 121 800. 
123 55318.60 122 1196. 
124 2463.68 123 91774. 
129 520.00 124 7233. 
130 360.00 129 577. 
131 4019.87 130 560. 
136 198.45 131 4649. 
137 137.45 136 303. 
138 18.38 137 210. 
139 39.69 138 28. 
139 60. 
1 2 
31022.28 33187. 
13527.40 16322. 
2007.63 1642. 
0.0 2372. 
6739.41 0. 
0.0 941. 
513.25 347. 
0.0 1700. 
1081.67 0. 
0.0 29. 
0.0 0. 
365.05 2372. 
51.11 332. 
: * A * Vc îV * A -!< A A A A A 
1 1 1 259.58 
112 549.01 
113 21.09 
114 182,93 
115 800.10 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 922.45 
123 134997.81 
124 11580.60 
129 577.74 
130 560.87 
131 4902.04 
136 303.85 
137 210.45 
138 28.14 
J39 60.77 
3 
34053.41 
17440.17 
0.0 
2372.68 
0.0 
0.0 
635•68 
314.97 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
A A A A A A A A 
58 
48 
09 
93 
10 
34 
00 
00 
68 
40 
92 
74 
87 
99 
85 
45 
14 
77 
38 
24 
58 
68 
0 
46 
33 
85 
0 
75 
0 
56 
1 6  
A A 
Farm 030 - partnership: 2 management units, 2 families 
0 1 : 
, )  
(d/e)k_| 
"fl C^aa.k-l - (CLP/5)k., 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets ^-1^ 
Working assets 
Liquid assets (bjga ^-1 
OCEPA 
OCLM 
0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 
30,862.00 44,457.99 58,053.99 60,773.18 
19,662 26,432 35,251 33,205 
0 86 1,576 3,331 
21,205 21,205 21,205 50,604 
sv._ j) 18,655 49,089 71,906 101,783 K 
2,590 4,573 6,132 10,073 
9,080 12,071 22,408 27,162 
5 239.46 6 249.96 3 .12 7 260.46 
26 77.13 31 158.72 7 260.46 10 382.55 
28 59.92 40 .24 10 382.55 16 4.92 
42 39.85 42 31.98 14 .01 30 180.40 
47 76.99 47 962.98 16 29.05 38 264.96 
51 64.18 48 29.76 18 42.66 40 .01 
55 333.39 51 64.18 23 .08 42 24.12 
65 47.89 52 4.64 30 180.40 44 35.43 
70 15.82 60 78.34 37 264.95 46 199.97 
72 61.18 65 24.71 47 647.26 47 278.84 
79 68.48 70 181.98 48 29.76 48 29.76 
80 264.91 72 727.65 51 64.18 51 64.18 
88 172.08 86 2479.54 52 4.64 52 4.64 
90 3176.95 87 1011.28 64 .02 59 45.68 
92 .40 88 2764.90 65 52.09 61 539.39 
90 37452.20 66 76.51 65 52.09 
92 3.54 82 328.74 66 76.51 
93 1 .38 84 301.90 75 45.68 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
Optimal solution (Continued) 
0 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .01 
101 57.74 
102 38.00 
105 793.69 
106 .18 
107 .11 
108 .03 
109 .04 
114 3.69 
115 533.40 
119 27.34 
121 373.70 
122 4039.60 
129 439.61 
130 243.63 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
101 522.00 100 .01 
102 38.00 101 522.00 
105 794.04 102 38.00 
113 13.18 105 793.69 
114 54.69 110 15.82 
115 533.40 111 61.18 
119 27.34 113 13.18 
120 4160.00 114 54.69 
121 1600.00 115 533.40 
2 3 
85 198.39 78 5.99 
86 2870.10 86 2350.48 
87 71.96 87 42.89 
91 22072.69 88 .20 
97 788.77 
100 .15 
101 56.62 
102 38.00 
105 788.77 
106 2.36 
107 1.60 
109 .47 
115 455.06 
116 68.48 
117 264.91 
129 422.85 
130 219.09 
135 25.28 
100 .15 
102 38.00 
104 22.08 
108 .01 
110 64.85 
111 250.86 
115 533.40 
116 68.48 
117 264.91 
124 1554.54 
131 209.26 
134 24.12 
138 35.43 
100 .15 
102 38.00 
103 7.23 
104 22.08 
106 .12 
107 .08 
109 .02 
110 99.45 
111 384.71 
116 68.48 
117 264.91 
124 3496.99 
129 3.83 
130 7.44 
product constraints (b^_j) 
2 3 4 
99 .24 99 .24 99 .01 
100 .15 100 .15 100 .15 
101 522.00 101 522.00 101 522.00 
102 38.00 102 38.00 102 38.00 
105 788.77 103 766.68 103 766.68 
106 .12 104 22.08 104 22.08 
107 .08 106 .12 106 .01 
108 .01 107 .08 110 197.80 
109 .02 108 .01 111 788.83 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Cont i nued) 
0 1 
123 18655.00 116 68.48 
129 860.00 117 264.91 
130 660.00 119 27.34 
132 239.46 120 4160.00 
133 137.05 121 1600.00 
134 39.86 122 3490.82 
135 47.89 123 49088.94 
124 86.04 
129 860.00 
130 660.00 
131 7715.50 
132 249.96 
133 158.72 
134 31.98 
135 49.99 
0 
FLE 51309.65 
EIT 14306.38 
DPLIC 86.04 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 1588.48 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 24.42 
2 3 4 
110 197.80 
111 788.83 
113 13.18 
114 54.69 
115 533.40 
116 68.48 
117 264.91 
119 27.34 
120 4160.00 
121 1600.00 
122 2942.06 
123 71906.31 
124 1576.54 
129 860.00 
130 660.00 
131 11114.50 
132 260.46 
133 180.40 
134 24.12 
135 52.09 
109 .02 
110 197.80 
111 788.83 
113 13.18 
114 54.69 
115 533.40 
116 68.48 
117 264.91 
119 27.34 
120 4160.00 
121 1600.00 
122 2393.37 
123 101783.56 
124 3331.99 
129 1188.74 
130 1160.29 
131 14513.50 
132 260.46 
133 180.40 
134 24.12 
135 52.09 
136 382.55 
137 264.96 
138 35.43 
139 76.51 
112 45.68 
113 13.18 
114 54.69 
115 539.39 
116 68.48 
117 264.91 
119 27.34 
120 4160.00 
121 1600.00 
122 1844.90 
123 171807.25 
124 3400.Op 
129 1188.74 
130 1160.29 
131 15193.29 
132 260.46 
133 180.40 
134 24.12 
135 52.09 
136 382.55 
137 264.96 
138 35.43 
139 76.51 
1 2 3 
57124.76 64700.44 62942.56 
23063.98 35613.52 33055.48 
1468.49 1382.45 0.0 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
20314.57 18726.10 0.0 
0.0 22072.69 0.0 
403.44 178.34 0.0 
SM 2 (Continued) 0 12 3 
DIMTG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DITCl 560.89 6867.13 3005.54 0.0 
DITC2 0.0 0.0 697.50 0.0 
CLP 56000.00 90131.88 114015.87 137843.94 
DMTG2 0.0 86.02 0.0 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 12.04 0.0 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 040 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 
Working assets 
OCEPA 
OCLM 
! proprietorship : 1 management unit, 1 family 
0 1 2 3 
0.253 0.253 0.298 0.253 
5,914.00 8,594.00 11 ,273.99 13,953.9! 
5,914 8,594 11,274 13,954 
0 0 466 958 
6,203 6,203 6,203 6,203 
SVk-.]) 5,579 10,814 13,334 24,444 
766 1,106 1,293 2,040 
5,049 5,547 6,232 9,124 
9 53.21 9 55.55 9 76.05 12 165.70 
33 15.55 33 35.27 37 52.67 37 114.77 
35 14.91 44 7.11 44 7.04 40 .02 
44 8.86 47 375.55 47 429.06 44 15.35 
55 328.48 66 .82 64 .03 47 470.60 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
Optimal solution (Continued) 
0 
66 10.64 
79 46.38 
80 137.96 
87 48.78 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
103 12.83 
105 542.04 
118 228.60 
119 27.34 
120 2.93 
122 1971.02 
129 142.58 
130 143.47 
1 2 3 
70 77.14 66 15.21 48 34.41 
72 298.41 70 10.99 64 .04 
86 121.62 72 42.52 66 33.14 
87 117.84 86 380.17 71 '  8.53 
88 1084.47 87 188.54 73 60.36 
90 15495.28 88 210.44 83 68.75 
92 1.93 90 • 2207.73 84 45.08 
93 .30 85 14.76 
97 37.47 86 947.50 
87 249.18 
88 313.39 
91 1577.72 
92 .38 
97 184.85 
100 .05 100 .06 100 .07 
103 17.25 103 1.44 103 3.13 
105 540.11 104 1.05 104 6.22 
106 .93 105 502.34 105 317.10 
107 .63 106 .15 106 .20 
108 .09 107 .10 107 .14 
109 .18 108 .01 116 67.47 
116 67.47 116 67.47 117 261.01 
117 261.01 117 261.01 118 228.60 
118 228.60 118 228.60 124 957.85 
119 27.34 119 27.34 
122 1505.95 122 902.31 
129 141.22 124 442.94 
130 138.07 129 96.13 
139 10.29 130 100.23 
I n i t i a l  a n d  u p d a t e d  s u p p l y  l e v e l s  o f  r e s o u r c e  a n d  
row and level 0 1 
103 116.00 
105 542.04 
116 21.09 
117 123.05 
118 228.60 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 2019.80 
123 5579.00 
129 236.00 
130 236.00 
136 53.21 
137 30.46 
138 8.86 
139 10.64 
103 116.00 
105 542.04 
116 67.47 
117 261.01 
118 228.60 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 10813.81 
129 236.00 
130 236.00 
131 1478.50 
136 55.55 
137 35.27 
138 7.11 
139 11.11 
0 
SM 2: FLE 22290.12 
E I T  2 0 4 5 . 0 7  
DPLIC 0.0 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 0.0 
DPTC2 0.0 
product constraints 
2 
Î 
3 4 
100 .05 99 .03 99 
103 116.00 100 .06 100 , 
105 540.11 103 152.42 103 332. 
110 77.14 104 1.05 104 6. 
111 298.41 105 502.34 105 317. 
116 67.47 106 .01 106 • 
117 261.01 107 .01 107 • 
118 228.60 110 88.13 110 96. 
119 27.34 111 340.93 111 401. 
120 2080.00 116 67.47 116 67. 
121 800.00 117 261.01 117 261. 
122 1471.03 118 228.60 118 228. 
123 13333.73 119 27.34 119 27. 
124 466.32 120 2080.00 120 2080. 
129 236.00 121 800.00 121 800. 
130 236.00 122 1196.68 122 922. 
131 2148.50 123 24444.24 123 51187. 
136 57.88 124 958.00 124 1049. 
137 40.09 129 236.00 129 304. 
138 5.36 130 236.00 130 295. 
139 11.58 131 2818.50 131 3488. 
136 76.05 136 165. 
137 52.67 137 114. 
138 7.04 138 15. 
139 15.21 139 33.  
1 2 3 
24592.24 26894.36 29196. 
4678.37 7125.58 10601. 
542.24 647.46 261. 
0.0 0.0 0. 
7747.64 8851.50 1103. 
0.0 0.0 1577. 
06 
07 
09 
22 
1 0  
03 
02 
66 
28 
47 
01 
60 
34 
00 
00 
45 
06 
00 
75 
84 
50 
70 
77 
35 
14 
47 
85 
92 
0 
86 
72 
SM 2 (Continued) 0 
DILIC 0.0 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 0.0 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
* * A * A * A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A * A A 
Farm 050 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)k_i 0.253 
EN I k-,) 6,822.00 
NF' - (CLP/5)k_, 6,822 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 0 
Working assets 4,804 
Liquid assets (b^ga^k-l " ^ ^k-1^ 7,358 
OCEPA ' 791 
OCLM 5,564 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
9 92.21 
35 35.43 
37 17.34 
40 .01 
44 15.35 
55 252 .28  
66 18.44 
70 4.66 
1 2 3 
153.89 99.81 58.04 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
2735.69 1633.27 177.17 
0.0 0.0 49.86 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  2 3 . 3 3  0 . 0  
0 . 0  3 . 2 6  0 . 0  
management unit :, 1 family 
1 2 \ 3 
0.253 0.284 0.253 
10,313.79 15,685.79 16,760.18 
10,314 15,686 16,706 
27 676 1,284 
4,804 4,804 16,444 
15,001 21,591 34,468 
1,289 1,750 3,372 
6,408 7,763 13,896 
9 96.25 2 .05 10 225.78 
33 56.22 10 188.95 12 95.06 
37 4.90 23 .04 38 222.21 
40 .11 37 222.21 44 29.71 
44 12.32 47 359.30 47 352.19 
66 19.25 64 .01 48 34.41 
70 83.48 66 64.17 58 20.45 
72 322.94 82 182.34 66 62.47 
Optimal solution (Continued) 
0 1 
72 18.02 86 664.65 
79 25.45 87 248.71 
80 36.40 88 1230.56 
88 54.42 90 16768.96 
90 935.64 92 1.76 
92 .12 93 .44 
2 3 
84 150.25 74 20.45 
86 880.54 83 145.80 
87 27.83 84 161.51 
91 11640.81 86 1188.46 
97 454.73 87 8.23 
89 .18 
90 236.23 
91 5652.86 
Primai slacks 103 22.23 100 .06 100 .06 100 .06 
105 456.92 103 12.07 103 167.67 103 7.76 
106 .06 105 454.73 104 12.73 104 12.73 
107 .03 106 1.06 110 14.34 106 .05 
109 .01 107 .72 111 55.46 107 .04 
118 533.40 109 .21 116 51.82 109 .01 
119 27.34 116 51 .82 117 200.46 110 15.80 
121 89.52 117 200.46 118 533.40 111 33.76 
122 2019.80 118 533.40 119 27.34 116 51.82 
129 99.12 119 27.34 122 562.66 117 200.46 
130 100.67 122 832.05 124 676.71 118 533.40 
129 87.80 136 131.89 124 1284.94 
130 91.21 138 29.71 139 1.69 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and product constraints (b|^_|) 
row and level 0 1 2 3 4 
103 201.00 99 .01 99 .11 99 .11 100 . 06 
105 457.04 103 201.00 100 .06 100 . 06 103 642.99 
116 26.37 105 456.92 103 201.00 103 642.99 104 12.73 
117 164.06 110 4.66 105 454.73 104 12.73 110 88.14 
118 533.40 111 18.02 106 .05 106 .05 111 340.96 
119 27.34 116 51.82 107 .04 107 .04 112 20.45 
120 2080.00 117 200.46 109 .01 109 .01 116 51.82 
Jr-
N) 
VjO 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Continued) 
0 1 
121 800.00 118 533.40 
122 2019.80 119 27.34 
123 7358.00 120 2080.00 
129 261.00 121 800.00 
130 261.00 122 1745.41 
136 92.21 123 15000.69 
137 52.77 124 27.21 
138 15.35 129 261.00 
139 18.44 130 261.00 
131 1705.50 
136 96.25 
137 61.12 
138 12.32 
139 19.25 
SM 21 
A A A A 
FLE 23070.09 
EIT 2729.27 
DPLIC 27.21 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 467.82 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 7.72 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 165.19 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
: A A A A A A A A A A A A A -1 : A A A A A A 
2 3 4 
110 88.14 
111 340.96 
1 1 6  5 1 . 8 2  
117 200.46 
118 533.40 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1471.03 
123 21591.28 
124 676.71 
129 261.00 
130 261.00 
131 2578.45 
136 100.29 
137 69.46 
138 9.29 
139 20.06 
110 88.14 
111 340.96 
1 1 6  5 1 . 8 2  
117 200.46 
118 533.40 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1196.68 
123 34467.94 
124 1284.99 
129 443.34 
130 411.25 
131 3921.45 
136 320.83 
137 222.21 
138 29.71 
139 64.17 
117 200.46 
118 533.40 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 922.45 
123 66149.94 
124 128$.03 
129 589.14 
130 572.76 
131 4190.04 
136 320.83 
137 222.21 
138 29.71 
139 64.17 
26069.54 30684.09 31606.99 
6200.24 12424.41 14282.18 
642.49 615.28 0.0 
0.0 0.0 .04 
8852.30 8384.48 118.11 
0.0 11640.81 5652.86 
178.13 89.47 238.11 
0.0 0.0 .03 
3035.64 1345.71 41.71 
0.0 367.85 178.63 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
27.20 0.0 0.0 
3.81 0.0 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A i\ s'c A 
Farm 060 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)k_i 0.253 
EN I (*6,,, |^_|) 11,594.00 
NFI (X3l[k-I • <CLP/S)k_, 11,594 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets |^_]) 0 
Working assets 11,827 
Liquid assets k-1 " ^ ^k-1^ 19,085 
OCEPA ' 2,009 
OCLM 7,105 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
9 126.61 
33 50.48 
35 21.99 
40 . 16 
44 21 .07 
47 421.19 
51 71.89 
66 25.32 
70 86.51 
72 334.68 
86 1371.50 
87 474.11 
88 1010.88 
90 17378.39 
92 2.33 
1 management ui 
1 
0.253 
15,780.00 
15,780 
505 
11,827 
30,045 
2,747 
5,111 
, 1 family 
2 
0.253 
19,965.99 
19,966 
3,285 
11,827 
52,082 
4,319 
13,587 
3 
0.253 
21,012.48 
21,012 
9,972 
12,974 
90,296 
7,217 
17,076 
2 3.96 
10 181.62 
14 .18 
23 2.69 
38 117.49 
40 .40 
44 21.91 
47 335.52 
48 3.06 
51 71.89 
52 31.35 
60 210.97 
64 
.79 
66 36.32 
86 1336.84 
87 408.57 
88 4548.56 
93 8.10 
97 103.01 
3 14.42 
10 196.98 
14 1.61 
23 9.99 
37 213.00 
46 320.00 
48 3.06 
50 71.89 
52 31.35 
61 79.64 
64 2.88 
66 61.51 
83 31.39 
86 1272.00 
87 199.03 
89 13140.64 
95 21.48 
97 247.13 
3 12.58 
10 128.11 
12 179.42 
23 9.99 
37 179.40 
38 33.59 
40 1.34 
44 28.48 
52 34.41 
59 423.14 
61 762.00 
64 2.88 
66 61.51 
75 423.14 
83 122.81 
85 136.92 
86 1080.58 
87 116.10 
Primal slacks 
0 
100 .06 
103 30.53 
105 379.72 
106 1.06 
107 .64 
109 .21 
114 24.91 
115 762.00 
119 27.34 
122 174.18 
129 213.65 
130 215.70 
Initial and updated supply levels 
row and level 0 
103 276.00 
105 382.04 
113 14.77 
114 82.03 
115 762.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 2019.80 
123 19085.00 
129 436.00 
130 436.00 
136 126.61 
137 72.46 
138 21.07 
139 25.32 
of resource and 
1 
99 .16 
100 .06 
103 276.00 
105 379.72 
106 .07 
107 .05 
108 .01 
109 .01 
no 86.51 
111 334.68 
113 14.77 
114 82.03 
115 762.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 30045.44 
124 505.44 
1 
100 .29 
103 18.78 
104 2.88 
105 268.61 
110 17.60 
111 65.63 
115 551.03 
129 100.43 
130 107.74 
2 
100 .89 
103 144.85 
104 9.80 
108 1.34 
110 20.78 
111 77.97 
115 682.36 
131 228.77 
136 110.55 
138 28.48 
3 
100 .89 
103 5.82 
104 9.80 
106 1.84 
110 86.51 
111 334.68 
113 14.77 
114 54.69 
124 9972.59 
product constraints 
2 3 4 
99 8.03 99 28.91 99 26.79 
100 .29 100 .89 100 .89 
103 376.12 103 616.33 103 616.33 
104 2.88 104 9.80 104 9.80 
105 268.61 106 14.42 106 13.37 
106 4.01 107 9.99 107 9.26 
107 2.78 108 1.34 108 1.24 
108 .37 109 2.88 109 2.67 
109 .80 110 86.51 110 86.51 
110 86.51 111 334.68 111 334.68 
111 334.68 113 14.77 112 423.14 
113 14.77 114 82.03 113 14.77 
114 82.03 115 762.00 114 82.03 
115 762.00 119 27.34 115 762.00 
119 27.34 120 2080.00 119 27.34 
120 2080.00 121 800.00 120 2080.00 
121 800.00 122 1196.68 121 800.00 
122 1471.03 123 90296.25 122 922.45 
123 52082.57 124 9972.59 123 135 410.38 
Initial and updated 0 I 
supply levels ,29 436.00 
(Continued) 1,36.00 
131 2898.50 
136 132.16 
137 83.92 
138 16.91 
139 26.43 
0 
FLE 27169.24 
EIT 7433.98 
DPLIC 505.44 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 8689.19 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 143.44 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 3068.15 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
Farm 070 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)k_, 0.253 
EN I k-l) 16,531.00 
NFI (*bi,i]k-l • (CLP/5)k_i 16,531 
2 3 4 
124 3285.16 129 467.39 124 17346.75 
129 436.00 130 436.00 129 590.20 
130 436.00 131 4991.50 130 572.92 
131 3945.00 136 307.53 131 5253.12 
136 187.67 137 213.00 136 307.53 
137 129.98 138 28.48 137 213.00 
138 17.38 139 61.51 138 28.48 
139 37.53 139 61.51 
1 2 3 
30765.01 34360.78 35259.72 
12523.54 18860.01 20086.96 
2779.72 2274.28 0.0 
0.0 3285.16 3285.16 
8689.19 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
710.64 480.90 880.14 
0.0 2354.96 436.10 
1394.61 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
505.40 3285.06 0.0 
70.76 459.91 0.0 
A * A A * « A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A : 
1 management unit, 1 family 
1 2 3 
0.253 0.253 0.253 
19,249.99 23,056.59 25,775.58 
19,250 23,057 25,776 
0 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets |^_]) 82,580 
Working assets 9,928 
Liquid assets 18,506 
OCEPA ' 6,018 
OCLM 6,722 
Optimal solution (x:) 2 98.18 
14 20.79 
activity and level 23 57 16 (  
40 15.74 
47 414.70 
64 19.64 
70 53.54 
72 165.46 
84 43.88 
86 774.23 
87 271.58 
88 28880.52 
90 9175.77 
91 886.82 
93 66.47 
Primal slacks 100 1.86 
105 443.57 
112 628.65 
119 27.34 
122 973.99 
2 3 
120,338 167,220 199,612 
10,815 10,815 25,249 
20,252 35,166 73,445 
8,097 11,433 16,496 
7,187 11,040 16,373 
1 95.58 
23 64.32 
40 12.96 
47 537.66 
64 20.26 
70 25.26 
72 97.71 
86 1209.39 
87 514.05 
90 5073.63 
3 105.23 
10 121.60 
14 1.99 
23 72.88 
37 84.22 
40 9.74 
44 11.26 
47 420.21 
48 34.41 
64 21.05 
66 24.32 
82 190.12 
84 79.56 
85 135.49 
86 1270.07 
87 200.96 
91 9439.12 
97 250.72 
3 105.23 
12 215.13 
14 1.15 
23 72.88 
37 149.00 
40 9.74 
44 19.92 
47 107.17 
48 34.41 
58 332.16 
59 465.28 
64 21.05 
66 43.03 
75 168.79 
83 171.57 
85 166.13 
86 1138.27 
87 58.41 
97 192.85 
99 17.79 
100  1 .86  
105 443.57 
106 5.71 
112 628.65 
1 0 0  1 . 8 6  
103 2.30 
104 7.02 
105 192.85 
110 24.12 
100 1 .86  
103 4.07 
104 12.42 
110 88.42 
111 314.72 
0 1 2 3 
Primal slacks (Continued) 124 79370.68 
129 44.57 
119 27.34 
122 21.97 
124 120388.25 
129 51.50 
130 19.03 
111 65.98 
112 628.65 
124 167220.50 
124 199612.50 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and product constraints (b^^^) 
row and level 0 12 3 
99 148.00 99 211.52 99 210.90 99 210.90 99 210.06 
105 510.04 100 1 .86 100 1.86 100 1.86 100 1.86 
106 67.89 105 443.57 105 443.57 103 243.70 103 431.15 
107 38.86 106 101 . 2 8  106 105.23 104 7.02 104 12.42 
108 11.30 107 64.32 107 72.88 105 192.85 106 104.81 
109 13.58 108 12.96 108 9.74 106 105.23 107 72.59 
110 31.64 109 20.26 109 21.05 107 72.88 108 9.71 
111 164.06 110 85.18 110 110.44 108 9.74 109 20.96 
112 628.65 111 329.52 111 427.23 109 21.05 110 110.44 
119 27.34 112 628.65 112 628.65 110 110.44 111 427.23 
120 2080.00 119 27.34 119 27.34 111 427.23 112 797.44 
121 800.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 112 628.65 119 27.34 
122 2019.80 121 800.00 121 800.00 119 27.34 120 2080.00 
123 18506.00 122 1745.41 122 1471.03 120 2080.00 121 800.00 
124 82580.00 123 20252.27 1 2 3  35166.63 121 800.00 122 922.45 
129 228.00 124 120388.25 124 167220.50 122 1196.68 123 131487.94 
130 148.00 129 228.00 129 228.00 1 2 3  73445.31 124 232004.50 
1 130 191.88 130 191.88 124 199612.50 129 589.70 
131 4132.75 131 4812.50 129 1 418.12 130 573.07 
130 406.94 131 6443.89 
131 5764.14 136 215.13 
136 121.60 137 149.00 
137 84.22 138 19.92 
138 11.26 139 43.03 
139 24.32 
SM 2: 
>V îV 
0 1 2 3 
FLE 31410.12 33745.74 37015.60 39351.22 
EIT 14028.06 17043.01 22483.57 27324.58 
DPLIC 14440.26 14440.26 0.0 0.0 
DPMTG 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 
DPTCl 4587.88 7124.70 2536.81 0.0 
DPTC2 886.82 0.0 9439.12 0.0 
DILIC 4098.14 1862.79 0.0 0.0 
DIMTG 3650.62 2986.87 2323.12 1659.37 
OITCl 1619.98 1632.10 407.16 0.0 
DITC2 28.02 0.0 298.28 0.0 
CLP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DMTG2 3209.27 0.0 0.0 0.0 
IMTG2 449.30 0.0 0.0 0.0 
îV Vt A A A A A A A A A A V< A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 080 - partnership: 2 management units, 3 families 
1 
(d/e)^_ 
EN I (*b 
NFI (*b,  
131,k-1 
) 
(CLP/5) 
'13 1,k-1 '•"""•"k-l 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets (b^g^ 
Working assets 
Liquid assets (b 
,k-l 
1 2 3 , k - 1  
OCEPA 
OCLM 
0.963 0.491 0.253 0.253 
30,999.99 43,999.98 51,999.97 55,999.95 
31,000 44,000 52,000 56,000 
212,032 298,032 384,970 455,470 
15,681 15,681 15,681 39,990 
49,407 51,412 99,559 209,256 
14,983 19,411 26,931 39,202 
11,133 12,210 20,331 31,703 
0 
Optimal solution (xf*,) 2 26.51 
, r 10 36.24 
activity and level 23 130 49 
38 20.74 
40 37.94 
44 6.03 
47 1028.66 
48 34.41 
58 319.74 
64 45.60 
66 7.25 
70 161.15 
72 721.67 
86 2659.55 
87 1380.05 
90 36095.53 
Primal slacks 99 252.04 
.  ,  ,  100 7.00 
row and level g 
104 1.00 
105 740.09 
106 201.48 
112 442.26 
124 212032.23 
129 421.61 
130 326.04 
1 
2 212.95 
10 37.83 
24 149.78 
38 24.02 
40 30.18 
44 4.84 
47 1021.74 
48 34.41 
58 61.01 
64 47.17 
66 7.56 
86 2507.41 
87 983:41 
2 
3 245.78 
10 283.52 
14 4.65 
23 170.23 
38 196.36 
40 22.76 
44 26.26 
46 220.37 
47 585.47 
48 34.41 
64 49.16 
66 56.70 
83 291.66 
85 365.56 
86 2652.62 
87 289.45 
97 503.29 
3 
3 240.57 
10 308.96 
23 170.23 
38 213.99 
40 22.76 
44 28.61 
49 34.41 
59 2734.43 
64 49.16 
66 61.79 
75 1972.43 
83 39.26 
85 35.56 
86 1919.95 
87 473.42 
97 52.47 
99 52.50 
100 7.00 
103 4.74 
104 1.00 
105 740.09 
106 22.92 
110 1.42 
111 5.50 
112 700.98 
124 298032.14 
129 214.54 
130 124.40 
100 7.00 
103 5.36 
104 15.09 
105 236.80 
110 45.77 
111 177.05 
112 762.00 
124 384970,24 
100 7.00 
103 5.84 
104 16.56 
105 184.33 
106 5.21 
no 211.29 
111 817.37 
123 1055.25 
124 455470.02 
Initial and updated supply levels product constraints 
2 3 row and level 
SM 2: FLE 
EIT 
DPLIC 
DPMTG 
DPTCl 
DPTC2 
0 
99 497.00 
100 7.00 
103 79.00 
104 1.00 
105 740.09 
106 227.99 
107 130.49 
108 37.95 
109 45.60 
no 50.13 
111 123.05 
112 762.00 
119 27.34 
120 4160.00 
121 1600.00 
123 49407.00 
124 212032.23 
129 684.00 
130 584.00 
136 36.24 
137 20.74 
138 6.03 
139 7.25 
122 4039.60 
of resource and 
1 
99 492.58 
100 7.00 
103 79.00 
104 1 .00 
105 740.09 
106 235.87 
107 149.78 
108 30.18 
109 47.17 
110 211.29 
111 844.72 
112 762.00 
119 27.34 
120 4160.00 
121 1600.00 
122 3490.82 
123 51412.50 
124 298032.14 
129 684.00 
130 584.00 
131 7750.00 
136 37.83 
137 24.02 
138 4.84 
139 7.56 
99 492.58 
100 7.00 
103 79.00 
104 1.00 
105 740.09 
106 245.78 
107 170.23 
108 22.76 
109 49.16 
110 211.29 
111 844.72 
112 762.00 
119 27.34 
120 4160.00 
121 1600.00 
122 2942.06 
123 99559.25 
124 384970.24 
129 684.00 
130 584.00 
131 10999.99 
136 39.42 
137 27.30 
138 3.65 
139 7.88 
99 492.58 
100 7.00 
103 568.20 
104 15.09 
105 236.80 
106 245.78 
107 170.23 
108 22.76 
109 49.16 
110 211.29 
111 844.72 
112 762.00 
119 27.34 
120 4160.00 
121 1600.00 
122 2393.37 
123 210311.25 
124 455470.02 
129 975.66 
130 949.56 
131 12999.99 
136 283.51 
137 196.36 
138 26.26 
139 56.70 
k 
99 482.72 
100 7.00 
103 619.20 
104 16.56 
105 184.33 
106 240.86 
107 166.82 
108 22.31 
109 48.17 
110 211.29 
111 844.72 
1 12 2734.43 
119 27.34 
120 4160.00 
121 1600.00 
122 1844.90 
123 332626.94 
124 524560.14 
129 1014.92 
130 985.13 
131 13999.98 
136 308.96 
137 213.99 
138 28.61 
139 61.79 
3 
99733.94 
57949.92 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 1 2 
78258.94 89425.94 96297.94 
26656.19 42949.97 52949.95 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
15500.29 16438.82 0.0 
34017.26 34017.26 0.0 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 
DILIC 0.0 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 14061.97 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
't * * >V i'< îV A * * * * A î'c * * * * * I't A * <V 
Farm 090 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)k., 0-253 
EN I |^.|) 13,198.99 
NFI - (CLP/51k-l 13.'99 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 
Working assets 
OCEPA 
OCLM 
0 
10,574 
;-l^ 
24,667 
2,291 
7,684 
2 13.96 
10 135.37 
23 8.43 
37 78.20 
40 2.05 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
1 2 3 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
5459.76 0.0 0.0 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
A /V * /> A 'It A A * * * -!t * * >V * A A A A A A A 
I management 
1 
0.381 
17,062.99 
17,063 
3,327 
10,574 
32,498 
2,967 
9,098 
, 1 family 
2 
0.556 
20,443.98 
20,444 
21,723 
11,976 
33,152 
4,030 
12,158 
3 
0.253 
21,409.97 
21 ,410 
64,001 
24,200 
47,566 
7,897 
14,841 
3 51.57 
10 140.80 
14 3.36 
23 34.43 
37 36.70 
3 52.51 
10 233.43 
14 .99 
23 36.37 
37 161.68 
3 50.48 
12 268.81 
23 36.37 
37 186.18 
40 4.86 
0 
Optimal solution (Continued) 44 22.09 
47 500.66 
48 9.29 
64 2.79 
66 27.07 
70 102.84 
72 405.20 
86  1516 .16  
87 503.63 
88 13306.52 
90 20937.14 
92 30.63 
97 49.42 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .86 
103 31.31 
104 1.38 
105 332.00 
116 39.58 
117 164.06 
118 762.00 
119 19.96 
129 63.04 
130 65.91 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
103 246.00 99 27.23 
105 412.04 100 .86 
116 39.59 103 294.04 
117 164.06 104 1.38 
1 
38 52.71 
40 5.57 
44 18.02 
47 455.11 
48 34.41 
64 10.31 
66 28.16 
82 22.91 
84 17.14 
86 1398.33 
87 347.08 
88 45050.02 
91 1401.71 
92 80.25 
2 
40 4.86 
44 21.62 
47 371.00 
48 34.41 
64 10.50 
66 46.69 
82 121.74 
83 55.66 
84 168.32 
86 1383.44 
87 87.59 
91 10152.12 
97 178.80 
3 
44 24.90 
47 163.42 
48 34.41 
58 569.44 
59 34.58 
64 10.50 
66 53.76 
75 604.02 
83 62.54 
85 60.14 
86 1161.04 
87 35.64 
97 72.95 
100 3.10 
103 17.65 
104 1.38 
105 251.75 
110 9.36 
111 16.23 
116 39.58 
117 164.06 
118 762.00 
124 3327.02 
100 3.10 
103 4.41 
104 6.39 
105 72.95 
110 26.63 
111 83.06 
116 39.58 
117 164.06 
118 762.00 
124 21723.26 
100 3.10 
103 5.08 
104 8.43 
106 2.03 
110 69.27 
111 248.01 
116 39.58 
117 164.06 
118 762.00 
124 64001.40 
product constraints (b^^j) 
2 3 4  
99 105.23 99 105.23 99 102.21 
100 3.10 100 3.10 100 3.10 
103 294.04 103 467.83 103 538.73 
104 1.38 104 6.39 104 8.43 
0 1 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Cont i nued) 
118 762.00 105 332.00 
119 27.34 106 13.04 
120 2080.00 107 8.28 
121 800.00 108 1.67 
122 2019.80 109 2.61 
123 24667.00 110 102.84 
129 326.00 111 405.20 
130 326.00 116 39.58 
136 112.85 117 164.06 
137 64.59 118 762.00 
138 18.78 119 27.34 
139 22.57 120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 32497.58 
124 3327.02 
129 326.00 
130 326.00 
131 3299.75 
136 140.80 
137 89.41 
138 18.02 
139 28.16 
SM 2: 
FLE 28547.93 
BIT 9807.30 
DPLIC 3326.63 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 10468.57 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 2317.33 
DIMTG 0.0 
2 3 4 
105 251.75 105 72.95 106 51.00 
106 52.51 106 52.51 107 35.32 
107 36.37 107 36.37 108 4.72 
108 4.86 108 4.86 109 10.20 
109 10.50 109 10.50 110 102.84 
110 102.84 110 102.84 111 405.20 
111 405.20 111 405.20 112 604.02 
116 39.58 116 39.58 116 39.58 
117 164.06 117 164.06 117 164.06 
118 762.00 118 762.00 118 762.00 
119 27.34 119 27.34 119 27.34 
120 2080.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
121 800.00 121 800.00 121 800.00 
122 1471.03 122 1196.68 122 922.45 
123 33152.20 123 47566.38 123 79085.06 
124 21723.26 124 64001.40 124 75971.54 
129 348.91 129 526.32 129 588.85 
130 343.14 130 511.46 130 571.60 
131 4265.75 131 5110.99 131 5352.49 
136 146.72 136 233.43 136 268.81 
137 101.62 137 161.68 137 186.18 
138 13.59 138 21.62 138 24.89 
139 29.34 139 46.69 139 53.76 
1 
31867.10 
2 
34771.37 
3 
35601.16 
14617.95 19420.43 20553.00 
14589.13 14589.13 14589.13 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
10468.57 0.0 0.0 
1401.71 10152.12 0.0 
9991.13 8551.72 4787.72 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0 
DITCl 3696.45 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
îV it A * A A * îV A A * * * A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 100 - sole proprietorship: 
0 
(d/e)|^_l 0.292 
EN I I,.,) 8,132.60 
NFI ('Xa.ik-l - (CLF/5)k., 8,'33 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets k-l^ 0 
Working assets 4,991 
Liquid assets 10,375 
OCEPA 999 
OCLM 6,974 
Optimal solution (x'^'\ ) 9 173.86 
. 1 r 35 21.41 
activity and level yg 
44 28.94 
51 51.62 
55 69.61 
66 34.77 
79 14.30 
80 55.32 
1 2 3 
1680.20 
44.29 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
A A A A A 
0 . 0  
320.81 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
A A A A A A A A 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
A A A A A A A 
1 management unit. 1 family 
1 2 3 
0.253 0.253 0.253 
11,968.59 15,804.59 17,722.5! 
11,969 15,805 17,723 
0 472 1,323 
9,491 9,491 9,491 
17,922 32,481 57,984 
1,782 2,752 4,453 
8,102 9,966 14,545 
9 181.48 10 202.45 12 321.16 
33 78.47 23 .60 23 1.43 
37 36.77 38 140.22 37 222.44 
40 .08 40 .08 40 .19 
44 23.22 44 18.75 44 29.74 
47 310.71 47 303.05 47 63.07 
51 51.62 48 34.41 48 34.41 
66 36.30 51 51.62 51 51.62 
70 63.82 58 155.97 58 577.20 
Optimal solution (Continued) 72 246.89 60 190.50 61 190.50 
86 912.40 64 .17 64 .41 
87 85.54 66 40.49 66 64.23 
88 944.44 72 21.26 75 421.22 
90 12820.12 74 155.97 83 213.32 
92 1.68 86 1145.62 84 17.98 
87 325.41 85 177.98 
89 1045.67 86 1144.22 
90 2607.20 87 52.46 
95 1.71 89 2449.42 
97 27.51 91 629.39 
95 3.38 
97 244.76 
Primal  s lacks 103 41 .93 100 .05 100 .09 100 .19 
105 279.04 103 22.76 103 3 .83 103 6.07 
row and level  113 5.22 105 277.361 104 .77 104 7.62 
115 190.50 106 .81,  105 248.14 106 2.07 
119 27.34 107 .55 106 .87 110 50.86 
120 210.01 109 .16 110 1.57 111 190.69 
121 486.73 113 5.22 113 5.22 113 5.22 
122 2019.80 115 190.50 116 14.30 116 14.30 
129 73.78 116 14.30 117 55.32 117 55.32 
130 76.70 117 55.32 124 210.80 124 711.50 
119 27.34 129 5 .98 
122 747.47 130 16.90 
129 52.47 
130 58.97 
I n i t i a l  a n d  u p d a t e d  s u p p l y  l e v e l s  of  resource and product  constraints  (bj^ 
- 1 )  
row and level 0 1 2 3 4 
103 379.00 103 379.00 99 .08 99 .86 99 2 .04 
105 279.04 105 279.04 100 .05 100 .09 100 . 1 9  
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Continued) 
114 
115 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
129 
130 
136 
137 
138 
139 
0 1 
15.82 113 15.82 
41.02 114 41.02 
190.50 115 190.50 
27.34 116 14.30 
2080.00 117 55.32 
800.00 119 27.34 
2019.80 120 2080.00 
10375.00 121 800.00 
379.00 122 1745.41 
379.00 123 17921.70 
173.86 129 379.00 
99.51 130 379.00 
28.94 131 2033.15 
34.77 136 181.48 
137 115.24 
138 23.22 
139 36.30 
SM 2: FLE 
EIT 
DPLIC 
0 
24195.90 
4278.19 
0 . 0  
2 3 4 
103 379.00 
105 277.36 
106 .04 
107 .03 
109 .01 
110 63.82 
111 246.89 
113 15.82 
114 41.02 
115 190.50 
116 14.30 
117 55.32 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1471.03 
123 32481.36 
124 472.22 
129 379.00 
130 379.00 
131 2992.15 
136 189.11 
137 130.98 
138 17.51 
139 37.82 
103 405.74 
104 
.77 
105 248.14 
106 .43 
107 .30 
108 .04 
109 .08 
110 63.82 
111 268.15 
112 155.97 
113 15.82 
114 41.02 
115 190.50 
116 14.30 
117 55.32 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1196.68 
123 57983.82 
124 1323.86 
129 379.00 
130 379.00 
131 3951.15 
136 202.45 
137 140.22 
138 18.75 
139 40.49 
103 643.65 
104 7.62 
106 1.02 
107 .70 
108 .09 
109 .20 
110 63.82 
111 268.15 
112 577.20 
113 15.82 
114 41.02 
115 190.50 
116 14.30 
117 55.32 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 922.45 
123 95121.12 
124 2079.63 
129 592.32 
130 574.96 
131 4430.64 
136 321.16 
137 222.44 
138 29.74 
139 64.23 
1 
27491.02 
8512.43 
472.22 
2 
30786.14 
12549.43 
472.22 
3 
32433.69 
15349.34 
0 , 0  
0 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 0.0 
DPTC2 4500.00 
DILIC 0.0 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 0.0 
DITC2 142.20 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
* * * /V * * * A A * A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 110 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)^_, 0.253 
EN I 9,642.00 
NFI - (CLP/5)9,642 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 0 
Working assets 10,644 
Liquid assets k_] " 15,613 
OCEPA ' 1,707 
OCLM 7,431 
Optimal solution (x*^^) 
activity and level 
9 158.26 
33 90.58 
44 26.34 
1 2 3 
0.0 261.42 873.77 
6410.05 7713.65 1303.60 
0.0 0.0 629.39 
134.02 60.92 182.75 
0.0 187.40 473.67 
2263.39 1489.11 209.23 
0.0 0.0 19.89 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 261.39 612.29 
0.0 36.59 85.72 
A A A A 5' t A A A A A A A A A Vc A A A A • 
1 management unit, 1 family 
1 2 
0.253 0.253 
13,141.99 16,641.98 
13,142 16,642 
359 851 
15,144 15,144 
18,671 35,399 
2,216 3,328 
8,205 11,375 
9 165.20 10 257.36 
33 7.82 37 178.25 
37 97.08 44 23.83 
VJ 
Optimal solution (Continued) 0 
47 321.29 
66 19.05 
70 65.99 
72 255.30 
86 698.12 
87 30.22 
88 718.06 
90 13256.64 
92 1.65 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .05 
103 50.76 
105 311.39 
106 .75 
107 .46 
108 . 1 1  
109 .15 
116 31.64 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
122 1291.46 
129 73.46 
130 69.81 
139 12.60 
1 
40 .02 
44 21 .14 
47 408 .50 
66 33 .04 
70 17 .91 
72 69 .30 
86 1031 .87 
87 198 .38 
88 265 .08 
90 3598 .34 
93 .47 
2 
47 396.37 
48 34.41 
64 .01 
66 51.47 
73 17.70 
82 49.78 
83 78.48 
85 114.44 
86 1325.00 
87 146.03 
88 57.15 
91 1742.25 
92 .08 
97 175.70 
100 .06 
103 20.71 
105 310.92 
106 .23 
107 .15 
109 .04 
116 31 .64 
117 164 .06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
122 515.16 
124 329.58 
129 47.79 
130 53.73 
100 .06 
103 4.87 
104 4.92 
105 135.14 
106 .05 
107 .04 
110 2.49 
116 31.64 
117 164.06 
118 381 .00 
124 850.61 
In i t ia l  and updated supply levels of  resource and 
row and level 0 
103 345.00 
105 313.04 
116 31.64 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 2019.80 
123 15613.00 
129 345.00 
130 345.00 
136 158.26 
137 90.58 
138 26.34 
139 31.65 
1 
100 .05 
103 345.00 
105 311.39 
110 65.99 
111 255.30 
116 31.64 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 I867I.28 
124 359.03 
129 345.00 
130 345.00 
131 2410.50 
136 165.20 
137 104.80 
138 21.14 
139 33.04 
0 
SM 2: FLE 25492.4? 
EIT 5587.34 
DPLIC 359.03 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 6628.32 
product  constra ints (b._, )  
2 3 
99 .02 99 .02 
100 .06 100 .06 
103 345.00 103 515.78 
105 310.92 104 4.92 
106 .01 105 135.14 
107 .01 106 .01 
110 83.91 107 .01 
111 324.60 110 83.91 
116 31 .64 111 342.30 
117 164.06 116 31.64 
118 381.00 117 164.06 
119 27.34 118 381.00 
120 2080.00 119 27.34 
121 800.00 120 2080.00 
122 1471.03 121 800.00 
123 35399.14 122 1196.68 
124 850.61 123 68880.69 
129 345.00 124 1011.72 
130 345.00 129 473.26 
131 3285.50 130 459.44 
136 172.14 131 4160.49 
137 119.23 136 257.36 
138 15.94 137 178.25 
139 34.43 138 23.83 
139 51.47 
1 2 
28498.96 31505.46 
9747.31 14151.11 
491.57 161.12 
0.0 0.0 
8427.49 1799.17 
0 
DPTC2 4500.00 
DILIC 101.89 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 2340.46 
DITC2 142.20 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
* * A A A * A * A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 120 - sole proprietorship: 
0 
(d/e)k_, 0.401 
EN I k-l) 18,876.00 
NF' - (GLP/5)k_i 18,876 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 70,100 
Working assets 9,395 
Liquid assets 24,320 
OCEPA ' 5,732 
OCLM 9,798 
Optimal solution 1 39-89 
2 22.04 
activity and level g 
13 13.81 
23 35.44 
37 108.96 
40 10.31 
1 2 3 
0.0 1742.25 
83.93 25.21 
0.0 0.0 
1699.13 288.77 
0.0 55.06 
0.0 0.0 
29.44 0.0 
4.12 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
1 management unit. 1 family 
1 2 3 
0.253 0.253 0.253 
22,608.74 23,675.23 24,741.72 
22,609 23,675 24,742 
103,506 136,772 164,204 
10,065 10,065 10,065 
39,883 70,650 89,273 
8,474 12,153 14,749 
12,496 15,894 18,441 
2 64.11 3 66.80 3 55.62 
10 230.74 10 240.76 10 240.76 
14 8.04 14 .61 24 46.04 
23 40.71 23 46.27 38 166.75 
38 147.92 38 166.75 40 6.16 
40 8.20 40 6.19 44 22.30 
44 28.67 44 22.30 59 207.43 
Opt imal  so lu t ion  (Cont inued)  
0 1 
44 31.68 47 110.86 
47 223.28 51 154.04 
51 154.04 52 34.41 
64 12.39 60 380.84 
66 38.08 64 12.82 
70 45.86 66 46.15 
72 177.42 86 1541.77 
86 1703.69 87 203.64 
87 175.01 97 66.69 
90 9212.67 
2  3  
52 34.41 61 1143.00 
58 111.53 64 13.30 
59 19.21 66 48.15 
60 748.41 75 76.69 
61 394.59 86 987.91 
64 13.36 87 208.77 
66 48.15 
75 130.74 
86 1225.61 
87 245.42 
97 2.77 
Primal slacks 100 1 .00 100 1.00 100 1 .00 99 11.73 
row and level 
103 45.90 103 26.35 103 4.55 100 1.00 
104 160.00 104 161.87 104 161.94 103 4.55 
105 108.04 105 41.36 105 38.58 104 161.94 
114 123.69 110 23.09 110 45.86 105 38.58 
115 1143.00 111 89.33 111 177.42 106 10.85 
119 27.34 114 96.34 113 31.64 110 45.86 
122 141.10 115 762.16 114 218.75 111 177.42 
124 89276.00 124 122541.75 124 155666.50 113 31.64 
129 261.16 129 175.58 129 145.11 114 246.09 
130 258.48 130 182.61 130 161.32 119 27.34 
123 29357.18 
124 183098.94 
129 156.87 
130 173.37 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and product constraints (k'k-l) 
row and level 0 1 2 3 4 
99 135.00 99 133.88 99 133.88 99 133.23 99 132.85 
100 1.00 100 1.00 100 1.00 100 1.00 100 1.00 
103 415.00 103 415.00 103 479.82 103 482.51 103 482.51 
0 1 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 104 
(Continued) 105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
113 
114 
115 
119 
120 
121  
122  
123 
124 
129 
130 
136 
137 
138 
139 
160.00 104 160.00 
108.04 105 108.04 
61.93 106 64.11 
35.44 107 40.71 
10.31 108 8.20 
12.39 109 12.82 
31.64 110 45.86 
246.09 111 177.42 
1143.00 113 31.64 
27.34 114 246.09 
2080.00 115 1143.00 
800.00 119 27.34 
2019.80 120 2080.00 
24320.00 121 800.00 
70100.00 122 1745.41 
711.00 123 39883.27 
711.00 124 103506.75 
190.38 129 711.00 
108.96 130 711.00 
31.68 131 4719.00 
38.08 136 198.72 
137 126.19 
138 25.43 
139 39.74 
SM 2: FLE 33424.48 
EIT 16628.31 
DPLIC 14230.77 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 5053.00 
DPTC2 0.0 
2  3 4 
104 161.87 104 161.94 104 161.94 
105 41.36 105 38.58 105 38.58 
106 66.80 106 66.48 106 66.29 
107 46.27 107 46.04 107 45.91 
108 6.19 108 6.16 108 6.14 
109 13.36 109 13.30 109 13.26 
110 45.86 110 45.86 110 45.86 
111 177.42 111 177.42 111 177.42 
113 31.64 112 130.74 112 207.43 
114 246.09 113 31.64 113 31.64 
115 1143.00 114 246.09 114 246.09 
119 27.34 115 1143.00 115 1143.00 
120 2080.00 119 27.34 119 27.34 
121 800.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
122 1471.03 121 800.00 121 800.00 
123 70650.50 122 1196.68 122 922.45 
124 136772.50 123 118630.62 123 177841.69 
129 711.00 124 164204.94 124 183098.94 
130 711.00 129 711.00 129 711.00 
131 5652.18 130 711.00 130 711.00 
136 239.42 131 5918.80 131 6)85.42 
137 165.82 136 240.76 136 240.76 
138 22.17 137 166.75 137 166.75 
139 47.88 138 22.30 138 22.30 
139 48.15 139 48.15 
1 2 3 
36630.90 37547.02 38463.12 
21958.50 23208.91 26034.37 
14230.77 8538.46 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
4606.34 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
DILIC 7710.23 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 1769.88 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
* * * * * A * * A * * * * * * * A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 130 - sole proprietorship 
0 
0.943 
E N  I  ( " b , 3 , 9 , 6 3 6 - 4 0  
NFI «Xi.'k-l - (CLP/S'k-, 5.636 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets j^_j) 0 
Working assets 2,542 
Liquid assets 13,349 
OCEPA ' 1,033 
OCLM 7,463 
Optimal solution (xf*,) 9 170.65 
33 97 67 
activity and level 28!40 
47 111.95 
51 123.23 
66 21.63 
70 22.99 
1 2 3 
4038.69 1101.46 0.0 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
8 1 1 . 0 1  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
1 management unit, 1 family 
1 2 3 
0.253 0.253 0.253 
9,636.40 15,486.99 19,248.08 
9,636 15,487 19,248 
125 250 643 
17,542 17,542 17,542 
11,701 25,991 54,180 
1,907 2,843 4,695 
8,025 9,613 15,068 
9 178.13 
33 113.11 
44 22.79 
47 27.36 
51 123.23 
55 30.64 
66 32.52 
10 185.62 
38 128.56 
40 .05 
44 17.19 
47 323.78 
51 123.23 
52 34.41 
12 322.25 
37 223.19 
40 .12 
44 29.84 
51 98.69 
52 34.41 
58 286.66 
0 
Optimal solution (Continued) 11 88.95 
86 341.35 
88 250.19 
90 4618.97 
92 .58 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .02 
103 53.65 
105 285.47 
106 .26 
107 . 16 
108 .04 
109 .05 
114 66.14 
115 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 192.30 
122 1678.45 
129 478.66 
130 1075.28 
139 12.50 
I n i t i a l  a n d  u p d a t e d  s u p p l y  l e v e l s  o f  r e s o u r c e  a n d  
0 1 
103 372.00 100 .02 
105 286.04 103 372.00 
113 25.31 105 285.47 
114 164.06 110 22.99 
1 
79 6.29 
80 24.35 
100 .02 
103 25.44 
105 285.47 
110 17.37 
111 67.22 
114 66.14 
115 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 357.07 
122 1745.41 
124 125.10 
129 453.10 
130 1057.96 
139 3.10 
100 .02 
103 372.00 
105 285.47 
110 22.99 
2 
60 73.12 
66 36.31 
70 43.51 
72 168.32 
86 1150.18 
87 320.85 
88 786.34 
90 8740.48 
93 1.14 
100 .05 
103 4.32 
105 284.32 
106 .55 
107 .38 
109 .11 
114 38.80 
115 307.88 
116 6.29 
117 24.35 
124 162.82 
129 431.05 
130 1040.58 
139 .81 
99 .05 
100 .05 
103 372.00 
105 284.32 
3 
59 154.71 
61 381.00 
64 .26 
66 64.45 
75 441.38 
86 1138.00 
87 58.68 
88 2124.20 
92 2.60 
97 281.72 
100 .12 
103 6.09 
104 7.89 
106 1 .29 
107 .89 
110 66.50 
111 257.28 
113 5.04 
114 58.30 
116 6.29 
117 24.35 
124 643.37 
129 179.22 
130 796.59 
4 
99 .38 
100 .12 
103 645.83 
104 7.89 
product constraints 
2 3 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Continued) 
115 381.00 111 88.95 
119 27.34 113 25.31 
120 2080.00 114 164.06 
121 800.00 115 381.00 
122 2019.80 119 27.34 
123 13349.00 120 2080.00 
129 772.00 121 800.00 
130 1372.00 122 1745.41 
136 170.65 123 11701.28 
137 97.67 124 125.10 
138 28.40 129 772.00 
139 34.13 130 1372.00 
131 2409.10 
136 178.13 
137 113.11 
138 22.79 
139 35.63 
SM 2: FLE 25487.66 
EIT 5582.48 
DPLIC 125.10 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 2309.48 
DPTC2 15000.00 
2  3  4  
111 88.95 106 .02 106 .19 
113 25.31 107 .02 107 .13 
114 164.06 109 .01 108 .02 
115 381.00 110 66.50 109 .04 
116 6.29 111 257.28 110 66.50 
117 24.35 113 25.31 111 257.28 
119 27.34 114 164.06 112 441.38 
120 2080.00 115 381.00 113 25.31 
121 800.00 116 6.29 114 164.06 
122 1471.03 117 24.35 115 381.00 
123 25991.73 119 27.34 116 6.29 
124 250.19 120 2080.00 117 24.35 
129 772.00 121 800.00 119 27.34 
130 1372.00 122 1196.68 120 2080.00 
131 2409.10 123 54180.20 121 800.00 
136 185.62 124 643.37 122 922.45 
137 128.56 129 772.00 123 92756.31 
138 17.19 130 1372.00 124 2098.64 
139 37.12 131 3871.75 129 772.00 
136 185.62 130 1372.00 
137 128.56 131 4812.02 
138 17.19 136 322.25 
139 37.12 137 223.19 
138 29.84 
139 64.45 
1 
25487.66 
5582.48 
125.10 
0 . 0  
2309.48 
0 . 0  
30513.32 
12215.19 
393.17 
0 . 0  
4370.23 
0 . 0  
3 
33744.10 
17040.89 
1455.27 
0 . 0  
4370.23 
0 . 0  
0 
D I L I C  3 5 . 5 0  
D I M T G  0 . 0  
D I T C 1  8 1 5 . 4 8  
D I T C 2  4 7 4 . 0 0  
C L P  0 . 0  
D M T G 2  0 . 0  
I M T G 2  0 . 0  
A * * * A * * * * A * * A A A A A A A * A A A A A 
Farm 140 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)k_, 0.253 
EN I (<%,,, k-|) 8,402.50 
« F I  (Xà. j k -l - (CLP/5)k-, 8.403 
E q u i t y  i n  p r o d u c t i v e  a s s e t s :  
Fixed assets ° 
Working assets 9,583 
Liquid assets 10,192 
O C E P A  '  1 , 2 8 5  
O C L M  6 , 2 8 5  
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
9 115.60 
33 42.41 
35 23.75 
44 19.24 
47 148.09 
5 1  5 1 . 6 2  
55 43.31 
1 2  3 
1 6 . 1 4  1 1 1 . 5 8  3 5 2 . 1 4  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
3 7 0 . 6 7  1 5 4 3 . 1 3  7 0 1 . 4 2  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  8 7 . 3 4  0 . 0  
0 . 0  1 2 . 2 3  0 . 0  
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
1 management 1 
1 
0.253 
12,372.70 
12,373 
165 
10,192 
18,918 
1 , 9 0 0  
7,299 
, 1 family 
2 
0.253 
1 5 , 6 8 1.19 
15,681  
8 1 2  
1 0 , 1 9 2  
3 0 , 6 9 0  
2 , 6 9 8  
1 0 , 0 3 6  
3 
0 . 2 5 3  
17,997.13 
17,997 
1,294 
19,156 
54,308 
4 , 8 4 1  
14,874• 
9 1 2 0 . 6 7  
33 62.84 
37 13.78 
40 .08 
44 15.44 
4 7  464.88 
5 1  5 1 . 6 2  
3 .04 
1 0  2 0 7 . 3 2  
23 .03 
37 143.59 
44 1 9 . 2 0  
4 7  3 8 7 . 2 7  
48 34.41 
1 2  3 2 1 . 1 4  
37 2 2 2.43 
4 0  . 0 3  
44 29.74 
4 7  1 3 9 . 0 2  
4 8  3 4 . 4 1  
5 1  5 1 . 6 2  
0 
Optimal solution (Continued) 66 23.12 
70 30.42 
72 117.67 
79 8.90 
80 34.42 
88 330.97 
90 6110.23 
92 .76 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .02 
103 27.87 
105 405.28 
106 .35 
107 .21 
108 .05 
109 .07 
113 2.05 
115 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 172.03 
122 2019.80 
129 49.05 
130 51.00 
1 
66 24.13 
70 65.07 
72 251.72 
86 1256.28 
87 462.33 
88 962.93 
90 13071.06 
93 1.72 
2 
51 51.62 
64 .01 
66 41.46 
83 129.32 
84 98.59 
85 19.60 
86 1227.03 
87 244.00 
91 3450.64 
97 168.21 
3 
58 125.43 
61 381.00 
64 .07 
66 64.23 
75 125.43 
83 209.29 
84 40.99 
85 162.17 
86 1175.04 
87 21.64 
88 546.03 
91 1434.57 
92 .67 
97 234.68 
100 .07 
103 15.13 
105 403.57 
106 .82 
107 .56 
109 .16 
113 2.05 
115 381.00 
116 8.90 
117 34.42 
119 27.34 
122 26.79 
124 58.48 
129 34.88 
130 39.18 
100 .07 
103 3.92 
104 4.71 
105 235.36 
110 15.94 
111 34.32 
113 2.05 
115 381.00 
116 8.90 
117 34.42 
124 812.43 
100 .09 
103 6.07 
104 11.28 
106 .37 
107 .25 
110 66.93 
111 231.59 
113 2.05 
116 8.90 
117 34.42 
124 1293.90 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
103 252.00 100 .02 
105 406.04 103 252.00 
113 12.66 105 405.28 
114 41.02 110 30.42 
115 381.00 111 117.67 
119 27.34 113 12.66 
120 2080.00 114 41.02 
121 800.00 115 381.00 
122 2019.80 116 8.90 
123 10192.00 117 34.42 
129 252.00 119 27.34 
130 252.00 120 2080.00 
136 115.60 121 800.00 
137 66.16 122 1745.41 
138 19.24 123 18918.15 
139 23.12 124 165.48 
129 252.00 
130 252.00 
131 2100.62 
136 120.67 
137 76.62 
138 15.44 
139 24.13 
0 
SM 2: FLE 24427.74 
EIT 4512.28 
product  constra ints 
2 3 4 
99 .08 99 .08 99 .11 
100 .07 100 .07 100 .09 
103 252.00 103 415.50 103 643.62 
105 403.57 104 4.71 104 11.28 
106 .04 105 235.36 106 .05 
107 .03 106 .04 107 .04 
109 .01 107 .03 109 .01 
110 95.49 109 .01 110 95.49 
111 369.40 110 95.49 111 369.40 
113 12.66 111 369.40 112 125.43 
114 41 .02 113 12.66 113 12.66 
115 381.00 114 41.02 114 41.02 
116 8.90 115 381.00 115 381.00 
117 34.42 116 8.90 116 8.90 
119 27.34 117 34.42 117 34.42 
120 2080.00 119 27.34 119 27.34 
121 800.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
122 1471.03 121 800.00 121 800.00 
123 30690.10 122 1196.68 122 922.45 
124 812.43 123 54308.37 123 94119.53 
129 252.00 124 1293.90 124 1566.91 
130 252.00 129 381.32 129 590.61 
131 3093.17 130 370.19 130 573.35 
136 125.74 131 3920.30 131 4499.28 
137 87.09 136 207.32 136 321.14 
138 11.64 137 143.59 137 222.43 
139 25.15 138 19.20 138 29.74 
139 41.46 139 64.23 
1 2 3 
27838.14 30680.14 32669.53 
8937.71 12419.57 15653.77 
0 
DPLIC 165.48 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 3055.11 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 46.96 
DIMTG 0.0 
DlTCl 1078.76 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
A * A * * * A * î'c * A * A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 150 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)k_, 0.253 
ENI k-l) 20,345.00 
MF' - (CLP/5)k-1 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 114,980 
Working assets 10,820 
Liquid assets (b^^g 15,057 
OCEPA ' 7,488 
OCLM 7,236 
Optimal solution 
act ivity and level 
1 105.58 
5 50.46 
15 12.17 
1 2 3 
646.95 481.46 273.01 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
9590.64 6535.53 0.0 
0.0 3450.64 1434.57 
157.99 62.11 97.92 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
2798.04 1048.95 0.0 
0.0 109.04 45.33 
0.0 0.0 0,0 
106.98 0.0 0.0 
14.98 0.0 0.0 
management 
1 
0.253 
27,801.79 
24,261 
170,614 
10,820 
31.194 
11,347 
8,922 
; 1 family 
2 
0.253 
32,462.28 
27,983 
205,441 
10,820 
77,771 
16,133 
14,393 
3 
0.253 
33,394.38 
27,979 
246,715 
26,878 
104,392 
20,991 
18,781 
2 118.44 3 143.63 3 115.56 
6 52.67 7 54.89 7 54.89 
4 12.06 10 117.48 10 117.48 
0 
Optimal solution (Continued) 23 65.11 
30 28.88 
40 18.93 
42 8.40 
47 218.79 
64 22.75 
65 10.09 
70 25.95 
72 104.94 
86 226.86 
90 5385.62 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
99 34.96 
105 300.04 
106 8.19 
112 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 234.65 
122 1792.94 
124 114980.00 
129 71.79 
130 68.46 
1 2 3 
16 6.60 14 2.72 24 99.48 
23 75.21 16 1.04 31 38.01 
30 33.45 23 99.48 38 81.37 
40 15.15 30 38.01 40 13.30 
42 6.74 38 81.37 42 5.08 
47 463.70 40 13.30 44 10.88 
48 34.41 42 5.08 59 1349.29 
64 23.69 44 10.88 64 28.72 
65 10.53 46 349.22 65 10.98 
70 50.31 48 34.41 66 23.50 
72 140.61 64 28.72 75 968.29 
73 81.34 65 10.98 86 988.76 
86 1377.32 66 23.50 87 207.92 
87 368.08 83 224.97 
90 8058.84 85 209.88 
86 1433.64 
87 37.39 
89 26350.58 
94 43.07 
97 242.23 
99 1.43 100 1 .20 99 25.94 
105 300.04 103 2.22 100 1 .20 
112 381.00 104 6.78 101 1.04 
124 170614.62 105 14.74 103 2,22 
129 40.84 110 23.52 104 6.78 
130 37.67 111 90.97 105 14.74 
112 381.00 106 28.07 
124 205441.62 110 95.24 
111 395.80 
119 27.34 
123 23266.36 
124 246715.25 
129 29.95 
130 31.82 
In i t ia l  and updated supply levels of  resource 
0 1 
99 248.00 99 247. 
101 110.00 101 110. 
105 300.04 105 300. 
106 113.77 106 118. 
107 65.11 107 75. 
108 18.94 108 15. 
109 22.75 109 23. 
110 18.98 110 44. 
111 68.91 111 173. 
112 381.00 112 381. 
119 27.34 119 27. 
120 2080.00 120 2080. 
121 800.00 121 800. 
122 2019.80 122 1745. 
123 15057.00 123 31194. 
124 114980.00 124 170614. 
129 358.00 129 358. 
130 358.00 130 358. 
132 50.46 131 5086. 
133 28.88 132 52. 
134 8.40 133 33. 
135 10.09 134 6. 
135 10. 
product  constra ints 
2 3 4 
99 245.98 99 287.85 99 283.01 
101 110.00 100 1 .20 100 1 .20 
105 300.04 101 110.00 101 110.00 
106 122.74 103 235.45 103 235.45 
107 85.01 104 6.78 104 6.78 
108 11.37 105 14.74 105 14.74 
109 24.55 106 143.63 106 141.21 
110 95.24 107 99.48 107 97.80 
111 395.80 108 13.30 108 13.08 
112 381.00 109 28.72 109 28.24 
119 27.34 110 95.24 no 95.24 
120 2080.00 111 395.80 111 395.80 
121 800.00 112 381.00 112 1349.29 
122 1471.03 119 27.34 119 27.34 
123 77770.88 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
124 205441.62 121 800.00 121 800.00 
129 358.00 122 1196.68 122 922.45 
130 358.00 123 127657.69 123 182558.87 
131 6950.44 124 246715.25 124 294051.87 
132 54.89 129 582.97 129 , 582.97 
133 38.01 130 567.88 130 567.88 
134 5.08 131 8115.57 131 8348.59 
135 10.98 132 54.89 132 54.89 
133 38.01 133 38.01 
134 5.08 134 5.08 
135 10.98 135 10.98 
136 117.48 136 117.48 
137 81.37 137 81.37 
138 10.88 138 10.88 
139 23.50 139 23.50 
and 
34 
00 
04 
44 
2 1  
15 
69 
94 
85 
00 
34 
00 
00 
41 
24 
62 
00 
00 
25 
67 
45 
74 
53 
FLE 33835.94 
EIT 17159.45 
DPLIC 20666.66 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 2692.81 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 5331.99 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITC1 950.83 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 4950.00 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
A A A A A A A A V i A A A A A A A A A A A : 
Farm 160 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)^_, 0.351 
EN I 8,047.20 
NFI - (CLP/S'k-I 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 0 
Working assets 5,205 
Liquid assets - SV^_^) lOflH 
OCEPA ' 1,000 
OCLM 6,313 
1 2 3 
38050.10 41247.46 41244.02 
25434.32 30128.84 30123.84 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 6587.64 6587.64 
6722.23 4029.42 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
2666.00 2666.00 2666.00 
0.0 4722.35 4372.55 
1854.98 646.72 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
17704.48 22395.99 27076.50 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
management unit, 
1 
0.253 
10,061.20 
10,061 
115 
10,605 
13,499 
1,573 
7,407 
1 family 
2 
0.253 
14,089.19 
14,089 
505 
10,605 
23,830 
2,264 
8,609 
3 
0.253 
16,505.98 
16,506 
1,234 
10,605 
42,280 
3,500 
13,383 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
0 
9 138.54 
35 48.65 
37 30.64 
kk 23.06 
47 102.68 
55 108.19 
66 27.71 
70 21.09 
72 81.59 
88 229.48 
90 4236.59 
92 .53 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .01 
103 33.40 
105 355.52 
106 .24 
107 .14 
108 .04 
109 .05 
116 14.20 
117 78.09 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 255.10 
122 2019.80 
129 58.79 
130 61.11 
1 
9 144.61 
33 85.84 
37 5.98 
40 .05 
44 18.50 
47 287.08 
66 28.92 
70 37.88 
72 146.52 
86 295.02 
88 560.50 
90 7608.46 
93 1.00 
2 
10 150.69 
38 104.37 
40 .06 
44 13.96 
47 490.71 
48 34.41 
58 17.79 
66 28.47 
70 41.82 
72 189.15 
74 17.79 
86 1093.49 
87 377.54 
88 889.09 
90 9643.72 
93 1.29 
3 
3 .03 
12 316.46 
23 .02 
38 219.18 
44 29.31 
47 354.64 
48 34.41 
59 13.42 
64 .01 
66 63.29 
83 280.00 
85 263.01 
86 1188.42 
87 8.27 
97 341.80 
100 .04 
103 18.13 
105 354.52 
106 .48 
107 .32 
109 .10 
116 36.42 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 98.38 
122 1450.38 
124 52.46 
129 41.82 
130 47.01 
100 .08 
103 4.52 
105 353.22 
106 .65 
107 .45 
109 .13 
116 36.42 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
124 410.94 
129 25.70 
130 32.93 
139 1.67 
100 .08 
103 5.98 
104 9.57 
105 11.43 
110 27.95 
111 108.12 
112 4.38 
116 36.42 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
124 1234.53 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
103 302.00 
105 356.04 
116 36.42 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 2019.80 
123 10174.00 
129 302.00 
130 302.00 
136 138.54 
137 79.29 
138 23.06 
139 27.71 
. 0 1  
302.00 
355.52 
21.09 
81.59 
36.42 
164.06 
381.00 
27.34 
2080.00 
800.00 
1745-41 
13499.12 
114.74 
302.00 
302.00 
2011.80 
144.61 
91.83 
18.50 
28.92 
100 
103 
105 
110  
1 1 1  
116  
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
129 
130 
131 
136 
137 
138 
139 
SM 2: FLE 
EIT 
DPLIC 
0 
24122.54 
4204.12 
114.74 
product  constra ints (b^_j )  
2 3 4 
99 .05 99 .06 99 .06 
100 .04 100 .08 100 .08 
103 302.00 103 302.00 103 634.23 
105 354.52 105 353.22 104 9.57 
106 .02 106 .03 105 11.43 
107 .02 107 .02 106 .03 
110 58.97 110 100.79 107 .02 
111 228.11 111 417.26 109 .01 
116 36.42 112 17.79 110 100.79 
117 164.06 116 36.42 111 417.26 
118 381.00 117 164.06 112 17.79 
119 27.34 118 381.00 116 36.42 
120 2080.00 119 27.34 117 164.06 
121 800.00 120 2080.00 118 381.00 
122 1471.03 121 800.00 119 27.34 
123 23829.60 122 1196.68 120 2080.00 
124 509.73 123 42279.68 121 800.00 
129 302.00 124 1234.53 122 922.45 
130 302.00 129 302.00 123 73322.75 
131 2515.30 130 302.00 124 1679.08 
136 150.69 131 3522.30 129 582.00 
137 104.37 136 150.69 130 565.00 
138 13.96 137 104.37 131 4126.50 
139 30.14 138 13.96 136 316.46 
139 30.14 137 219.18 
138 29.31 
139 63.29 
1 2 3 
25852.56 29312.61 31388.64 
5956.82 10744.14 14000.31 
394.99 724.80 444.54 
0 1 2 3 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 2118.29 
DPTC2 5400.00 
DILIC 32.56 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 747.97 
DITC2 170.64 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
* * A * * * * A A * A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
5922.52 8626.09 4821.86 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
94.34 162.31 57.35 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
1683.26 2313.18 773.91 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
62.26 98.74 0.0 
8.72 13.82 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A Vc A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 170 - sole proprietorship: 1 management unit, 1 family 
0 12 3 
(d/e)k_, 0.333 0.253 0.253 0.253 
EN I 8,757.50 7,839.39 12,429.89 16,102.28 
NFI - (CLP/5)k_, 8,758 7,839 12,430 16,102 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 0 211 422 710 
Working assets 16,550 16,550 16,550 16,550 
Liquid assets |<_i ~ 13,452 1 1 ,875 18,343 38,827 
OCEPA ' 1,950 1,858 2,290 3,637 
OCLM 7,673 8,220 9,324 13,920 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
9 185.79 9 193.93 
33 106.33 33 123.15 
44 30.92 44 24.81 
47 188.90 47 83.45 
9 202.08 12 313.52 
33 114.92 37 217.14 
37 25.04 40 .18 
40 .04 44 29.04 
0 
Optimal solution (Continued) 66 33.08 
70 38.80 
72  150 .10  
86  216 .10  
88 422.17 
90 7793.95 
92 .97 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .03 
103 48.87 
105 252.07 
106 .44 
107 .27 
108 .06 
109 .09 
116 23.76 
117 123.05 
118 381,00 
119 27.34 
121 311.89 
122 1803.70 
129 80.87 
130 81.96 
139 4.08 
1 
55 80.28 
66 5.85 
2 
44 18.72 
47 344.24 
66 40.42 
70 31.91 
72 123.44 
86 783.81 
88 576.64 
90 6409.55 
93 .84 
3 
47 153.31 
48 34.41 
58 658.58 
64 .38 
66 62.70 
74 658.58 
83 171.82 
84 154.88 
86 1142.17 
87 54.51 
88 3202.17 
90 7606.56 
91 5420.74 
93 3.93 
97 229.77 
100 .03 
103 57.26 
105 252.07 
110 21 .66 
HI 83.79 
116 7.28 
117 59.25 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 399.83 
122 1745.41 
124 211.08 
129 72.59 
130 63.10 
139 32.94 
100 .05 
103 3.82 
105 251 .23 
106 .41 
107 .28 
109 .08 
116 23.76 
117 123.05 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 6.87 
122 687.22 
124 358.09 
129 33.37 
130 44.20 
100 . 16 
103 5.93 
104 6.43 
105 17.54 
106 1.92 
107 1.33 
110 39.22 
111 124.37 
116 23.76 
117 123.05 
118 381.00 
124 354.67 
In i t ia l  and updated supply levels of  resource 
0 1 
103 405.00 100 
105 253.04 103 405. 
116 23.77 105 252. 
117 123.05 110 38. 
118 381.00 111 150. 
119 27.34 116 23. 
120 2080.00 117 123. 
121 800.00 118 381. 
122 2019.80 119 27. 
123 13500.00 120 2080. 
129 405.00 121 800. 
130 405.00 122 1745. 
136 185.79 123 11874. 
137 106.33 124 211. 
138 30.92 129 405. 
139 37.16 130 405. 
131 2189. 
136 193. 
137 123. 
138 24. 
139 38. 
product  constra ints (b,_. )  
2 3 4 
100 .03 99 .04 99 .56 
103 405.00 100 .05 100 . 16 
105 252.07 103 405.00 103 628.33 
110 38.80 105 251.23 104 5.43 
111 150.10 106 .02 105 17.54 
116 23.76 107 .01 106 .28 
117 123.05 110 70.71 107 .19 
118 381.00 111 273.53 108 .03 
119 27.34 116 23.76 109 .06 
120 2080.00 117 123.05 110 70.71 
121 800.00 118 381.00 111 273.53 
122 1471.03 119 27.34 112 658.58 
123 18342.94 120 2080.00 116 23.76 
124 422.17 121 800.00 117 123.05 
129 405.00 122 1196.68 118 381.00 
130 405.00 123 38827.53 119 27.34 
131 1959.85 124 710.49 120 2080.00 
136 202.08 129 405.00 121 800.00 
137 139.96 130 405.00 122 922.45 
138 18.72 131 3107.47 123 57500.20 
139 40.42 136 202.08 124 2599.90 
137 139.96 129 576.82 
138 18.72 130 559.88 
139 40.42 131 4025.57 
136 313.52 
137 217.14 
138 29.04 
139 62.70 
and 
03 
00 
07 
80 
10 
76 
05 
00 
34 
00 
00 
41 
64 
08 
00 
00 
38 
93 
15 
81 
79 
0 
FLE 24732.69 
E I T  4820.18 
DPLIC 211.08 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 3896.97 
DPTC2 10000.00 
DILIC 59.91 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 1376.02 
DITC2 316.00 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
I't * A )'( A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 180 - sole proprietorship: 
0 
(d/e)^_, 0.253 
ENI ( 20,199.00 
"1^1 - (CLP/S'k-I 20,199 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets |^_j) 103,350 
Working assets 11,197 
Liquid assets ^-1 - SV^_p 25,041 
OCEPA 7,575 
OCLM 7,743 
1 2 3 
23944.04 27887.27 31041.86 
4023.88 8997.90 13552.67 
211.08 288.32 1889-41 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
3896.97 3204.77 7008.05 
0.0 0.0 5420.74 
27.23 81 .82 491.58 
0.0 0.0 1 0.0 
^ 1857.30 625.46 1131.60 
0.0 0.0 171.30 
0.0 0.0 I 0.0 
0.0 64.01 355.80 
0.0 8.96 49.81 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A  A  A  A A A '  
management unit, 
1 
0.253 
27,490.99 
27,491 
142,125 
11,197 
60,573 
11,842 
11,016 
1 family 
2 
0.259 
34,782.99 
34,783 
238,189 
19,578 
43,735 
16,144 
12,234 
3 
0.253 
35,512.17 
35,512 
363,158 
20,096 
66,934 
23,996 
15,868 
0 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 2 92.59 
10 19.72 
23 72.20 
38 11.29 
40 21 .00 
44 3.28 
47 510.74 
48 32.40 
64 25.23 
66 3.94 
70 76.43 
72 349.54 
86 1465.42 
87 554.38 
90 17394.74 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
99 61.85 
103 4.76 
105 340.04 
106 33.56 
112 190.50 
119 1.60 
124 103350.00 
129 95.46 
130 97.91 
3 229.14 
10 20.59 
14 20.79 
23 149.80 
38 13.08 
40 26.68 
44 2.63 
46 26.77 
47 367.37 
48 34.41 
64 45.83 
66 4.12 
83 144.63 
85 144.71 
86 1547.34 
87 198.07 
88 115142.49 
92 205.11 
2 
3 235.63 
10 21.80 
14 4.46 
23 163.20 
38 15.10 
40 21.82 
44 2.02 
46 124.27 
47 268.54 
48 34.41 
64 47.13 
66 4.36 
83 12.99 
85 1.32 
86 1333.22 
87 137.82 
97 .71 
3 
3 235.63 
12 86.90 
14 3.14 
23 163.20 
37 60.19 
40 21.82 
44 8.05 
47 203.73 
48 34.41 
58 47.51 
59 405.24 
64 47.13 
66 17.38 
75 262.25 
83 119.05 
85 114.90 
86 1186.81 
87 9.87 
97 134.22 
100 5.74 
103 2.58 
105 134.93 
110 23.95 
111 91.04 
112 190.50 
124 142125.00 
100 5.74 
103 .41 
104 .02 
105 134.22 
110 24.22 
111 92.11 
112 190.50 
124 238189.19 
100 5.74 
103 1.64 
104 3.78 
110 63.06 
111 242.35 
124 363158.37 
In i t ia l  and updated supply levels product constraints 
2 row and level 
SM 2: FLE 
EIT 
DPLIC 
DPMTG 
DPTCl 
0 
99 275.00 
103 43.00 
105 340.04 
106 126.15 
107 72.20 
108 21.00 
109 25.23 
110 28.48 
111 82.03 
112 190.50 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 2019.80 
123 25041.00 
124 103350.00 
129 318.00 
130 318.00 
136 19.73 
137 11.29 
138 3.28 
139 3.94 
of  resource and 
1 
99 272.87 
103 43.00 
105 340.04 
106 130.66 
107 82.97 
108 16.72 
109 26.13 
110 104.90 
111 431.57 
112 190.50 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 60573.42 
124 142125.00 
129 318.00 
130 318.00 
131 5049.75 
136 20.59 
137 13.08 
138 2.63 
139 4.12 
99 472.24 
100 5.74 
103 43.00 
105 134.93 
106 235.63 
107 163.20 
108 21.82 
109 47.13 
110 104.90 
111 431.57 
112 190.50 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1471.03 
123 43734.92 
124 238189.19 
129 462.63 
130 462.71 
131 6872.75 
136 21.46 
137 14.86 
138 1.99 
139 4.29 
(^k- l )  
3 
99 472.24 
100 5.74 
103 43.69 
104 .02 
105 134.22 
106 235.63 
107 163.20 
108 21.82 
109 47.13 
110 104.90 
111 431.57 
112 190.50 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1196.68 
123 66934.50 
124 363158.37 
129 475.62 
130 464.03 
131 8695.75 
136 21 .80 
137 15.10 
138 2.02 
139 4.36 
4 
99 470.92 
100 5.74 
103 174.16 
104 3.78 
106 234.98 
107 162.75 
108 21 .76 
109 47.00 
110 104.90 
111 431.57 
112 452.75 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 922.45 
123 157240.06 
124 430556.37 
129 594.68 
130 578.93 
131 8878.04 
136 86.90 
137 60.19 
138 8.05 
139 17.38 
0 12 3 
34560.93 40824.76 47088.58 47714.94 
19133.21 29465.33 38628.73 39540.20 
0.0 57571.22 57571.22 0.0 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
8697.37 8697.37 0.0 0.0 
0  
DPTC2 0 . 0  
DILIC 0 . 0  
DIMTG 0 . 0  
DITCl 3 0 7 1 . 0 4  
D1TC2 0 . 0  
CLP 0 . 0  
DMTG2 0 . 0  
IMTG2 0 . 0  
A * * * * A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
I 
I 
1  2  3  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
1 6 3 3 8 . 7 1  7 4 2 6 . 6 9  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
1 3 9 5 . 9 2  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
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A P P E N D I X  F  
R e s u l t s  G i v e n  L a n d  V a l u e s  B a s e d  o n  P h a s e  A  
Results Given Land Values Based on Phase A 
Farm 020 - sole proprietorship: 1 management unit, 1 family 
(d/c)k-1 
EN I (*b 
NFI 
, )  
131jk-l 
- (CLP/5)k-, 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 
Working assets 
) 
Liquid assets (b 12 3,k-l 
OCEPA 
OCLM 
0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 
11,038.80 18,599.99 28,681.57 34,982.57 
11,039 18,600 26,878 29,833 
0 191 1,092 1,676 
11,019 11,019 11,019 20,935 
SVk-,) 17,799 29,964 64,036 92,658 
1,873 2,674 4,934 7,468 
6,660 7,651 10,116 12,462 
9 144.05 2 3.62 2 3.65 3 1.46 
33 82.42 6 47.31 6 156.46 7 162.39 
44 23.97 10 150.36 10 156.68 10 156.68 
47 327.88 23 2.46 24 2.53 16 2.68 
51 102.70 30 32.11 31 108.37 23 2.53 
66 14.70 38 95.48 38 108.52 30 112.47 
70 67.35 40 .36 . 40 .34 38 108.52 
72 260.54 42 4.79 42 14.49 40 .34 
86 1160.52 44 19.24 44 14.51 42 15.04 
87 312.62 47 327.41 46 261.25 44 14.51 
88 443.17 51 102.70 50 72.14 59 452.07 
90 13528.64 52 34.41 51 30.56 61 800.10 
92 1.69 60 79.52 52 34.41 64 .73 
64 .72 64 .73 65 32.48 
65 9.46 65 31.29 66 31.43 
66 30.07 66 31.34 75 452.07 
86 1392.33 83 62.56 83 10.04 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
Opt imal  so lut ion (Cont inued) 
0 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .05 
103 48.85 
104 46.00 
105 342.36 
106 .77 
107 .46 
108 .11 
109 .15 
114 101.32 
115 800.10 
119 27.34 
122 546.65 
129 274.19 
130 109.56 
139 14.11 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
100 .05 
103 314.00 
104 46.00 
105 342.36 
110 67.35 
111 260.54 
113 21.09 
114 182.93 
115 800.10 
119 27.34 
1 2 3 
87 353.08 
88 1715.06 
93 7.54 
96 98.55 
85 205.55 
86 1399.70 
87 71.33 
96 224.06 
85 11.07 
86 1061.31 
87 135.37 
96 12.21 
99 . 16 
100 .26 
101 2.12 
102 2.76 
103 18.85 
104 46.00 
105 236.28 
110 .10 
111 .38 
114 73.98 
115 720.58 
129 156.34 
130 4.28 
99 .07 
100 .26 
101 2.96 
102 9.03 
103 2.96 
104 46.00 
105 12.21 
110 13.69 
111 52.95 
114 73.98 
115 800.10 
124 1091.92 
100 .26 
101 .39 
102 9.38 
103 2.96 
104 46.00 
106 2.19 
110 67.35 
111 260.54 
113 21 .09 
114 182.93 
119 27.34 
123 35797.73 
124 1676.52 
product constraints (b|^_|) 
2 3 4 
99 7.32 99 7.32 99 5.06 
100 .26 100 .26 100 .26 
101 95.79 101 313.57 101 325.45 
102 2.76 102 9.03 102 9.38 
103 314.00 103 314.00 103 314.00 
104 46.00 104 46.00 104 46.00 
105 236.28 105 12.21 106 2.53 
106 3.65 106 3.65 107 1.75 
107 2.53 107 2.53 108 .23 
108 .34 108 .34 109 .50 
0 1 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Cont i nued) 
120 2080.00 109 
121 800.00 110 
122 1745.41 111 
123 29964.34 113 
124 190.56 114 
129 520.00 115 
130 360.00 119 
131 2759.70 120 
136 150.36 121 
137 95.48 122 
138 19.24 123 
139 30.07 124 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
SM 2: FLE 
EIT 
DPLIC 
DPMTG 
DPTCl 
DPTC2 
DILIC 
DIMTG 
DITCl 
0 
26692.32 
6898.93 
221.58 
0 . 0  
6764.32 
0 . 0  
62 .88  
0 . 0  
2388.48 
2  3 4 
.73 109 .73 110 67.35 
67.35 1 110 67.35 111 260.54 
260.54 111 260.54 112 452.07 
21.09 113 21.09 113 21.09 
182.93 114 182.93 114 182.93 
800.10 115 800.10 115 800.10 
27.34 119 27.34 119 27.34 
2080.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
800.00 121 800.00 121 800.00 
1471.03 122 1196.68 122 922.45 
64036.14 123 128456.94 123 202346.19 
1091.92 124 1676.52 124 1441.81 
520.00 129 582.56 129 592.60 
360.00 130 565.55 130 576.62 
4650.00 131 7170.39 131 8745.64 
47.80 132 156.46 132 162.39 
33.10 133 108.37 133 112.47 
4.43 134 14.49 134 15.04 
9.56 135 31.29 135 32.48 
156.68 136 156.68 136 156.68 
108.52 137 108.52 137 108.52 
14.51 138 14.51 138 14.51 
31.34 139 31.34 139 31.34 
1 2 3 
33187.39 40297.49 42837.19 
16322.25 28699.30 32442.17 
1079.11 857.53 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
6764.32 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
271.95 110.62 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1085.67 0.0 0.0 
0 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
A * A A A * * * A * A * A * A * A A * * * * * * * A 
Farm 040 - sole proprietorship: 
0 
(d/e)^_, 0.253 
EN I k-l) 5,984.00 
( * b , -  (C L P / S ) , . ,  5 . 9 8 4  
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets |^_j) 0 
Working assets 6,203 
Liquid assets - SV^_|) 5,579 
OCEPA 766 
OCLM 4,796 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
9 53.21 
35 27.45 
37 3.01 
44 8.86 
55 325.74 
66 10.64 
79 45.81 
80 135.79 
87 41.71 
1 2 3 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 9021.96 25744.07 
190.56 0.0 0.0 
26.68 0.0 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
1 management unit, 1 family 
1 2 3 
0.253 0.253 0.253 
9,983.99 13,983.99 17,983.98 
9,984 13,004 10,637 
0 195 1,120 
6,203 6,203 29,466 
11,051 22,877 19,048 
1,121 1 ,900 3,210 
5,275 8,112 8,551 
6 25.70 1 4.85 1 39.09 
9 55.55 5 223.25 5 223.25 
16 1.15 9 57.88 9 1.25 
23 .65 13 1.06 12 56.63 
30 17.44 15 48.87 14 8.56 
37 35.27 17 12.67 15 48.87 
42 2.60 19 3.36 17 12.67 
44 7.11 26 154.62 24 27.07 
47 219.67 33 40.09 26 154.62 
Opt imal  so lut ion (Cont inued) 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
103 12.83 
105 542.04 
118 228.60 
119 27.34 
120 16.38 
122 1978.09 
129 142.58 
130 143.47 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
103 116.00 
105 542.04 
116 66.91 
1 
55 95.24 
64 .19 
65 5.14 
66 11.11 
70 45.12 
72 174.55 
88 454.41 
90 9063.75 
92 2.00 
96 53.52 
2  
40 .45 
42 20.68 
44 5.36 
82 327.53 
84 337.15 
88 1759.02 
91 23263.71 
93 9.14 
96 406.79 
3 
37 40.09 
40 3.62 
42 20.68 
44 5.36 
82 449.54 
84 68.62 
88 11105.96 
91 18135.41 
92 6.53 
93 64.06 
100 . 06 
102 1.50 
103 6.96 
105 486.52 
106 .96 
108 .10 
116 47.34 
117 183.15 
118 228.60 
119 27.34 
121 30.35 
122 1745.41 
129 87.75 
130 90.54 
100 .31 
102 12.89 
105 70.59 
109 .97 
110 45.12 
11 1 174.55 
116 66.91 
117 258.83 
118 228.60 
119 27.34 
120 148.99 
121 800.00 
122 1471.03 
129 34.92 
135 44.65 
139 11.58 
100 2.29 
102 12.89 
109 7.82 
110 45.12 
111 174.55 
116 66.91 
117 258.83 
118 228.60 
119 27.34 
120 80.40 
121 800.00 
122 1196.68 
129 421.17 
135 44.65 
139 11.58 
product constraints (b|^_|) 
2 3 4 
99 .84 99 9.72 99 78.34 
100 .06 100 .31 100 2.29 
101 52.02 101 447.42 101 447.42 
0 1 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Cont i nued) 
117 258.83 102 
118 228.60 103 
119 27.34 105 
120 2080.00 106 
121 800.00 107 
122 1745.41 108 
123 11050.92 109 
129 236.00 110 
130 236.00 111 
131 1496.00 116 
136 55.55 117 
137 35.27 118 
138 7.11 119 
139 11.11 120 
1 2 1  
1 2 2  
123 
124 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
0 
SM 2: FLE 22350.25 
EIT 2097.81 
2 3 4 
1 .50 102 12.89 102 12.89 
116.00 103 116.00 103 116.00 
486.52 105 70.59 106 39.09 
.42 106 4.85 107 27.07 
.29 107 3.36 108 3.62 
.04 108 .45 109 7.82 
.08 109 .97 110 45.12 
45.12 110 45.12 111 174.55 
174.55 111 174.55 116 66.91 
66.91 116 66.91 117 258.83 
258.83 117 258.83 118 228.60 
228.60 118 228.60 119 27.34 
27.34 119 27.34 120 2080.00 
2080.00 120 2080.00 121 800.00 
800.00 121 800.00 122 922.45 
1471.03 122 1196.68 123 11270.73 
22876.91 123 19047.62 124 6494.98 
195.40 124 1119.82 129 1013.06 
236.00 129 563.53 130 641.77 
236.00 130 573.15 131 4496.00 
2496.00 131 3496.00 132 223.25 
25.96 132 223.25 133 154.62 
17.98 133 154.62 134 20.68 
2.40 134 20.68 135 44.65 
5.19 135 44.65 136 57.88 
57.88 136 57.88 137 40.09 
40.09 137 40.09 138 5.36 
5.36 138 5.36 139 11.58 
11.58 139 11.58 
1 2 3 
25786.25 28380.41 26347.52 
5883.96 9602.07 6512.08 
0 1 2 3 
DPLIC 0.0 227,120 1106.72 6432.49 
DPMTG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DPTCl 0.0 4531.87 4531.87 0.0 
DPTC2 0.0 0.0 23263.70 10135 .41 
DILIC 0.0 64.48 278.91 1689.39 
DIMTG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DITC1 0.0 1600.20 727.36 0.0 
DITC2 0.0 0.0 735.13 573.08 
CLP 0.0 0.0 4900.05 36732.98 
DMTG2 0.0 0.0 195.39 1119.80 
IMTG2 0.0 0.0 27.35 156.77 
* * * A * * * îV A * îV îV sV sV jV >V jV sV sV * sV >V sV îV sV >V * A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 050 - sole proprietorship: 1 management unit, 1 family 
0 1 2 
(d/e)^_, 0.253 0.253 0.253 
NFI k-, - (CLP/5)k-. 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 
Working assets 
Liquid assets 
OCEPA 
OCLM 
10,384.00 17,391.99 21,596.79 
10,384 16,505 19,785 
0 286 1,639 
4,804 4,804 5,306 
14,058 24,597 45,772 
1,226 1,926 3,403 
5,730 6,567 8,626 
0 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
6 19.56 
9 92.21 
16 3.56 
23 .70 
30 1 1 .82 
37 52.77 
42 2.87 
44 15.35 
47 306.53 
64 .23 
65 3.91 
66 18.44 
68 1 .20 
70 62.96 
72 243.57 
86 309.37 
88 665.08 
90 12647.50 
92 2.53 
96 42.93 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .07 
103 22.23 
105 411.59 
106 1.15 
108 .17 
116 26.37 
117 164.06 
118 533.40 
1 
2 5.14 
6 46.88 
10 96.25 
16 3.71 
23 3.97 
30 30.94 
38 61.12 
40 .61 
42 5.28 
44 12.32 
47 501.77 
48 14.76 
64 1.17 
65 9.38 
66 19.25 
70 40.10 
72 166.87 
82 9.15 
84 5.20 
86 1304.16 
87 441.25 
88 2573.88 
90 8500.35 
91 502.12 
93 11.31 
96 56.03 
2 
3 172.39 
7 47.99 
9 100.29 
14 37.74 
15 10.51 
17 21.96 
23 42.16 
25 77.23 
30 33.24 
37 69.46 
40 15.97 
42 4.44 
44 9.29 
68 2.77 
82 22.61 
83 299.97 
84 377.86 
88 66257.75 
91 14016.70 
92 344.25 
100 .39 
102 2.77 
103 12.07 
105 344.25 
106 .74 
116 26.37 
117 164.06 
118 533.40 
100 10.03 
109 34.48 
110 103.06 
111 410.44 
116 26.37 
117 164.06 
118 533.40 
119 27.34 
Primal slacks (Cont i nued) 
0 
119 27.34 
121 7.93 
122 1710.43 
129 61.76 
130 61.56 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
99 .93 
100 .07 
101 41.72 
102 1.20 
103 201.00 
105 411.58 
106 .44 
107 .28 
108 .06 
109 .09 
110 62.96 
111 243.57 
116 26.37 
117 164.06 
118 533.40 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 24596.67 
124 285.99 
129 261.00 
130 261.00 
131 2596.00 
1 
119 15.61 
2 
120 23.94 
121 800.00 
122 1471.03 
124 1638.70 
135 9.60 
139 20.06 
product constraints 
2 3 
99 10.88 99 345.49 
100 .39 100 10.03 
101 96.18 101 96.18 
102 2.77 102 2.77 
103 201.00 103 201.00 
105 344.25 106 172.39 
106 5.43 107 119.40 
107 3.76 108 15.96 
108 .50 109 34.48 
109 1 .09 110 103.06 
110 103.06 111 410.44 
111 410.44 116 26.37 
116 26.37 117 164.06 
117 164.06 118 533.40 
118 533.40 119 27.34 
119 27.34 120 2080.00 
120 2080.00 121 800.00 
121 800.00 122 1196.68 
122 1471.03 123 29479.55 
123 45772.19 124 31006.85 
124 1638.70 129 592.73 
129 270.15 130 644.06 
130 266.20 132 47.99 
131 4348.00 133 33.24 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Continued) 
1 2 3 
132 19.98 132 47.99 134 4.44 
133 12.69 133 33.24 135 9.96 
134 2.56 134 4.44 136 100.29 
135 4.00 135 9.60 137 69.46 
136 96.25 136 100.29 138 9.29 
137 61.12 137 69.46 139 20.06 
138 12.32 138 9.29 
139 19.25 139 20.06 
0 1 2 
FLE 26129.85 31387. 54 34205.25 
EIT 6267.90 13998. 89 17636.17 
DPLIC 332.54 1619. 48 34415.78 
DPMTG 0.0 0. 0 0.0 
DPTCl 6323.75 10573. 92 4250.18 
DPTC2 0.0 502. 12 14016.69 
DILIC 94.38 408. 13 9567.97 
DIMTG 0.0 0. 0 0.0 
DITCl 2232.91 2515. 70 682.15 
DITC2 0.0 15. 87 442.93 
CLP 0.0 4436. 46 9059.28 
DMTG2 0.0 285. 98 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 40. 04 0.0 
A * * * * i< * * * * * * * * * »V sV sV jV A }V A sV sV * * * sV sV A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 060 - sole proprietorship: 1 management unit, 1 family 
0 12 3 
(d/e)^_, 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 
EN I  k-,) 10,775.00 20,394.99 30,014.98 36,748.97 
(Xsi.k-I - <CLP/5)k-, 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 
Working assets 
Liquid assets 
OCEPA 
OCLM 
0 
10,775 
0 
11,827 
;-l^ 19,085 
2,009 
6,554 
9 126.61 
33 72.46 
44 21.07 
47 430.05 
51 71.89 
70 88.33 
72 341.72 
84 53.25 
86 1397.04 
87 497.01 
88 581.26 
90 17744.08 
91 1076.20 
92 2.21 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
1 2 3 
20,395 23,241 30,845 
250 1,432 2,199 
12,903 18,574 19,758 
26,361 56,041 92,969 
2,565 4,922 7,438 
8,303 10,029 12,378 
1 4.74 6 179.42 3 2.53 
5 58.73 10 137.72 7 179.42 
6 118.89 27 8.05 10 137.72 
9 117.91 31 116.22 16 3.39 
13 .21 34 95.38 23 3.30 
15 7.95 40 .44 30 124.27 
23 3.22 42 16.62 38 95.38 
30 120.54 44 12.75 40 .44 
37 83.92 46 298.22 42 16.62 
40 .48 49 3.06 44 12.75 
42 17.97 50 71.89 53 15.74 
51 71.89 53 31.35 59 464.50 
64 .95 71 13.15 61 762.00 
65 35.52 85 32.05 64 .95 
66 26.43 86 1385.50 65 35.88 
82 116.71 87 85.53 66 27.54 
84 45.31 75 464.50 
86 207.52 83 38.70 
88 2249.46 85 9.22 
91 5670.56 86 1066.39 
93 9.88 87 130.29 
96 369.95 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
0  1 2 3  
100  .06  100  .34  99  9.10 100  .34  
103  55 .85  102  10.36 100  .34  102  10.36 
105  379 .83  103  47 .73  101  39.28 103 2 .60  
106 1 .01  110  88.33 102  10.36 106  2.23 
107  .61  111  341.72 103 30 .15  110  101 .48  
108  .15  114  24.91 106 4 .79  111  341.72 
109  .20  115  762.00 107  3 .32  113  14 .77  
114  24 .91  119  27 .34  109  .96  114  69 .52  
115  762.00 121 624.30 110  40 .23  119  14 .83  
119  27 .34  122 1537 .89  111  102.32 123 17134 .56  
122 125 .74  136 14 .25  115  762.00 124  2198.92 
129  226.39 138 16.91 124  1432 .16  
130  269.10 129 1 .01  
139  25 .32  135  35.88 
139  27 .54  
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and product constraints 
row and level 0 1  2 3  4  
100 .06 99  9.61 99  9 .54  99  7.22 
103 276.00 100  .34  100  .34  100  .34  
105 379.83 101  359 .59  101  359 .59  101  359 .59  
110  88 .33  102 10.36 102 10.36 102 10.36 
111  341 .72  103 276.00 103  276.00 103 276.00 
113  14 .77  106 4 .79  106 4.76 106 3.60 
114  82.03 107 3 .32  107  3 .30  107 2.49 
115  762.00 108 . 44  108 . 44  108 . 33  
119  27 .34  109 . 96  109 . 95  109 . 72  
120 2080.00 110 88.33 110 101 .48  110 101 .48  
121 800.00 111 341.72 111  341.72 111  341 .72  
122 1745 .41  113 14 .77  113  14 .77  112 464 .50  
123  26361. 45  114  82.03 114  82.03 113  14 .77  
124  249 .94  115  762.00 115  762.00 114  82.03 
129  436.00 119  27 .34  119  27 .34  115  762.00 
0 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Continued) 
1 2 
130 489.25 120 2080.00 
131 2693.75 121 800.00 
136 132.16 122 1471.03 
137 83.92 123 56041.19 
138 16.91 124 1432.16 
139 26.43 129 552.71 
130 534.56 
131 5098.75 
132 179.42 
133 124.27 
134 16.62 
135 35.88 
136 137.72 
137 95.38 
138 12.75 
139 27.54 
3 4 
120 2080.00 119 27.34 
121 800.00 120 2080.00 
122 1196.68 121 800.00 
123 111103.06 122 922.45 
124 2198.92 123 187914.62 
129 552.71 124 1891.07 
130 . 566.61 129 591.41 
131 7503.74 130 575.82 
132 179.42 131 9187.24 
133 124.27 132 179.42 
134 16.62 133 124.27 
135 35.88 134 16.62 
136 137.72 135 35.88 
137 95.38 136 137.72 
138 12.75 137 95.38 
139 27.54 138 12.75 
139 27.54 
0 12 3 
FLE 26465.72 34729.29 37174.21 43705.50 
EIT 6644.70 19362.99 22700.05 33705.72 
DPLIC 290.63 1415.36 1124.73 0.0 
DPMTG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DPTCl 8872.04 8872.04 0.0 0.0 
DPTC2 1076.20 5670.55 0.0 0.0 
DILIC 82.48 356.69 145.09 0.0 
DIMTG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DITCl 3132.71 1423.96 0.0 0.0 
DITC2 34.01 179.19 0.0 0.0 
CLP 0.0 0.0 33868.77 29521.88 
DMTG2 0.0 249.92 0.0 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 34.99 0.0 0.0 
A * * A A A A i 'c A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A • 
Farm 070 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)|^.| 0.253 
EN I k-|) 18,1(10.10 
- (CLP/S'k-I '8'4I0 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets |^_]) 66,064 
Working assets 9,928 
Liquid assets ^-1 " ^ ^k-1^ 18,506 
OCEPA ' 5,184 
OCLM 7,862 
Optimal solution (x^*,) 2 67.89 
13 2 ^ 8 
activity and level 23 3886 
37 140.46 
40 11.30 
47 389.23 
64 13.58 
66 46.48 
70 48.31 
72 145.22 
82 56.38 
84 113.49 
86 883.18 
87 205.76 
90 8124.84 
91 3432.98 
97 510.04 
1 management unit, 1 family 
1 2 3 
0.253 0.253 0.253 
21,769.69 24,289.38 25,129.27 
21,770 24,289 25,129 
58,965 52,860 47,610 
13,361 30,914 32,875 
46,231 80,415 91,785 
6,851 9,906 10,507 
9,579 12,306 12,930 
3 70.41 3 73.24 3 72.19 
10 237.40 10 247.37 10 247.37 
14 8.12 23 50.80 23 46.10 
23 44.71 37 171.33 24 4.19 
38 150.75 40 6.79 38 171.33 
40 9.01 44 22.91 40 6.72 
44 30.38 47 74.66 44 22.91 
47 362.70 48 34.41 59 1284.25 
48 34.41 58 105.48 • 64 14.52 
64 14.08 59 822.58 66 49.47 
66 47.48 64 14.67 75 356.10 
73 6.27 66 49.47 86 1037.35 
82 209.87 75 299.41 87 159.33 
83 63.54 83 31.88 
85 289.27 85 21.68 
86 1624.18 86 1328.42 
87 121.23 87 142.61 
88 .06 
91 7345.62 
0 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
99 12.42 
103 308.83 
104 14.28 
112 628.65 
119 27.34 
122 930.85 
124 66064.00 
136 232.41 
138 34.11 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
99 147.03 
103 495.76 
104 14.28 
106 70.41 
107 44.71 
108 9.01 
109 14.08 
110 79.95 
111 309.28 
112 628.65 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 46231.48 
124 58965.04 
129 284.38 
130 261.49 
131 4602.52 
136 237.40 
137 150.75 
1 
99 .67 
103 29.76 
104 14.28 
no 5.45 
112 628.65 
124 58965.04 
2 
103 4.68 
104 14.28 
106 .11 
110 64.61 
111 228.88 
124 52859.95 
3 
103 4.68 
104 14.28 
106 .41 
110 79.95 
111 315.55 
119 27.34 
123 41710.44 
124 47609.57 
129 1.67 
130 1.63 
product constraints (b, _,) 
2 
rs- 1 
3 4 
99 147.00 99 145.50 99 143.72 
103 495.76 103 495.76 103 495.76 
104 14.28 104 14.28 104 14.28 
106 73.35 106 72.60 106 71.71 
107 50.80 107 50.28 107 49.67 
108 6.79 108 6.72 108 6.64 
109 14.67 109 14.52 109 14.34 
110 79.95 110 79.95 110 79.95 
111 315.55 111 315.55 111 315.55 
112 628.65 112 928.06 112 1284.25 
119 27.34 119 27.34 119 27.34 
120 2080.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
121 800.00 121 800.00 121 800.00 
122 1471.03 122 1196.68 122 922.45 
123 80415.62 123 133494.81 123 189667.62 
124 52859.95 124 47609.57 124 43094.23 
129 557.79 129 589.66 129 589.66 
130 550.76 130 572.44 130 572.44 
131 5442.42 131 6072.34 131 6282.32 
136 247.37 136 247.37 136 247.37 
137 171.33 137 171.33 137 171.33 
i 
0 1 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 138 30.38 
(Continued) 139 47.48 
0 
SM 2: FLE 33024.2? 
EIT 16111.68 
DPLIC 0.0 
DPMTG 2500.00 
DPTCl 4062.42 
DPTC2 3432.98 
DILIC 0.0 
DIMTG 3650.62 
DITCl 1434.44 
DITC2 108.48 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
* * it * i< A it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it 
Farm 090 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)k_, 0.253 
EN I k-l) 15,815.00 
NFI 0\3i',k-l - (GLP/5)k-l 15,815 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets (b,„. , ,) 0 
1 2 4 , k - l  
Working assets 10,754 
2 3 4 
138 22.91 138 22.91 138 22.91 
139 49.47 139 49.47 139 49.47 
1 2 3 
35910.16 38074.57 38796.04 
20974.76 25469.88 26518.01 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 
4062.42 0.0 0.0 
7345.61 0.0 0.0 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
2986.87 2323.12 1659.37 
652.02 0.0 0.0 
232.12 0 .0  0 .0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
it it it it it it it it it it it it it it * it it it it it it it A A 
1 management unit, 1 family 
1 2 3 
0.253 0.253 0.253 
24,709.99 29,157.49 30,936.48 
18,000 23,213 25,755 
0 0 0 
19,191 22,787 23,453 
0 1 2 3 
Liquid assets (b^^a.k-l - sVk-,) 24,667 51,682 60,661 55,613 
OCEPA 2,302 4,607 5,424 5,139 
OCLM 8,557 10,044 10,601 10,003 
Optimal solution 6 147.92 7 151.09 7 157.44 7 157.44 
9 152.68 10 158.49 10 165.14 10 165.14 
activity and level 16 26.92 16 18.94 16 2.98 16 2.98 
30 89.39 18 47.88 30 109.04 30 109.04 
37 88.66 30 95.94 38 114.38 37 114.38 
42 21.71 37 100.64 43 14.58 42 9.31 
44 3.07 43 19.33 45 15.29 43 5.27 
55 5.77 45 20.28 49 .05 45 15.29 
65 29.58 65 30.22 57 34.36 49 .05 
66 30.54 66 3.68 63 1194.37 63 1212.06 
68 9.09 68 9.09 65 31.49 65 31.49 
82 208.57 83 41.76 66 33.03 66 33.03 
84 208.91 85 82.24 68 3.72 81 17.68 
91 8437.27 86 81.15 73 .04 86 1091.23 
96 324.62 89 .04 81 432.37 87 105.45 
97 87.42 83 18.36 
86 1288.71 
87 182.32 
Primal slacks 103 56.02 104 2.45 102 5.36 102 9.09 
row and level 
104 2.45 116 39.58 103 3.12 103 3.12 
116 38.40 117 164.06 104 2.45 104 2.45 
117 159.47 118 762.00 116 39.58 116 39.58 
118 762.00 119 27.34 117 136.75 117 164.06 
119 27.34 121 800.00 123 32692.62 119 27.30 
121 785.08 122 1664.26 124 .01 123 93989.89 
122 2019.80 123 23276.94 130 36.42 124 .02 
138 21.56 139 28.01 130 38.28 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and product constraints 
row and level 0 12 3 
101 315.53 101 315.53 101 315.53 101 315.53 
102 9.09 102 9.09 102 9.09 102 9.09 
103 330.97 103 330.97 103 330.97 103 330.97 
104 2.45 104 2.45 104 2.45 104 2.45 
116 39.58 116 39.58 111 .04 111 .04 
117 164.06 117 164.06 116 39.58 116 39.58 
118 762.00 118 762.00 117 164.06 117 164.06 
119 27.34 119 27.34 118 1194.37 118 1212.06 
120 2080.00 120 2080.00 119 27.34 119 27.34 
121 800.00 121 . 800.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
122 1745.41 122 1471.03 121 800.00 121 800.00 
123 51682.59 123 93353.56 122 1196.68 122 922.45 
129 534.57 129 576.33 123 149603.37 123 211747.19 
130 534.91 130 617.15 129 594.70 129 594.70 
131 3953.75 131 6177.50 130 617.15 130 617.15 
132 151.09 132 157.44 131 7289.37 131 7734.12 
133 95.94 133 109.04 132 157.44 132 157.44 
134 19.33 134 14.58 133 109.04 133 109.04 
135 30.22 135 31.49 134 14.58 134 14.58 
136 158.49 136 165.14 135 31.49 135 31.49 
137 100.64 137 114.38 136 165.14 136 165.14 
138 20.28 138 15.29 137 114.38 137 114.38 
139 31.70 139 33.03 138 15.29 138 15.29 
139 33.03 139 33.03 
0 1 2 3 
FLE 30795.08 32672.06 37150.54 39333.98 
EIT 12560.39 15657.02 22667.73 27299.53 
DPLIC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DPMTG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DPTC1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DPTC2 8437.26 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DILIC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0 1 2 3 
DIMTG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DITCl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DITC2 266.62 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CLP 0.0 33549.64 29719.13 25904.82 
DMTG2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
A A A A A * >V * A A * * A * * * A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
(d/s'k-, 
"F' - ("P/S'k-l 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 
Working assets 
Liquid assets (b^^a.k-l 
OCEPA 
OCLM 
e proprietorship: 1 management unit. 1 family 
0 1 2 3 
0.292 0.253 0.253 0.253 
7,532.20 7,903.29 15,325.29 22,747.28 
7,532 7,903 12,598 18,293 
0 0 0 0 
4,991 9,491 17,739 24,529 
Vi^ 10,375 
16,449 19,379 38,160 
999 1,686 2,413 4,075 
6,146 7,208 7,806 8,738 
9 173.86 5 71.50 5 135.34 6 94.57 
33 99.50 9 181.48 9 189.11 7 40.77 
44 28.94 15 17.15 15 15.82 10 189.11 
51 51.62 17 59.05 17 9.08 16 29.63 
55 109.75 26 48.52 26 93.73 17 41.40 
66 23.02 33 115.24 33 130.98 30 93.73 
79 22.54 42 7.23 42 12.53 37 130.98 
80 87.21 44 23.22 44 17.51 42 12.53 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
Optimal solution (Continued) 
0 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
103 53.68 
105 279.04 
113 5.22 
115 190.50 
119 27.34 
120 16.69 
121 383.01 
122 2019.80 
129 79.66 
130 76.70 
139 11.75 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
103 379.00 
105 279.04 
113 15.82 
114 41.02 
115 190.50 
116 22.54 
117 87.21 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
1 
65 .34 
82 91.24 
84 144.40 
91 8247.63 
96 148.92 
2 
65 13.80 
82 113.29 
84 80.71 
91 6789.95 
96 130.13 
3 
44 17.51 
68 7.81 
83 16.16 
85 50.03 
89 .20 
102 4.17 
105 130.13 
113 15.82 
114 41 .02 
115 190.50 
116 22.54 
117 87.21 
119 27.34 
120 206.97 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
135 13.96 
139 36.30 
102 7.81 
103 32.32 
113 15.82 
114 41.02 
115 190.50 
116 22.54 
117 87.21 
119 27.34 
121 800.00 
122 1471.03 
135 13.26 
139 37.82 
113 15.82 
114 41 .02 
115 190.50 
116 22.54 
117 87.21 
119 27.34 
120 133.29 
121 800.00 
122 1196.68 
123 11997.62 
135 27.07 
139 37.82 
product constraints 
2 3 4  
101 144.74 101 271.23 101 271.23 
102 4.17 102 7.81 102 7.81 
103 379.00 103 379.00 103 379.00 
105 130.13 113 15.82 113 15.82 
113 15.82 114 41.02 114 41 .02 
114 41.02 115 190.50 115 190.50 
115 190.50 116 22.54 116 22.54 
116 22.54 117 87.21 117 87.21 
117 87.21 119 27.34 119 27.34 
119 27.34 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
0 1 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 122 
(Continued) 123 16449.22 
129 379.00 
130 379.00 
131 1883.05 
136 181.48 
137 115.24 
138 23.22 
139 36.30 
0 
SM 2: FLE 2368O.I6 
EIT 3264.42 
DPLIC 0.0 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 0.0 
DPTC2 4500.00 
DILIC 0.0 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 0.0 
DITC2 142.20 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
sV * -k A /V A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
2 3 4 
120 2080.00 121 800.00 121 800.00 
121 800.00 122 1196.68 122 922.45 
122 1471.03 123 38160.12 123 80721.62 
123 19379.19 129 583.54 129 599.69 
129 470.24 130 604.11 130 654.14 
130 523.40 131 3831.32 131 5686.82 
131 1975.82 132 135.34 132 135.34 
132 72.22 133 93.73 133 93.73 
133 50.02 134 12.53 134 12.53 
134 6.69 135 27.07 135 27.07 
135 14.44 136 189.11 136 I89.II 
136 189.11 137 130.98 137 130.98 
137 130.98 138 17.51 138 17.51 
138 17.51 139 37.82 139 37.82 
139 37.82 
1 2 3 
23998.93 28032.23 32924.34 
4079.31 9175.50 15982.68 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
8247.63 6789.94 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
260.62 214.56 0.0 
0.0 13633.22 22267.58 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 110 - sole proprietorship: 
0 
(d/e)k_, 0.253 
ENl k-|l 9,738.50 
NFI - k:LP/5)k_, 3.738 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets k-l^ ° 
Working assets 10,644 
Liquid assets - SV^ ^) 15,613 
OCEPA ' 1,707 
OCLM 7,795 
Optimal solution (x**,) 5 24.75 
9 242.65 
activity and level 
17 53*52 
30 14.96 
35 51.33 
37 90.24 
42 3.63 
44 38.73 
65 4.95 
66 48.53 
82 155.86 
84 179.31 
91 6773.78 
96 54.31 
97 185.19 
1 management i 
1 
0.253 
17,808.49 
16,685 
0 
21,918 
21,429 
2,818 
8,132 
, 1 family 
2 
0.253 
21 ,843.49 
19,660 
844 
2 1 , 9 1 8  
54,481 
5,008 
10,346 
3 
0.253 
21,439.98 
19,537 
1,351 
26,813 
86,530 
7,436 
12,260 
2 4.14 
6 56.45 
9 50.64 
10 114.00 
16 10.95 
23 2.81 
30 37.20 
37 159.64 
47 120.86 
55 206.47 
64 .83 
65 11.29 
66 50.28 
68 3.34 
70 24.82 
72 96.04 
79 10.77 
86 1022.33 
88 1963.54 
7 57.82 
10 261.96 
16 1,09 
23 1.75 
30 40.05 
37 181.44 
40 .36 
42 5.36 
44 24.26 
47 59.70 
48 34.41 
58 978.16 
64 .78 
65 11.56 
66 52.39 
74 717.29 
75 260.87 
82 90.07 
84 49.78 
6 57.82 
10 261.96 
31 40.05 
34 67.90 
38 113.54 
40 .13 
42 5.36 
44 24.26 
58 178.27 
59 1144.72 
75 344.84 
86 1008.41 
87 188.28 
Optimal solution (Continued) 
0 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
102 1.52 
104 5.18 
105 73.55 
116 31.64 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 800.00 
122 2019.80 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
101 52.79 
102 1.52 
103 525.00 
104 5.18 
105 73.55 
1 2 3 
90 4986.78 86 1323.06 
92 8.63 87 147.97 
96 64.92 90 8284.70 
91 4894.88 
100 .24 100 .24 99 1.03 
103 150.45 102 3.34 100 .24 
104 5.18 103 4.95 101 12.66 
108 .42 104 5.18 102 3.34 
118 381.00 106 3.88 103 57.35 
119 27.34 107 .93 104 5.18 
122 723.08 110 12.56 106 1.44 
129 39.31 111 21 .26 107 1.00 
130 86.82 116 42.41 109 .29 
134 6.39 117 164.06 110 24.82 
136 86.76 118 381.00 111 96.04 
138 32.17 124 844.32 116 42.41 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
124 1570.44 
129 34.78 
130 3.07 
135 11.56 
139 52.39 
product constraints (b k-l) 
2 3 4 
99 7.78 99 2.89 99 1.16 
100 .24 100 .24 100 .24 
101 115.89 101 115.89 101 115.89 
102 3.34 102 3.34 102 3.34 
103 525.00 103 525.00 103 525.00 
0 1 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Continued) 
116 31.64 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 21429.06 
129 500.86 
130 524.31 
131 2434.62 
132 25.28 
133 16.05 
134 3.23 
135 5.06 
136 251.40 
137 159.64 
138 32.17 
139 50.28 
SM 2: FLE 
EIT 
DPLIC 
0 
25575.36 
5671.03 
0 . 0  
2 3 4 
104 5.18 
106 3.88 
107 2.69 
108 .36 
109 .78 
110 24.82 
111 96.04 
116 42.41 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1471.03 
123 54481.42 
124 844.32 
129 500.86 
130 524.31 
131 4452.12 
132 57.82 
133 40.05 
134 5.36 
135 11.56 
136 261.96 
137 181.44 
138 24.26 
139 52.39 
104 5.18 
106 1.44 
107 1.00 
108 .13 
109 .29 
110 24.82 
III 96.04 
112 978.16 
116 42.41 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1196.68 
123 86530.25 
124 1570.44 
129 590.93 
130 574.10 
131 5460.87 
132 57.82 
133 40.05 
134 5.36 
135 11.56 
136 261.96 
137 181.44 
138 24.26 
139 52.39 
104 5.18 
106 .58 
107 .40 
108 .05 
109 .12 
110 24.82 
111 96.04 
112 1323.00 
116 42.41 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 922.45 
123 128054.69 
124 1350.58 
129 590.93 
130 574.10 
131 5359.99 
132 57.82 
133 40.05 
134 5.36 
135 11.56 
136 261.96 
137 181.44 
138 24.26 
139 52.39 
31543.24 
14199.89 
981.77 
34098.30 
17498.11 
981.77 
3 
33992.36 
17361.36 
0 . 0  
0 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 0.0 
DPTC2 11273.78 
DILIC 0.0 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 0.0 
D1TC2 356.25 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
1MTG2 0.0 
A A * A it A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 120 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)^_, 0.419 
EN I k-l) 20,075.99 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets (bjgi, |^_]) 56,080 
Working assets 9,395 
Liquid assets (bj^g |^_] ~ SV^ 24,320 
OCEPA ' 5,024 
OCLM 8,454 
Optimal solution (x' ".) 2 89.79 
q iqo 18 
activity and level 19*40 
23 52.28 
1 2 3 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
2493.39 6635.74 4142.35 
0.0 4894.88 0.0 
278.63 126.65 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
880.41 1862.85 664.85 
0.0 154.68 0.0 
5612,63 10915.33 9514.40 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
1 management 
1 
0.297 
26,075.99 
26,076 
67,375 
9,395 
33,024 
6,160 
8,843 
, 1 family 
2 
0.253 
28,475.98 
28,476 
81,680 
9,395 
55,381 
8,335 
10,018 
3 
0.253 
27,875.96 
27,876 
82,178 
9,395 
107,772 
11,766 
13,260 
2 115.33 
10 198.72 
14 .72 
23 74.22 
3 119.26 
10 207.07 
23 18.25 
24 64.35 
3 87.54 
10 207.07 
24 82.60 
38 143.42 
Optimal solution (Continued) 37 108.96 
40 14 .40  
44  31.68 
47 120.08 
51 154.04  
64  17 .96  
66  38.08 
70 24 .66  
72  95 .42  
86 1349.80  
88 16065.90  
90  4954.56  
93  61 .14  
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 2 .71  
103 45 .90  
104 160.00  
105 46 .90  
114 123.69  
115 1143.00  
119 27 .34  
121 91 .66  
122 670.00 
124 54294.56  
129 208.83 
130 204.10 
1 2  3  
37  64 .01  38  143.42  40  11 .04  
38  62 .18  40  11 .04  44  19.18 
40 14 .15  44  19.18 59 187.49  
44  25 .43  46  199.27  61 1143.00  
47  199.76  50  154.04  64  23 .85  
51 154.04  52  11.56 66 41 .41  
52  34 .41  53  22 .86  73  428.36 
64 23 .07  64  23.85 75 187.49  
66  39 .74  66  41 .41  86  1002.81  
70  16 .37  86  1424.19  87  193.87  
72  63.31 87 46 .84  
86 1645.92  
87  99 .49  
88  10674.64  
90  3287.62 
93 46 .90  
99 11 .53  
100 4 .02  
103 24.92  
104 160.00 
114 96 .34  
115 1143.00  
124 66189.49  
129 144.98  
130 156.24  
99 2.26 
100 4.02  
103 3.92  
104 160.00 
110 .10  
111 .39  
114 96 .34  
115 1143.00  
124 81679.81 
129 110.90 
130 128.42  
99 30.90 
100 4.02  
103 3 .92  
104 160.00 
106 31.72  
110 41.03  
111 587.09  
113 31 .64  
114 246.09  
119 27 .34  
124 82177.75  
129 142.62  
130 160.14  
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and product constraints (b|^_|) 
row and level 
99 193.83 99 239.02 99 239.02 99 235.94 
100 2.71 100 4.02 100 4.02 100 4.02 
103 415.00 103 415.00 103 415.00 103 415.00 
104 160.00 104 160.00 104 160.00 104 160.00 
105 46.90 106 119.26 106 119.26 106 117.73 
106 92.82 107 82.60 107 82.60 107 81.54 
107 58.94 108 11.04 108 11.04 108 10.90 
108 11.88 109 23.85 109 23.85 109 23.54 
109 18.56 110 41.03 110 41.03 110 41.03 
110 24.66 111 158.73 111 158.73 111 587.09 
111 95.42 113 31.64 113 31.64 112 187.49 
113 31.64 114 246.09 114 246.09 113 31.64 
114 246.09 115 1143.00 115 1143.00 114 246.09 
115 1143.00 119 27.34 119 27.34 115 1143.00 
119 27.34 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 119 27.34 
120 2080.00 121 800.00 121 800.00 120 2080.00 
121 800.00 122 1471.03 122 1196.68 121 800.00 
122 1745.41 123 55381.43 123 107771.87 122 922.45 
123 33024.35 124 81679.81 124 82177.75 123 176050.37 
124 67375.56 129 711.00 129 711.00 124 70672.81 
129 711.00 130 711.00 130 711.00 129 711.00 
130 711.00 131 6518.99 131 7118.99 130 711.00 
131 5019.00 136 207.07 136 207.07 131 6968.99 
136 198.72 137 143.42 137 143.42 136 207.07 
137 126.19 138 19.18 138 19.18 137 143.42 
138 25.43 139 41.41 139 41.41 138 19.18 
139 39.74 139 41.41 
0 12 3 
SM 2: FLE 34455.2? 39609.2? 41670.86 41155.44 
EIT 18988.98 27699.48 30744.97 29945.74 
DPLIC 22263.72 27601.03 13875.78 0.0 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTC1 2923.94 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 9989.97 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 1018.11 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 1785.43 
IMTG2 249.96 
* * * * A A * * A * » * * A * * A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 130 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)|^_l 0.943 
ENI 10,472.20 
"F' - (CLP/5)k., 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets (b^gn k-l^ 0 
Working assets 2,542 
Liquid assets 13,349 
OCEPA ' 1,033 
OCLM 6,719 
Optimal solution 
activity and level 
9 170.65 
35 77.10 
37 20.56 
1 2 3 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
4121.09 1643.81 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
6589.67 1789.97 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1049.72 263.83 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1186.05 0.0 0.0 
166.05 0.0 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
1 management 
I 
0.253 
' 7,964.79 
7,965 
59 
17,542 
14,757 
2,102 
6,990 
, 1 family 
2 
0.253 
16,322.78 
14,224 
338 
17,542 
23,481 
2,684 
7,567 
3 
0.253 
24,680.78 
22,851 
14,469 
17,542 
32,776 
4,001 
8,130 
1 1.12 1 61.88 5 20.44 
5 55.04 2 21.00 6 35.15 
9 178.13 5 55.60 12 185.62 
0 
Optimal solution (Continued) 44 28.40 
47 101.48 
51 123.23 
66 34.13 
70 20.84 
72 80.63 
86 300.68 
88 137.16  
85  4186.99  
92 .52 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .01 
103 41.15 
105 285.52 
106 .24 
107 .14 
108 .03 
109 .05 
114 66.14 
115 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 219.35 
122 1719.11 
129 472.41 
130 1075.28 
1 
13 .27 
15 9.99 
17 57.96 
19 .76 
26 37.35 
33 113.11 
40 .11 
42 5.57 
44 22.79 
65 3.48 
88 530.80 
93 2.33 
96 114.63 
2 
9 185.62 
13 18.14 
15 12.17 
17 40.63 
21 13.95 
25 43.46 
28 38.50 
33 60.03 
34 68.52 
40 7.68 
42 5.15 
44 17.19 
86 38.76 
88 32442.56 
92 152.75 
93 15.81 
3 
15 1.05 
23 57.40 
30 38.50 
37 128.56 
40 7.68 
42 5.15 
44 17.19 
47 83.80 
51 123.23 
58 625.83 
64 16.58 
65 11.12 
66 37.12 
74 625.83 
86 1081.18 
87 115.51 
90 7228.36 
100 .08 100 4.80 99 81.32 
102 3.21 102 3.21 100 4.80 
105 168.56 109 16.58 102 3.21 
109 .22 110 20.84 103 3.51 
110 20.84 111 80.63 106 82.88 
11 1 80.63 113 25.31 110 3.63 
113 25.31 114 164.06 11 1 14.05 
114 164.06 115 381.00 114 66.14 
115 381.00 119 27.34 115 381.00 
119 27.34 121 800.00 119 27.34 
120 349.52 122 1432.27 124 14469.16 
121 800.00 129 172.95 129 258.37 
122 1745.41 130 722.47 130 875.25 
129 336.40 135 1 1.12 
130 889.79 139 37.12 
135 7.53 
139 35.63 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource 
row and level 0 1 
100  
103  372 .  
105  285 .  
110  20 .  
111  80 .  
113  25 .  
114  164 .  
115  381 .  
119  27 .  
120  2080 .  
121  800 .  
122  1745 .  
123  14756 .  
124  58 .  
129  772 .  
130  1372 .  
131  2618 .  
136  178 .  
137  113 .  
138  22 .  
139  35 .  
product constraints (b. _.) 
2 
N- 1 
3  4  
99  2 .27  99  166. 11  99  162.98 
100  .08  100 4.80 100 4 .80  
101 111 .42  101 111 .42  101 111 .42  
102 3.21 102 3 .21  102 3.21 
103  372.00 103 372.00 103  372.00 
105  168.56 106 82.88 106  81.32 
106 1 .13  107 57 .40  107  56.32 
107  .78  108 7.68 108 7 .53  
108 .10 109  16.58 109  16.26 
109  .23  110 20 .84  110 20 .84  
110 20 .84  111  80.63 111  80.63 
111  80 .63  113  25 .31  112  625.83 
113  25 .31  114  164 .06  113  25.31 
114  164 .06  115  381.00 114  164 .06  
115  381.00 119  27 .34  115  381 .00  
119  27 .34  120  2080.00 119  27 .34  
120  2080.00 121 800.00 120  2080.00 
121 800.00 122 1196 .68  121 800.00 
122 1471.03 123  32776 .43  122 922 .45  
123  23481 .33  124  14469 .16  123  64746 .36  
124  337 .94  129  772.00 124  26393.78 
129  772.00 130  1372.00 129  772.00 
130  1372.06 131  4080 .70  130  1372.00 
131  1991 .20  132  55.60 131  6170.20 
132  55 .60  133  38.50 132  55.60 
133  38 .50  134  5 .15  133  38.50 
134  5 .15  135  11.12 134  5 .15  
135  11.12 136 185 .62  135  11.12 
136  185.62 137  128.56 136  185 .62  
137  128.56 138 17 .19  137  128.56 
138  17 .19  139  37 .12  138 17 .19  
139  37 .12  139  37 .12  
and 
01 
00 
52  
84 
63  
31  
06 
00 
34  
00 
00 
41  
68 
98 
00 
00 
05  
13  
1 1  
79  
63  
0 
FLE 26205.61 
EIT 6352.89 
DPLIC 68.58 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPT CI 2093.49 
DPTC2 15000.00 
DILIC 19.46 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITC1 739.21 
DITC2 473.99 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
* îV A i< îV * * A * >V îV * Vf * * * * A A A A A A A A A 
Farm 140 - sole proprietorship! 
0 
(d/e)k_, 0.253 
EN! k-,) 8,599.99 
NFI - (CLP/5)k_, 8,600 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 0 
Working assets 9,583 
Liquid assets (b^^a.k-l " 10,192 
OCEPA ' 1,146 
OCLM 5,738 
1 2 3 
24051.75 29428.32 36839.24 
4132.64 10885.91 22242.85 
333.98 16486.68 16221.28 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
2093.49 0.0 3614.18 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
84.17 4637.83 2092.54 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
336. 00  0.0 1276.17 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 10494.43 9147.52 
58.98 337.93 0.0 
8 .26  47.31 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
management unit, 
1 
0.253 
14,799.98 
14,800 
83 
9,583 
19,789 
1,913 
6,768 
1 family 
2 
0.253 
22,199.97 
28,326 
477 
13,464 
40,078 
3,504 
8,543 
3 
0.253 
30,199.96 
27,433 
2,579 
20,107 
68,417 
5,884 
10,407 
0 
Optimal solution 9 115*60 
3 3  2 . 2 2  
activity and level ^5 63*94 
44 19.24 
47 143.22 
51 51.62 
55 47.87 
66 23.12 
70 29 . 42  
72 113.80 
79 9.83 
80 38.04 
88 193.58 
90 5909.39 
92 .74 
Primal slacks 100 .02 
. , , 103 27.87 
row and level j05 405.31 
106 .34 
107 .20 
1 
2 1.06 
6 49.14 
9 120.67 
16 2.20 
23 1.07 
30 33.35 
37 76.62 
42 4.97 
44 15.44 
47 292.84 
51 51.62 
64 .32 
65 9.83 
66 24.13 
70 30.73 
72 118.89 
82 58.37 
84 52.53 
86 738.36 
87 41.85 
88 749.15 
90 6173.26 
91 3881.46 
93 3.29 
96 102.36 
2 
2 11.17 
6 84.08 
10 125.74 
16 1.59 
23 8.34 
30 58.24 
37 87.09 
40 1.12 
42 7.79 
44 11.64 
47 201.82 
48 34.41 
51 51.62 
58 220.26 
60 381.00 
64 2.41 
65 16.82 
66 25.15 
74 220.26 
82 97.55 
84 92.26 
86 1176.32 
87 294.71 
88 4293.73 
90 2544.06 
91 6643.45 
93 22.31 
96 71.01 
3 
6 162.92 
10 125.74 
24 22.67 
31 112.84 
38 87.09 
40 3.03 
42 15.09 
44 11.64 
46 322.51 
49 34.41 
50 51.62 
64 6.55 
65 32.58 
66 25.15 
71 6.09 
73 50.92 
83 150.36 
85 144.22 
86 1156.28 
87 40.41 
89 6124.23 
94 43.79 
96 162.54 
100 .11 100 .74 99 33.07 
102 2.86 102 4.85 100 1 .96 
103 15.13 103 2.38 101 3.08 
105 299.66 105 206.34 102 9.40 
106 .52 106 .87 103 2.38 
Primal slacks (Cont i nued) 
0 
108 .05  
109 .07  
113 2 .05  
115 381.00  
119 27 .34  
121 172.83  
122 2019.80  
129 49 .05  
130 51 .00  
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
100 .02  
103 252.00  
105 405.31  
110 29 .42  
111 113.80  
113 12 .66  
114 41 .02  
115 381.00  
116 9 .83  
117 38 .04  
119 27 .34  
120 2080.00  
121 800.00  
122 1745.41  
123 19788.75  
124 83 .24  
129 252.00  
130 252.00  
131 2150.00  
136 120.67  
137 76 .62  
1 
108 .16  
113 2 .05  
115 381.00  
116 9 .83  
117 38 .04  
119 27 .34  
122 965.20  
2 
110 18 .70  
111 44 .98  
113 2 .05  
116 9 .83  
117 38 .04  
3 
106 32 .73  
112 220.26  
113 2 .05  
115 381.00  
116 9 .83  
117 38 .04  
123 3459.03  
124 2578.62  
product constraints (t)|^_|) 
2 3 4  
99  2 .45  99  23.03 99 65.32 
100 .11  100 .74  100 1 .96 
101 99 .49  101 168.51  101 326.51 
102 2.86 102 4.85 102 9 .40  
103 252.00 103 252.00 103 252.00 
105 299.66  105 206.34 106 32 .59  
106 1 .22  106 11.49  107 22.57  
107 .85  107 7.96  108 3.02 
108 .11 108 1.06 109 6.52 
109 .24  109 2.30 110 66.24  
110 60.15  110 60.15  111 283.61  
111 232.69 111 232.69 112 220.26 
113 12.66 1 12 220.26 113 12.66 
114 41 .02 113 12.66 114 41 .02 
115 381 .00 114 41 .02 115 381 .00 
116 9.83  115 381.00  116 9.83 
117 38.04  116 9.83 117 38 .04  
119 27 .34  117 38 .04  119 27 .34  
120 2080.00 119 27 .34  120 2080.00 
121 800.00 120 2080.00 121 800.00 
122 1471 .03 121 800.00 122 922.45  
0 1 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 138 15.44 
(Continued) 139 24.13 
0 
FLE 24597.40 
ElT 4683.57 
DPLIC 96.79 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCI 2954.70 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 27.47 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 1043.30 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
v'c îV A I't * * <V * * •k v'{ * Y( Vt * îV îV * Vf îV îV A A A 
2 3 4 
123 40078.54 
124 476.96 
129 310.37 
130 304.53 
131 3700.00 
132 49.64 
133 34.38 
134 4.60 
135 9.93 
136 ,125.74 
137 87.09 
138 11.64 
139 25.15 
122 1196.68 
123 71875.88 
124 2578.62 
129 407.91 
130 396.80 
131 5549.99 
132 84.08 
133 58.24 
134 7.79 
135 16.82 
136 125.74 
137 87.09 
138 11.64 
139 25.15 
123 132344.12 
124 5380.62 
129 558.28 
130 541.02 
131 7549.99 
132 162.92 
133 112.84 
134 15.09 
135 32.58 
136 125.74 
137 87.09 
138 11.64 
139 25.15 
1 
29923.18 
11492.18 
471.36 
0 . 0  
6041.33 
3881.46 
118.79 
0 . 0  
1564.12 
122.65 
0 . 0  
83.23 
11.65 
2 
34669.89 
19281.90 
2521.44 
0 . 0  
4358.66 
6643.44 
657.60 
0 . 0  
944.56 
209.93 
9370.64 
476.94 
66.77 
40774.94 
29392.96 
2146.86 
1531.06 
1272.03 
0 . 0  
276.94 
1097.54 
204 .16 
0 . 0  
13834.81 
0 . 0  
Farm 150 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)^_, 0.263 , 
EN I k-,) 20,345.00 
NF' (*biai!k.1 - (GLP/5)k., 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 91,984 
Working assets 10,820 
Liquid assets ^-1 " ^5,057 
OCEPA ' 6,327 
OCLM 6,456 
Optimal solution I 105.58 
. , r 5 50.46 
activity and level ^g ^2 \-j 
23 65.11 
30 28.88 
40 18.93 
42 8.40 
47 218.79 
64 22.75 
65 10.09 
70 25.95 
72 104.94 
86 226.86 
90 5385.62 
1 management unit. 1 family 
1 2 3 
0.253 0.253 0.253 
32,462.29 41,783.27 44,579.5: 
30,188 39,769 41,408 
96,880 103,999 110,122 
10,820 20,255 27,145 
31,194 50,304 105,156 
7,623 9,838 14,161 
8,458 9,603 13,531 
2 219.90 3 225.61 3 225.46 
6 52.67 7 97.92 7 97.92 
16 6.60 23 156.26 16 1.85 
23 144.06 30 35.39 23 79.59 
30 33.45 31 32.42 24 76.62 
40 25.42 40 20.89 30 1.36 
42 6.74 42 9.07 31 66.46 
47 337.40 47 338.56 40 20.89 
64 43.98 48 34.41 42 9.07 
65 10.53 64 45.12 59 1250.37 
70 24.36 65 19.58 64 45.11 
72 94.25 71 .24 65 19.58 
82 138.72 73 28.26 75 869.37 
84 130.85 83 98.22 83 .71 
86 1289.98 84 11.85 85 1.64 
87 24.61 85 76.87 86 1062.66 
88 48099.71 86 1458.20 87 134.03 
90 4894.08 87 12.84 
0 1 2 3 
Optimal solution (Continued) 91 9435.09  91 414.74  
93  211.32  96  88.72 
99 34.96 99 18.80 99 4 .12  100 5.92 
105 300.04  100 5 .92  100 5 .92  102 2.48  
106 8.19  105 88.72 101 1.85 106 .08  
112 381.00  112 381.00 102 2.48  no  69.54  
119 27 .34  119 27 .34  112 381.00  111 296.36 
121 234.65  122 430.82  124 103999.19  119 27 .34  
122 1792.94  124 91535.09  123 14674.97  
124 91984.00  124 110122.13 
129 71 .79  
130 68 .46  
Primal slacks 
row and level 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and product constraints 
row and level 0 12  3 
99 247.34  99  452.16  99  452.02  99  447.67  
101 110.00 100 5.92  100 5.92  100 5 .92  
105 300.04  101 110.00 101 196.23  101 196.23  
106 118.44  105 88.72 102 2.48  102 2.48  
107 75.21  106 225.61  106 225.54  106 223.37  
108 15.15 107 156.26 107 156.21  107 154.71  
109 23.69 108 20.89  108 20 .89  108 20 .69  
110 44.94 109 45.12  109 45.11  109 44 .67  
111 173.85 110 69 .30  110 69 .54  110 69 .54  
112 381.00 111 268.10 111 296.36 111 296.36  
119 27.34 112 381.00  1 12  381.00  112 1250.37  
120 2080.00 119 27.34  119 27 .34  119 27 .34  
121 800.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00  120 2080.00  
122 1745.41  121 800.00 121 800.00  121 800.00  
123 31194.24  122 1471 .03 122 1196.68 122 922.45  
124 96879.50 123 50304.51 123 119831.06  123 224515.56  
129 358.00 124 103999.19  124 110122.13  124 94705.00  
0 1 2 3 4 
i n i t i a l  u p d a t e d  130 358.00 129 496.72 129 594.94 129 595.66 
supply levels 131 5086.25 130 488.85 130 577.57 130 579.21 
(continued) 132 52.67 131 8115.57 131 10445.82 131 11144.89 
133 33.45 132 54.89 132 97.92 132 97.92 
134 6.74 133 38.01 133 67.82 133 67.82 
135 10.53 134 5.08 134 9.07 134 9.07 
135 10.98 135 19.58 135 19.58 
0 1 2 3 
sm 2: fle 33835.94 43141.99 51371.71 52779.47 
e i t  17159.45 32885.73 44861.45 46910.02 
dplic 20666.66 24049.86 24049.86 0.0 
dpmtg 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
dptcl 2692.81 5139.85 2447.04 0.0 
dptc2 0.0 9435.09 414.74 0.0 
d i l i c  5331.99 9491.34 5768.43 2666.00 
dimtg 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ditcl 950.83 1296.24 392.75 0.0 
ditc2 0.0 298.15 13.10 0.0 
clp 4950.00 11368.49 10070.50 15857.75 
dmtg2 0.0 5344.41 0.0 0.0 
imtg2 0.0 748.22 0.0 0.0 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A >V sV /V >V îV A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
farm 160 -  sole proprietorship :  1 management u n i t .  1  f a m i l y  
0 1 2 3 
(d/e)k. |  0.351 0.253 0.253 0.253 
8,035.99 11,035.99 19,035.99 26,635.98 
• (clp/5) 8,036 11,036 18,436 23,243 
0 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 0 
Working assets 5,205 
Liquid assets 10,174 
OCEPA 649 
OCLM 5,655 
Optimal solution (xf",) 9 138.54 
35 58.45 
activity and level yj go 84 
44 23.06 
47 104.27 
55 106.64 
66 27.71 
70 21.42 
72 82.85 
88 140.93 
90 4302.10 
92 .54 
1 
60 
10,605 
13,475 
1,568 
6,219 
2 
347 
10,605 
29,273 
2 ,610  
8,770 
3 
1 2 , 1 6 1  
32,381 
29,338 
4,626 
8,658 
2 .70 
6 15.74 
9 144.61 
16 .70 
23 .78 
30 10.68 
37 91.83 
40 .12 
42 1.59 
44 18.50 
47 204.59 
64 .23 
65 3.15 
66 28.92 
70 20.61 
72 79.72 
86 2.20 
88 545.39 
90 4139.38 
93 2.40 
96 32.78 
2 69.05 
6 103.12 
9 11.32 
10 139.37 
14 15.12 
16 1.95 
18 32.99 
23 47.82 
30 71.42 
37 104.37 
40 6.40 
42 9.55 
44 13.96 
65 20.62 
68 5.95 
82 294.76 
84 327.40 
88 27040.98 
91 21775.84 
92 124.25 
93 16.24 
96 179.84 
6 103.12 
10 83.96 
12 66.72 
24 31.14 
31 71.42 
38 104.37 
40 6.39 
42 9.55 
44 13.96 
47 394.86 
48 34.41 
64 13.81 
65 20,62 
66 30.14 
70 39.08 
72 178.53 
86 1111.40 
87 85.28 
90 8887.02 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
0 
100 .02 
103 33.40 
105 355.51 
106 .24 
107 .15 
108 .04 
109 .05 
116 14.52 
117 79.32 
118 381.00 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
100 .02 
103 302.00 
105 355.51 
no 21.42 
111 82.85 
116 36.42 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 13474.96 
124 60.60 
129 302.00 
130 302.00 
136 144.61 
1 
100 .08 
102 .92 
103 18.13 
105 320.33 
106 .45  
116 36.42 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
121 299.98 
122 1743.20 
129 11.05 
130 16.74 
2 
100 4 .02 
109 13.81 
110 42.02 
111 162.57 
116 36.42 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
119 27.34 
120 60.20 
121 800.00 
122 1471.03 
139 30.14 
3 
99 85.96 
100 4 .02 
101 1 .95 
102 5 .95 
103 2 .85 
106 69.05 
107 16.69 
116 36.42 
117 164.06 
118 381.00 
124 12160.75 
129 88.79 
130 138.77 
product constraints 
2 3  4  
99 1 .83 99 138.39 99 137.30 
100 .08 100 4.02 100 4.02 
101 31.86 101 206.66 101 206.66 
102 .92  102 5.95 102 5 .95 
103 302.00 103 302.00 103 302.00 
105 320.33 106 69.05 106 68.51 
106 .91  107 47.82 107 47.45 
107 .63 108 6 .39 108 6.34 
108 .08 109 13.81 109 13.70 
109 .18  110 42.02 110 81.10 
110 42.02 111 162.57 111 341.10 
111 162.57 116 36.42 116 36.42 
116 36.42 117 164.06 117 164.06 
117 164 .06 118 381.00 118 381.00 
118 381.00 119 27.34 119 27.34 
119 27.34  120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
120 2080.00 121 800.00 121 800.00 
Initial and updated 137 91.83 
supply levels 138 18.50 
(Continued) 139 28,92 
0 
FLE 24112.92 
EIT 4194.40 
DPLIC 70.46 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 2151.05 
DPTC2 5400.00 
DILIC 20.00 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITC1 759.54 
DITC2 170.64 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0,0 
IMTG2 0.0 
' A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A : 
2 3  4  
121 800.00 122 1196.68 122 922.45 
122 1471.03 123 29338.18 123 64396.82 
123 29273.21 124 12160.75 124 22085.86 
124 347.23 129 596.76 129 596.76 
129 302.00 130 629.40 130 629.40 
130 302.00 131 4759.00 131 6658.99 
131 2759.00 132 103.12 132 103.12 
132 15.90 133 71.42 133 71.42 
133 11.01 134 9.55 134 9.55 
134 1.47 135 20.62 135 20.62 
135 3.18 136 150.69 136 150.69 
136 150.69 137 104.37 137 104.37 
137 104.37 138 13.96 138 13.96 
138 13.96 139 30.14 139 30.14 
139 30.14 
1 2 3 
26689.91 33046.36 37175.40 
6896.23 16140.21 22701.69 
343.16 13793.18 13520.49 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
4220.74 2069.69 4443.51 
0.0 21775.84 0.0 
86.48 3872.29 1744.14 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1076.05 332.18 1569.00 
0.0 688.12 0.0 
0.0 3000.87 16966.81 
60.59 347.21 0.0 
8.48 48.61 0.0 
' A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A : 
Farm 180 -  so le  proprietorship  
0 
(d/e)k_, 0.253 
EN I |^_|) 24,406.99 
NFI - (CLP/5)k_, 24,407 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets 82,680 
Working assets 11,197 
Liquid assets 25,0Al 
OCEPA ' 6,531 
OCLM 7,676 
Optimal solution (x! ,) 2 190.14 
9 19.72 
activity and level z>] 05 
23 110.87 
37 11.29 
40 30.39 
44 3.28 
47 313.64 
64 38.03 
66 3.94 
70 35.95 
72 167.19 
82 72.37 
84 88.75 
86 1060.55 
87 10.45 
88 36896.40  
90 8286.95 
1 management 
1 
0.253 
35,406.99 
35,407 
86,970 
14,453 
45,959 
8,319 
9,618 
, 1 family 
2 
0.253 
41,406.97 
41,407 
110,197 
25,684 
63,248 
10,695 
10,861 
3 
0.253 
40,406.94 
40,407 
114,307 
27,756 
110,456 
14,756 
13,967 
2 292.40 
10 20.59 
14 2.12 
23 189.85 
38 13.08 
40 34.84 
44 2.63 
47 350.24 
48 34.41 
64 58.48 
66 4.12 
71 7.52 
73 56.42 
82 152.23 
83 24.41 
84 148.77 
86 1654.63 
87 90.78 
3 301.47 
10 21.46 
14 5.70 
23 196.70 
24 12.10 
38 14.86 
40 27.92 
44 1.99 
46 336.75 
49 34.41 
64 60.29 
66 4.29 
83 29.67 
85 26.67 
86 1462.36 
87 8.67 
3 284.77 
10 21.46 
24 208.80 
38 14.86 
40 27.92 
44 1.99 
59 1306.43 
64 60.29 
66 4.29 
75 1115.93 
86 1020.78 
87 175.90 
0 1 2 3  
Optimal solution (Continued) 91 3256.26 88 45435-50 
93 140.42 91 10535.16 
92 199.62 
Primal slacks 100 3.93 99 26.49 100 9.52 99 16.82 
. , , 103 4.76 100 9.52 103 .40 100 9.52 
row and level io5 199.62 103 2.58 110 2.77 103 .40 
16.70 
71.94 
305.64 
27.34 
123 41534.17 
124 114306.62 
129 19.55 
130 22.40 
105 199.62 
112 190.50 112 190.50 1 11 10.72 106 
119 27.34 124 86970.19 112 190.50 110 
122 948.79 123 7043.23 111 
124 78579.62 124 110197.00 119 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and product constraints (b|^_|) 
row and level 0 12 3 
99 410.48 99 604.19 99 604.19 99 598.61 
100 3.93 100 9.52 100 9.52 100 9.52 
103 43.00 103 43.00 103 43.00 103 43.00 
105 199.62 106 301.47 106 301.47 106 298.69 
106 196.56 107 208.80 107 208.80 107 206.87 
107 124.81 108 27.92 108 27.92 108 27.66 
108 25.15 109 60.29 109 60.29 109 59.74 
109 39.31 110 71.94 110 71.94 110 71.94 
110 64.42 111 305.64 111 305.64 111 305.64 
111 249.22 112 190.50 112 190.50 112 1306.43 
112 190.50 119 27.34 119 27.34 119 27.34 
119 27.34 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
120 2080.00 121 800.00 121 800.00 121 800.00 
121 800.00 122 1471.03 122 1196.68 122 922.45  
122 1745.41 123 70291.12 123 151990.19 123 256446.56 
0 1 
Init ia l  and updated 
supply levels  
(Continued)  
123 45959.33 
124 86970.19  
129 390.37 
130 406.75 
131 6101.75 
136 20.59 
137 13.08 
138 2.63 
139 4 .12 
0 
FLE 38175.60 
EIT 25616.65 
DPLIC 18448.20 
DPMTG 0 .0  
DPTCl 4143.48 
DPTC2 3256.26 
DILIC 5235.60 
DIMTG 0 .0  
DITCl 1463.06 
DITC2 102.90 
CLP 0 .0  
DMTG2 4100.35 
IMTG2 574.05 
•k * * * A iV A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A Vf A 
2 3  4  
124 110197.00 
129 567.02 
130 555.52 
131 8851.75 
136 21.46 
137 14.86 
138 1 .99 
139 4.29 
124 114306.62 
129 596.68 
130 582.20 
131 10351.74 
136 21.46 
137 14.86 
138 1.99 
139 4.29 
124 98303.69 
129 596.68 
130 582.20 
131 10101.73 
136 21.46  
137 14.86 
138 1.99 
139 4.29 
1 
47624.59 
39408.73 
41165.94 
0 . 0  
4143.48 
10535.16 
8827.11 
0 . 0  
665.03 
332.91 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
2 
52778.57 
46908.70 
22717.75 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
2930.59 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
3 
51919.55 
45658.67 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
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APPENDIX G 
Results Given Linear Projected Land Values and 
Preference for Ownership 
Results Given Linear Projected Land 
Farm 070 - sole proprietorship 
0 
(d/e)^., 0.253 
iNl 16,750.00 
- (CLP/S'k-I 
Equity in productive assets: 
Fixed assets k-P 82,580. 
Working assets 9,928 
Liquid assets (b^^g |^_i " 18,506 
OCEPA ' 6,018 
OCLM 6,932 
Optimal solution (xf",) 2 113.15 
, , 14 23.74 
activity and level 23 2I 
40 17.94 
47 370.16 
64 22.63 
70 44.39 
72 130.07 
84 73.04 
86 651.72 
87 156.49 
88 43150.74 
90 7338.14 
91 1476.04 
93 99.32 
ilues and Preference for Ownership 
1 management unit, 1 family 
1 2 3 
0.403 0.253 0.253 
20,749.99 23,249.98 23,749.98 
20,749 23,250 23,750 
105,948 169,504 217,477 
11,404 11,404 11,404 
19,980 39,321 73,411 
7,390 11,857 16,496 
7,433 9,193 11,907 
1 35.98 
2 80.70 
23 74.09 
40 14.93 
47 445.57 
64 23.34 
70 15.49 
72 59.92 
86 845.25 
87 288.98 
90 3111.55 
3 122.52 
14 2.32 
23 84.86 
40 11.35 
47 398.94 
48 34.41 
58 191.57 
59 189.66 
64 24.50 
86 1016.01 
87 455.02 
88 1593.56 
92 2.32 
3 121.14 
23 84.86 
40 11.35 
47 115.27 
48 34.41 
58 743.22 
59 623.69 
64 24.50 
75 738.27 
86 695.36 
87 501.32 
0 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 2.78 
105 410.72 
112 628.65 
119 27.34 
122 1211.59 
124 77784.92 
129 16.49 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
99 243.66 
100 2.78 
105 410.72 
106 116.68 
107 74.09 
108 14.93 
109 23.34 
no 76.03 
111 294.13 
112 628.65 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 19979.89 
124 105948.00 
129 228.00 
130 221.04 
131 4187.50 
1 2 3  
99 14.25 
100 2.78 
105 410.72 
112 628.65 
119 27.34 
122 611.18 
124 105948.00 
129 18.10 
130 15.34 
100 2 .84 
105 408.41 
no 9.58 
111 9.71 
112 247.41 
124 169504.31 
129 1.54 
100 2.84 
105 408.41 
106 1.37 
110 67.84 
111 235.12 
124 217477.94 
129 4.08 
130 3.69 
product constraints 
99 243.29 
100 2.78 
105 410.72 
106 121.39 
107 84.08 
108 11.24 
109 24.28 
no 91.52 
111 354.05 
112 628.65 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1471 .03 
123 39320.61 
124 169504.31 
129 228.00 
130 221.04 
131 5187.50 
99 245.54 
100 2.84 
105 408.41 
106 122.52 
107 84.86 
108 11.35 
109 24.50 
no 91.52 
111 354.05 
112 628.65 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1196.68 
123 73411 .19 
124 217477.94 
129 228.00 
130 221.04 
131 5812.50 
4 
99 241.85 
100 2.84 
105 408.41 
106 120.67 
107 83.58 
108 11.18 
109 24.13 
no 91.52 
111 354.05 
112 1366.92 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 922.45 
123 114259.12 
124 267246.81 
129 228.00 
130 221.04 
131 5937.49 
511a 
Results Given Linear Projected Land Values and 
Preference for Leasing 
SM 2:  
A A A A 
(cl/e)|^_ 
EN I (*b 
NFI (*b 
FLE 31598.25 35034.23 37181.73 37611.22 
EIT 14270.90 19779.22 22710.32 23296.55 
DPLIC 10787.68 10787.68 11186.07 11186.07 
DPMTG 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 2500.00 
DPTCl 3669.07 5224.85 1555.78 0.0 
DPTC2 1476.04 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DILIC 7514.70 6958.05 4452.34 1648.57 
DIMTG 3650.62 2986.87 2323.12 1659.37 
DITCl 1295.55 1138.23 249.70 0.0 
DITC2 46.64 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CLP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DMTG2 425.08 0.0 0.0 0.0 
IMTG2 59.51 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 
: A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A Y; A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Results Given Linear Projected Land Values and Preference for Leasing 
Farm 090 - sole proprietorship: 1 management unit, 1 family 
0 1 2 3 
1 
0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 
12,715.99 14,647.99 16,096.98 17,545.97 
- (CLP/S'k-I 12,716 14,648 15,289 16,569 
in productive assets : 
Fixed assets ^ 
-1) 0 0 0 0 
Working assets 10,574 18,112 20,374 22,742 
Liquid assets |<-i " 24,66? 43,038 75,153 78,645 
OCEPA ' 2,291 3,975 6,209 6,590 
vn 
0 1 2 3 
OCLM 9,894 12,243 15,625 17,064 
Optimal solution (xf*,) 10 291.57 7 9.52 7 9.62 7 9.62 
K~ 1 
37 135.28 10 299.88 10 312.48 10 312.48 
activity and level 38 37.31 16 .43 16 .18 16 .18 
44 45.01 30 6.46 30 6.66 30 6.66 
55 371.95 37 90.45 38 216.42 37 30.70 
56 34.41 38 99.97 42 .89 38 185.72 
66 58.31 43 .96 44 11.42 42 .89 
79 36.81 45 38.37 45 17.51 44 28.94 
80 158.83 54 295.51 54 357.62 63 1282.80 
82 189.82 55 62.25 57 34.41 65 1.92 
84 183.17 56 34.41 65 1.92 66 62.50 
86 1821.90 65 1.90 66 62.50 81 520.80 
87 197.90 66 59.98 83 35.29 86 1038.44 
91 7538.18 83 41.29 85 29.15 87 158.25 
97 392.20 85 36.88 86 1414.29 
86 1636,26 87 56.74 
87 109.15 
96 19.84 
Primal slacks 103 58.76 102 .56 102 .56 102 .56 
104 10.98 103 37.60 103 5.91 103 3.30 
row and level 105 19.84 104 10.98 104 10.98 104 10.98 
118 762.00 116 2.91 116 2.94 116 76.40 
117 11.27 117 11.39 117 322.89 
118 762.00 118 762.00 119 27.34 
123 30603.05 123 55394.04 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and product constraints "=k-i' 
row and level 0 1 2 3 4 
103 626.24 101 19.28 101 19.28 101 19.28 
104 10.98 102 .56 102 .56 102 .56 
0 1 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 
(Cont i nued) 
105 19.84 
116 76.40 
117 322.89 
118 762.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
123 43038.46 
129 515.82 
130 509.17 
131 3179.00 
136 299.88 
137 190.42 
138 38.37 
139 59.98 
0 
FLE 28133.04 
EIT 9299.00 
DPLIC 0.0 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 0.0 
DPTC2 7538.18 
DILIC 0.0 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 0.0 
2 
103 626.24 
104 10.98 
116 76.40 
117 322.89 
118 762.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1471.03 
123 75153.50 
129 557.11 
130 546.05 
131 3662.00 
132 9.62 
133 6.66 
134 .89 
135 1.92 
136 312.48 
137 216.42 
138 28.94 
139 62.50 
3 
103 626.24 
104 10.98 
116 76.40 
117 322.89 
118 762.00 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1196.68 
123 109248.81 
129 592.40 
130 575.20 
131 4024.24 
132 9.62 
133 6.66 
134 .89 
135 1.92 
136 312.48 
137 216.42 
138 28.94 
139 62.50 
4 
103 623.64 
104 10.98 
116 76.40 
117 322.89 
118 1282.80 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 922.45 
123 146581.75 
129 592.40 
130 575.20 
131 4386.49 
132 9.62 
133 6.66 
134 .89 
135 1.92 
136 311.18 
137 215.52 
138 28.82 
139 62.24 
1 
29792.62 
11332.23 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
2 
30343.38 
12006.99 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
3 
31443.05 
14070.55 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 1 2 3 
DITC2 
CLP 
DMTG2 
IMTG2 
A A * A A A A 
238 .21  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0.0  4039.09 4883.21 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
A îV îV îV "k îV * îV * îV îV îV * îV îV * >V 5V * * 
Ui 
4=-
515 
APPENDIX H 
Results Given Linear Projected Land Val 
and Weighted Family Assistance 
Results Given Linear Projected Land Values and Weighted Family Assistance 
Farm 050 - sole proprietorship: 1 management unit, 1 family 
0 1 2 3 
(d/e)k-| 0.253 0.255 0.253 0.253 
«"".si.k- l '  9,683.20 13,187.20 16,691.19 18,267.98 
9,683 13,187 16,691 18,268 
Equity in productive assets: 
400 1,025 Fixed assets ^-l) 0 952 
Working assets 4,804 4,804 4,804 23,936 
Liquid assets • svk-,) 14,058 19,890 32,712 50,560 
OCEPA 1,226 1,625 2,487 4,900 
OCLM 6,019 6,754 12,588 15,255 
Optimal solution (x** ) 9 92.21 9 20.25 3 .07 3 .07 
k-1 35 40.34 10 76.00 10 292.99 10 320.50 
activity and level 
37 12.43 38 61.12 23 .05 23 .05 
40 .14 40 .05 37 221.98 37 42.16 
44 15.35 44 12.32 41 .01 38 179.82 
47 388.16 47 550.44 47 377.57 40 .01 
66 18.44 48 4.80 48 34.41 44 29.68 
70 79.73 64 .10 64 .01 46 328.35 
72 308.43 66 19.25 66 64.10 47 27.52 
86 585.70 70 33.33 82 178.35 48 34.41 
87 203.00 72 132.76 83 107.81 64 .01 
88 931.60 86 1195.30 84 254.11 66 64.10 
90 16015.48 87 550.11 86 1368.31 83 42.35 
92 2.14 88 481.41 87 102.72 85 57.19 
90 6840.11 91 15135.97 86 1195.78 
93 .86 97 454.04 87 .91 
Primal slacks 
row and level 
100 .06 
103 22.23 
105 454.90 
106 .98 
107 .59 
109 .20 
116 26.37 
117 164.06 
118 533.40 
119 27.34 
122 1231.10 
129 99.06 
130 100.53 
Initial and updated supply levels of resource and 
row and level 0 1 
99 .14 
100 .06 
103 201.00 
105 454.90 
106 .07  
107 .04  
108 .01  
109 .01 
110 79.73 
111 308.43 
116 26.37 
117 164.06 
118 533.40 
119 27.34 
120 2080.00 
121 800.00 
122 1745.41 
1 
100 .08 
103 12.07 
105 454.04 
106 .48 
107 .32 
116 26.37 
117 164.06 
118 533.40 
119 23.53 
124 347.09 
129 87.78 
130 91 .27 
2 
100 .08 
103 63.25 
104 12.71 
110 35.51 
111 113.82 
116 26.37 
117 164.06 
118 533.40 
124 952.10 
136 27.51 
138 29.68 
3 
100 .08 
103 - 6.06 
104 12.71 
110 39.96 
111 131.07 
116 26.37 
117 164.06 
118 533.40 
124 1025.82 
product constraints (b^_j) 
2 3 4  
99 .15 99 .15 99 .15 
100 .08 100 .08 100 .08 
103 201.00 103 642.33 103 642.33 
105 454.04 104 12.71 104 12.71 
106 .07  106 .07 106 .07 
107 .05  107 .05  107 .05 
108 .01 108 .01 108 .01 
109 .01  109 .01  109 .01  
110 113.06 110 113.06 110 113.06 
111 441.19 111 441.19 111 441.19 
116 26.37 116 26.37 116 26.37 
117 164.06 117 164.06 117 164.06 
118 533.40 118 533.40 118 533.40 
119 27.34 119 27.34 119 27.34 
120 2080.00 120 2080.00 120 2080.00 
121 800.00 121 800.00 121 800.00 
122 1471 .03 122 1196.68 122 922.45  
0 1 
Initial and updated 
supply levels 123 (14058) 123 19889.79 
(Continued) 124 400.59 
129 261.00 
130 261.00 
131 2420.80 
136 96.25 
1 3 7  6 1 . 1 2  
138 12.32 
139 19.25 
0 
SM 2: FLE 25527-86 
EIT 5623.07 
DPLIC 465.80 
DPMTG 0.0 
DPTCl 8007.74 
DPTC2 0.0 
DILIC 132.19 
DIMTG 0.0 
DITCl 2827.53 
DITC2 0.0 
CLP 0.0 
DMTG2 0.0 
IMTG2 0.0 
* * A A * A A * A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
2 3  4  
123 32712.65 123 50560.03 123 93043.56 
124 952.10 124 1025.82 124 1610.20 
129 261.00 129 547.16 129 589.51 
130 261.00 130 515.11 130 572.30 
131 3296.80 131 4172.80 131 4566.99 
136 100.29 136 320.50 136 320.50 
137 69.46 137 221.98 137 221.98 
138 9.29 138 29.68 138 29.68 
139 20.06 139 64.10 139 64.10 
1 2 3 
28537.80 31547.72 32902.19 
9794.88 14205.68 15954.10 
706.51 240.71 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
11427.79 3420.05 0.0 
0.0 15135.97 0.0 
128.40 31.05 2244.28 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
2492.86 548.92 0.0 
0.0 478.30 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
53.46 0.0 0.0 
7.48 0.0 0.0 
A A A Vt A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
